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ABSTRACT. 
I n t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n I t r a c e t h e f a t e o f a t r a d i t i o n a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem, ' t h e problem o f knowledge' m th e w r i t -
i n g s o f Hegel and Marx. My aim has been t o r e f u t e t h e t h e s i s 
t h a t t h e i r u l t i m a t e r e j e c t i o n o f t h e problem was w i t h o u t a 
p o s i t i v e outcome and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , the t h e s i s o f Habermas 
t h a t m r e j e c t i n g t h e problem t h e y , m e f f e c t , negated t h e 
achievements o f p r e v i o u s e p i s t e m c l o g y . 
My aim has n o t been t o deny t h a t Heg^l and Marx t r a n s f o r m 
t h e problem o f knowledge :n t h e i r w r i t i n g s . Rather, I have 
a t t e m p t e d t o b r i n g out t h e p o s i t i v e a s p e c t s o f t h e i r c r i t i c i s m 
o f p r e v i o u s e p i s t e r n o l o g y . The theme o f t n e i r c r i t i c i s m i s 
t h a t p r e v i o u s t h e o r i e s o f knowledge had g i v e n an i n a d e q u a t e 
account o f e x p e r i e n c e . I n i t s p l a c e t h e y o f f e r what I b e l i e v e 
t o be new and i m p o r t a n t accounts o f e x p e r i e n c e . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , Hegel and Marx's c r i t i c i s m s o f p r e v i o u s e p i s t e n -
o l o g y are f a r from b e i n g i d e n t i c a l . Hegel, on t h e one hand, 
d i r e c t s h i s c r i t i c i s m s a t t h e s c e p t i c a l a t t i t u d e o f h i s f o r e r u n n e r 
He i s f o r t h i s reason p a r t i c u l a r l y b l u n t w i t h t h e E m p i r i c i s t 
p h i l o s o p h e r s . Marx, on t h e o t h e r hand, concerns h i m s e l f more w i t h 
the a b s t r a c t n e s s o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach i n g e n e r a l . I n 
h i s view p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f i s che o b s t a c l e t o a c o r r e c t n o t i o n 
o f e x p e r i e n c e . Bi.it what Marx means by p h i l o s o p h y i s German 
I d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y and, m p a r t i c u l a r , , t h a t o f Hegel. I t i s 
f u r t h e r my t r e s e s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s m t h e manner 
i n which Mar:: and Kegel e a r v y out t h e i r c r i t i c i s m o f t r a d i t i o n a l 
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PREFACE 
I have o u t l i n e d t h e n a m argument m t h e f i r s t Chapter, 
There I s l i t t l e need, t h e r e f o r e , f o r ine t o e l a b o r a t e on i t 
h e r e . However, I s h o u l d l i k e t o make a few b r i e f remarks 
about t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e work and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
about t h e approach t h a t I t a k e t o Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y . 
T h i s s t u d y b r o a d l y f a i l s i n t o t h r e e p a r t s . I n t h e two 
opening c h a p t e r s I d i s c u s s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l background t o 
Hegel's system. T h i s I c a l l his C r i t i q u e o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y 
I n t h e f o l l o w i n g two c h a p t e r s I dea] w i t h Hegel's concept o f 
E x p e r i e n c e . For these two c h a p t e r s I draw on t h e Phenomenolog 
o f Mind. I n t h e f i n a l t h r e e c h a p t e r s I d e a l w i t h t h e d e v e l o p -
ment o f Marx's concept o f E x p e r i e n c e . I c o n c e n t r a t e on h i s 
e a r l i e r works because i t i s t h e r e t h a t he works out h i s g e n e r a l 
t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
I n t h e opening c h a p t e r s o f t h i s s t u d y 1 have adopted 
an approach t o Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y w h i c n i s , m my view, a 
most f r u i t f u l one. I n g e n e r a l , Hegel's system has e i t h e r 
been approached d i r e c t l y , t h a t i s , t h r o u g h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f one o r many o f h i s m ajor works, o r i n d i r e c t l y , t h r o u g h an 
account o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l and l i t e r a r y works o f h i s immed-
i a t e c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . I t i s o f course i n t h i s l a t t e r c o n t e x t 
t h a t the s t u d y o f h i s e a r l y works has become i m p o r t a n t . But 
b o t h these approaches, I b e l i e v e , run t h e r i s k o f l e a v i n g us 
w i t h o u t a secure f o o t h o l d ±n t h e H e g e l i a n system. The f i r s t 
does so s i m p l y because i t i s , pemaps, t o o d i r e c t . Hegel's 
11. 
p h i l o s o p h y i s n o t o r i o u s l y obscure; so t h e r e : s f o r t h e 
e x p l a n a t i o n which i s couched m terms o f t h e system i t s e l f 
t h e e v e r - p r e s e n t danger thac i t i t s e l f may be as obscure as 
t h e system. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e second approach, t h r o u g h 
contemporary l i t e r a t u r e and p h i l o s o p h y , may have t o be p i t c h e d 
a t such a g e n e r a l l e v e l t h a t we p r o h i b i t o u r s e l v e s f r o m 
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e c e n t r a l t e n e t s o f t h e system. 
The approach t h a t I have adopted a v o i d s , >n my view, these 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . By i n t r o d u c i n g Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y t h r o u g n an 
assessment o f h i s views on the major Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s we 
g e t t o the h e a r t o f h i s system, b u t i n a manner w h i c h does 
n o t always r e q u i r e us t o d e a l w i t h t h e system m i t s own, 
opaque, te r m s . On t h e one hand t h i s approach w i l l s a t i s f y 
t h e demand o f t h e s t u d e n t , t h a t he be i n t r o d u c e d t o Hegel's 
m a j o r d o c t r i n e s by an a n a l y s i s o f l e s s complex i d e a s (and 
who can doubt t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f D e s c a r t e s and Locke, 
f o r i n s t a n c e , are l e s s d i f f i c u l t ) , and. on t h e o t h e r , i t 
w i l l s a t i s f y t h e demand o f t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r t h a t 
Hegel's i d e a s be f i r s t t e s t e d a g a i n s t tnose o f o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s . 
I have used t h e T h e o r i e VJerkausgabe e d i t i o n o f Hegel's 
Werke p u b l i s h e d by t h e Suhrkamp V e r l a g , and f o r Marx's w r i t i n g s 
I have used t h e D i e t z V e r l a g e d i t i o n o f t h e Marx-Engels Werke. 
A l l t r a n s l a t i o n s from t h e German are my own. 
I am g r a t e f u l t o Henry Tudor f o r h i s h e l p and encourage-
ment i n w r i t i n g t h i s work. T h i s , a l s o , i s t h e p l a c e t o 
thank t h e S o c i a l Science Research C o u n c i l f o r f i n a n c i n g my 
I l l 
s t u d i e s o v e r t h e past t h r e e y e a r s , and t h e 'Deutscher 
Akademischer A u s t a u s c h d i e n s t ' lor the s c h o l a r s h i p which 
a l l o w e d me t o s t u d y a t H e i d e l b e r g U n i v e r s i t y l a s t summer. 
Durham, October, 19? 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
Epi s t e m o l o g y and Expe r i e n c e 
Marx and Hegel are most r e a d i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e i r 
f o r e r u n n e r s i n p h i l o s o p h y by t h e i r r e j e c t i o n o f what Ayer would 
c a l l 'The Problem o f Knowledge'. T h i s r e j e c t i o n e n t a i l e d t h a t 
t h e y , u n l i k e o t h e r modern p h i l o s o p h e r s , were pr e p a r e d t o f o r g o 
a s e a r c h f o r an a b s o l u t e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h . As Haberrnas t e l l s 
u s / t h i s was, u n t i l t h e n , a ma j o r p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f Modern 
P h i l o s o p h y . D e s c a r t e s , Locke and Hume, f o r i n s t a n c e appear t o 
c o n c e n t r a t e e n t i r e l y on t h e problem. C r i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y 
r e c e i v e s i t s name, we are t o assume, from t h e c r i t i c i s m o f t h e 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l premisses o f p r e v i o u s metaphysics. Moreover, 
i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e problem does n o t recede i n t o t h e background 
i n t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f t h e ,^reat s y s t e m - b u i l d e r s , Spinoza and 
L e i b n i z . To t h e a d m i r e r s o f t h a t t r a d i t i o n , amongst v/nom 
Habermas i s t o be counted, Marx and Hegel's abandonment o f 
'The Problem o f Knowledge' m t h e i r e n q u i r i e s r e p r e s e n t s a sad 
l o s s t o p h i l o s o p h y . They assume t h a t p h i l o s o p h y i s t h e p o o r e r 
' I f i t was r e q u i r e d t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
d i s c u s s i o n on the modern p e r i o d m t h e form o f a j u d i c i a l 
h e a r i n g i t would be c a l l e d t o d e c i d e t h e one q u e s t i o n : how i s 
dependable ( z u v e r l a s s i g e ) knowledge p o s s i b l e ' . J i i r g e n Habermas 
E r k e n n t n i s und I n t e r e s s e , Suhrkamp V e r l a g , F r a n k f u r t am Mam, 
1958, p. 11. 
I n s a y i n g t h : s Habermas p r o b a b l y has i n mind t he monumental 
work o f E r n s t C a s s i r e r : Das E r k e n n t n i s p r o b l e m m d e r P h i l o s o p h i e 
und W i s s e n s c h a f t d e r neueren Z e i t which i s an a t t e m p t , j.n 
s e v e r a l volumes, t o t r a c e t h e development o f t h e problem o f 
knowledge m Modern P h i l o s o p h y . The volumes f i r s t appeared 
i n V e r l a g Brune C a s s i r e r , B e r l i n . 
f o r n o t knowing a p r i o r i t h e n a t u r e o f knowledge. The s p e c i f i c 
c r i t i c i s m s " o f Habermas i s t h a t owing t o Marx and Hegel p h i l o s o p h y 
2 
no l o n g e r has a s e r i o u s grasp o f s c i e n c e . I n h i s view, t h e 
l a s t person t o achieve such an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s c i e n c e was Kant. 
I t i s because t h e y n e g l e c t e d t h i s achievement o f Kant's Habermas 
believes t h a t Marx and Hegel squandered t h e g a i n s o f c l a s s i c a l 
e p i s t e r n o l o g y . Marx i n p a r t i c u l a r , r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g t h e m h e r i t o 
o f c l a s s i c a l German p h i l o s o p h y , 'had completed the d e m o l i t i o n 
(Abbau) o f epD stemology ' . ~-* 
I do n o t i n t e n d t o deny t h a t Marx and Hegel i n t h e i r works 
t r a n s f o r m c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g y . What I w i s h t o deny, however, 
^ i s t h a t t h i s was merely a work o f ' d e m o l i t i o n ' . The c l a i m t h a t 
our knowledge s u f f e r e d a g r e a t l o s s t h r o u g h the abandonment o f 
t h e 'Problem o f Knowledge ' su g g e s t s , I b e l i e v e , an i g n o r a n c e o f 
t h e grounds on w h i c h Marx and Hegel abandoned t h e problem;and 
t n e r e i s t h e added i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t no such grounds e x i s t . But* 
on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e y d o , s i n c e Marx and Hegel do not p r e f u n c t o r i l y 
abandon t h e quest f o r c e r t a i n t y i n knowledge. The quest i s 
g i v e n up o n l y as a r e s u l t o f a c r i t i c a l e n q u i r y i n t o t h e whole 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s u r r o u n d i n g t h e problem. C o n t r a r y t o 
what Habermas i m p l i e s , sentence i s n o t passed w i t h o u t t r i a l . 
2. J.Habermas. op. c i t p . 12. 
3- J.Habermas. o p . c i t . , p . 14. He d i d so, Habermas argues, 
because 'he had m i s u n d e r s t o o d h i s own concept', ( i b i d ) T h i s 
i s a s t r a n g e argument. I t seems t o me t h a t t h e r e was no-one 
more e m i n e n t l y w e l l p l a c e d t o u n d e r s t a n d h i s own concepts 
t h a n Marx. 
3. 
Hegel d e a l s a t l e n g t h w i t h the t h e o r i e s o f knowledge o f h i s 
p r e d e c e s s o r s . Marx a l s o does n o t c u r s o r i l y r e j e c t t h e q u e s t i o n . 
As i s t h e case w i t h Hegel h i s r e j e c t i o n o f t h e 'Problem o f Know-
l e d g e 1 : t h e c r i t i c i s m o f t h e s e a r c h f o r c e r t a i n t y m t h e know-
le d g e o f o u r knowledge, i s a l e a d i n g m o t i v e i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
o f h i s Weltanschauung. I t i s my b e l i e f t h a t t h e s t u d y o f t h e 
grounds o f t h a t m u t u a l c r i t i c i s m o f Marx and Hegel w i l l n o t o n l y 
show Habermas' assessment o f t h e impact o f i t s r e s u l t s t o be 
f a l s e b u t w i l l a l s o p r o v i d e s i g n i f i c a n t c o n c l u s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g 
E r k e n n t n i s and I n t e r e s s e o r what I have chosen t o c a l l Epi s t c m o i o g y 
/ and E x p e r i ence. 
My t h e s i s i s , then, t h a t t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h a t c l a s s i c a l 
e p i s t e m o l o g y undergoes i n t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f Marx and Hegel i s 
n o t o n l y a work o f d e m o l i t i o n b u t a l s o one of c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n must c l e a r l y f o l l o w t h e l i n e s o f t h e i r 
c r i t i c i s m . The theme o f t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t p r e v i o u s 
e p i s t e r n o l o g i e s had g i v e n an i n a d e q u a t e account o f e x p e r i e n c e . 
T h e i r t a s k , t h e n , i s t o c o n s t r u c t a more adequate account o f 
e x p e r i e n c e w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f e p i s t e m o l o g y . S i m i l a r 
i n t e n t i o n s do n o t , however, i m p l y s i m i l a r achievements. So 
t h a t i t i s f u r t h e r my t h e s i s t h a t t h e r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s m 
th e manner i n w h i c h t h i s t a s k i s c a r r i e d o u t by b o t h Hegel and 
Marx c o n s t i t u t e s t h e end o f German C l a s s i c a l P h i l o s o p h y . Marx 
i n f o r m e d by d i f f e r e n t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s s e t s about t h e t a s k i n a 
manner a l i e n t o Hegel and i t i s t h a t w h i c h t r a n s f o r m s p h i l o s o p h y 
i n t o ( t o borrow a phrase o f Marcuse's) s o c i a l t h e o r y . 
I t i s l o g i c a l t o b e g i n t h e account o f t h i s whole p r o c e s s , f r o n 
4. 
Hegel t o Marx, w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f Hegel's o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e 
e p i s t e n r o l o g i e s o f t h e p r i n c i p a l Modern p h i l o s o p h e r s . Our mam 
source must be t h e L e c t u r e s on t n e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y . T h i s 
can be supplemented from t i m e t o t i m e by Hegel's major p u b l i s h e d 
works, The Phenomenology o f Mind, The Science o f L o g i c , and 
The E n c y c l o p e d i a , m o r d e r t h a t we may f u r t h e r s u p p o r t o u r 
c o n c l u s i o n s . For reasons t h a t w i l l become more e v i d e n t i n 
t h e t h e s i s i t s e l f an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f 
Modern P h i l o s o p h y w i l l p l a c e us m an e x c e l l e n t p o s i t i o n t o 
i n t e r p r e t t h e Phenomenology o f Mind. That work r e p r e s e n t s 
Hegel's most developed t h e o r y o f knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e ; 
and i t i s a t h e o r y o f knowledge and e x p e r i e n c e b u i l t on a 
p r o f o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Modern p h i l o s o p h y . 
The C r i t i q u e o f D e s c a r t e s , Spinoza and L e i b n i z 
I s h a l l a n a l y s e HegeJ 's c r i t i q u e o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y m 
t h r e e s t a g e s . T h i s f i r s t s t a g e , as i s e v i d e n t , w i l l d e a l w i t h 
Hegel's o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f D e s c a r t e s , Spinoza and 
L e i b n i z ; t h e second w i l l d e a l w i t h Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f E m p i r i c i s t 
p h i l o s o p h y , i . e . t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f Locke and Hume; f i n a l l y I 
s h a l l devote a c h a p t e r t o h i s c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s -
o p h ies o f h i s f e l l o w German I d e a l i s t s , Kant, F i c h t e and SchelDing. 
The a t t e m p t t o analy s e Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f t h e t h e o r i e s o f 
knowledge o f D e s c a r t e s , Spinoza and L e i b n i z c o n j o i n t l y p r o b a b l y 
r e q u i r e s some e x p l a n a t i o n . I n advance o f t h e f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n 
w h i c h can o n l y come i n t h e a n a l y s i s i t s e l f , I might say t h i s . 
For o ur purposes these t h r e e p h i l o s o p h i e s form one d i s t i n c t s e c t i o r 
because o f t h e manner i n wh i c h t h e y seek t o i n t e g r a t e t h e o l o g y 
w i t h t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge. The p h i l o s o p h i e s I i n t e n d t o 
c o n s i d e r i n t h e o t h e r two s e c t i o n s do n o t aim a t such an i n t e g r a -
t i o n . I n one way o r a n o t h e r , D e s c a r t e s , Spinoza and L e i b n i z , a l l 
r e g a r d God as t h e a b s o l u t e ground o f knowledge. I n c o n t r a s t , 
God f i g u r e s markedly l i t t l e m t h e t h e o r i e s o f knowledge o f Locke 
and Hume. The concept does a d m i t t e d l y g a m g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e 
i n t h e t h i r d o f our s e c t i o n s , f i r s t l y w i t h Kant and F i c h t e b u t 
as an o b j e c t o f b e l i e f , n o t o f knowledge and se c o n d l y , w i t h 
S c h e l l i n g and Hegel h i m s e l f , b u t n o t a g a i n as an o b j e c t o f 
c e r t a i n knowledge b u t as a concept a l o n e . I t i s t r u e t h a t as 
a concept alone God does r e t a i n a p r i m a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e 
p h i l o s o p h i e s o f S c h e l l m g and Hegel b u t I s h a l l argue t h a t t h i s 
i s m a sense such t h a t t h e break w i t h t h e o l o g y i s a b s o l u t e . 
Nobody can o r i s supposed t o b e l i e v e i n t h e God o f t h e 
p h i l o s o p h i e s o f S c h e l l m g and Hegel nor, on t h e o t h e r hand , 
do t h e y r e g a r d Him as the a b s o l u t e ground o f a l l knowledge. 
L e t us now make a b e g i n n i n g w i t h Hegel's d i s c u s s i o n s o f 
D e s c a r t e s . I have suggested, c o n c e r n i n g D e s c a r t e s , t h a t f o r 
him God i s the a b s o l u t e ground o f a l l knowledge. T h i s appears 
t o c o n t r a d i c t t h e i n i t i a l , h i s t o r i c a l p o i n t t h a t Hegel b r i n g s 
up i n the d i s c u s s i o n . There he applauds D e s c a r t e s f o r t h e 
' s u b j e c t i v i t y ' o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y i s embodied 
f o r Hegel m t h e famous p r i n c i p l e o f De s c a r t e s cogoato ergo sum. 
Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e D e s c a r t e s s e t a s i d e 
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f o r e v e r t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e Church m p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t t e r s . 
I n h i s view, t h e whole o f p h i l o s o p h y p r i o r t o D e s c a r t e s had been 
v i t i a t e d by t h e c o n s t a n t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f something as b e i n g 
t r u e . T h e r e f o r e t h e m e r i t o f D e s c a r t e s , he says, i s t o i n s i s t 
chat we s h o u l d h o l d n o t h i n g t o be t r u e which does n o t possess 
an i n w a r d evidence m our t h o u g h t . At l e a s t , t h i s i s how Hegel 
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e cognuto, I t h i n k t h e r e f o r e I am. He t a k e s i t 
t o mean t h a t a l l c e r t a i n t y i n our knowledge i s t o be d e r i v e d 
from t h e I t h i n k o r t h e I . I t i s t h e same p r i n c i p l e , he adds, 
t h a t reappears i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s contemporary F i c h t e . 
But i t i s t h e h i s t o r i c a l j u n c t u r e t h a t i s s i g n i f i c a n t w i t h 
D e s c a r t e s : 'Thus p h i l o s o p h y r e g a i n e d i t s own ground m t h a t 
4. G.W.F.Hegel. Werke 20 Vo r l e s u n g e n uber d i e G eschichte d e r 
P h i l o s o p h i e I I I . Suhrkamp V e r i a g , F r a n K f u r t am Mam, 1971J 
p. 126. 
7. 
t h o u g h t b e g i n s f r o m t h o u g h t as something w h i c h i s c e r t a i n i n 
i t s e l f , n o t f r o m something e x t e r n a l , s o mething g i v e n ; n o t 
f r o m a u t h o r i t y , b u t s i m p l y f r o m t h i s freedom w h i c h i s c o n t a i n e d 
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i n t h e I t h i n k . 1 I f t h o u g h t b e g i n s f r o m t h e c e r t a i n t y o f t h e 
I t h i n k t h e n i t appears t h a t an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l dependence on 
God i s an i m p r o b a b i l i t y i n Descartes' p h i l o s o p h y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , 
D e s c a r t e s comes t o r e l y on t h e p o s t u l a t e o f God t o g i v e c e r t a i n t ; 
t o o u r knowledge,^* and i t i s t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h i s development 
i n D e s c a r t e s ' p h i l o s o p h y t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e o f 
h i s e p i s t e m o l o g y . 
I t i s f r o m t h e cogp-ito ergo sum - t h e c o r n e r - s t o n e : o f 
p h i l o s o p h y - t h a t D e s c a r t e s d e r i v e s t h e s u b j e c t i v e c e r t a i n t y 
o f knowledge. No m a t t e r how" s c e p t i c a l I am, he says, I cannot 
deny t h a t I t h i n k . Now, i t i s t h e c e r t a i n t y o f t h i s knowledge 
t h a t s u p p l i e s t h e c e r t a i n t y as a model t o a l l o u r o t h e r know-
l e d g e . We have i n t h e c o g n i t o , D e s c a r t e s b e l i e v e s , one p r o p -
o s i t i o n t h a t we know t o be t r u e . I n o r d e r t h a t we may o b t a i n 
a c r i t e r i o n f o r c e r t a i n t y i n a l l o u r o t h e r knowledge a l l we 
have t o do i s t o examine t h e grounds o f c e r t a i n t y i n t h a t 
o r i g i n a l case. What he c o n c l u d e s on e x a m i n i n g t h e c o g n i t o m 
t h i s way i s w e l l * k n o w n : . 'Observing t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g m t h 
p r o p o s i t i o n I t h i n k t h e r e f o r e I am, t o assure me t h a t I am 
5- I b i d . p.135. 
6. R.Descartes. Medj t a t i o n s , Penguin C l a s s i c s : D e s c a r t e s . 
D i s c o u r s e on MethodTT96Q, n." 160. Here he argues t h a t " w e 
know o u r i d e a s emanate f r o m m a t e r i a l t h i n g s hecause God 
does n o t d e c e i v e i n making us t h i n k t h i s . See below p. 9-
8. 
s p e a k i n g t h e t r u t h , e x c e p t t h a t I see v e r y c l e a r l y and 
d i s t i n c t l y t h a t , i n o r d e r t o t h i n k , cne must e x i s t , I 
concluded t h a t I c o u l d t a k e as a g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t t h e t h i n g s 
t h a t we c o n c e i v e v e r y c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y a re a l l o f them 
t r u e , b u t t h a t t h e r e i s some d i f f i c u l t y m t h e p r o p e r d i s c e r n -
y 
ment o f d i s t i n c t p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n o t h e r words, a l l t h a t 
i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e c e r t a i n t y o f o u r knowledge i s t h e p e r s o n a l 
assurance t h a t i n i t t h i n g s are co n c e i v e d 'very c l e a r l y and 
d i s t i n c t l y ' . I d e a s a r e t r u e because we c o n c e i v e them c l e a r l y 
and d i s t i n c t l y o r , s i m p l y , because we know them t o be t r u e . 
There need be no e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e . And h e r e l i e s D e s c a r t e s 
d i f f i c u l t y . H i s aim i s t o e s t a b l i s h a m a t h e m a t i c a l c e r t a m t j 
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i n t h e r e a l m o f p h i l o s o p h y , b u t i t i s Hegel's b e l i e f t h a i 
t h i s aim can o n l y be pursued a t t h e c o s t o f the n e g l e c t o f t h e 
c o n t e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y . P h i l o s o p h y , i n h i s o p i n i o n , has t o 
conc e r n i t s e l f w i t h knowledge as a whole and n o t w i t h a moment 
o f i t , such as c e r t a i n t y . The aim o f p h i l o s o p h y , he b e l i e v e s , 
i s n o t s i m p l y t o a t t a i n a c e r t a i n t y f o r our knowledge b u t t o 
g a i n a mastery f o r t h o u g h t over t h e whole o f o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . 
What i s more, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e one aspe c t o f p h i l o s o p h y , 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a c e r t a i n t y f o r o u r i d e a s , has i t s own i n h e r e n t 
7. R.Descartes. D i s c o u r s e on Method, Penguin C l a s s i c s , p. 62. 
8. A . W o l l a s t o n . I n t r o d u c t i o n t o D e s c a r t e s ( o p . c i t ) Penguin 
C l a s s i c s . He says: 'The aim o f De~scartes . . tfas . . t o compos 
p h i l o s o p h y m t h e l i k e n e s s o f mathematics, t o e x h i b i t a l l 
v a r i e t i e s o f knowledge as t h e consequence of a s e t o f 
u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e s o f f i n a l s i m p l i c i t y w h i c h would be 
u n i v e r s a l l y a ccepted l i k e m a t h e m a t i c a l axioms. 1 p.8. 
d e f e c t , and t h i s d e f e c t , he argues, becomes apparent when 
D e s c a r t e s t u r n s h i s a t t e n t i o n t o a c q u i r i n g a c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t 
f o r o ur i d e a s . Hegel bases h i s argument on t h i s q u o t a t i o n 
from D e s c a r t e s ' P r i n c i p l e s o f P h i l o s o p h y : ' The consciousness 
w h i c h s o l e l y knows i t s e l f t o be c e r t a i n seeks now, however, 
t o e x t e n d i t s knowledge and f i n d s t h a t i t has c o n c e p t i o n s o f many 
t h i n g s m which c o n c e p t i o n s i t does n o t d e c e i v e i t s e l f so l o n g 
as i t does n o t a s s e r t o r deny t h a t something s i m i l a r o u t s i d e 
, Q 
corresponds t o them.. The consequence o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g on 
c e r t a i n t y alone i s t h a t a c l e f t i s i n t r o d u c e d between o u r 
c o n c e p t i o n s and t h i n g s o u t s i d e our consciousness, s i n c e i t i s 
o n l y t h o u g h t t h a t i s e s t a b l i s h e d t o be c e r t a i n m i t s e l f . The 
p o s s i b i l i t y now e x i s t s t h a t we can have c l e a r and d i s t i n c t i d e a s 
w h i c h may be regarded as t r u e as l o n g as t h e y are n o t p r e d i c a t e d 
o f o b j e c t s . D e s c a r t e s t h e r e f o r e f i n d s h i m s e l f i n t h e p o s i t i o n 
o f b e i n g a b l e t o a s s e r t t h a t t h e mind does n o t d e c e i v e i t s e l f 
i n i t s i d e a s b u t a l s o o f h a v i n g t o a s s e r t t h a t t he mind w i l l 
i m m e d i a t e l y l a y i t s e l f open t o d e c e p t i o n as soon as i t seeks 
t o a p p l y those i d e a s t o t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . 
I t i s t o guard a g a i n s t t h i s t h r e a t o f d e c e p t i o n , t o 
overcome t h e dichotomy e s t a b l i s h e d between o u r c o n c e p t i o n s 
and t h i n g s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s t h a t D e s c a r t e s i n v o k e s God. 
'But God', he c l a i m s , 'does n o t d e c e i v e , and so i t i s m a n i f e s t 
t h a t he does n o t send me these ideas d i r e c t l y o r t h r o u g h some 
c r e a t u r e m whom t h e i r r e a l i t y i s o n l y v i r t u a l l y c o n t a i n e d . 
9. G.W.F.Hegel. Suhrkamp Werke 20,p. 1^6. 
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For He has given me no means of knowing th a t t h i s i s so, but 
on the c o n t r a r y , a great propensity to b e l i e v e t h a t these ideas 
emanate from m a t e r i a l t h i n g s , and i t would be d i f f i c u l t not t o 
1 
t h i n k t h a t He had deceived us i f they came from any other source 
Our ideas t h e r e f o r e , emanate from m a t e r i a l t h i n g s ' because 'God 
does not deceiveJ conversely, m a t e r i a l t h i n g s e x i s t because 
t h e i r ideas as being such t h i n g s are u l t i m a t e l y derived from 
God. I n both cases the dichotomy between conceptions and 
t h i n g s outside ourselves i s evaded only by the assurance t h a t 
'God does not deceive'. But even t h i s , Hegel claims, i s not 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r the dichotomy to be f u l l y overcome. I n Hegel's 
view t h a t would only be the case when, as I have i n d i c a t e d , 
thought gams a mastery over the whole of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . 
I t i s only when we know e v e r y t h i n g t h a t the d i v i s i o n o f thought 
and r e a l i t y i s surmounted. There s t i l l enters an impediment 
t o t h i s i n Descartes' philosophy although 'God do?s not deceive' 
That i s because those m a t e r i a l t h i n g s are p r i i r n r i l y known to 
us through our senses and what we perceive through our senses, 
according t o Descartes, ' i s notably obscure and confused'.'1"'1' 
I t f o l l o w s f o r him t h a t i t i s only what we perceive c l e a r l y and 
d i s t i n c t l y i n our thought t h a t has absolute o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . 
This i s why philosophy must aim at a mathematical c e r t a i n t y 
because m the mathematical sciences we are given the best 
example of what i s a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t l y r e a l . That i s 
because they deal w i t h thought alone. 
1 0 . 
1 1 . 
R.Descartes, o p . c i t . , Meditations,p. 160 
I b i d . 
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T n i s , then, i s Hegel's case against Descartes. God, 
he b e l i e v e s , has to he Invoked I n Descartes' epistemology 
because 'we have t h i s o p p o s i t i o n : s u b j e c t i v e knowing and r e a l i t y 1 
Where they are regarded as d i f f e r e n t , as i n the c o n t r a s t between 
sensation and thought, 'there enters the need t o mediate them 1. 
This need t o mediate s u b j e c t i v e knowing and r e a l i t y a r i s e s from 
Descartes' f a i l u r e t o conceive thought m the form of s e n s a t i o n ^ 
Consequently, what i s t r u e f o r Descartes i s always an o b j e c t o f 
thought, an u n i v e r s a l m Hegel's terms. I n not con c e i v i n g 
thought as sensation he has no human l i n k between thought and 
m a t e r i a l t h i n g s and, l i k e w i s e , between m a t e r i a l t h i n g s and 
thought. He has t h e r e f o r e t o r e l y on the d i v i n e . 
This c r i t i c i s m o f Descartes' theory of knowledge i s c l e a r l y 
two-edged. On the one hand, Hegel i s pleading the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f sensation m knowledge, the p o s i t i o n of a m a t e r i a l i s t , and on 
the o t h e r , he i s suggesting t h a t i t only be taken as a form o f 
thought, the p o s i t i o n of an i d e a l i s t . This, I would argue, is 
one of the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n s o f Hegel's j d e a l i s m , indeed one o f the 
reasons he l i k e s t o c a l l h i s i d e a l i s m o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m . And 
i t i s from t h i s p o i n t of view t h a t he argues t h a t Descartes i s 
wrong m conceiving sensation merely as a n u l l i t y . Sensation 
becomes a n u l l i t y f o r Descartes because he i s unable t o regard wh 
we sense-perceive as being i n any way t r u e . I n our sensation, 
he claims, t h i n g s are c o n t i n u a l l y changing. There are t h e r e f o r e 
12. Hegel. Suhrkarrp Worke 20,pp. 144 - 145. 
l."5. IbDd.p. 1 5 5 : ' i n the sharp o p p o s i t i o n between thought and 
extension, the former i s not considered as sensarior (Sr.pfi 
dung), so t h a t the l a t t e r can i s o l a t e i t s e l f . ' 
t 
no f i x e d p r o p e r t i e s t h a t we can a t t r i b u t e t o t h i n g s t h a t arxse 
i n sensation. Appearance, smells, t a s t e s , sounds, e t c . , cannot 
be predicated t o t h i n g s because they do not inhere i n those t h i n g 
Descartes even seeks to demonstrate t h a t s o l i d i t y and hardness 
whlch we sense-perceive are not e s s e n t i a l t o matter. He 
be l i e v e s t h a t a l l thai: can w i t h c e r t a i n t y be pre d i c a t e d t o matter 
i s extension. This i s the case, he argues, because a l l t h i n g s 
of matter (e.g. the wax i n the M e d i t a t i o n s ) give way under 
pressure without l o s i n g t h e i r nature. Nov; i t i s at t h i s p o i n t 
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t h a t Hegel r a i s e s h i s o b j e c t i o n . I t may be, he says, t h a t 
t h i n g s give way under pressure but t h i s does not e n t a i l t h a t 
they w i l l lose a l l t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s apart from extension. 
S o l i d i t y and hardness w i l l remain a t t r i b u t e s of those t h i n g s . 
Under pressure the resistence t h a t those t h i n g s o f f e r may 
become q u a n t i t a t i v e l y less but not no n - e x i s t e n t . I t i s c l e a r 
t h a t Hegel i s here wearing h i s m a t e r i a l i s t h a t . We have r.ow 
to analyse h i s c r i t i c i s m of Descartes t o see why Hegel's objec-
t i v e i d e a l i s m allows t h i s empiricism. Hegel argues t h a t thought 
has^ also t o be considered i n the form of sensation. Descartes, 
however, wants thought alone; thought opposed t o sensation. 
He f a i l s t o grasp t h e r e f o r e t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s we d e t e c t i n 
ob j e c t s w i t h our senses are, as soon as they are expressed, 
themselves thoughts. Hegel t h e r e f o r e i s prepared t o grant t o 
the m a t e r i a l i s t t h a t thought considered as sensation does have 
o b j e c t s opposed to i t . These, furthermore, are not immediately 
r e d u c i b l e t o thought. But this i n no way e s t a b l i s h e s f o r Kegel 
t h a t t h i n g s e x i s t independently of human consciousness. These 
Ik. I b i d . , pp. 150 - 1 5 1 . 
1 5 . 
t h i n g s are t o Hegel n o t h i n g but seJf-consciousness m the 
form o f sensation. At t h i s p o i n t he takes o f f h i s m a t e r i a l i s t 
hat. Descartes makes the e r r o r , i n Kegel's estimation, of not 
regarding the determinations of o b j e c t s sensed as a dea l . 
The sum of Hegel's c r i t i c i s m o f Descartes would, I t h i n k , 
be t h a t he i s a metaphysician. Metaphysics Hegel understands, 
i n the sense of Kant, as the reaching a f t e r Substance. The 
p o i n t of view of metaphysics, he argues, presupposes an 
o p p o s i t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y or, i n more modern 
terms, the i n d i v i d u a l and r e a l i t y , and s t r i v e s f o r t h e i r u n i t y . I 
metaphysics, 'one thought, one u n i t y i s Taintained against i d e a l i s m 
j u s t as w i t h the Ancients - Being. ' The metaphysician seeits 
w i t h h i s philosophy t o u n i t e i n d i v i d u a l and Substance. Thought 
becomes the mediator between the two terms. Bat, Hegel claims, 
where thought and r e a l i t y are i n i t i a l l y conceived as being 
d i f f e r e n t they are never s u c c e s s f u l l y u n i t e d . The attempt t o 
u n i t e i n d i v i d u a l and substance i s , as i n Descartes' ca'be, a 
confession t h a t they are i r r e v o c a b l y d i v i d e d . God, t h e r e f o r e , has 
t o perform the task of a r t i f i c i a l union. 'My i n d i v i d u a l thought 
i s s u b s t a n t i a l or r e a l w i t h Descartes because God does not deceive 
me. 
Now, as I have already suggested, the n o t i o n o f God does play 
a r o l e i n Hegel's own philosophy but he b e l i e v e s t h a t Descartes' 
d e s c r i p t i o n of God as the p h y s i c a l guarantor o f our knowledge 
15- I b i d . , p. 122. 
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misrepresents t h a t r o l e . I t i s , he t h i n k s 'the form t h a t 
i s somewhat mistaken expressing above a l l only the o p p o s i t i o n 
which self-consciousness has t o the consciousness o f i t s o t h e r , 
of the o b j e c t i v e ; and i t ( i . e . God) has t o do w i t h the u n i t y of 
both, - whether t h a t which i s i n thought also has o b j e c t i v i t y . 
Now t h i s u n i t y l i e s m God, or i s God h i m s e l f . ' ^ God i s 
r i g h t l y t o be understood m philosophy as the u n i t y o f thought 
and being. To t h i s extent Descartes' d e p i c t i o n - o f h i s r o l e i s 
c o r r e c t . For Hegel, however, he i s not t o be understood as 
the mediator of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and Substance. This would imply 
t h a t God were a t h i r d term b r i n g i n g about t h a t u n i t y . Rather, 
God i s f o r Hegel t h a t u n i t y i t s e l f . God 3s a r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t 
f a l l s e n t i r e l y w i t h i n thought and r e a l i t y , a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n 
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which the o p p o s i t i o n of thought and r e a l i t y as overcome. 
Because Descartes does not conceive God i n t h i s way, h i s 
philosophy remains f o r Hegel at the o p p o s i t i o n of being and 
thought. We can see t ^ i s dualism most sharply expressed, Hegel 
t h i n k s , i n Descartes' absolute separation of extension and 
thought. Descartes recognises 'no more than two species o f 
16. I b i d . , p. 1 3 7 . 
17. He describes the r e l a t i o n s h i p more t e c h n i c a l l y i n the 
Logic as the t r a n s i t i o n of tne Notion ( B e g r i f f ) i n t o 
O b j e c t i v i t y and adds t h a t i t was Descartes V 'sublimest 
thought, t h a t God i s t h a t whose n o t i o n Includes w i t h i n 
i t s e l f i t s b e i n g 1 . He claims there as w e l l t h a t Descaite 
d i d not comprenend h i s p r i n c i p l e m i t s f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
I n h i s view he degraded the p r i n c i p l e by p r e s e n t i n g i t as 
an o n t o l o g i c a l proof of God's existence. Hegel. SuhrKWip 
Werke 6,(Wissenschaft der Logik T e i l I I ) p . 402. 
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t h i n g s : namely the one i s the species of t h i n k i n g t h i n g s 
and the o t h e r the species o f t h i n g s t h a t r e l a t e t o what i s 
l 8 ' extended. 1 Thought and extension are d i s t i n c t f o r Descartes 
because, ap a r t from God, they are the only two substances 
i n the universe Which are t o t a l i r e s i n themselves. The one 
substance, he would argue, may be c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y con-
ceived w i t h o u t the oth e r . This ontology i m p l i e s f o r Hegel 
however t h a t , 'thought, the n o t i o n , the s p i r i t u a l , i s t h a t 
which i s a t home w i t h i t s e l f and has i t s opposite i n not being 
119 
a t home w i t h oneself, extension, the unfree. y Descartes 
argues t h a t the essence o f thought i s thought and the essence * 
o f o b j e c t s i s extension. I t appears t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e r e i s no 
way i n which they can be immanently u n i t e d , the one i s opposed 
t o the o t h e r as freedom t o n e c e s s i t y . I t i s only i n God t h e i r 
c r e a t o r t h a t they are one. Hegel, however, f i n d s a gr e a t d e a l 
t h a t i s a r t i f i c i a l i n t h i s ontology. This i s because i t i s an 
ontology t h a t maintains :.n unreasonable b i f u r c a t i o n (Plntzweiung) 
between the i n d i v i d u a l and r e a l i t y . This i s a b i f u r c a t i o n whichil 
the o b j e c t of Hegel's philosophy t o overcome. Descartes' 
18. Hegel. S. Werke 20i p. 148 
19. I b i d . 
2 0 . That t h i s i s the o b j e c t of Hegel's philosophy r e q u i r e s 
l i t t l e p r o o f from me. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the n o t i o n 
Entzweiung m Hegel's philosophy was po i n t e d out by Herbert 
Marcuse as e a r l y as 1933' m h i s book Kegels Ontologie und 
d i e Theorie der G e s c h : c h t l i c h k e i t ( V i t t o n o Klostermann3 
F r a n k f u r t am Mam) pp. 9 - 2 3 . More r e c e n t l y R. Plant 
(Hegel, A l i e n & Unwm, 1 9 7 3 ) and G.Rohrmoser ( S u b j e k t i v : t a t 
und V e r d i n g l i c h u r t r . Theoiogie und G e s e l l s c h a f t i>n Denken jdos 
jungen -Hege LS 190-O h a a r g u e d the~same case most convmcTri 
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ontology suggests to Hegel t h a t there are m the beginning 
two t h i n g s , thought and body ( e x t e n s i o n ) . Subsequently God 
makes an appearance t o r e c o n c i l e them. But because he i s 
'outside both' as t h e i r Creator, 'not the n o t i o n of u n i t y and 
the two elements themselves, not the n o t i o n , ' he i s unable t o 
achieve i t . " B i f u r c a t i o n t h e r e f o r e as not overcome. I n 
order t h a t t h i s may be achieved, Hegel claims, God has t o be 
prope r l y conceived. As we already know, t h a t c o r r e c t conception 
of God i s as the immanent u n i t y of thought and being. 
I t i s the philosophy of Spinoza t h a t , m Hegel's view, takes 
an important step towards the r e a l i s a t i o n of t h i s n o t i o n of God. 
I t i s , he claims, Spinoza's n o t i o n of Substance t h a t achieves t h i s . 
This Substance Hegel describes as being the 'abstract u n i t y ' of 
extension and thought, or body and soul. I n h i s o p i n i o n , t h e r e f o r e 
t h i s n o t i o n bears a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o the p r i n c i p a l ideas of 
Descartes' system. Indeed 'the philosophy o f Spinoza r e l a t e s t o 
the philosophy of Descartes as a co n s i s t e n t implementation of 
?2 
the l a t t e r ' s p r i n c i p l e . ' - I n the philosophy of Descartes we have 
the o p p o s i t i o n of extension and thought w i t h a t h i r d term, God, 
posi t e d as u n i t i n g them. Hegel understands Spinoza to have 
implemented Descartes' p r i n c i p l e m t h a t the n o t i o n of Substance 
draws together extension and thought m a more s a t i s f a c t o r y way 
than Descartes' n o t i o n of God. Spinoza's Substance i s the essence 
21. Hegel. Suhrkanp Werke 20 p. 157 
22. I b i d . 
both o f mind and matter. I t i s 'that whicn i s m i t s e l f 
t 2^ 5 
and i s conceived through i t s e l f ' . J I t c o n s i s t s of ' i n f i n i t e 
, 24 
a t t r i b u t e s ; no t h i n g l i e s outside of i t . Therefore, i t i s 
God, 'the cause of a l l t h i n g s ' . ^ J I n s h o r t , i t i s e v e r y t h i n g 
m ev e r y t h i n g . I t i s the world, or simply r e a l i t y i t s e l f . 
God or r e a l i t y , which embraces both extension and thought, 
mind and matter. 
I n short, Hegel f i n d s Spinoza's n o t i o n of one Substance t o 
be a r a d i c a l improvement on the dualism of Descartes' philosophy, 
but t h a t i s not a l l he has t o say i n praise of the idea. He 
v;ould argue t h a t as an a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e , Spinoza's Substance 
has t o be the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t of a l l thought t h a t claims to be 
philosophy. 'That thought', he says, 'has placed i t s e l f at the 
standpoint of Spinozism i s the e s s e n t i a l beginning of a l l p h i l o -
sophising. ' Everyone has f i r s t of a l l t o be a Sp i n o z i s t i f 
he wishes t o be able t o philosophise. He 'must bathe' h i s soul 
' i n the ether of the one Substance i n which e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s 
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h e l d t o be t r u e perishes. This one Substance i s , then, f o r 
Hegel the negation of a l l t h a t i s p a r t i c u l a r . We are, he claims, 
w i t h Spinoza's philosophy at once at the l e v e l of the u n i v e r s a l . 
What Hegel means by t h i s i s not immediately c l e a r . I t i s , how-
ever, c l e a r what he t h i n k s i t i m p l i e s f o r the problem of knowledge. 
2 3 . B.Spinoza. E t h i c , Part I , D e f i n i t i o n 3 . 
24. I b i d . P r o p o s i t i o n X I . 
2 5 . I b i d . P r o p o s i t i o n X V I I I 
2 6 . Hegel. Suhrkamp Uerke 20 p. 1 6 5 . See also Lucio C o l l e t i : 
Marxism and Hegel "(New L e f t Books, 197:?) P- 2 8 . 
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The standpoint of Spinoza, he claims, r a i s e s us above such 
mundane problems as those concerning the c e r t a i n t y o f our 
thought. Prom t h a t standpoint i t i s the content of a philosophy 
t h a t i s of prime i n t e r e s t . 
I t i s worth t r y i n g t o understand what Hegel means by t h i s . 
He appears t o be suggesting t h a t t h i s one Substance o f Spinoza 
as e v e r y t h i n g i n e v e r y t h i n g i s a n o t i o n t h a t i s intended t o 
provide more than c e r t a i n t y t o our thought. Spinoza i s not 
simply concerned t h a t our thought should correspond w i t h 
extension. On the c o n t r a r y , thought i n the one Substance i s , 
not only s u b j e c t , i t i s o b j e c t as w e l l . I t j s a case, t h e r e f o r e , 
o f the i d e n t i t y of thought and extension. Perhaps I can maks 
the p o i n t c l e a r e r i n the f o l l o w i n g way. Spinoza's Substance, 
as I have already s a i d , i s God. Now God f o r him only has two 
27 
a t t r i b u t e s , thought and extension. 1 So t h a t whatever i s s a i d 
or thought i s said of God or Substance and whatever as said o f 
extension i s eq u a l l y s a i d of God or Substance. Since, then, 
whatever i s said of Substance i s said of both i t s a t t r i b u t e s , 
extensions and thought, predicates of the one are, at one and the 
same time, p r e d i c a t e s of the other. Or, as Spinoza puts i t , 
'The order and connection of ideas i s the same as the order and 
?8 
connection of t h i n g s ' . " He gives t h i s example i n the C o r o l l a r y 
t o the same p r o p o s i t i o n : 'the c i r c l e e x i s t i n g i n nature and the ide 
t h a t i s i n God are one and the same t h i n g which i s manifested 
through d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s ' . The one Substance as the a t t r i b u t e 
2 7 . Spinoza. E t h i c Part I I P r o p o s i t i o n s I and I I . 
2 8 . I b i d . Part I I , P r o p o s i t i o n V I I . 
of thought, the c i r c l e as an idea, i s the same as the one 
Substance as the a t t r i b u t e of extension, the c i r c l e as a 
r e a l i t y m nature. Both express tne same 'essence of God'. 
I t i s now more than evident t h a t m a context such as t h i s , 
problems concerning the r e l a t i o n of thought t o extension, or 
subject t o object become simply i r r e l e v a n t . Both subject and 
object are enveloped m the one Substance or God. As I i n d i c a t e d , 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n i s one of immediate i d e n t i t y ; and i t i s f o r t h i s 
reason t h a t Hegel regards Spinoza's Substance as the t r u e beginning 
of philosophy. 
I f t h i s i s so, Hegel would l i k e to add t h i s one Q u a l i f i c a t i o n , 
namely, t h a t Spinoza's Substance expresses the i d e n t i t y of subject 
and object m too a b s t r a c t a f a s h i o n , ~ ^ Here Hegel revives a 
c r i t i c i s m he l e v e l l e d at the philosophy of h i s e r s t w h i l e f r i e n d 
S c h e l l i n g . I n h i s view S c h e i l m g , too, expresses the i d e n t i t y 
i n h i s n o t i o n of Absolute i d e n t i t y i n too a b s t r a c t a manner. 
This i s because both he and Spinoza do not present the d i f f e r e n c e 
between thought and extension as r e s i d i n g i n the two d i f f e r e n t 
a t t r i b u t e s themselves. T h e i r d i f f e r e n c e i s , r a t h e r , depicted 
as a s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of God or Substance. Hegel would noc 
wish to deny the p r i n c i p l e of the philosophies of Spinoza and 
S c h e l l i n g : the i d e n t i t y of nature and mind. But he believes 
t h a t he takes ' a higher tone' i n demanding t h a t they should 
have demonstrated t h a t p r i n c i p l e d i f f e r e n t l y . I n the proper 
demonstration of t h a t p r i n c i p l e , he argues, i t has t o be pre-
2 9 . Hegel. o p . c i t . p. 1 6 6 . 
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supposed t h a t both nature and mind are r a t i o n a l . We are n o t , 
however, t o stop at t h i s a s s e r t i o n , as though the mere p o s s i b i l i t y 
of the i d e n t i t y o f rnlnd and nature e n t a i l e d i t s - r e a l i t y . We 
have t o show the a s s e r t i o n t o be t r u e , t h a t i t i s 'the t o t a l i t y 
which i s developing i t s e l f w i t h i n i t s e l f ' t h a t i s t h a t i d e n t i t y . - ^ ' 
At no stage w i l l i t do simply to pronounce the i d e n t i t y o f mind 
and n a t u r e . Hegel would perhaps say t h a t n a t u r e and mind are 
u n i t e d as Reason. But Reason f o r him c o n s i s t s , i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , 
i n n o t h i n g o t h e r than the reasoning process t h a t shows nature and 
mind t o be i d e n t i c a l . He b e l i e v e s t h a t the philosopher, by 
h i s reasoning, has t o show t h a t nature embodies Reason and t h a t mm 
i s i n h e r e n t l y r a t i o n a l . Because Spinoza and ScholUng do net do 
t h i s i n t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i e s of i d e n t i t y they have t o d e p i c t the 
d i f f e r e n c e between nature and mind as a s e l f - u i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f 
God. T h e i r n o t i o n o f i d e n t i t y i s t h e r e f o r e a b s t r a c t . 
We have now t o consider the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s o b j e c t i o n 
to Spinoza's n o t i o n o f Substance f o r the e p i s t e r o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s 
embodied i n Spinoza's philosophy. I n t h i s respect Hegel's own 
assessment i s t h a t by d e p i c t i n g the u n i t y Df-thought and being 
as he does, Spinoza i n t r o d u c e s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t o h i s t h e o r y 
of knowledge. This contradiction i s t h a t at the one time we can 
be a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n o f the t r u t h of our conceptions about r e a l i t y 
w h i l e at another, we can be a b s o l u t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t as t o t h e i r 
congruence. Spinoza i n d i c a t e s the absolute c e r t a i n t y m t h i s 
way: 'Whatever happens m the o b j e c t o f the idea c o n s t i t u t i n g the 
5 0 . I b i d . p. 1 7 7 . 
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human mind rnuct be perceived by the human mind. Thai" i s 
t o say, i f the o b j e c t o f the idea c o n s t i t u t i n g the human mind 
be a body, n o t h i n g can happen m that body which i s not perceived 
by the mind.'-^ The knowledge o f e v e r y t h i n g which happens i n 
the o b j e c t of any idea n e c e s s a r i l y e x i s t s i n God, f o r he i s f o r 
Spinoza both extended and t h i n k i n g substance. I n so f a r as t h a t 
idea i s an idea o f a t h i n k i n g t h i n g , and since God i s a l l thought, 
the idea i s n e c e s s a r i l y an expression o f God. I t i s consequently 
c o r r e c t . On the other hand Spinoza i n d i c a t e s what Hegel e l l s 
the absolute i n d i f f e r e n c e of thought and r e a l i t y i n t h i s way: 
'The human mind does not know the human body i t s e l f , nor does i t 
know t h a t the body e x i s t s , except through ideas o f a f f e c t i o n s by 
which the body i s a f f e c t e d . ' - ^ 2 What Hegel appears to be g e t t i n g 
a t , then, i s t h a t i n Spinoza's philosophy knowledge does not apper-
as an outcome of the a c t i v i t y of the human mind i n r e l a t i o n s n i p 
t o t h i n g s . I s i s simply an a t t r i b u t e $of God. This appeaiancc 
31. E t h i c . Part I I , P r o p o s i t i o n X I I j S t u a r t Hampshire (S p i 110 7 a. 
P e l i c a n Original,1970* pp. 65 - 6 6 )says of t h i 
conception of the unique Substance and i t s a t t r i n u t e s , 
Spinoza i s deducing t n a t the system o f ideas wnieh c o n s t i t u i 
God, as conceived under the a t t r i b u t e of thought, mast not 
only correspond t o , but coinc i d e w i t h , the o b j e c t s o f these 
i d e a s j he i s showing t h a t , i f God i s r i g h t l y conceived as 
the unique Substance, the problem which confronted Descartes 
how can we be c e r t a i n t h a t our c l e a r and d i s t i n c t ideas 
correspond t o r e a l i t y ? - cannot even a r i s e ; there can be no 
question of the c_o r- re s pond en c e between the order of thought 
or ideas and tne order of t i l i n g s , because tnere are r e t tv,To 
orders t o correspond.' This i s remarkably I I K C Hegel's 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Scinoza's Substance, see e s p e c i a l l y p. 18 
I 9 above. 
3 2 . Spinoza. E t h i c Part I I , Prop. X I X . 
i s maintained. Hegel would claim, because j u s t as w i t h the 
epistemology of Descartes the d i r e c t l i n k between the human 
mind and the e x t e r n a l world (sensation) i s , so to speak, severed. 
Descartes and Spinoza sever t h a t l i n k on the grounds t h a t what 
the i n d i v i d u a l person senses d i r e c t l y i s not so much the l i m i t -
a t i o n s of an object as h i m s e l f l i m i t e d by tne o b j e c t . The 
argument i s a f a m i l i a r one. I t i s , as Spinoza puts i t , t h a t 
'the ideas we have of e x t e r n a l bodies i n d i c a t e the c o n s t i t u t i o n 
of our own body r a t h e r than the nature of e x t e r n a l bodies. ' ^ 
The ' i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t we as i n d i v i d u a l s are not the source of 
adequate knowledge. I n Spinoza's case a l l knowledge p e r t a i n s to 
the u n i v e r s a l thought which i s an a t t r i b u t e of tne one Substance, 
God. This, we know, i s an absolute presupposition of Spinoza's 
philosophy. Spinoza, consequently, i s not so much concerned 
w i t h d i s c e r n i n g the i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t i e s of obje c t s as w i t h 
le a d i n g them back to the oie Substance• The concern i s always, 
and t h i s i s Hegel's ca r^, w i t h the explanation of the one SUD-
stance as opposed to the i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g . 
This, he says, i s the source of the c o x i t r a d i c t i o n i n Spinoza' 
theory of knowledge. The absolute i n d i f f e r e n c e of thought and 
objec t i s i m p l i c i t m t h e i r i d e n t i t y . I t i s the n o t i o n of 
Substance t h a t i s incomplete. I n t h a t n o t i o n thought and r e a l i t y 
are not i n i t i a l l y a f f i r m e d to be independent oT s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
The consequence of not d e p i c t i n g them i n t h a t way i s thai", i t i s 
a matter of i n d i f f e r e n c e what the one s i g n i f i e s t o the other. 
3 3 - I b i d . Part I I , Prop. XVI. C o r o l l a r y 2 . 
I t i s of l i t t l e consequence how the i n d i v i d u a l ' s thought 
r e l a t e s t o o b j e c t s , i f a l l thought and a l l o b j e c t s are a 
p r i o r i d i v i n e . The whole of Spinoza's philosophy, Hegel 
would argue, i s coloured by t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . I t i s the 
u n i t y of thought and being t h a t i s alone s i g n i f i c a n t , he says, 
the One. Knowledge f o r Spinoza i s but the contemplation o f 
God. ^ This i s 7 o f course, h i s E t h i c as w e l l . The good l i f e , 
Spinoza, argues, i s the one spent i n contemplation of God. 
Hegel i s convinced t h a t t h i s p o i n t represents the extreme 
l i m i t of Spinoza's system.-' Instead o f e v e r y t h i n g being 
explained f o r i t s e l f , i t JS l e d back t o God. I n d i v i d u a t i o n 
has no place i n h i s philosophy. By i n d i v i d u a t i o n Hegel means 
not only the i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t i c u l a r existence of o b j e c t s but 
also the freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l . He t h i n k s , then, t n a t i n 
Spinoza's system the i n d i v i d u a l , i n both these senses, appears 
only as what he c a l l s a 'vanishing moment'. The i n d i v i d u a l 
e x i s t s only as an embodiment or mode of one of the two a t t r j b u t 
o f Substance, as thought or as extension. I n t h i s f a s h i o n , He 
claims, ' A l l d i f f e r e n c e s and determinations of t h i n g s are si.npl 
r e t u r n e d to the one Substance; so, one can say, i n Spinoza's 
system a l l t h i n g s are merely tnrown down i n t o t h i s abyss o f 
~5k. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 177': For Spinoza 'God alone i s , a l l 
w o r l d l i n e s s has no t r u t h ' . 
35. I b i d . , p. 3 9 0 . 
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a n n i h i l a t i o n ' . And from t h i s abyss of a n n i h i l a t i o n n o t h i n g 
emerges. Botn the p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t i n g 
p a r t i c u l a r and the p o s s i b i l i t y of an independent i n d i v i d u a l 
consciousness are o b l i t e r a t e d . 
I t i s the i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t t h i s lack of i n d i v i d u a t i o n 
might have f o r human thought and a c t i o n t h a t are most remarkable. 
Human consciousness i s only conceived as a mode of the One Sub-
stance. I t i s but a mode of the a t t r i b u t e thought. I t s own 
independent c a p a b i l i t i e s are t h e r e f o r e s everly l i m i t e d . As we 
have seen, the mode human consciousness cannot a t t a i n knowledge 
through i t s own perceptions of the world. I t can only know 
r e a l i t y through i t s contemplation of God. Correct thought and 
r i g h t a c t i o n , as I have i n d i c a t e d , can only be achieved tarough 
t h i s contemplation of God. For n e i t h e r can the body determine 
the mind d i r e c t l y t o movement or r e s t nor the mind the body t o 
^8 
movement or rest.-" Correct thought and r i g h t accion then have 
t h e i r common ground no f i n the one i n d i v i d u a l but i n God. Actin g 
as w e l l as knowing have t o be mediated by the one Substance. 
Hegel contends t h a t t h i s i s the case because i n Spinoza's 
E t h i c as m the philosophy of Descartes' thought has only the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the u n i v e r s a l , not of self-consciousness . 
37* I b i d . p . 1 6 6 . Hegel f i n d s i t i n t e r e s t i n g to speculate at t h i s 
p o i n t whether Spinoza's death of consumption was i t s e l f an 
i n d i c a t i o n of the 'all-consuming' nature of h i s own p r i n c i p l 
Hegel ma.kes a b e t t e r pun i n German since consumption 
(Schwmdsucht) means l i t e r a l l y 'fading away sickness'. p . l 6 7 
3 8 . I b i d p. 183 - 1 8 4 . 
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Quite simply, self-consciousness has f o r Hegel t o be understood 
as being an a t t r i b u t e of the one Substance not merely as a mode. 
This, e v i d e n t l y , i s not the p o s i t i o n m Spinoza's philosophy. 
Thus Spinoza proceeds i n a manner which i s a l i e n t o Hegel. His 
philosophy descends from the u n i v e r s a l , Substance t o the p a r t i c -
u l a r , thought and extension and f i n a l l y t o the i n d i v i d u a l , the 
mode. This descent he regards as a progressive 'loss' of 
Substance. The r e s u l t i s t h a t the mode appears less e s s e n t i a l 
than the One. Or, viewed from the opposite d i r e c t i o n , the modes 
simply disappea.r i n the one Substance. They are not, Hegel 
complains, r a i s e d t o the n o t i o n . The independence of s e l f -
eonsciousness i s extinguished i n the one Substarce, This 
i m p l i c a t i o n of Spinoza's philosophy i s , Hegel b e l i e v e s , the reason 
why Spinoza's system arouses so much i n d i g n a t i o n since the m d i v -
i 4 l l d u a l s being f o r h i m s e l f i s denied. I n such a system of 
philosophy we cannot be at home w i t h ourselves, we are not f r e e . 
Spinoza's philosophy d e p i c t s only 'a r i g i d ( s t a r r e ) Substance, 
not yet s p i r i t ' . r The lack of self-consciousness, the lacK of 
freedom i n Spinoza's philosophy has t o be remedied, then, by 
conceiving the one Substance not merely as substance but as 
mind or s p i r i t ( G e i s t ) . This remedy t h a t Hegel proposes f o r 
40. I b i d . See also C o l l e t t i . op.cat. p. j50. 
41. Ib:M . Hampshire ?op.cit, ?p. l 4 9 7 draws our a t t e n t i o n t o the 
same t h i n g : ' i t was Spinoza's 'hideous hypothesis', and t h e 
only part of h i s p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h immediately became gener-
a l l y famous, t h a t t h i s c r i t e r i o n of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g human 
beings as e x e r c i s i n g r a t i o n a l w i l l and choice i s mere 
s u p e r s t i t i o n . 
4 2 . Hegel-Werke 20, p. 1 6 6 
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t h e E t h i c i s necessary n o t sim p l y because Spinoza has mis-
i n t e r p r e t e d t h e p r e v a i l i n g r e l i g i o n , C h r i s t i a n i t y , b u t because 
Spinoza's n o t i o n o f Substance f a i l s t o c o r r e s p o n d w i t h r e a l i t y . 
T h i s i s the source o f Hegel's m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n t o 
Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y . H i s n o t i o n o f r e a l i t y i s d i f f e r e n t . 
R e a l i t y , he argues i n The Science o f L o g i c , has t o be seen as 
4 "3 
t h e r e a l i s a t i o n o f freedom, o f t h e N o t i o n . v For t h i s reason 
t h e a n a l y s i s o f r e a l i t y i s t h e c r i t i q u e o f Spinoza's Substance. 
I t i s t h i s a n a l y s i s t h a t forms t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t h e o b j e c t i v e 
l o g i c t o t h e s u b j e c t i v e l o g i c . R e a l i t y i t s e l f has t o be shown 
t o e n t a i ] s u b j e c t i v e freedom. R e a l i t y o r t h e c o r r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c 
system (one and t h e same t h i n g t o He g e l ) has t o have 'the s i g n i f -
t 44 
i c a n c e o f t h e I . R e a l i t y , he wishes t o argue i s n o t o n l y 
Substance b u t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I s i s a l s o m_y r e a l i t y , 
Hegel now argues t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l d e f e c t o f Spinoza's 
p h i l o s o p h y , t h e l a c k o f what he d e s c r i b e s as i n d i v i d u a t i o n , i s 
made good m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f L e i b n i z . ^ Indeed, he c l a i m s , 
as f a r as e x t e r n a l a s p e c t s are concerned, L e i b n i z ' p r i n c i p l e o f 
4 3 . H e g e l . Suhrkamp Werke 6„ p. 240. The a n a l y s i s o f t h e 
r e l a t i o n o f Substance ^ r e a l i t y ) r e c i p r o c i t y l e a d s t o one 
c o n c l u s i o n '- T h i s i s t h e N o t i o n , t h e kingdom o f s u b j e c t -
i v i t y o f Freedom'. T h i s v e r y phrase concludes t ne O b j e c t i v e 
L o g i c and i s t h e r e f o r e t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e S u b j e c t i v e L o g i c 
o r t h e ' D o c t r i n e o f t h e N o t i o n ' . 
4 4 . V/erke 20., p. 1 8 9 . A l s o t h e c h a p t e r t h a t opens up t h e 
S u b j e c t i v e L o g i c 'The Not:on i n g e n e r a l ' ( t f e r k e 6, p. 2 4 5 ) 
g i v e s an account o f what Hegel t a k e s t o be t h e a c t u a l s i g n i f -
i c a n c e o f t h e 1 m p h i l o s o p h y . See e s p e c i a l l y p. 23"5 - 2 5 6 . 
4 5 . Hegel-V/erke 6, p. 1 9 8 . 
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i n d i v i d u a t i o n completes Spinoza's system o f p h i l o s o p h y . I n 
L e i b n i z ' Monadology. t h e monads are t h e s i m p l e substances 
t h a t make up t h e u n i v e r s e . The advantage t h e y have o v e r 
Spinoza's Substance, Hegel c l a i m s , i s t h a t t h e y are more 
f l u i d and w o r k a b l e . As we know, he r e g a r d s Spinoza's 
Substance as r i g i d and t h e r e f o r e unworkable ( s t a r r e ) . The 
monads o f L e i b n i z a r e n o t , however, l i m i t e d i n t h i s f a s h i o n . 
They are n o t f i x e d and unchanging: t h e y c o n t i n u e t o d e v e l o p 
themselves f r o m t h e m s e l v e s . L e i b n i z t a k e s i t 'as g r a n t e d t n a t 
e v e r y c r e a t e d t h i n g , and c o n s e q u e n t l y the c r e a t e d monad a l s o , 
i s s u b j e c t t o change and indeed t h a t t h i s change i s c o n t i n u a l 
i n e a c h ' . ^ Hegel suggests t h e r e f o r e t h a t vie can r e g a r d tner> 
as Spinoza's Substance s h a t t e r e d i n t o f r a g m e n t s : ' i n o p p o s i t -
i o n t o t h e s i m p l e u n i v e r s a l Substance o f Spinoza L e i b n i z t a k e s 
as h i s b a s i s a b s o l u t e m u l t i p l i c i t y , t h e i n d i v i d u a l s u b s t a n c e . . . 
These monads are n o t m a t e r i a l nor extended, a l s o t h e y dc n o t 
o r i g i n a t e n o r do t h e y pass away i n a n a t u r a l f a s h i o n ; . . . t h e y 
, 47 
a r e r a t h e r s u b s t a n t i a ] forms . 1 Each monad i s u n i v e r s a l , 
s u b s t a n t i a l b u t a t t h e same t i m e i n d i v i d u a l . 
Each i n d i v i d u a l monad i s , t h e n , a w o r l d o f i t s cwn. 'They 
, 48 
have no windows, by w h i c h a n y t h i n g c o u l d come m o r o u t . 
Because i t has no windows t h e monad cannot be d e t e r m i n e d f r o m 
o u t s i d e . The monads are t h u s n o t c a s u a l l y r e l a t e d n o r i s t h e i r 
46. L e i b n i z - Monadology i n L e i b n i z : P h i l o s o p h i c a l W r i t i n g s 
(Everyman'TJibTaly -)" P-3« ~ 
47. Hege 1- Werke 20, p P. 2 5 8 - 2 ^ 9 . (Hegel's empnasis). 
48. L e i b n i z . c p . c i t . . p. 3. 
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r e l a t i o n one o f a s s i s t a n c e . They are h a r d , r e p e l l i n g u n i t i e s 
w h i c h a l l o w o f one r e l a t i o n o n l y , i m p l a n t e d a t t h e : r c r e a t i o n : 
harmony. I n o r d e r t h a t i t may p a r t i c i p a t e p r o p e r l y m t h i s 
harmony each monad i s endowed w i t h t h e f a c u l t y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
o r p e r c e p t i o n . By means o f t h i s p e r c e p t i o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
o f t h e monad i s p r e s e r v e d . Each monad i s t o t h a t e x t e n t i n t e l ] 
e c t u a l . Even t h e monads o f m a t t e r r e p r e s e n t themselves t o them 
s e l v e s i n t h i s f a s h i o n . Consequently, i n L e i b n i z ' system one 
o f t h e main d i s t i n c t i o n s o f Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y i s r a d i c a l l y 
t r a n s f o r m e d . The t*vo a t t r i b u t e s , t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n , are 
n o t a t t r i b u t e s o f God o n l y . E v e r y t h i n g possesses t h a t d i s t i n c -
t i o n . The monads are b o t h extended and i n t e l l e c t u a l . Our 
con s c i o u s n e s s and t h e cons c i o u s n e s s o f God a r e s i m p l y h i g h e r 
forms o f t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t i s an a t t r i b u t e o f each monad. 
liq 
S e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s m e r e l y a p p e r c e p t i o n . '. 
The i m p o r t a n t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e j n c o r p o r a t e d i n 
t h i s system : s, f o r H e g ^ l , t h a t o f s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n : t h e iron 
SO 
de v e l o p s i t s e l f f rom i t s e l f . Not o n l y do t h e n a t u r a l change 
o f 'monads come fr o m an i n t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e ' b u t ' t h e r e must oe 
• SI 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h a t which changes'. " Each t h i n g i s 
49- I b i d . p . 5 . 
5 0 . The i m p o r t a n c e o f L e i b n i z ' p h i l o s o p h y f o r Hegel ' l i e s m 
th e p r i n c i p l e s , m t h e p r i n c i p l e s c f i n d i v i d u a l i t y and t h e 
p r o p o s i t i o n o f u n d i f f e r e n t 2 a b i l i t y ( U n u n t e r s c h i e d b a r k e i t ) ' . 
J.C.Horn, Monade and B e g r i f f : Per Weg von L e i b n i z zu Hegel 
(Oldenburg, Wien und Munchen,1 9 7 0 . ) 5 1 . Lej.bniz. op. c i t . p. 4 
i n d e e d l i m i t e d i n i t s e l f , b u t i t i s so c o n s t i t u t e d t h a t i t 
l i m i t s i t s e l f a c c o r d i n g l y . I n Spinoza's system, on t h e o t h e r 
hand, t h i n g s are o n l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d e x t e r n a l l y . " They are 
s i m p l y l i m i t e d , o r i n Hegel's t e r m s , f i n i t e . They are t h e 
f i n i t e modes o f an i n f i n i t e Substance. These f i n i t e modes, 
i f t h e y are t o be known p r o p e r l y , have, however, t o be under-
s t o o d as s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g . Indeed K e g e l argues t h a t we 
ha\re t o r e g a r d them as L e i b m z i a n monads, l i m i t i n g t h e m s e l v e s 
i n t h e manner i n w h i c h t n e y appear t o be l i m i t e d . T h i s a r g u -
ment i s one t h a i ; i s d i f f i c u l t t o f o l l o w because o f t h e a d m i x t u r e 
o f S p i n o z i s t J c and L e i b n i z i a n t e r m i n o l o g y . What Hegel means 
th o u g h i s , I t h i n k , b o t h s i m p l e and s i g n i f i c a n t . The p o i n t i s , 
as I have i n d i c a t e d , m e t h o d o l o g i c a l m n a t u r e . He i s a r g i u n g 
t h a t our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o b j e c t s has t o be more t h a n a conven-
i e n t c a t e g o r j z a t i o n , t h a t we have t o s e t about t h i n g s m a more 
c i r c u m s p e c t way, r e c o g n i s i n g t h a t t h i n g s are d i f f e r e n t m them-
s e l v e s . I t i s t hose i n h e r e n t d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t have t o be t h e 
b a s i s o f any c a t e g o r i z a t i o n . The way we q u a l i f y an o b j e c t m 
our d e s c r i p t i o n has t o be a l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f . 
T h a t t h i s i s Hegel's p o i n t can be seen by t h e example he g i v e s : 
' i t i s n o t o n l y we t h a t d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e a n i m a l by i t s c l a w s , 
b u t i t e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t s e l f i n t h a t way. I n t n a t 
way i t d efends i t s e l f and p r e s e r v e s i t s e l f . 
5 2 . Kegel-V.'erke ?0, p. ? 4 l . I t seems t o me t h a t t h i s method-
o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e i s i m p o r t a n t t o Marx as w e l l . I t h i n k 
would e l ~ n n t h a t ^ r a c was s i g n i f i c a n t about h i s concept o f 
c a p i t a l i s m " r a5 t h a t i t was n o t s i m p l y one way o f see.in<f h i s 
s o c j e i y but thao i t v;as now t h a t s o c i e t y was o r g a n i s e d J .a 
i t s e l f . 
\ 
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Hegel makes t m s p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n so much h i s 
own t h a t he f e e l s a b l e t o r e g r e t t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e i s n o t 
implemented i n i t s most t e l l i n g sense i n L e i b n i z p h i l o s o p h y . ^ 
T h i s he b e l i e v e s i s t o be so because, as I have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d 
o u t , t he monads cannot be d e t e r m i n e d from o u t s i d e . Each monad 
enc l o s e s a l l l i f e w i t h i n i t s e l f . I t cannot be i n f l u e n c e d by 
t h e l i v e s o f any o f i t s fellow-monads. As Hegel puts i t , t h e 
pa s s i v e moment o f b e i n g i s n o t p r e s e n t m t h e i d e a o f t h e monad. 
They a r e , as I have suggested, h a r d r e p e l l i n g u n i t i e s . T h e i r 
p e c u l i a r p r o p e r t y i s t h a t a l t h o u g h each one r e p e l s t h e o t h e r 
none i s r e p e l l e d . A l l are a c t i v e , none are p a s s i v e . For 
example, our t h i n k i n g may know these h a r d r e p e l l i n g u n i t i e s b u t 
b e i n g i t s e l f p a r t o f a monad i t does n o t p e r c e i v e these monads 
d i r e c t l y . I t cannot d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e a n y t h i n g , because t h a t 
would i m p l y t h a t i t were p a s s i v e l y r e l a t e d t o an o b j e c t o u t s i d e 
i t s e l f . 
There i s , t h e n , Hegal suggests, t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n m L e i b n i z ' s 
p h i l o s o p h y , t h a t i n o ur t h i n k i n g we know the i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t i c u l a r 
t h i n g , t h e monad, b u t n o t as i t p r i m a r i l y appears t o human consc-
i o u s n e s s , as t h e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t o f our s e n s e - i r r p r e s s i o n s . 
L e i b n i z ' n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n he c l a i m s t h e r e f o r e , 'has o n l y 
t h e sense o f b e i n g t h e e x c l u d i n g one, not e n c r o a c h i n g on® t h e 
o t h e r ' . So t h a t t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e monad i s n o t t h e p e r c e p t i o n 
5 3 - Hegel.Werke 6 ,p. 200 Horn ( o p . c i t . p . 1 3 6 ) misses t h e p o i n t 
m s u g g e s t i n g t h a t Hegel s i m p l y f i n d s L e i b n i z ' p r i n c i p l e 0/ 
i n d i v i d u a t i o n t o oe u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . Hegel meets L e i b n i z 
on h i s own ground. 
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of t h e o r d i n a r y human consciousness. I t i s n o t t n e p e r c e p t i o n 
of something t h a t i s d i s t i n c t o r d i f f e r e n t from i t s e l f . The 
p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e monad, as R u s s e l l p u t s i t , 'cannot be con-
c e i v e d as an a c t i o n o f the o b j e c t on t h e p e r c i p i e n t , s i n c e 
i 54 i 
substances n e v e r i n t e r a c t . Rathe r , t h e monad s p e r c e p t i o n 
can o n l y be c o n c e i v e d as i t s s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n . , The p e r c e p t i o n 
or t h e a p p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e human consciousness i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
n o t o f o b j e c t s e x t e r n a l t o i t s e l f . I t p e r c e i v e s o n l y what i s 
i m p l a n t e d i n i t a.t i t s c r e a t i o n . These p e r c e p t i o n s w h i c h are 
i m p l a n t e d m the human consciousness L e i b n i z d e s c r i b e s as e t e r n a l 
t r u t h s . I t i s t h e r e f o r e t h e i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n o f man as 
p a r t o f t h e w o r l d o f monads t h a t he i s c a p able 'of t h e knowledge 
of e t e r n a l t r u t h s , ^ but m h i s manner o f r e c e i v i n g t h a t know-
l e d g e he i s as b a d l y p l a c e d as t h e s i m p l e s t o f monads. 
Our knowledge i s , t h e n , a c c o r d i n g t o L e i b n i z n o t o f o b j e c t s 
DUG o f th e s e e t e r n a l t r u t h s . I t i s a g a i n an i n s t a n c e , K e g e l 
would c l a i m , o f t h o u g h t n o t b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e form o f 
s e n s a t i o n . I n d e e d , as ought t o be c l e a r a l r e a d y , L e i b n i z ' 
system does n o t a l l o w o f such a r e l a t i o n . L e i b n i z , t h e r e f o r e , 
i n h i s a t t e m p t t o p r o v i d e c e r t a i n knowledge does n o t advance, i n 
Hegel's e s t i m a t i o n , beyond t h e p o s i t i o n o f Spinoza and D e s c a r t e s . 
54. B e t r a n d R u s s e l l . A C r i t i c a l E x p o s i t i o n o f L e i b n i z ' 
P h i l o s o p h y . a l i e n & Unwin ( 1 9 3 7 3 " ? • 1 3 2 ."Hegel's c l a i m 
c o n c e r n i n g L e i o n i z n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n i s t o be fo u n d 
on p. 2 5 0 V/erke 20. 
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Indeed, t h e r e i s l i t t l e t o be s a i d from L e i b n i z ' p o i n t o f 
view. We must e i t h e r accept a l l our knowledge as e t e r n a l 
t r u t h s o r r e j e c t bus system a l t o g e t h e r . E x t e n s i o n and t h o u g h t , 
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j u s t as w i t h D e s c a r t e s and Spinoza, have no d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n . 
T h e i r r e l a t i o n i s the same as t h a t among the monads themselves: 
one o f p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d harmony. There i s , t h e n , no q u e s t i o n 
o f d i s c u s s i n g how they might be r e l a t e d m themselves. To t h i s 
e x t e n t L e i b n i z , m Hegel's view, f o r s a k e s h i s own p r i n c i p l e 
o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n . 
The r e l a t i o n among the monads i s n o t , then, one o f t h e i r 
own making; i t i s one e s t a b l i s h e d by God. T i n s , Hegel c l a i m s , 
i s an e x t r e m e l y a r t i f i c i a l account o f t h e r e l a t i o n between t h i n g s . 
A prime example o f t h i s a r t i f i c i a l r e l a t i o n he argues i s t h e 
c i r c u i t o u s c o n n e c t i o n t h a t e x i s t s between t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n . 
( o r , what i s t n e same, body and s o u l ) m L e i b n i z ' p h i l o s o p h y . 
Tne c o n n e c t i o n , Hegel c l a i m s , t a k e s on t h e f o l l o w i n g form: 'The 
s o u l has t h e r e f o r e a s e r i e s o f c o n c e p t i o n s whicn are developed 
from w i t h i n i t s e l f and t h i s s e r i e s i s o r i g i n a l l y p l a c e d w i t h i n 
i t a t i t s c r e a t i o n . ' And ' p a r a l l e l w i t h t h i s s e r i e s o f v a r y i n g 
c o n c e p t i o n s t h e r e runs a s e r i e s o f movements o f t h e body o r o f 
what e x i s t s o u t s i d e t h e s o u l ' . 'Both are e s s e n t i a l moments o f 
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r e a l i t y ' b u t ' they have i n d i f f e r e n c e t o one a n o t h e r ' . 
Thei^e i s no d i r e c t c o n n e c t i o n between t h e two. I t appears, Therefore, 
as though t h e s o u l i s programmed a t b i r t h w i t h c o n c e p t i o n s t n a t 
5 7 . I b i d . ^ ^ 1 f25o 
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c o r r e s p o n d t o a l l p o s s i b l e c o r p o r e a l o c c u r r e n c e s y and a t the 
ve r y same t i m e t h e body i s programmed w i t h a l l those p o s s i b l e 
c o r p o r e a l o c c u r r e n c e s . That i s t h e i r o n l y l i n k , and t h a t l i n k 
i s i n God. But t h i s , Hegel argues, i s an e x t r e m e l y a r t i f i c i a l 
a ccount o f the m a t t e r s i n c e t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f body and s o u l are n o t 
l i n k e d o f themselves. Indeed such a r e l a t i o n i s p r e c l u d e d . So 
t h a t i n a c t u a l l i f e t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f mind and body r u n s i d e by 
s i d e w i t h o u t t he one d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g t h e o t h e r . J u s t as i n 
Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y , n e i t h e r can t h e body d e t e r m i n e t h e s o u l t o 
a c t n o r t h e s o u l t he body. T h e i r s o l e d i r e c t r e l a t i o n m 
L e i b n i z ' p h i l o s o p h y i s t h e i r p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d harmony i n God. 
I t i s t h a t p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d harmony which m Hegel's view 
t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f a n r o p e r l y developed n o t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n . 
T h i s i s t h e reason why L e i b n i z abandons h i s own p r i n c i p l e s i n c e 
'those a b s o l u t e b a r r i e r s m t h e m i t s e l f o f Monads are n o t 
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p r e s e n t i n and f o r themselves, b u t d i s a p p e a r m the A b s o l u t e . ' 
The s e l f - d i f f e r e n t a t i o n o f t h e monads i s a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
i m p l a n t e d by God. But Hegel c l a i m s , i t i s as though 'when a 
dog g e t s a b e a t i n g t h e p a i n develops i t s e ] f w i t h i n him, s i m i l a r l y 
5 9 - J.C.Horn. O p . c i t . , g i v e s us t h i s example: 'The i n d i v i d u a l 
concept o f A l e x a n d e r o r Caesar c o n t a i n s e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n 
i t s e l f t h a t he w i l l a c t u a l l y r u n a c r o s s ' and concludes 'so 
t h a t i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s t he concept o f Adam c o n t a i n s 
the whole human r a c e ' . p. 3 5 - See a l s o i b i d . p. 5 0 . 
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t h e b e a t i n g develops i t s e l f ' , , j u s t as t h e b e a t e r develops 
h i m s e l f w i t h i n h i m s e l f , t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a l l c o r r e s p o n d 
t o one a n o t h e r - b u t each i s independent - t h u s n o t t h r o u g h 
t h e i r o b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n ' . ^ 1 I n d i v i d u a t i o n t a k e s on t h i s 
d e r i s o r y form w i t h L e i b n i z because t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i v e 
r e l a t i o n between the monads themselves. They i n t e r a c t n o t a t 
t h e i r own behest but a t t h a t o f God. None can be caused t o 
a c t by a n o t h e r monad; none can c o o r d i n a t e i t s a c t i v i t y w i t h t h a t 
o f a n o t h e r . They are not t h e r e f o r e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s 
s i n c e an i n d i v i d u a l m t h i s sense bears a r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r t h i n g s 
T h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s u l t i m a t e l y d i s a p p e a r m God. They are n o t 
g e n u i n e l y s e l f - d etermined s i n c e t h e y are d e t e r m i n e d by God t o 
g i v e t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e o f a l l w o r l d s . So Hegel concludes t h a t 
w i t h L e i b n i z as w i t h h i s f e l l o w m e t a p h y s i c i a n s Spinoza and 
De s c a r t e s God ' i s t h e d r a m (Gosse) i n t o which a l l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
f l o w ' . Since i n d i v i d u a t i o n i s n o t p r o p e r l y c o n c e i v e d , i t i s 
God t h a t has t o take or t h e burden o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f t h e 
w o r l d . 
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HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF EMPIRICISM: THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LOCKE 
AND HUME 
As I i n d i c a t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s e n q u i r y t h e 
t h e o r i e s o f knowledge o f Locke and Hume p r e s e n t a marked c o n t r a s t 
t o t hose we have j u s t d i s c u s s e d . God f i g u r e s l i t t l e , I f a t a l l , 
m t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i e s . I n t h e i r accounts o f t h e o r i g i n s o f 
our knowledge, Locke and Hume p l a c e g r e a t emphasis on i t s b e i n g 
our knowledge conveyed m o u r t h o u g h t . Thus, i n c o n t r a s t t o 'the 
R a t i o n a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s who tended t o t r e a t t h o u g h t as a d i s -
embodied u n i v e r s a l opposed t o e x t e n s i o n , t h e ' t h o u g h t ' w i t h which 
t h e y d e a l i s always t h e t h o u g h t o f a human i n d i v i d u a l . Conse-
q u e n t l y t h e problems t h a t a r i s e f o r them i n e x a m i ning knowledge 
are o f a k i n d w h o l l y d i f f e r e n t from those encountered by De s c a r t e 
Spinoza and L e i b n i z . They are t h e problems t h a t a re more t r a d i t 
l o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e 'Problem o f Knowledge'; t h a t i s t h e y 
concern t h e r e l a t i o n o f o u r t h i n k i n g t o i t s o b j e c t . And Hegel, 
d e s p i t e Habermas' s t r i c t u r e s , has a g r e a t d e a l t o say on t h e 
m a t t e r . 
John Locke m h i s Essay c o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t a c k l e s t h e problem o f knowledge m f o u r s t a g e s , w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d 
t o t h e f o u r books o f t h e Essay. I n Book One he endeavours t o 
r e f u t e t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e can be i n n a t e i d e a s . I n one way 
o r a n o t h e r t h i s n o t i o n has been i m p l i c i t m t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s 
o f t h e R a t i o n a l i s t s . (We have j u s t seen how, f o r example, i t 
f i g u r e s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f L e i b n i z : as e t e r n a l t r u t h s i m p l a n t e d 
m us by God a t our c r e a t i o n . ) Locke, h a v i n g t o h i s own 
s a t i s f a c t i o n r e f u t e d t h i s n o t i o n , i s the n f a c e d w i t h t h e t a s k o f 
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d e s c r i b i n g t h e t r u e o r i g i n o f i d e a s . T i n s , a s i s w e l l - k n o w n , 
forms t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e second book o f t h e Essay: 'Of I d e a s ' . 
I t i s m d e l i b e r a t i n g on o u r i d e a s , t h e n 1 c o m b i n a t i o n and t h e i r 
o r i g i n , t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f language, o f o u r use o f words 
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i s b r o u g h t home t o him. Book Three t h e r e f o r e d e a l s w i t h 'Words 
o r Language m g e n e r a l ' . And i t i s a f t e r t h a t n e c e s s a r y d i g -
r e s s i o n t h a t Locke r e t u r n s t o h i s p r i n c i p a l c oncern w h i c h i s t o 
d i s c o v e r what knowledge we have by t h e use w h i c h t h e u n d e i s t a n d i n g 
makes o f our i d e a s . Book Four o f t h e Essay i s t h e r e f o r e 'of 
Knowledge and O p i n i o n 1 . 
Hegel t h i n k s t h a t Lccke w i t h t h i s account t h a t he g i v e s i n 
t h e Essay o f t h e o r i g i n and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f c u r .ideas 'had t r i e d 
t o s a t i s f y a genuine need o f p h i l o s o p h y ' . 0 ^ 1 I t i s n o t t o t h e i r 
c r e d i t t h a t D e s c a r t e s , Spinoza and L e i b n i z d i s p e n s e w i t h such an 
account f o r t h e consequence i s t h a t we have t o acce p t immediate];/ 
as t r u e t h e f u n d a m e n t a l i d o a s o f t h e i r systems. Tnese i d e a s 
t h e r e f o r e appear as u n e n b i t a b l e d e f i n i t i o n s , axioms, p r o p o s i t i o n s 
e t c . I t i s i n t h i s way t h a t t h e meaning o f such terms as 
Substance, mode, e x t e n s i o n and t h e Monad are f i x e d - w i t h o u t t h e 
a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s b e i n g argued. Hegel f i n d s 
t h i s p r o c e d u r e t o be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y s i n c e , he c l a i m s , i t i s t h e 
o b j e c t o f a p h i l o s o p h y t o prove i t s t r u t h , n o t s i m p l y t o a s s e r t 
i t . I t i s t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e d e r i v a t i o n o f such 
6 2 . John Locke. An Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g . C o l l i e r 
Books, New York-London 19o5.~Ed. M.Cranston, p.2 2 3 . 
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i d e a s as Substance and Monad s h o u l d be e x p l a i n e d and some 
i n d i c a t i o n as t o how they may be v e r i f i e d s h o u l d a l s o be 
g i v e n . I t i s Locke's m e r i t , Hegel c l a i m s , t o have drawn 
a t t e r t i o n t o t h i s n e c e s s i t y . From now on, he t h e r e f o r e 
argues, t h e mam ide a s o f p h i l o s o p h y have t o be d e r i v e d and 
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n o t o r a c u l a r l y pronounced. 
I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel f i n d s Locke's s t a r t i n g -
p o i n t i n e p i s t e m o l o g y t o be t h e c o r r e c t one. LocRe, he argues, 
r i g h t l y b e g i n s w i t h what i s 'immediate t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s , ' by 
w h i c h Hegel means t h a t Locke b e g i n s from t h e d a t a s u p p l i e d by 
our s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s . I t i s from t h e c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e 
b e g i n n i n g i n t h i s way w i t h our sense-impressions t h a t u n i v e r s a l e 
( t h a t i s , concepts su^h as Substance, a t t r i b u t e and mode) have 
t o be d e r i v e d . T h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t Hegel t h i n k s corresponds 
t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f each i n d i v i d u a l ; each t h e r e f o r e w i l l be 
a b l e t o v e r i f y t h e concepts f o r h i m s e l f . Because i n t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s e x p e r i e n c e t h e immediate, che sense-d^ta, alwaye 
precedes the u n i v e r s a l : 'Space, f o r example, comes l a t e r t o 
consciousness t h a n t h e s p a t i a l , t h e s p e c i e s l a t e r t h a n t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l . . ' J The u n i v e r s a l cannot t h e r e f o r e be presupposed 
s i n c e i t i s always a r e s u l t . I ndeed, Hegel suggests t h a t 
everybody knows t h i s i s t h e case, t h a t he b e g i n s m h i s t h i n k i n g 
f r o m w h o l l y c o n c r e t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and o n l y s u b s e q u e n t l y organ-
i s e s t h a t d a t a i n t o knowledge. Hence p h i l o s o p h y has t o proceed 
64. 
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i n t h a t manner n o t o n l y because i t i s t h e manner m which 
o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g proceeds, b u t a l s o m o r d e r t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y 
t h i n k e r may a t t e s t t o i t s t r u t h . 
I n a d o p t i n g t h i s course m h i s p h i l o s o p h y Locke i s m 
Hegel's view c o m p l e t e l y c o r r e c t . However he f a l l s down m 
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Hegel's e s t i m a t i o n by n o t p u r s u i n g i t d i a l e c t i c a l l y . S t a r t -
i n g w i t h i n d i v i d u a l sense-experience Locke seeks t o show t h a t 
a l l i d e a s o r i g i n a t e i n s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s , and i t i s t h e manner 
i n w h i c h he s e t s about d o i n g t h i s , Hegel c l a i m s , t h a t i t i s 
u n d i a l e c t i c a l . A c c o r d i n g t o Locke i d e a s are e i t h e r a r r i v e d 
a t t h r o u g h t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e body's s e n s a t i o n s 
o r t h r o u g h t he i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e f l e c t i o n on h i s m e n t a l a c t i v i t y 
aroused by those s e n s a t i o n s . There i s no m e n t a l a c t i v i t y p r i o r 
t o t h e s t i m u l u s o f s e n s a t i o n . A l l t h i n k i n g t h e r e f o r e i s brougn 
about by 'the i m p r e s s i o n s t h a t outward o b j e c t s make on our 
s e n s e s ' I t i s i n t h i s way, Hegel says, t h a t ' u n i v e r s a l 
i d e a s ' are shown by Locke ' t o a r i s e s u b j e c t i v e l y from o b j e c t s ' . 0 
I n s t e a d o f h i s p r o c e e d i n g d i a l e c t i c a l l y from t h e o b j e c t and the 
s u b j e c t t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e I and t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f 
t h e o b j e c t , Locke remains a t t h e s t a r t i n g - p o i n t : i n d i v i d u a l , 
c o n t i n g e n t s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n . I n h i s p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e f o r e , 
Hegel argues, we have always t o do w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l sense-
p e r c e p c i o n , never w i t h o b j e c t s as o b j e c t s o f t h o u g h t o r w i t h 
66. Tbid- 'So t h e course which LOCKC adopted i s q u i t e c o r r e c t 
But i t i s n o t d i a l e c t i C a l l y ( a d o p t e d ) r a t h e r t h e u n i v e r s a l 
i s a n a l y s e d from t h e e m p i r i c a l c o n c r e t e ' . 
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t h o u g h t as shared ( u n i v e r s a l ) t h o u g h t . I t i s on these 
grounds t h a t Hegel t h i n k s Kant was r i g h t t o c r i t i c i z e Locke 
by a r g u i n g t h a t ' i t i s n o t t h e i n d i v i d u a l who i s t h e source 
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o f u n i v e r s a l c o n c e p t i o n s b u t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ^ Hegel i s 
p r e p a r e d t o g r a n t t h a t i d e a s may o r i g i n a t e m i n d i v i d u a l sense-
p e r c e p t i o n b u t t h e y are n o t i n h i s o p i n i o n w h o l l y formed o r , 
Indeed, t o be v e r i f i e d t h e r e . T h i s i s Hegel's major methodol-
o g i c a l c r i t i c i s m o f Locke: t h a t he pl a c e s t o o h i g h a v a l u e on 
s e n s a t i o n i n o u r knowledge. T h i s o v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f t h e s i g n i f -
i c a n c e o f sense-data a r i s e s because Locke does n o t co n c e i v e t h i s 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t d i a l e c t i c a l l y . Had he con c e i v e d i t m t h a t 
manner, Hegel b e l i e v e s , he would have found t h a t w i t h t h e 
advance o f the argument our c o n c e p t i o n o f i t s b e g i n n i n g i s 
c o n t i n u a l l y m o d i f i e d . 
As I have a l r e a d y remarked, Locke b e g i n s h i s Essay OP The 
Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a r e f u t a t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f i n n a t e 
i d e a s . He i s opposed t o t h e i d e a on p e r f e c t l y c l e a r grounds. 
They are t h a t ' i f we w i l l a t t e n t i v e l y c o n s i d e r new-born c h i l d r e n , 
we s h a l l have l i t t l e reason t o t h i n k t h a t t h e y b r i n g many id e a s 
i n t o t h e w o r l d w i t h them. For, b a t i n g perha.ps some f a i n t i d e a s 
o f hunger and t h i r s t , and warmth...there i s n o t t h e l e a s t appear-
ance o f any s e t t l e d i d e a s a t a l l m therriy e s p e c i a l l y o f i d e a s 
a n s w e r i n g t h e terms w h i c h make up those u n i v e r s a l p r o p o s i t i o n s 
t h a t are esteemed as i n n a t e p r i n c i p l e s . ' ' ' 0 U n f o r t u n a t e l y , 
Hegel's a t t i t u d e t o t h e m a t t e r i s more ambiguous. He i s n e i t h e r 
69. I b i d p. 206. 
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f u l l y a b l e t o acce p t t h e n o t i o n o f i n n a t e i d e a s n o r ( l i k e 
L ocke) t o r e j e c t i t c o m p l e t e l y . He i s n o t prepared t o d i s c a r d 
th e n o t i o n s i n c e he t h i n k s Locke's r e j e c t i o n o f t h e n o t i o n t o 
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be t i e d up w i t h a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e mind as a t a b u l a r a s a , 
and he i s n o t a b l e t o accept t h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s c o n c e p t i o n 
t h a t t h e mind r e c e i v e s a l l i t s c o n t e n t t h r o u g h e x t e r n a l s t i m u l -
a t i o n and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e r e i s no p a r t o f an i d e a t h a t i s 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e mind a l o n e . For t h i s i s what Locke c l a i m s : 
t h a t t h e mind w h i c h i s a t a b u l a rasa r e c e i v e s a l l i t s c o n t e n t 
f r o m s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e . Hegel g r a n t s t h a t t h e r e i s some s t r e n g t h 
t o t h e c r i t i c i s m o f t h e n o t i o n o f i n n a t e i d e a s . As we a l r e a d y 
know, he b e l i e v e s t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s t h r o u g h p r e s e n t i n g t h e i r 
p r i n c i p a l i d e a s as i n n a t e o r e t e r n a l t r u t h s had evaded t h e t a s k 
o f p r o v i n g t h o s e i d e a s t o be t r u e . What i s more, Hegel t h i n k s 
t h a t Locke had e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i m p o r t a n t p r e c e d e n t i n p h i l o s o p h y 
t h a t i d e a s s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d as f i r s t b e i n g caused ' t h r o u g h s o t c -
i t h i n g e x t e r n a l ' . 'The a c t i v i t y o f mind', he argues, ' i s f j . r s t 
r e a c t i o n ; o n l y i n t h i s way w i l l i t become c o n s c i o u s o f i t s 
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essence'. A c c o r d i n g l y , i t i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t h a t i d e a s be 
r e g a r d e d s i m p l y as b e i n g e x i s t e n t m t h e mind. We have t o under-
s t a n d them, f o l l o w i n g t h e pre c e d e n t e s t a b l i s h e d by Locke, as 
f i r s t b e i n g caused by o u r e n v i r o n m e n t . A g a i n s t t h i s background, 
however, Hegel does want t o argue t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f i n n a t e 
i d e a s has a s i g n i f i c a n c e . They do e x i s t i n t h e mind :'n a 
71-
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c e r t a i n sense f o r hxm b u t , maybe, n o t i n the sense i n i t i a l l y 
i n t e n d e d by t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s who had f i r s t argued t h e i r e x i s -
t e n c e . He would r a t h e r r e g a r d them as ' p r o p e r t i e s o f a germ 
(Keim), t h a t do n o t y e t e x i s t ' , ^ n o t as c o m p l e t e l y developed 
i d e a s . I n t h i s sense he b e l i e v e s thern t o be e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t s 
o f t h e t h i n k i n g p r ocess. So he m o d i f i e s t h e n o t i o n t o t h e 
e x t e n t t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h e id e a s are n o t t o be regarded as 
i n b o r n b u t as ' i m p l i c i t ' i n t h e human consciousness. Tms, 
t h e n , as f a r as i t goes i s Hegel's a t t i t u d e t o t h e n o t i o n o f 
i n n a t e i d e a s . I t i s c l e a r l y a p e c u l i a r response t o t h e prob -
lem, and I b e l i e v e t h e r e are two reasons why t h i s appears t o 
be so. F i r s t l y , i t i s s t r a n g e t h a t t h e i d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r , 
Hegel, s h o u l d argue t h a t t h e f i r s t s t i m u l u s t o t h o u g h t i s p r o -
v i d e d by t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , f o r t h i s suggests, t h a t c e r t a i n l y 
a t one l e v e l , he ad m i t s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a w o r l d e x t e r n a l ~o 
mind. Secondly, a l t h o u g h Hegel i s p r e p a r e d t o admit t h a t t h e 
mind f i r s t r e c e i v e s i t s c o n t e n t from o u t s i d e , Le i s n o t l i k e 
Locke prepared t o r e g a r d t h e mind as a b l a n k . We can perhaps 
agree w i t h Hegel t h a t t h e mind i s n o t a b l a n k b u t t h i s t e l i s 
us n o t h i n g about t h e o r i g i n o f i d e a s . P e c u l i a r l y , i t i s 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r Hegel t o i n s i s t t h a t those i d e a s are ' i m p l i c i t ' 
m t h e human mind. 'The q u e s t i o n whence t h e y came' i s d e v o i d 
74 
o f i n t e r e s t f o r him. 
But i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t q u e s t i o n t h a t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o 
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Locke, so t h a t w i l l y - n i l l y Hegel has to engage m the d i s -
cussion concerning the o r i g i n of our ideas. Locke takes a l l 
ideas t o have t h e i r o r i g i n i n experience. He b e l i e v e s t h i s 
i s so since i f we 'suppose the mind t o be, as we say. white 
paper., devoid of a l l characters. w i t h o u t any ideas: How comes 
i t t o be furnished? Whence comes i t by that vast s t o r e which 
the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on i t w i t h an 
almost endless v a r i e t y ? Whence has i t a l l the m a t e r i a l s c f 
reason and knowledge. To t h i s I answer, frorr EXPERIENCE. I n 
t h a t a l l our knowledge i s founded and from t h a t i t u l t i m a t e l y 
d e r i v e s i t s e l f . Our observations employed e i t h e r , about 
e x t e r n a l sensible o b j e c t s , or about the i n t e r n a l operations o f 
our minds perceived and r e f l e c t e d on by ourselves, i s t h a t which 
supplies our understanding w i t h a l l the m a t e r i a l s of our t h m k -
i n g . J Hegel does not wish t o disagree w i t h t h i s . He b e l i e v e 
however, t h a t the i m p o r t a r t question i s 'what one understands by 
7 f t 
experience'. Locke as, we can see, understands by experience 
'our obeservations employed e i t h e r , about e x t e r n a l sensible 
o b j e c t s , or about the i n t e r n a l operations of our minds' awakened 
by e x t e r n a l s t i m u l a t i o n . Experience i s , f o r Locke, the experJen 
of the impression t h a t the world makes on ourselves, ana i t takes 
i t s o r i g i n m the senses. The senses convey t o the mind, 
'Several d i s t i n c t perceptions of t h i n g s , according to those 
77 
various ways wherein those o b j e c t s do a f f e c t them'. 
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Once i n the mind these ideas are operated on by our ' i n t e r n a l 
sense' and through t h i s i n t e r n a l sense observing i t s own a c t i v i t y 
we have the ideas of r e f l e c t i o n . Thus both the ideas of sensa-
t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n are derived from experience conceived as 
the observation of the o b j e c t s of our senses. This account o f 
experience Hegel regards as the ' n a t u r a l ' epistemoiogy of n a t u r a l 
science. However, he says, i t i s not f o r t h a t reason t r u e . 
The theory of knowledge^m h i s view7, has to be more than a 
r e f l e c t i o n on the a c t i v i t i e s of n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s . 
I n the question at issue, the proper account of experience, 
Hegel agrees w i t h Locke t h a t e v e r ything i s experienced. Every-
t h i n g , he admits, has t o be i n our experience before i t i s known. 
I t would be absurd f o r one t o b e l i e v e t h a t one can know what i s 
not experienced. But i t i s what i s understood by experience 
t h a t has, m Hegel's view, to be c l a r i f i e d . When Locke t a l k s 
of the experience of the mind, what he means i s i t s r e f l e c t i o n on 
what i s e x t e r n a l t o j t , what, t h e r e f o r e , does not pertair. to : t s 
nature. But t h i s i s not how Hegel understands experience. For 
him ' I must have t h a t myself, be t h a t myself, what I have and am 
i ft 
i s experience'. I n h i s view experience i s not simply what we 
sense, but what determines and moves my mind. Even i f we add 
the n o t i o n of r e f l e c t i o n t o t h a t of sensation we s t i l l do not 
have an adequate account, since experience i s not of something 
t h a t i s simply e x t e r n a l t o me; t h a t something must e i t h e r be 
p a r t of my i d e n t i t y or be something t h a t T possess. For example, 
78. Hegel.3 bid,p. 213. 
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' I am a man, have a c t i v i t y , w i l l , a consciousness of t h a t which 
! 7° 
I am and others are, and so t h i s i s c e r t a i n l y experience . 
So experience, Hegel appears t o be arguing, i s always personal 
and a c t i v e i n nature. I t presupposes a w i l l . Equally i t i s 
not only the experience of myself qua i n d i v i d u a l or simply of 
obje c t s of my perception, but of others. Thus experience, 
Hegel suggests, i s immediately s o c i a l ; c e r t a i n l y i t i s never 
blank. 
I t i s immediately apparent t h a t experience conceived m 
t h i s fashion i s not confined t o observation as w i t h the empiric-
i s t philosophers. According t o Hegel i t i s both p r a c t i c a l 
and s o c i a l . And i t i s h i s opinion t h a t tne problems of the 
e m p i r i c i s t philosophers, who r e s t t h e i r arguments on a narrow 
conception of experience, recede i n t o the background i f we 
understand experience as he suggests. For example, t h a t I 
know man from experience i m p l i e s t h a t ' a l l are men, I do not 
need t o have seen them a l l ' t o be sure of t h a t . Tbac ' I have 
a consciousness of myself and what others are' i m p l i e s t h a t I 
, gQ 
know what men i n general are. My experience c o r r e c t l y con-
ceived i s per se u n i v e r s a l . By which Hegel means we do not 
have t o search outside ourselves f o r a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h ; i t 
i s contained m experience i t s e l f . 
I t seems we have now come near t o understanding what Hegel 
means by experience; i t does not appeal' a l l t h a t d i f f e r e n t from 
79- I b i d . 
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what i s normally understood by experience. But the appearance 
i s deceptive,experience, as we normally use i t i s f a r too vague 
a term f o r Hegel's purposes. I n h i s vocabulary i t has a more 
precise meaning. According t o him ' i t i s n o t h i n g more than 
the form o f o b j e c t i v i t y ; t h a t there i s something in conscious-
ness means t h a t i t has an o b j e c t i v e form f o r i t or, i t experiences 
the same, i t looks on i t as something o b j e c t i v e , - immediate 
8l 
knowledge, perception'. E v e r y t h i n g t h a t there i s t o be known 
must, i n h i s view, take on t h i s form, i t has t o be something f o r 
consciousness. The o b j e c t must'be seen, heard - sensed m one 
way or another. I t has t o be an appearance m the world. An 
e s s e n t i a l component of Hegel's n o t i o n of experience i s , then, 
p a r a d o x i c a l l y the e m p i r i c i s t ' s d e p i c t i o n of i t . S?nce 'there i s 
i n Empiricism t h i s great p r i n c i p l e t h a t what i s t r u e must be i n 
82 
r e a l i t y and must be there f o r p e r c e p t i o n . ' So our experience, 
he suggests, i s f i r s t l y the connection t h a t tneught nas w i t h 
r e a l i t y . I t i s t h i s l i n k t h a t is not developed i n the p n i l o s o p r -
i e s o f Leibniz,Spinoza and Descartes since 'thought as not con-
side r e d as sensation'. But as we have now been l e d t o expect, t h a t , 
f o r Hegel t i s not a l l t h a t there i s to experience. I t has, he 
says, "to be d i f f e r e n t : ated from the simple i n d i v i d u a l p erception 
of i n d i v i d u a l f a c t s . -" The f a c t t h a t something has taken or 
an o b j e c t i v e form f o r consciousness i n i t s sense-experience does 
not exhaust experience. Just as e s s e n t i a l t o the n o t i o n of 
experience, i n Hegel's view, i s the content of the appearance 
81. T>id p. 215. 
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(Weltegcheinung) what i t i s ' m i t s e l f 1 . This i s , a d m i t t e d l y , 
a complex argument; but i t accounts f o r the u n i v e r s a l and personal 
nature of Hegel's view of experience. What i s as e s s e n t i a l m 
understanding experience i s , he argues, t h a t i t should also be 
seen as 'the overcoming (Aufheben) of the semblance of otherness 
and the r e c o g n i t i o n o f the n e c e s s i t y of the t h i n g through i t s e l f ' . 
The other e s s e n t i a l aspect of experience i s then t h a t we should 
know what i s experienced ' i n i t s e l f ' . That i s the task of science 
(Wissenschaft). I n science Hege] t h i n k s t h a t the semblance of 
the ' i n i t s e l f ' being e x t e r n a l t o me i s overcome. The o b j e c t 
has t o become something f o r me as w e l l as being o b j e c t i v e as the 
e m p i r i c i s t m h i s account of experience claims. I t becomes 
something f o r me, Hegel b e l i e v e s , i n being known. I n science, 
then, he argues, experience i s both personal and uiin versa 1. I t 
i s t h a t which c o n s t i t u t e s genuine experience. 
We have already encorntered the idea t h a t the l a c k of u n i t y 
of being and consciousness i m p l i e s an 'otherness' t o Kegel. I t 
enters i n t o h i s c r i t i c i s m o f both Descartes and Spinoza. As we 
have seen, he believes t h a t i t i s the purpose of philosophy,to over 
come t h i s otherness. I t i s , as ought now t o be c l e a r , a l e i t m o t i ' , 
i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of Locke. I t i s m the e m p i r i c i s t s ' n o t i o n of 
experience t h a t t h i s otherness takes on i t s sharpest form. 
C e r t a i n l y , Hegel b e l i e v e s Locke's philosophy wakens i n the modern 
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era 'the b i f u r c a t i o n ' o f thoughc and being, of the I and r e a l i t y " . 9 
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Locke m regarding experience merely as i n d i v i d u a l and passive 
had placed r e a l i t y on the one side and thought on the other i n 
such a manner t h a t i t was impossible t c mediate the two success-
f u l l y . But experience p r o p e r l y conceived i s the overcoming of 
t h a t b i f u r c a t i o n . Experience i s , Hegel has argued, not only 
the form of o b j e c t i v i t y i n general but i s also the consciousness 
o f what I am or have. Experience i s the overcoming of b i f u r c a t i o n 
since i t i s the process of the o b j e c t i v e world being i n t e r n a l i s e d , 
becoming my own. 
I s h a l l not discuss here the merits of t h i s , Hegel's account 
o f experience as the process of overcoming o b j e c t i v i t y . I t h i n k 
i t w i l l be more appropriate t o discuss i t when we come to Manx's 
c r i t i c i s m of the Phenomenology of Mind, f o r i t i s there t n a t the 
whole discussion concerning e x t e r n a l i s a t J o n and a l i e n a t i o n i n 
Hegel's philosophy a r i s e s . What concerns us here i s the s t r e n g t h 
D f Hegel's c r i t i c i s m of Locke's theory of knowledge. That I 
t h i n k l i e s m h i s o b j e c t i o n t o the narrowness of Locke's Ldea of 
experience. Experience, as Locke understands i t , i s almost 
e x c l u s i v e l y confined t o the i n d i v i d u a l ' s sensation. What, 
according to him, we are to suppose when we examine experience i s 
t h a t the mind is,as he says, a white paper, void of a l l characters, 
without any idea of i t s own. Experience i s what subsequently 
impresses i t s e l f on the mind through the organs of sense. Ex-
perience, chen, i s confined t o t a s t i n g , seeing, hearing, f e e l i n g 
and s m e l l i n g . Kegel, however, argues t h a t t h i s i s but the matter 
of thought not t h i n k i n g i t s e l f . For t h a t reason, he suggests, 
Locke's n o t i o n c f experience lacks u n i v e r s a l i t y . Now what Hegel 
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appears t o mean by t h i s i s t h a t what we experience according 
t o Locke's account of i t i s d e f i c i e n t i n two respects. F i r s t l y , 
i t lacks u n i v e r s a l i t y because i t i s the sense-experience of an 
i n d i v i d u a l ; and who, Hegel would argue, can convey a f e e l i n g 
other than s u b j e c t i v e l y ? Secondly, i t lacks u n i v e r s a l i t y because 
i t i s the experience of an i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l not, as 1 i n d i c a t e d 
e a r l i e r , a shared experience. Experience conceived i n t h i s way 
cannot f u r n i s h knowledge, c e r t a i n or otherwise. 
Hegel seeks t o ground t h i s c r i t i c i s m more f i r m l y by examining 
Locke's account of the d e r i v a t i o n of complex ideas. Now, according 
t o LocRe such complex ideas as the notions of cause and e f f e c t 
are derived from experience i n t h i s way: ' i n the n o t i c e t h a t our 
senses take of the constant v i c i s s i t u d e s of t h i n g s , we cannot but 
observe t h a t several p a r t i c u l a r , both q u a l i t i e s and substances, 
begin t o e x i s t ; and t h a t they receive t h i s t h e i r existence from 
the due a p p l i c a t i o n and operation of some other bei.ig. From 
, 86 
t h i s observation we get our ideas of cause and e t f e c t . This 
account of the o r i g i n of our complex ideas, Hegel argues, i s 
tautologous m nature. I t appears t h a t Locke i s cl a i m i n g t h a t we 
>v) 
o b t a i n the not i o n s o f cause and e f f e c t simply be observing the 
'constant v i c i s s i t u d e ? o f t h i n g s ' . By observing t h a t constant 
v i c i s s i t u d e of th i n g s we perceive t h a t some th i n g s begin to e x i s t , 
and we a t t r i b u t e t h a t existence t o the a c t i o n of another e x i s t e n t 
t h i n g . We c a l l the t h i n g coming i n t o existence ' e f f e c t ' and the 
t h i n g t h a t i s already e x i s t e n t 'cause'. Locke seems then t o be 
86. Locke.op.cit.,p. 188 
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saying t h a t the complex ideas cause and e f f e c t are simply 
l a b e l s we a t t a c h to two d i s t i n c t but connected observations. 
What has happened m Hegel's opinion i s t h a t we have been asiced 
t o take note of two o b j e c t s i n our sense-experience t h a t already 
87 
stand i n a concrete r e l a t i o n t o one anotner. From the 
p a r t i c u l a r instance of t h i s r e l a t i o n we are asked t o pass immed-
i a t e l y t o the u n i v e r s a l : the categories or the complex ideas o f 
cause and e f f e c t . Tt i s , Hegel argues, 'a t r a n s l a t i o n from the 
determinate i n t o the form of u n i v e r s a l i t y , wherein the same l i e s 
8^ 
at i t s basis..'." The t a u t o l o g y , Hegel would claim, c o n s i s t s 
t h e r e f o r e i n the categories being derived from what i s a3 ready 
known to be a p a r t i c u l a r instance of t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y . Fo^. 
at the basis of the observation which i s employed t o derive the 
categories I J e the categories themselves. Hegel's p o i n t appears 
t o be simply t h a t we cannot point t o a p a r t i c u l a r instance of the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the ideas cause and e f f e c t without our beforehand 
possessing those ideas. 
This, then, i s what Hegel believes t o be the defect of Locke's 
d e r i v a t i o n of complex ideas from sense-experience. Locke, of 
course, does not immediately proceed t o t h i s d e r i v a t i o n m h i s 
Essay on the Human Understanding. I t comes at the end of a 
lengthy account of the general process of a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t cakes 
place m our t h i n k i n g . I t i s the nature of t h i s general process 
of a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t f o r him casts doubts on the c e r t a i n t y of our 
knowledge. He begins, as Hegel notes, by making a d i s t i n c t i o n 
87. Hegel. Subrkamp Verlag Werl e 20, p. 219- 'One could say,' 
he adds, 'that there i s n o thing more s u p e r f i c i a l than t h i s 
deduction of ideas.' 
88. I b i d . 
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s i m i l a r t o t h a t of Descartes and Spinoza between ideas 'as they 
are ideas or perceptions i n our minds, and as they are m o d i f i c -
a t i o n s of matter m the bodies t h a t cause such perceptions m 
, 89 
us . I t i s m the basis of t h i s observation t h a t Locke makes 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between the primary q u a l i t i t e s of an o b j e c t : the 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s of matter m the bodies and i t s secondary q u a l i t i e s : 
ideas or perceptions i n our minds. The primary q u a l i t i e s are 
'such as are u t t e r l y inseparable from the body, an what s t a t e 
1 90 
soever i t be . - He suggests t h a t the p r i n c i p a l examples of 
such primary q u a l i t i e s are s o l i d i t y , extension, f i g u r e , motion 
and r e s t . Secondary q u a l i t i e s are on the other hand those 
'which m t r u t h are n o t h i n g m the o b j e c t s themselves but powers 
t o produce various sensations i n us by t h e i r primary q u a l i t i e s ! " 
I t f o l l o w s f o r Locke char, sample ideas derived from sense-impress-
ions do not n e c e s s a r i l y resemble the o b j e c t s which are t h e i r 
e f f e c t i v e cause. He appears, then, to be c l a i m i n g t h a t simple 
sense-ideas, such as t h ^ t of colour, are not derived from t h i n g s 
by themselves but r a t h e r from our manner of sensing t h i n g s . 
Thus simple ideas 'whatever r e a l i t y we by mistake a t t r i b u t e t o 
them' are, he repeats, 'nothing m the o b j e c t s themselves but 
powers to produce various sensations i n u s ' S i m p l e ideas of 
sensation m h i s e s t i m a t i o n f a l l short of g i v i n g an accurate 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the object which induces them. This d i s t i n c t i o n , 
as Hegel p o i n t s out, i s one made by Descartes and Spmoza. i*Te 
might remember, however, t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n takes on a s l i g h t l y 
89- Locke, op. c i t . . p. 82. 
90. i b i d . p . 83. 
91. I b i d . 
92. I b i d - p . 85. 
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d i f f e r e n t form i n t h e i r philosophies since they are prepared 
t o admit only one primary q u a l i t y of o b j e c t s : extension. They 
t h e r e f o r e b e l i e v e t h a t the Knowledge imparted by our senses i s 
more r e s t r i c t e d than Locke suggests. They are, however, at one 
though w i t h Locke m s t r e s s i n g the deceptive nature of the ideas 
imparted by our sense-experience. 
Hegel i s o f the o p i n i o n t h a t t h i s emphasis on the deceptive 
nature of our sense-experience represents, m Locke's theory of 
knowledge, a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . He accounts f o r the c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
i n t h i s way. T r u t h , Locke asserts, ' i s the agreement of our 
i 93 
ideas w i t h the r e a l i t y of t h i n g s This, obviously, i s a 
correspondence n o t i o n o f t r u t h according t o which we e s t a b l i s h 
the t r u e nature o f t h i n g s by observing 'the product of t h i n g s 
i 94 op e r a t i n g on the mind t h a t i s , by examining our sense-ideas. 
The touchstone of knowledge i s , then, our observations of externa] 
sensible o b j e c t s . The c o n t r a d i c t i o n a r i s e s , Hegel claims, i n 
t h a t t h i s touchstone, i n the course of Locke's d i s t i n g u i s n i n g 
primary and secondary q u a l i t i e s m o b j e c t s , i s i t s e l f shown t o 
f u r n i s h u n r e l i a b l e knowledge. So, Hegel, suggests, m Locke's 
theory of knowledge the standard of t r u t h i s i t s e l f untrue. 
Hegel expresses t h i s m a somewhat complex manner by c l a i m i n g 
t h a t , m Locke's epistemology, 'the moment o f being f o r another 
i s explained t o be i n e s s e n t i a l ' and nonetheless (Locke) sees 
' a l l t r u t h i n being f o r a n o t h e r ' . ^ By which I take him t o mean. 
93- I b i d . , p . 325-
94. I bid.,p. 320. 
95» Hegel. WerKe 20, p. 21*5 He t h i n g s t h a t LccKe h i m s e l f i s 
aware of t n i s problem. 
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as I already i n d i c a t e d , t h a t on the one hand Locke stresses 
the deceptive nature of sense-impressions (the moment of being 
f o r another i s explained t o be e s s e n t i a l ) and on the other he tak 
as the standard of t r u t h t h a t very same sense-experience (he sees 
a l l t r u t h i n being f o r another). Hence the claim i s t h a t Locke 
undermines his own theory o f knowledge by arguing t h a t the simple 
ideas o f sensation are deceptive. 
I t i s nevertheless through the combination of these vanous 
imprecise simple ideas t h a t , according t o Locke, vie are able l o 
c o n s t r u c t those complex ideas w i t h which t o perceive substances. 
I t i s more than evident t h a t 'such a complex idea cannot be the 
r e a l essence of any substance f o r then the p r o p e r t i e s i n t h a t 
body would depend on t h a t complex idea, and be deducible from 
196 
i t , and t h e i r necessary connection be known. Locke argues 
t h a t the ideas making up a complex idea ought t o be d e r i v e d f r c n 
the substance i t s e l f . However, what our senses secure from the 
observation o f the substance i t s e l f ( a t l e a s t i n the case of the 
ideas of the secondary q u a l i t i e s of t h a t substance) i s u n r e l i a b l e 
knowledge. So the only way t h a t our complex ideas can possibly 
be congruent w i t h the p r o p e r t i e s of the substance by i t s e l f i s 
'that the p r o p e r t i e s i n t h a t body would depend on t h a t complex 
i d e a . 1 But t h i s i s c l e a r l y incompatible w i t h the standard o f 
t r u t h which i s the o b j e c t as i t i s by i t s e l f . I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
a l l cur complex ideas are imperfect and inadequate. Since, i f 
we d i d have an exact c o l l e c t i o n of a l l the secondary q u a l i t i e s 
o f a substance m our complex idea, we should not have an idea 
96. L o c k e . i b i d .p. 215. 
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o f the essence o f t h a t t h i n g . I n Locke's view, we cannot 
know what a substance i s i n i t s e l f . 
Locke conceives the problem more f u l l y under tne n o t i o n 
o f co-existence. This i s a simple enough n o t i o n . I t i s h i s 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t there i s no c e r t a i n t y t h a t what we understand 
t o c o - e x i s t i $ one subject m our ideas does so i n r e a l i t y . So, 
as. f a r as Locke i s concerned, i t i s impossible f o r us t o know 
what p r o p e r t i e s have a necessary union or incons i s t e n c y w i t h one 
another. I t f o l l o w s t h a t i t i s impossible f o r us to know how 
we should p r o p e r l y demarcate substances w i t h our ideas. He 
claims t h a t t h i s i s so because f i r s t l y , i t i s most probable 
t h a t there are i n s e n s i b l e pares o f o b j e c t s which e q u a l l y co-
e x i s t w i t h the causes of our other ideas i n the object and., 
secondly, because i t may be t h a t the v"ery same ob j e c t w i l l be 
found elsewhere i n nature w i t h y e t another property c o - e x i s t i n g 
98 
i n i t . I n both these instances we would be prevented from 
demarcating an obj e c t p r o p e r l y . We are, then, on these grounds 
again not able t o claim adequate knowledge o f substances since 
such knowledge would c o n s i s t i n knowing what a l l the p r o p e r t i e s 
o f an o b j e c t are 'by i t s e l f ' . 
Hegel concludes from a l l t h i s t h a t ' t h e u n i v e r s a l as such 
i s according t o Locke the pi oduct of our mind; I t i s not o b j e e t i ' / 
but only r e l a t e s i t s e l f t o the o b j e c t ' . S i n c e we do a f t e r a l l 




I b i d . p. 220. 
I b i d . p . 310. 
Hegel .Werke, p. 220. 
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i s o bliged t o argue t h a t those ideas are something we formulate 
f o r our s u b j e c t i v e purposes only. The l a s t t h i n g he can argue 
i s t h a t they are o b j e c t i v e or t r u e . This n o t i o n of a complex 
idea Hegel equates w i t h h i s n o t i o n of a species-idea (Gattung-
s b e g r i f f ) . So he takes Locke's reasoning t o imply t h a t 'the 
species indeed expresses something t h a t i s i n the o b j e c t s ; they 
do not exhaust the objects however.' 1 0 0 I n h i s view, t h i s 
reasoning accounts f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Locke makes between 
r e a l and nominal essences. The species ideas are n e c e s s a r i l y 
nominal essences r a t h e r than r e a l essences because they do not 
exhaust the nature of t h e i r o b j e c t s . For example, m speaking 
o f man or gold or any other species which we suppose t o con s i s t 
of a precise essence imparted t o the objects by n a t u i e , we can-
not be c e r t a i n , Locke t h i n k s , of the t r u t h o f any a f f i r m a t i o n 
made about i t . " 1 ' 0 1 We are indeed, i n h i s view, q u i t e out of 
o" r way when we t h i n k t h a t t h i n g s contain w i t h i n themselves the 
q u a l i t i e s they appear t o possess. 
Therefore Locke i s , as Hegel notes, q u i t e m awe when i t 
comes to understanding nature. According to him we have but 
l i t t l e i n s i g h t i n t o i t s essence. Things, however absolute and 
100. I b i d . 
101.. Locke, i b i d - p . 332. 
102. 'To suppose t h a t the species of t h i n g s are anything but 
the s o r t i n g of them under general names, according as they 
agree to several a b s t r a c t ideas of which we make those names 
the signs, i s t o confound t r u t h , and introduce u n c e r t a i n t y 
i n t o a l l the general p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t can be made about 
them.' i b i d . 
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e n t i r e they nay seem i n themselves, 'are D u t r e t a i n e r s Z^ 
other parts of nature f o r t h a t which they are most taken n o t i c e 
of by us'. Those of t h e i r q u a l i t i e s chat we observe, i n c l u d i n g 
any of t h e i r a c t i o n s and powers, are 'owing t o something without 
them'.' ^ There i s not one part of nature, he would claim, t h a t 
i s not i n t h i s way dependent on something beyon^ our apprehension 
Because of t h i s dependence of our knowledge on our l i m i t e d exp-
erience 'a science of nature and the corporeal world i s ' , f o r 
Locke, 'impossible; what remains to us are more or less probable 
• 104 
i n t i m a t i o n s which through each new f a c t can be overthrown'. 
What nature i s m i t s e l f i s , then, m Locke's view f o r e v e r 
beyond our ken. 
Hegel suggests t h a t t h i s i s so because Locke never achieved 
a f u l l understanding of the nature of the t h i n g i n i t s e l f (Ansich 
We have already had some i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s argument m Hegel 's 
account of experience. For Hegel, wnat a t h i n g 'm i t s e l f ' i s 7 
i s i t s concept, t h a t i s , the t h i n g as i t i s understood and not, 
as Locke would have i t , the t h i n g as i t i s passively perceived 
by our senses. Hegel would claim t h e r e f o r e t n a t the t h i n g m 
i t s e l f i s only p r o p e r l y experienced i n our understanding. There-
i t s 'apparent otherness' i s overcome. Because Locke dees not 
have t h i s view of the m i t s e l f (Ansich) Hegel t h i n k s h i s epister-, 
ology i s shallow. Obviously, there i s an element of Hegel's 
103. Locke, i b i d . , p. j?39-
104. Ernst Cassire^, o p . c i t . , Vo]. 2. p. 209. Hegel t h i n k s t h i s 
o b j e c t i o n t o the c e r t a i n t y of n a t u r a l science to oe the o l 
o l d l i t a n y : 'ins innere der Natur d r m g t kem erscnaffener 
Geist'. Werke 20, p. 220. 
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a n t i p a t h y t o a l l materialism contained m t h i s c r i t i c i s m . None 
the l e ss we might agree w i t h Hegel when he argues t h a t Locke's 
epistemology remains at the l e v e l of appearance. Since, a f t e r 
a l l , Locke i s concerned w i t h how th i n g s appear to our senses 
Hegel seems t o be r i g h t m a s s e r t i n g t h a t a l l Locke has to o f f e r i s 
knowledge of phenomena or 'that which i s and not what i s t r u e . ' ^ " 1 
Be t h a t as i t may, he believes t h a t Locke through h i s shallowness 
has misconstrued the purpose of philosophy. I n Hegel's view i t 
has as i t s purpose the examination of the content of experience 
f o r i t s t r u t h . I t i s c e r t a i n l y not i t s aim t o l i m i t experience 
as the e m p i r i c i s t s do. With Locke, he adds, the t r u t h (unless 
i t i s merely v e r b a l t r u t h ) simply s i g n i f i e s the harmony of our 
ideas w i t h e x t e r n a l t h i n g s . A l l t h a t then a r i s e s i n h i s p h i l o s -
ophy i s the question o f the r e l a t i o n of thought t o i t s o b j e c t . 
(This i s what we have i d e n t i f i e d e a r l i e r as the problem of know-
ledge .) The r e s u l t of t l i s , a t t empting to discover the l i m i t s 
of our knowledge, Hegel maintains, i s t h a t the content of thought 
i t s e l f i s l e f t t o one side. But where on the other hand 'thought 
i s from the beginning concrete, thought and the u n i v e r s a l i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h extension, the question concerning the r e l a t i o n of the two 
i s incomprehensible, without i n t e r e s t ' . This we might regard 
as one of the formal grounds f o r Hegel's r e j e c t i o n of the problem 
of knowledge. He reasons t h a t i t cannot represent a problem to 
105. Hegel i b i d . , p. 214. The general o b j e c t i o n i s t o the 
p o s i t i v i t y of the approach. 
106. The opposite of t h i s i s , of coarse, b i f u r c a t e d t h i n k i n g . 
See Werke 20 p. 210. 
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genuine philosophy which i s immediately the concrete knowledge 
of i t object ( o f the Ansich). I n e f f e c t , what he i s saying 
i s f a i r l y simple. He i s saying t h a t where philosophy i s know-
ledge there i s no question as t o whether i t might be. 
I f t h a t i s one of the formal grounds f o r Hegel's r e j e c t i o n 
of the problem of knowledge, we might l e a r n more of the substan-
t i a l grounds m examining h i s o b j e c t i o n s to the philosophy of 
David Hume, f o r m Hume's philosophy the problem takes on i t s 
most vexing form. I t leads, as we s h a l l see, t o a species of 
scepticism. Now Hume, Hegel t h i n k s , took Locke's p r i n c i p l e of 
experience as h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t 'but f o l l o w e d i t through more 
c o n s i s t e n t l y ' . 3 ^ Hume took experience t o mean 'immediate 
p e r c e p t i o n 1 or, what he c a l l s the impressions made by obje c t s on 
our senses. As w i t h Locke immediate perception ( o r these 
impressions) i s the only source of our ideas. Idea r-, according 
to Hume, are then e i t h e r derived from sense impressions or the 
impressions of r e f l e c t i o n i . e . , our fe e l i n g s concerning the 
objec t s about us or our f e e l i n g s concerning the a c t i v i t y of 
our mind. Prom t h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , Hegel e x p l a i n s , Hume procee 
to undermine i n a con s i s t e n t fashion the o b j e c t i v i t y of a l l our 
ideas: 'he abrogated the o b j e c t i v i t y , the being i n and f o r i t s e l f 
108 
of the determinations of thought.' 
107. I b i d p. 28l. 
108. I b i d . Hegel does not simply regard the achievement of 
Hume's n e g a t i v e l y . This i s i n d i c a t e d by h i s use o f the 
term aufheben f o r abrogate. Aufheben can also mean o v e r -
come. Read i n this" sense i t i m p l i e s t h a t Hume's achieve-
ment was t o create the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a higher form o f 
philosophy. This m Hegel's view i s h i s mam achievement 
He sets the scene f o r Kant. See below p.64. 
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A c c o r d i n g t o K e g e l , hune developed h i s i d e a s most c l e a r l y 
i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e c a t e g o r i e s , cause and e f f e c t . The terms,, 
we would agree, are o r d i n a r i l y used t o s i g n i f y a necessary conn-
e c t i o n between two o b j e c t s o r e v e n t s . Hume t h i n k s t h a t t h i s 
o r d i n a r y usage betokens a c o n c l u s i o n g o i n g 'beyond t h e i m p r e s s i o n s 
o f o ur s e n s e s ' . 1 0 ^ For t h a t reason t h e n o t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n 
i m m e d i a t e l y arouses h i s s c e p t i c a l d i s t r u s t . As he argues i t , we 
have i n our minds t h e c a t e g o r i e s cause and e f f e c t which, t o have 
any r e a l i t y must c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e impressions o f our senses. 
T h e i r r e a l i t y , he b e l i e v e s , must be owing t o t h e appearance o f 
an o b j e c t o r ev e n t . We are t h e r e f o r e n o t j u s t i f i e d i n g o i n g 
beyond appearance m an a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e a l i t y . I n 
h i s view a l l t h a t we c o u l d p o s s i b l y g a i n by t h a t would be f u r t h e r 
u n c e r t a i n t y . S i n c e , 'As l o n g as we c o n f i n e o ur s p e c u l a t i o n s t o 
th e appearances o f o b j e c t s t o our senses, w i t h o u t e n t e r i n g i n t o 
d i s q u i s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t 1 e i r r e a l n a t u r e and o p e r a t i o n s , we are 
sa f e from a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s and can nev e r be embarrassed by any 
q u e s t i o n ' . That i s because 'the appearance o f o b j e c t s t o our 
senses are a l l c o n s i s t e n t ; and no d i f f i c u l t i e s can e v e r a r i s e , 
b u t from t h e o b s c u r i t y o f t h e terms we make use of.'"1""1"^ The 
id e a s t h e n o f cause and e f f e c t must be c o n t a i n e d i n o u r e x p e r i e n c e , 
i n 'the appearance o f o b j e c t s t o our senses' t o have an o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y f o r Hume. But a l l t h a t may be induced from e x p e r i e n c e 
so c o n c e i v e d , as Hume r i g h t l y p o i n t s o u t , J S t h a t t h e two o b j e c t s 
10'9. David Hume. A T r e a t i s e c f Human N a t u r e Book One. Fontanr 
P h i l o s o p h y L i b r a r y I 9 o 2 , p. 120. 
110. I b i d . pp. 109 - 110 f o o t n o t e . 
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o r e v e n t s t h a t we d e s i g n a t e cause and e f f e c t a r e c o n t i g u o u s and 
.success]ye, Added t o t h a t , we may con c l u d e f r o m p a s t e x p e r i e n c e 
t h a t t h e y a r e found i n c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n . I t i s on t h e 
s t r e n g t h o f t h i s e v i d e n c e t h a t we a r e l e d t o d e s c r i b e one o b j e c t 
o r e v e n t as cause and a n o t h e r as e f f e c t . Now., t h e sub s t a n c e o f 
Hume's c l a i m i s t h a t t h e grounds o f w h i c h we wou l d h o l d t h a t 
d e s c r i p t i o n t o be t r u e a re ' t h a t i n s t a n c e s o f w h i c h we have no 
e x p e r i e n c e , must resemble t h o s e o f w h i c h we have had e x p e r i e n c e , 
and t h a t t h e coarse o f n a t u r e c o n t i n u e s a l w a y s u n a ' f o r m i l y t h e 
s a m e * . B u t t h e r e i s i n h i s vi e w no l e g i t i m a c y i n t h e s e 
g r o u n d s . P r e c i s e l y because we have n o t y e t ob s e r v e d t h e new 
e x p e r i e n c e o r , what i s t h e same t h i n g , a l l i n s t a n c e s o f t h e 
o b j e c t o r e v e n t have n o t y e t appeared, we do n o t , i n Hume's 
o p i n i o n , know w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t one i s t h e cause o f t h e o t h e r . 
T h e r e f o r e i t i s o n l y a p r o b a b l e and n o t a n e c e s s a r y c o n j u n c t i o n 
t h a t t h e i d e a s d e s c r i b e . Where t h e y a r e t a k e n t o d e s c r i b e a 
n e c e s s a r y c o n j u n c t i o n o f two o b j e c t s , t h a t , Hunc a r g u e s , i s o u r 
i n f e r e n c e o n l y . As he says, 'the n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n depends 
on t h e i n f e r e n c e , i n s t e a d o f t h e i n f e r e n c e ' s d e p e n d i n g on t h e 
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n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n . ' The n e c e s s i t y , H e g e l t a k e s Hume t o 
mean, i s n o t t o be found i n e x p e r i e n c e b u t r a t h e r we c a r r y i t 
i n t o e x p e r i e n c e ; we make t h e c o n n e c t j o n i n a c o n t i n g e n t , s u b j e c t -
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l v e manner. ^ 
1 1 1 . I b i d . p . 135. 112. I b i d . p. 135. 
113. Weri-e 20, p. 2?8. L . X o l a k o w s k i (Posa ta v i s t Phi l o s o p h v , Pengo 
Books J972) e x p l a i n s Hume's p o i n t i n t h i s Vva7T TThc g r o u n d o 
c o n j u n c t i o n oetween e v e n t s i s n o t r e p e a l e d an e x p e r i e n c e , z 
t h a t we p e r c e i v e i s t h e c o n j u n c t i o n i t s e l f . T h i s e x p l a i n s 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y why we b e l i e v e t h e causa] nexus i s neecssa? 
i t i s a h a b i t r o o t e d m a s s o c i a t i o n - b u t f o r t h a t v e r y 
reason r e f u t e s t h e b e l i e f . T he'necessaty ' i s an o u r minds 
o n l y , n e t m t h e t h i n g s themselves.' p. !V J. 
6o. 
Hume d e v e l o p s t h i s c l a i m more f u J l y by a n a l y s i n g t h e 
reasons f o r o ur h o l d i n g an i d e a t o be t r u e . When we h o l d a 
t h o u g h t t o be t r u e we are s a i d t o b e l i e v e i t . So i t i s t h e 
n a t u r e o f b e l i e f t h a t i n t e r e s t s him. I t i s I n t h i s a n a l y s i s o f 
t h e n a t u r e o f b e l i e f t h a t Hume comes t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t an 
i d e a t h a t we t a k e t o be t r u e i s n o t h i n g o t n e r t h a n 1 a l i v e l y i d e a 
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r e l a t e d t o a p r e s e n t i m p r e s s i o n . I t i s t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e 
i m p r e s s i o n made on o u r minds by those l i v e l y i d e a s t h a t , he says, 
causes them t o be b e l i e v e d . For 'an i d e a a s s e n t e d t o f e e l s 
d i f f e r e n t f rom a f i c t i c i o u s i d e a t h a t t h e f a n c y a l o n e p r e s e n t s 
t o us: and t h i s d i f f e r e n t f e e l i n g I endeavour t o e x p l a i n by 
c a l l i n g i t a s u p e r i o r f o r c e o r v i v a c i t y , o r s o l i d i t y , o r f i r m n e s s 
o r s t e a d i n e s s . 1 A c c o r d i n g t o Hume, t h e n , we h o l d an i d e a 
t o be t r u e , n o i because we have reasons t o b e l i e v e i t t o be so 
b u t u l t i m a t e l y because we f e e l i t t o be t r u e . 'When I am con-
v i n c e d o f a p r i n c i p l e , i t i s o n l y an i d e a w h i c h s t r i k e s more 
s t r o n g l y upon me. When I g i v e p r e f e r e n c e t o one s e t o f arguments 
above a n o t h e r , I do n o t h i n g b u t d e c i d e from my i e e i m g c o n c e r n i n g 
t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e i r i n f l u e n c e . ' 1 1 ^ I t f o l l o w s f o r Hume t n e n 
t h a t ' i n p h i l o s o p h y , we can go no f u r t h e r t h a n a s s e r t , t h a t i t i s 
something f e l t by t h e mind, whic h d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e i d e a s o f j u d g e -
1 1 7 
ment fr o m t h e f i c t i o n s o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e i f 
p h i l o s o p h y has t o o f f e r a c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h i t can o n l y l e g i t i m -
a t e l y suggest t h a t i t be an a e s t h e t i c one. Since ' a l l p r o b a b l e 
r e a s o n i n g i s n o t h i n g b u t a s p e c i e s o f s e n s a t i o n . Iz i s n o t s o l e l y 
i n p o e t r y and music we mast f o l l o w o ur t a s t e and s e n t i m e n t b u t 
114. Hume, o p . c i t . , p. 14 6. 
115- I b i d . , p. 145 
116. Jbid..p. 152. 
H 7 . I b a d " P- 1^5. 
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l i k e w i s e m p h i l o s o p h y . ' " " 
I n Hume's view, n o t even p h i l o s o p h y t h e n can o f f e r an 
o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h . I t o b l i g e s us t o conclude t h a t 
a l l we b e l i e v e c o n c e r n i n g t he e x t e r n a l w o r l d r e s t s on a s u b j e c t i v e 
c o n v i c t i o n . So t h e k i n d o f necessary c o n n e c t i o n we a t t r i b u t e t o t h 
r e l a t i o n s between two o b j e c t s o r events m t h e n o t i o n s o f cause 
and e f f e c t i s p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e i n n a t u r e . 1 O b j e c t s ' , as f a r as 
Hume i s concerned 'have no d i s c o v e r a b l e c o n n e c t i o n s t o g e t h e r ; n o r 
i s i t from any o t h e r p r i n c i p l e b u t custom o p e r a t i n g on t h e i m a g i n -
a t i o n , t h a t we can draw any i n f e r e n c e from t h e appearance o f one t o 
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the existence o f a n o t h e r . y Hence any necessary c o n n e c t i o n we 
a t t r i b u t e t o o b j e c t s cannot be o b j e c t i v e . Hume argues t h a t we 
a t t r i b u t e t h e necessary c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e o b j e c t s s i m p l y as a 
m a t t e r o f custom. And Hegel t a k e s t h i s t o be t h e c e n t r a l c l a i m 
o f Hume's whole p h i l o s o p h y . J u s t 'as we c a l l e v e r y t h i n g custom 
which proceeds from a p a s t r e p e t i t i o n , w i t h o u t any new reason:rig o r 
c o n c l u s i o n , we may e s t a b l i s h i t as a c e r t a i n t r u t h , ' Hume c l a i m s 
' t h a t a l l t h e b e l i e f , w h i c h f o l l o w s upon any p r e s e n t i m p r e s s i o n , 
120 
i s d e r i v e d s o l e l y from t h a t o r i g i n . 1 The n a t u r e o f t h a t 
customary b e l i e f i n t h e i n s t a n c e o f cause and e f f e c t i s t h a t we 
i n f e r from o ur past o b s e r v a t i o n s o f t h e c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n o f two 
o b j e c t s o r events t h a t they w i l l be found t o be m c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c -
t i o n m the f u t u r e . The c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n w h i c h causes t h i s 
b e l i e f , Hume suggests, m some cases may be so f a m i l i a r t h a t i t 
m i g h t n o t pass t h r o u g h o u r mmds t h a t we are assuming o r i n f e r r i n g 
118. Thid.,p. 135- 119. I b i d . , p . 152. 
120. I b i d . , p . 151 . 
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a c a s u a l r e l a t i o n . F o r example, t h e i d e a o f s i n k i n g i s so 
c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h a t o f w a t e r , and t h e i d e a o f s u f f o c a t i n g 
w i t h s i n k i n g ' t h a t t h e mind makes t h e t r a n s i t i o n ' f r o m t h e cne i d o , 
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to t h e o t h e r ' w i t h o u t t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f memory,' The n e c e s s a r y 
c o n n e c t i o n between s i n k i n g and s u f f o c a t i n g i s one t h a t we i n f e r 
s i m p l y as a m a t t e r o f h a b i t . 
We w i l l n o t be s u r p r i s e d t o f i n d t h a t H e g e l d i s p u t e s t h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n . He does however b e l i e v e t h a t such a c o n c l u s i o n 
n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s f r o m Hume's account o f e x p e r i e n c e . I n h i s 
v i e w Hume's c o n c l u s i o n s s e r v e t o emphasise t h e s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
n a t u r e o f e m p i r i c i s m . I n d e e d he s u g g e s t s t h a t we m i g h t r e g a r d 
o u r s e l v e s as engaged i n t h e c r i t i q u e o f e m p i r i c i s m s i m p l y i n 
f o l l o w i n g t h r o u g h Hume's r e a s o n i n g . I t i s i n t h i s r e s p e c t , 
H e g e l c l a i m s , t h a t Hume adheres t o and implements Locke's p r i n c i p l e 
of e x p e r i e n c e more c o n s i s t e n t l y . By d o i n g t h i s , a l l t h a t he has 
done i s make e v i d e n t t h e t a u t o l o g o u s n a t u r e o f Locke's d e r i v a t i o n 
of complex i d e a s . H e g e l i n d e e d agrees t h a t complex i d e a s such 
as cause and e f f e c t c a n not be d e r i v e d f r o m o u r e x p e r i e n c e u n d e r -
s t o o d s i m p l y as s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n . To t h i s e x t e n t he concedes t h e 
v a l i d i t y o f Hume's a n a l y s i s o f c a u s a l i t y . S i n c e ' e x p e r i e n c e as 
s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n c o n t a i n s no n e c e s s i t y , no c a s u a l r e l a t i o n . ' c~ 
1 2 1 . I b i d . , p. 152. 
122. Hegel.Werke 20,p.277• A l s o ' C o n s e q u e n t l y what can r e a l l y be 
a s s e r t e d beyond a l l doubt i s l i m i t e d t o i n d i v i d u a l 
of immediate o b s e r v a t i o n s ; a s s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e 
of t h e w o r l d ' g i v e n ' m th o s e o b s e r v a t i o n s , w h e t h e r t o u c h i n g 
i t s r e a l i t y o r t h e n a t u r e o f t n e o b s e r v i n g s u b j e c t , a re ex-
c l u d e d . I t i s easy t o see t h a t m t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f Know-
l e d g e , t h a t w h i c h we t r u ] / know i s u t t e r l y b a r r e n and unp r o d 
u c t i v e , whereas t h a t w h i c h h e l p s us t o l i v e , t o c r e a t e a 
s c i e n c e and e n r i c h o ur s t o r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n g e n e r a l l y i s no 
l o n g e r knowledge i n ""he p r o p e r sense 6 f t h e ter-n. ' Kolakov/? 
op. c i t . , pp. 51-52 . HJ-& g e n e r a l assessment o f Hume's p h i l o s o c 
i s c l o s e t o t h a t o f Hegel, e s p e c i a l l y H e g e l ' s b e l i e f t h a t 
Hume's p h i l o s o p h y s e r v e s t o she; up t h e i n h e r e n t l y c o n c r c d _ ^ 
t o r y n a t u r e o f e m p i r i c i s m : X o l a k o w s k i soys, 'Hume c a r r i e d 
e m p i r i c i s m i n t o i t s r r d i c a l l a t t e r - a a y phase, r i s k i n g u^o o f 
c r i t e r i a e l a b o r a t e d oy a n t i - e m p i m e a l systems he r>rc ught -Oo:> 
t h e s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n o f t n e e m p i r i c a l doct r m e . ' J b i d . p p 5 5 - o 
63. 
I f we were t o u n d e r s t a n d e x p e r i e n c e m e r e l y as sense--percepti on, 
Hegel s u g g e s t s , a l l we would have as i t s c o n t e n t i s a s e r i e s o f 
d i s c o n n e c t e d i m p r e s s i o n s . I t i s Hume's m e r i t t o have p o i n t e d 
t h i s o u t . Hume makes i t c l e a r t h a t we cannot d e r i v e any i d e a 
t h a t has u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y f rom mere s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e . Hegel 
g i v e s t h i s example t o i l l u s t r a t e h i s p o i n t . When we say t h a t 
the p r e s s u r e o f t h e w a t e r i s t h e cause o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f a 
house d u r i n g a f l o o d what we have i s n o t 'a pure e x p e r i e n c e ' i n 
t h e L o c k e a n s e n s e . W e r e i t a 'pure e x p e r i e n c e ' we would have 
observed m e r e l y two o c c u r r e n c e s : t h e w a t e r f o r c i n g i t s e l f a g a i n s t 
the s i d e o f t h e house and t h e house c o l l a p s i n g . As Hume r i g h t l y 
p o i n t s o u t , t h e r e i s n o t h i n g c o n t a i n e d i n th o s e two i m p r e s s i o n s 
t h e m s e l v e s w h i c h i m p l i e s t h a t t h e y a r e n e c e s s a r i l y l i n k e d . I t 
i s we t h a t t a k e t h e i d e a o f c a u s a t i o n i n t o t h a t 'pure e x p e r i e n c e ' . 
The s t a t e m e n t , t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e o f t h e w a t e r caused t h e house t o 
be d e s t r o y e d i s n o t m e r e l y a s t a t e m e n t o f f a c t b u t an i n f e r e n c e 
of t h e o b s e r v e r ; and Hume argues, as we have seen, t h a t we make 
such i n f e r e n c e s s i m p l y out o f h a b i t . 
Hume's i n s i s t e n c e on t h i s a c c o u n t o f c a u s a l i t y i s a s o u r c e 
of amazement t o H e g e l . T h i s , more t h a n a n y t h i n g e l s e , I s what 
l e a d s him i n t o d i s p u t e w i t h Hume. He b e l i e v e s t h a t 'one ca n n o t 
descend l o w e r i n t h i n k i n g t h a n t o i m p l y t h a t a l l u n i v e r s a l and 
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n e c e s s a r y r e a s o n i n g i s a r b i t a r y . He s u g g e s t s t h a t we have an 
unsav o u r y c o n t r a s t i n Hume's p h i l o s o p h y f o r ' p e r c e p t i o n i s supposed 
t o r e m a i n t h e b a s i s o f what s h o u l d count as t r u t h ' , and : s o u n i v e r -
s a l i t y and n e c e s s i t y appear as so m e t h i n g u n j u s t i f i e d , as s u b j e c t i v e 
12>. H e g e l - i b i d . , p . 278. 
12k. I b i d . ^  p. 279. 
64. 
c o n t i n g e n c y , a pure custom whose c o n t e n t may be so c o n s t i t u t e d 
( b e s c h a f f e n ) o r n o t . 1 D But s i m p l y because we make i n f e r e n -
ces m our o b s e r v a t i o n s which go beyond e x p e r i e n c e , u n d e r s t o o d 
as p e r c e p t i o n , does n o t i m p l y t o Hegel t h a t t h o s e o b s e r v a t i o n s 
are c d n t i n g e n t . I n h i s view, we have r a t h e r t o accept t h a t 
t h e s u b j e c t p l a y s a more s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e m c o n s t i t u t i n g 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge t h a n e m p i r i c i s m cares t o a l l o w . T h i s 
i s r e a d i l y u n d e r s t o o d , he argues, i f we r e g a r d e x p e r i e n c e 
m a more comprehensive way, n o t s i m p l y as e x t e r n a l e x p e r i e n c e , 
b u t as my_ e x p e r i e n c e . I t i s Kant who m Hegel's e s t i m a t i o n 
f i r s t t a k e s p h i l o s o p h y m t h i s d i r e c t i o n . Hume's g r e a t e s t 
m e r i t , Hegel says, t h e r e f o r e , m r o u n d i n g o f f h i s r a t h e r 
summary judgement o f him, i s t h a t h i s s c e p t i c i s m g i v e s Kant 
h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . 
125. Hegel. Werke 8, p. 111. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HEGEL AND GERMAN IDEALJ SM. 
The C r i t i q u e o f Kant. 
I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Kant we e n t e r , a c c o r d i n g t o 
Hegel, a new epoch m t h e h i s t o r y o f t h o u g h t . Kant's p h i l o s o p h y 
i s t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e I , t h e ' u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ' , o r what 
Hegel c a l l s the'freedom o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' . I t i s t h e p h i l o s -
ophy whi c h more t h a n any o t h e r b r i n g s nome t o us t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f t h e s u b j e c t , o f th e I m knowledge. T h i s development Hegel 
l i n k s ( m a manner we have s i n c e l e a r n t t o a s s o c i a t e w i t h Marx) 
w i t h t h e g e n e r a l h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s o f th e t i m e . The p h i l o s o p h y o f 
Kant, he sug g e s t s , i s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l consciousness o f t h e p r a c -
t i c e o f t h e French R e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . " 1 " The demand o f t h a t p r a c t i c e 
was t h a t ' e v e r y t h i n g , a l l e x i s t e n c e , a l l a c t i v i t y ' 'shoald be 
something u s e f u l ' , ( i b . ) And Hegel, r i g h t l y o r w r o n g l y , t a k e s 
t h e g e n e r a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s u t i l i t a r i a n v i e r t o be t h a t wn»t 
a t h i n g i s 'm i t s e l f ' m a y be i g n o r e d . I t s concern, he says, 
i s w i t h what t h i n g s are ' f o r a n o t h e r ' , t h a t o t h e r i s , o f cour s e , 
man. ( i b . ) Consequently what r e a l i t y i s ' i n i t s e l f ' i s d e c l a r e d 
t o be i n s i g n i f i c a n t . A l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d o f r e a l i t y was t h a t 
i t y i e l d t o t h e demands o f th e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s i n d i v i d u a l . Be-
cause i t t a k e s up t h i s p o s i t i o n , t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Kant i s f o r 
Hegel t h e ' A u f k l a r u n g ' reducfced t o method. The p a r a l l e l i s c l e a r . 
1. 'The consciousness c f t h i s p r a c t i c e -an a b s t r a c t way - i s t h e 
K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y ' . Hegel. Werke, Suhrkamp V e r l a g , V o l . 2 0 , 
p. 332. 
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Kant m a i n t a i n s m h i s t h e o r y c f knowledge t h a t we cannot know 
what t h e t h i n g 'm i t s e l f ' i s . I t f o l l o w s we cannot know what 
i s o b j e c t i v e l y t r u e . We o n l y know appearances, o r , r a t h e r , 
t h e phenomenon as i t i s observed by t h e i n d i v i d u a l , c o n t i n g e n t 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e r e f o r e , as w i t h U t i l i t a r i a n i s m , ' a l l 
t h a t i s e s s e n t i a l f a l l s w i t h i n s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' ( i b . ) 
A l t h o u g n Hegel t h i n k s t h a t i n t h i s way Kant b e g i n s a new 
epoch i n t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y he re g a r d s the q u e s t i o n t h a t 
l i e s a t t h e h e a r t o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y t o be t h e same as t h a t w h i c h 
p r e o c c u p i e d Locke and Hume. I n h i s e a r l y essay on ' F a i t h and 
Knowledge' (Glauben und Wissen) he quotes t h e f o l l o w i n g from 
t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Locke's Essay Concerning Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g : 
'For I t h o u g h t t h a t t h e f i r s t s t e p towards s a t i s f y i n g s e v e r a l 
i n q u i r i e s t h e mind o f man was v e r y a p t t o r u n i n t o , was t o t a k e 
a survey o f our own u n d e r s t a n d i n g , examine our own powers, and 
t o see what t h i n g s t h e y are adapted'. T h i s he b e l i e v e s T i g h t 
j u s t as w e l l have come from t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n zo Kant's C r i t i q u e 
o f Pure Reason because t h a t work t i e s p h i l o s o p h y t o t h e same 
purpose as t h a t r e v e a l e d i n Locke's Essay, 'namely, t h e examm-
a t i o n o f t h e f i n i t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' . Kant m h i s Cr111que 
examines, as d i d Locke, our c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s w i t h t h e aim o f 
d i s c o v e r i n g 'how c u r powers are adapted' t o the comprehension o f 
t h i n g s . The prime i n t e r e s t o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p a r t o f Kant's 
p h i l o s o p h y i s , as w i t h the e m p i r i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , t h e r e l a t i o n 
o f t h o u g ht t o t h i n g s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s . But m c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s 
2. 
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problem, Kant produces new r e s u l t s , r e s u l t s which Hegel b e l i e v e s 
t o be e x t r e m e l y s i g n i f i c a n t , though v i t i a t e d by the l i m i t s o f 
the problem posed. 
The s t a r t i n g - p o i n t o f Kant's c r i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i s , as i s 
w e l l known, t h e s c e p t i c i s m o f D a v i d Hume. T h i s s c e p t i c i s m , as 
ought t o be c l e a r from our c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Hegel's c r i t i c i s m o f 
Hume, c o n s i s t e d m r e g a r d i n g a l l a s s e r t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g necessary 
connexions m t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d t o be based on custom, n o t on 
c e r t a i n knowledge. These c o n c l u s i o n s are d e r i v e d from an empir-
i c a l view o f e x p e r i e n c e . A view o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t r e g a r d s a l l 
our knowledge t o have a r i s e n m t h e ' i m p r e s s i o n s ' o f our senses, 
and Kant a c c e p t s t h i s view as a premiss m examining o ur c o g n i t i v e 
f a c u l t i e s : 'There i s i n d e e d' he says, 'no doubt t h a t a l l our 
knowledge b e g i n s w i t h e x p e r i e n c e ' . However, w i t h i n t h a t premiss 
he makes a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t he t h i n k s was missed by t h e E m p i r i c i s t s 
' i f , however, a l l our knowledge b e g i n s w i t h o ur e x p e r i e n c e , s t j l l , 
i t does n o t f o r t h a t reason a l l s i m p l y o r i g i n a t e m e x p e r i e n c e . 
For i t c o u l d indeed be t h a t t h e knowledge we have from e x p e r i e n c e 
( E r f a h r u n g s e r k e n n t n i s ) was a compound o f what we r e c e i v e t h r o u g h 
our i m p r e s s i o n s and what our f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n ( o c c a s i o n e d 
s o l e l y by sense i m p r e s s i o n s ) s u p p l i e s from i t s e l f , w h i c h a d d : t i o n 
we do n o t d i s t m g u i s n from the b a s i c m a t e r i a l u n t i l l o n g p r a c t i c e . , 
m t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f the same.' ( i b . ) So, as we can see, Kant 
wishes t o argue t h a t i n a l l o ur e m p i r i c a l knowledge t h e r e i s an 
.3. Inrnanuel Kant. K r i t i k d e r Peinen V e r n u n f t , Werke (SuhrKamp 
V e r l a g ) E d i t e d by WilheL'n We 1 schede 1. Vo 1. 2. p. 45 . ~ 
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element t h a t p e r t a i n s t o o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n l y . T h i s element 
he c a l l s knowledge a p r i o r i . T h i s knowledge c o n s t i t u t e s a 
p a r t o f e x p e r i e n c e s i n c e t h e 'common u n d e r s t a n d i n g I s I t s e l f 
n e v er w i t h o u t such. E x p e r i e n c e , t h e n , he d i v i d e s i n t o two 
c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s . I n s t e a d o f i t b e i n g t h e one element - what 
we r e c e i v e from o ur sense - i m p r e s s i o n s - i t I s , Kant b e l i e v e s , 
made up o f two elements, s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s and id e a s a p r i o r i . 
Kant wants t o c l a i m n o t o n l y t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
always c o n t a i n s knowledge a p r i o r i b u t a l s o t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
5 
s c i e n c e s are c o n s t i t u t e d m t h e same way. T h i s c l a i m r e s t s on t 
d i s t i n c t i o n he makes between s y n t i i e t i c and a n a l y t i c judgements. 
A n a l y t i c judgements are o f t h e g e n e r a l form such t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t 
B belongs t o t h e s u b j e c t A i n a manner t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e B i s 
a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d m A. As an example o f such a judgement he 
g i v e s : ' a l l b o d i e s are extended'. He b e l i e v e s t h a t m t h i s 
judgement t h e n o t i o n o f e x t e n s i o n i s c o n t a i n e d m t h e n o t i o n o f 
body. S y n t h e t i c judgements a r e , c o n t r a r i w i s e , judgements m 
which t he p r e d i c a t e B l i e s w h o l l y o u t s i d e t h e s u b j e c t A. As 
an example o f t h i s form o f judgement he g i v e s : ' A l l b o d i e s are 
heavy'. He argues t h a t m t h e n o t i o n 'body' t h e r e i s n o t 
c o n t a i n e d t h e n o t i o n o f w e i g h t . So t h e extraneous element 
4. Kant, i b i d . , p. 46. 
5- ' i n a l l t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n c e s o f reason t h e r e a re c o n t a i n e d 
s y n t h e t i c judgements a p r i o r i as p r i n c i p l e s . ' Kant, i b i d . , 
P- 55-
6. '..the p r e d i c a t e i s something t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o what 1 
t h i n k a t a l l i n t h e mere concept o f a body.' i b i d . , p. 53. 
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i s what makes i t a s y n t h e t x c judgement. F u r t h e r m o r e , he 
argues t h a t a l l our judgements o f e x p e r i e n c e ( E r f a h r u n g s u r t e i l e ) 
are o f t h i s s y n t h e t i c n a t u r e because m such judgements c u r 
knowledge i s n o t o n l y c l a r i f i e d b u t extended t o embrace a new 
c o n t e n t , ( l b . ) What he now contends t h e n i s t h a t such j u d g e -
ments are employed m t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n c e s . For example, 
the s i m p l e p r o p o s i t i o n 7 + 5 = 12 i n mathematics may appear t o 
be merely an a n a l y t i c a l judgement. I t appears t h a t the n o t i o n 
12 i s c o n t a i n e d m the n o t i o n 7 p l u s 5> But Kant argues t h a t 
we may a n a l y s e t h e n o t i o n s 7 and 5 and t h e i r a d d i t i o n as much 
as we w i l l , we w i l l n e ver get a t t h e n o t i o n 12 w i t h o u t a p p e a l i n g 
7 
t o e x p e r i e n c e . A l l t h a t we have m the n o t i o n 7 + 5 i s t h a t 
an u n i t y o f the two m one number i s r e q u i r e d . We cannot d i s -
c over what the number i s from t h e n o t i o n i t s e l f . Kant t h e r e f o r e 
concludes t h a t t h e number 12 i s n o t c o n t a i n e d m t h a t n o t i o n . 
To d i s c o v e r the number t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e sum o f 7 and 5 we 
have t o go beyond t h a t n o t i o n . We have t o r e f t r t o our experier:?:-, 
t o such p e r c e p t i o n s as t h a t o f f i v e f i n g e r s . I n a d d i n g t o t h a t 
p e r c e p t i o n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f 7 s i m i l a r u n i t s we d e r i v e our prop-
o s i t i o n . And i t i s from t h i s t h a t Kant concluded t h e 1 a n t h m e t -
o 
i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n i s a t a l l t i m e s s y n t h e t i c 1 . For as a i l our 
experience-knowledge ( E r f a h r u n g s e r k e n n t n i s ) c o n t a i n s an element 
t h a t p e r t a i n s a p r i o r i t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e a r i t h m e t i c a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n must be a s y n t h e t i c judgement a p r i o r i . Kant employs 
a s i m i l a r argument t o show t h a t a l l t h e ocher t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n c e s 
c o n t a i n such judgements. 
7. Kant, i b i d . , p. 36. 
8. f\ant. l b i d . , pp. 56 - 57. 
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Kant a s c r i b e s t h e p a r l o u s s t a t e o f metaphysics t o t h e 
J , r> 9 
f a c t t h a t 1 1 f a i l s t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e two forms o f judgement:.' 
Hume, i n Kant's e s t i m a t i o n , had come n e a r e s t t o making t h e 
d i s t i n c t i o n . He had made t h e p r o p e r b e g i n n i n g w i t h h i s 
a n a l y s i s o f cause and e f f e c t , b u t i t was o n l y a b e g i n n i n g . 
He had f a i l e d , Kant adds, t o co n c e i v e t h e problem m i t s f u l l 
u n i v e r s a l i t y and s i g n i f i c a n c e , ( l b . ) He had r a t h e r c o n c e n t r a -
t e d on t h e one s y n t h e t i c p r o p o s i t i o n t o prove t h a t such a 
p r o p o s i t i o n a p r i o r i was i m p o s s i b l e . The c o n c l u s i o n s o f 
t h i s a n a l y s i s had t h r e a t e n e d t o reduce t h e whole c o n t e n t o f 
metaphysics t o nonsense. A l l t h e necessary r e l a t i o n s t h a t 
m e taphysics had d i s c o v e r e d appeared now t o d e r i v e t h e i r necess-
i t y from mere custom. However, 'he would n e v e r have a r r i v e d 
a t such a c l a i m which d e s t r o y s a l l pure p h i l o s o p h y i f he had 
b e f o r e h i s eyes our t a s k m a l l i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y , f o r he would 
have seen t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o h i s argument t h e r e c o u l d a l s o be 
no pure mathematics.' ( i b . ) H i s good sense, K^ i t hopes, would 
have saved him from such an a s s e r t i o n . 
Hume, t h e n , had p r e j u d i c e d a l l pure p h i l o s o p h y because he had 
f a i l e d t o see t h a t t h e same t y p e o f p r o p o s i t i o n whose o b j e c t i v i t y 
he wished t o r e j e c t m t h e a n a l y s i s o f cause and e f f e c t was i m p l i c -
ated i n a l l m a t h e m a t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. The n e c e s s i t y 
t h a t we p r e d i c a t e t o t h e r e l a t i o n s o f two o b j e c t s o r ev e n t s i n 
t h e n o t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n i s t h e same as t h e n e c e s s i t y we a s c r i b e 
t o t h e b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n s o f mathematics. Both are s y n t h e t i c 
9- Indeed, he savs, t h i s f a i l u r e i s s o l e l y ( l e d i g l i c h ) t o blame 
f o r t h e i n s e c u r e p o s i t i o n o f metaphysics. See x b i d . , p. 59. 
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p r o p o s i t i o n s a p r i o r i . A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, t h e c r u c i a l 
q u e s t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y i s t h e r e f o r e : 'How are s y n t h e t i c j u d g e -
ments a p r i o r i p o s s i b l e 9 ' ( i b . ) For t h e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s 
problem depends, Kant argues, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f the use o f 
reason m t h e f o u n d i n g o f mathematics and n a t u r a l s c i e n c e . 
Kant b e l i e v e s t h a t m p l a c i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n a t the c e n t r e o f 
h i s p h i l o s o p h y he i s b r i n g i n g about a r a d i c a l change i n t h e 
methodology o f t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge. T h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
change amounts,he" suggest. t o a r e v e r s a l o f i t s f o r m e r p r i o r -
i t i e s : ' H i t h e r t o i t has been assumed t h a t a l l our c o g n i t i o n 
s h o u l d accomodate i t s e l f t o o b j e c t s . However, a l l a t t e m p t s 
made under t h a t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t o make a n y t h i n g o f o b j e c t s 
w i t h concepts a p r i o r i t h r o u g h w h i c h our knowledge would be 
extended have come t o n o t h i n g . The a t t e m p t w i l l t h e r e f o r e 
be made t h i s once t o see whether we would n o t advance b e t t e r 
i n t h e t a s k s o f metaphysics m t h a t we assume t h a t o b j e c t s m^st 
accombdate themselves t o our c o g n i t i o n . ' " " ' T h i s r e v e r s a l i s 
analogous t o a change t h a t had t o t a k e p l a c e m the method o f 
n a t u r a l s c i e n c e b e f o r e i t c o u l d p r o g r e s s p r o p e r l y . F o r j u s t 
as Copernicus c o u l d make no p r o g r e s s w h i l e he assumed t h e spec-
t a t o r t o be f i x e d and t h e heavenly b o d i e s t o be m m o t i o n , p h i l -
osophy i n Kant's o p i n i o n , would advance no f u r t h e r u n l e s s i t 
i n v e r t e d i t s ' u n i v e r s e ' . I f we make t h e assumption i n D h i l o s -
10. Kant, i b i d . , p. 25. C. Lukacs i n h i s H i s t o r y and Class 
Consciousness (Engl±sh Ed., M e r l i n Press, 1971) m i s t a k e n l y 
I t h i n k , r e g a r d s t h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n as the pro 
lem t h a t dominates Modern P h i l o s o p h y . For t h i s , and othe 
m i s c e l l a n e o u s remarks on the problem, see pp. I l l - 112. 
( M e r l i n e d . ) . 
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ophy t h a t o b j e c t s are c o n s t r u c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o our mode o f 
c o g n i t i o n o f them, th e n p h i l o s o p h y may r e g a i n t h e ground i t 
had l o s t m t r y i n g t o make our t h i n k i n g accomodate i t s e l f t o 
o b j e c t s . T h i s ground would be r e g a i n e d i n t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e 
o f t h e o b j e c t c o u l d now be assumed t o be i d e n t i c a l w i t h o u r 
mode o f c o g n i t i o n o f i t . Thus t h e r e would be a g r e a t d e a l 
we c o u l d say a p r i o r i about o b j e c t s as they were t h e p r o d u c t 
o f t h e ' I t h i n k ' o r t h e I i t s e l f . 
T h i s emphasis on t h e r o l e o f t h e I i n t h e c o g n i t i o n o f 
o b j e c t s i s i n Hegel's view t h e e s s e n t i a l aspect o f Kant's 
p h i l o s o p h y and f o l l o w s l o g i c a l l y from t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t Kant 
l e v e l s a t the s c e p t i c a l e m p i r i c i s m o f Hume. T h i s o b j e c t i o n 
t o Hume's p h i l o s o p h y i s , as we have a l r e a d y seen, t h a t Hume does 
n o t a l l o w v a l i d i t y t o , n o r even r e c o g n i s e , t h e s y n t h e t i c prop-
o s i t i o n s a p r i o r i c o n t a i n e d i n a l l our e m p i r i c a l knowledge. 
He had t a k e n t h i s view because i n h i s o p i n i o n , t he n o t i o n s o f 
u n i v e r s a l i t y and n e c e s s i t y were n o t t o be found i n o ur e x p e r i e n c e , 
u n d e r s t o o d as t h e sense-impressions we r e c e i v e o f an o b j e c t . 
But Kant, Hegel c l a i m s , does n o t w i s h t o c o n f i n e e x p e r i e n c e m 
t h i s way. As w e l l as t h e s e n s e - m a t e r i a l ( s m n l i c h e n S t o f f e s ) , 
Kant argues, t h e r e are a l s o i n c l u d e d m ex p e r i e n c e u n i v e r s a l 
r e l a t i o n s ( a l l g e m e m e n B e z i e h u n g e n ) . 1 1 These are t h e s y n t h e t i c 
11. Hegel. Werke 6, (Enzy. I ) , p. 112. Hegel adds, ' - the 
t h o u g h t - d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o r concepts o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
make up t h e o b i e c t i v i t y o f t h e experience-knowledge.' i b i d . , 
p. 113. 
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p r o p o s i t i o n s a p r i o r i o f the- u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Hume's e r r o r , 
t h e n , was n o t t o have seen from t h e b e g i n n i n g t h a t e x p e r i e n c e 
was made up o f these two elements. Kant i s p r epared t o g r a n t 
t h a t t h e sense-data have i n themselves no necessary c o n n e c t i o n : 
t h e y merely form a sensuous m a n i f o l d . The u n i v e r s a l i t y and 
n e c e s s i t y indeed come from elsewhere, namely, from t h e I , t h e 
s u b j e c t o f knowledge. H i s answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n : 'Where do 
the s y n t h e t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s a p r i o r i a r i s e 9 ' i s t h e r e f o r e , ' i n 
1 ^ 
t h e t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t h i m s e l f . ' ^ 
'The ' u n i v e r s e ' o f t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge has, t h e n , t o 
be s t o o d on i t s head because t he n o t i o n s o f u n i v e r s a l i t y and 
n e c e s s i t y w h i c h are a b s o l u t e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r our knowledge a r c 
n o t , Kant b e l i e v e s , ^o be found i n t h e o b j e c t s of e x p e r i e n c e 
themselves. These n o t i o n s are o n l y t o be found xn t h e i , o r 
what he c a l l s t h e ' u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ' ( E i n h e i t d e r Apperzeo-
t i o n ) . Opposed t o t h a t u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n stands t h e o t h e r 
element o f e x p e r i e n c e t ne ' m a n i f o l d o f i n t u i t i o n ' ( T i a n n i g f a l t i g e 
d e r Anschauung). Now, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, i n o r d e r t h a t we may 
ex p e r i e n c e o b j e c t s a t a l l , t h i s m a n i f o l d o f i n t u i t i o n has t o be 
reduced by t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o t h e u n i t y o f 
a p p e r c e p t i o n . T h i s s u g g e s t i o n , Hegel b e l i e v e s , i s t h e p r i n c i p a l 
1^ 5 
achievement o f t h e K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y . ^ For here Kant has n o t 
12. 1 Because .. n e c e s s i t y and u n i v e r s a l i t y i s n o t m extex^nal 
t h i n g s , t h e y must be a p r i o r i , i . e . l i e m Reason i t s e l f , m 
Reason as s e l f - c o n s c i o u s Rea~son. ' Hegel. Werke 20. p. 336. 
13- 'And t h i s u n i t y o f t h e m a n i f o l d p o s i t e d t h r o u g h my s p o n t a n e i t y 
t h i s i s t h o u g h t i n g e n e r a l , t h e s y n t h e s x s m g o f t h e m a n i f o l d . 
T h i s i s a g r e a t consciousness, an i m p o r t a n t i n s i g h t (Erker.n-
t n i s ) . ' i b i d . , p. 34^. 
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o n l y made i t c l e a r t h a t the I p o s c u l a t e s t he necessary 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n e x p e r i e n c e but a l s o t h a t : t c o n s t i t u t e s 
t h a t e x p e r i e n c e . Our sense-impressions may w e l l s u p p l y 
the c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e , but t h e I , t h e u n i t y o f apper-
c e p t i o n s u p p l i e s i t s form. What makes the c o n t e n t an o b j e c t 
o f our e x p e r i e n c e a t a l l i s the u n i t y b r ought about m t h e 
m a n i f o l d by t h e ' I t h i n k ' . And the d i s t i n c t manner o f t h i s 
r e l a t i o n ' , Hegel c l a i m s , 'are t h e pure concepts o f t h e under-
s t a n d i n g : t h e categories'." 1"^ 
Hegel, however, p l a c e s an even g r e a t e r s i g n i f y c a n c e on t n e 
' s p o n t a n e i t y o f the I 1 t h a n Kant has i n d i c a t e d here. Whereas 
Kant has no d e s i r e t o d i s p r o v e Hume's t h e s i s c o m p l e t e l y , Hegel 
c l e a r l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e i d e a o f t h e ' u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ' 
i s a w h o l l y s u c c e s s f u l answer t o the problems t h a t beset Hume's 
15 
e m p i r i c i s m . T h i s i s because i t p r o v i d e s a more workab l e 
n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e . I n Kant's n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e i t i s , 
he c l a i m s , r e c o g n i s e d t h a t p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t y e t e x p e r i e n c e . 
What counts as e x p e r i e n c e f o r Kant i s t h e s y n t h e s i s o f t h e 
c o n t e n t , o f t h e m a n i f o l d o f appearance i n the u n i t y o f appercep 
14. Hegel. Werke 8, p. 116. 
15- T h i s o p i n i o n Hegel p r o b a b l y shared w i t h a l l educated Germans 
o f h i s t i m e . C e r t a i n l y i t i s one shared by F i c h t e and 
S c h e l l m g . I t i s remarkable t o no t e how the s h i f t i n g o f tne 
ground o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n i s seen as t n e r e f u t a -
t i o n o f t h e o l d system. 
16. Hegel. Werke, V o l . 20., p. '^YJ. 
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t i o n . W i t h i n the n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e i s now c o n t a i n e d 
t h e i d e a o f t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f t h e sense-data: i t s subsumption 
under the c a t e g o r i e s o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n 
o f the sense-data i s an a c t i v i t y t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o Kant t h e 
s u b j e c t o f knowledge must u n d e r t a k e m o r d e r t h a t t h e r e may 
be an o b j e c t o f knowledge a t a l l : 'The s y n t h e t i c u n i t y o f t h e 
consciousness i s t h e r e f o r e an o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n o f a l l know-
le d g e , n o t s i m p l y one t h a t I may r e q u i r e t o know an o b j e c t but 
under which each i n t u i t i o n must s t a n d m o r d e r t h a t r c become 
an o b j e c t f o r me, . . ' 
T h i s c o n t r a s t s s h a r p l y w i t h the i d e a o f e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e 
e m p i r i c i s t s and, indeed, o f the R a t i o n a l i s t s , i n t h a t t h e con-
t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e now becomes s u b j e c t i v e . As Hegel says, 
'consciousness becomes one, i t becomes my c o n t e n t ' . I n Kant's 
n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e ' I am now i ' , n o t something e x t e r n a l t o 
18 
u y s e l f . The f a c t t h a t something may be e x p e r i e n c e d i m p l i e s 
w i t h Kant t h a t i t has t o be subsumed by the u n i t y o f t h e T. 
I t has t o become my c o n t e n t and n o t remain something o t h e r 
t h a n m y s e l f which I have t o a s s i m m i l a t e p a s s i v e l y . As Hegel 
s t a t e s i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Locke's m a t e r i a l i s m , e x p e r i e n c e i s 
now t o be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e 'consciousness o f what I have o r 
17- Kant. K r i t i k der Femen V e r n u n f t , o p . c i t . , p. 140. As 
K t i r n e r ( K a n t: Penguin O r i g i n a l , p. 63) says: '..tne mere 
p e r c e p t i o n o f a d e t e r m i n a t e o b j e c t , i . e . none whic h i s n o t 
but c o u l d be judged t o be the b e a r e r o f concepts, presupposes 
the s y n t h e t i c u n i t y o f t h e o b j e c t , and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e u n i t y 
o f pure a p p e r c e p t i o n . ' 
l 8 . Hegel. Werke 20, p. 'jh^. 
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am' and n o t merely as t h e consciousness o f what i s . y I 
have t o be a c t i v e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o b j e c t . The n o t i o n o f 
t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y expresses t h i s 
f o r Hegel. I t i m p l i e s t h a t a l l t h a t ' I t o u c h must be i t s e l f 
20 
c o n s t r a i n e d i n t o t h i s form o f u n i t y ' . T h i s , as I have a l -
ready i n t i m a t e d , i s a much br o a d e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e ' u n i t y 
o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ' t h a n t h a t o f Kant. For Hegel t h e idea becomes 
an e x p r e s s i o n o f c o r r e c t i d e a l i s m . I t i n d i c a t e s t o him t h a t 
m genuine p h i l o s o p h y a l l o t h e r n e s s , a l l o b j e c t i v i t y i s over-
come . 
I t i s m t h i s sense t n a t Hegel t h i n k s Kant t o be d e f i c i e n t 
i n h i s t h i n k i n g . Kant, ' u n f o r t u n a t e l y ' , f a x l c t o comprehend 
h i s own p r i n c i p l e m i t s f u l l o b j e c t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e . lie does 
n o t p r e s e n t i t as t h e r e f u t a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i s m . Rather, he 
i s c o n t e n t t o a l l o w Locke and Hume t h e i r sphere w i t h i n p h i l o s o p h y 
Kant i s a b l e t o do t h i s because he r e g a r d s n n s t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l -
osophy as t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . By t h i s he means t h a t i t does not 
a t t e m p t t o a p p l y i t s c o n c l u s i o n s t o t h e c o n c r e t e o b j e c t o f know-
l e d g e , t o what i s e x t e r n a l t o us, t h e ' o b j e c t o ut t h e r e ' . As 
Kt t r n e r says, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y i s 'concerned n o t co 
much w i t h o b j e c t s , as w i t h t h e manner o f our c o g n i t i o n o f ob-
j e c t s m so f a r as i t i s a p r i o r i p o s s i b l e ' . " T r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
19. See above, Chapter One pp.42.- 44. 
20. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 344. 
21. S. Korner. o p . c i t . , p. 35- He c o n t i n u e s 'more p r e c i s e l y , a 
a p i e c e o f knowledge i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i f i t i s a p r i o r i an 
i f by i t we u n d erstand " t h a t and why c e r t a x n p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
( p e r c e p t i o n s o r c o n c e p t s ) are o n l y a p r i o r i apt l i e d o r 
possible'' . ' ~ 
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p h i l o s o p h y i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d s p e c i f i c a l l y from a t r a n s -
cendent p h i l o s o p h y which would a t t e m p t t o a p p l y the c a t e g o r i e s 
o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o areas l y i n g beyond e x p e r i e n c e , Trans-
c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y remains c o r r e c t m t h a t i t p o i n t s 
out t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f our knowing o b j e c t s whereas t r a n s c e n -
dent p h i l o s o p h y i s w h o l l y i n c o r r e c t i n t h a t i t a t t e m p t s t o 
say t h a t such c o n d i t i o n s p e r t a i n t o ' t h i n g s themselves'. I t 
f o l l o w s t h a t t h e whole l o g i c a l a p p a r a t u s t h a t makes p o s s i b l e 
our knowledge,, t h a t which Kant examines m h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
p h i l o s o p h y , remains f o r him s u b j e c t i v e m i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
A l t h o u g h i t makes p o s s i b l e our knowledge o f t h i n g s i t cannot 
p r o v i d e us w i t h t h e knowledge o f t h e ' t h i n g m i t s e l f ' ( D i n g 
an s i c h ) . Thus from ' t h i s human f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n Kant 
i 22 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h e m - i t s e l f , t h e t h i n g m i t s e l f . ' 
Hume and Locke r e t a i n t h e n t h e i r sphere m Kant's p h i l o s -
ophy because, Hegel argues, Kant a d m i t s a.s a c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t 
o f a l l knowledge t h e m a n i f o l d o f s e n s e-experience. I t was 
t h e e m p i r i c i s t s t h a t had shown t h a t what t h i s senuous m a n i f o l d 
was 'm i t s e l f ' was unknowable. I t was o n l y known t o us t h r o u g h 
our s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s w h i c h , t h e y c l a i m e d , were jast as much 
a f f e c t i o n s m us as q u a l i t i e s m o b j e c t s g i v i n g r i s e t o t h ese 
a f f e c t i o n s . I t was t h e r e f o r e Kant's c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t we c o u l d 
22. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 338. What Goldmannhas t o say on t h i s 
p o i n t i s i n s t r u c t i v e : 'Knowledge o f t h i n g s i n tnemselves 
would o n l y be p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h a n o t h e r k i n d o f i n t u i t i o n 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f g i v e n e m p i r i c a l man. 
The u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a p u r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l f a c u l t y , t i e d co 
e x p e r i e n c e , cannot d e t e r m i n e wnether such an i n t u i t u on e x i s t s 
o r i s even p o s s i b l e . ' Kant, NLB, p. 135. 
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o n l y advance i n metaphysics i f we assumed t h a t what c o n s t i t u t e d 
an o b j e c t o f e x p e r i e n c e was our mode o f c o g n i t i o n . But t h a t 
th e o b j e c t was c o n s t i t u e d m c o n f o r m i t y w i t h o ur mode o f c o g n i t -
i o n d i d n o t , as we know, i m p l y t h a t we knew t h e o b j e c t a p a r t 
from i t s e x p e r i e n c e . V/hat i t m a t e r i a l l y was ' m i t s e l f ' was 
f o r e v e r beyond our ken. T h i s Kant concedes t o t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s . 
And i t i s t h i s , o f course, t h a t Hegel cannot concede. I n h i s 
view i t i s because K a n t i a n i d e a l i s m concedes t h i s t h a t i t r e -
mains e s s e n t i a l l y a t the s t a n d p o i n t o f Locke and Hume, a t t h e i r 
'problem o f knowledge'. Kant's p h i l o s o p h y i s c r i t i c a l t h e r e -
f o r e because, Hegel c l a i m s , i t has as i t s premiss t h i s e m p i r i c i s t 
v i e w p o i n t t h a t what i s t r u e can o n l y be d e r i v e d from t h e m a t e r i a l 
2^ 
t h i n g i t s e l f . ' T h i s remains t he s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h , i n examin-
i n g our mode o f c o g n i t i o n t h e ' t h i n g m i t s e l f ' i s t h e t o u c h s t o n e . 
Kant does, however, u n d e r t a k e t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e cog-
n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s m a manner t h a t meets w i t h Hegel's a p p r o v a l . 
He s e t s t o work i n a h i s t o r i c a l f a s h i o n g o i n g ' t h r o u g h t h e main 
modes o f t h e o r e t i c a l consciousness. The f i r s t f a c u l t y o r 
23. 'The c r i t i q u e o f reason i s j u s t t h i s : n o t t o know o b j e c t s 
but t h e c o g n i t i o n and the p r i n c i p l e s o f reason, i t s l i m i t s 
and i t s e x t e n t , m o r d e r t h a t i t n o t become t r a n s c e n d e n t 
( t i b e r f l i e g e n d ) . ' Hegel Werke 20, p. 339. A l s o , from t h e 
e a r l y essay on ' F a i t h and Knowledge': '.. the whole t a s k and 
c o n t e n t o f t h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s n o t the knowledge o f the A b s o l -
u t e b u t t h e knowledge o f t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y o r a c r i t i q u e o f 
the f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n . ' Werke 2, p. 303. 
24. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 339- 'Kant was the f i r s t g r e a t modern 
p h i l o s o p h e r t o make the t h r e e f o l d d i v i s i o n : s e n s i b i l i t y , 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and reason'. See L u c i e n Goldmann o o . c i t . , 
p. 159-
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mode examined i s i n t u i t i o n , t h e second, t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and 
t h e t h i r d , Reason. (The e x t e r n a l schema o f the Phenomenology 
o f Mind i s e v i d e n t h e r e . ) B e g i n n i n g w i t h i n t u i t i o n o r appear-
ance ( A n s c h a u u n g ) 2 ^ Kant d i s t i n g u i s h e s what 'corresponds t o 
s e n s a t i o n , the m a t t e r o f t h e same' from t h a t t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e 
m a n i f o l d o f appearance may be o r d e r e d , 'the form o f appearance'. 2' 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between form and m a t t e r we nave a l r e a d y encoun-
t e r e d m our d i s c u s s i o n o f Kant's n o t i o n o f t h e ' u n i t y o f appear-
ance'. Now, m the T r a n s c e n d e n t a l A e s t h e t i c what corresponds t o 
t h e m a t t e r , the c o n t e n t o f s e n s a t i o n would be such q u a l i t i e s as 
s m e l l , c o l o u r , hardness e t c . However, j u s t as d i d D e s c a r t e s 
and Locke, Kant d i s t i n g u i s h e s from t h i s o r d i n a r y m a t t e r o f sens-
a t i o n t h a t w h i c h g i v e s i t e x t e n s i o n , o r s t r u c t u r e ( G e s t a l c ) . 
Kant's i d e a l i s m now c o n s i s t s m s a y i n g t h a t we p r o v i d e t h a t form 
o r s t r u c t u r e t o what appears t o us: 'By means o f e x t e r n a l sense 
(a p r o p e r t y o f our mind (Gemlit)) we r e p r e s e n t t o o u r s e l v e s as 
b e i n g o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s o b j e c t s and a l c o g e t h e r .-15 b e i n g m space. 1 
25. The t r a n s l a t i o n o f Kant's term Anschauung r e p r e s e n t s sone-
t h m g o f a prooiem. I t i s a l s o a term t h a t i s o f some s i g -
n i f i c a n c e i n our e n q u i r y . I t i s n o r m a l l y t r a n s l a t e d as 
' i n t u i t i o n ' . I n some i n s t a n c e s , however, t n i s t r a n s l a t i o n 
misses t h e p o i n t and terms such as 'appearance' and 'percep-
t i o n ' are n e a r e r t h e mark. I t i s always as w e l l t o keep m 
mind the l i t e r a l German sense o f t h e t e r m 'look on a t ' when 
d e a l i n g w i t h i t . 
26. Kant. K r i t i k d e r Reinen V e r n u n f t , Suhrkamp Werke p. 69 
27. I b i d . , p. 7 1 . He c o n t i n u e s : 'Therein t h e i r form, s i z e and 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o each o t h e r i s d e t e r m i n e d o r d e t e r m i n a b l e , ' 
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Space i s i n t h i s way c o n s i d e r e d by Kant t o be a pure i n t u i t i o n 
( r e m e Anschauung), something w h i c h we s u p p l y t o t h e m a t t e r o f 
s e n s a t i o n m our consciousness. S i m i l a r l y , Time i s a pure i n -
t u i t i o n ; i t i s t h e manner m which we r e p r e s e n t o b j e c t s t o our-
s e l v e s w i t h o u r i n n e r sense. We p r o v i d e these u n i v e r s a l cond-
i t i o n s f o r each t h i n g we i n t u i t . I n t u i t i o n (Anschauung) i s 
t h e r e f o r e w h o l l y d i s t i n c t from s e n s a t i o n ( E r r p f i n d u n g ) . An 
example t h a t Hegel g i v e s i s : hardness i s my s e n s a t i o n ; i n t u i t i o n 
i s t h a t I sense something h a r d , t h a t I p r o j e c t t h e hardness as 
b e i n g o u t s i d e m y s e l f m space. The m a t e r i a l i s t s ' a t t e m p t t o 
d e r i v e a ] 1 knowledge from o u t s i d e m y s e l f and, even more, r e s t r i c t 
a l l e x p e r i e n c e t o t h e same, i s t h e r e f o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y miscon-
c e i v e d because the ' o u t s i d e m y s e l f ' i s my own i n t u i t i o n . 
We would expect t h a t Hegel would be w h o l l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h 
t h i s account which appears t o be a r e f u t a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i s m , 
c e r t a i n l y o f t h e m a t e r i a l ! - m o f Locke. However, he argues t h a t 
Kant has missed the p o i n t i n r e g a r d i n g space and t i m e as forms 
28 
o f 'sensuous i n t u i t i o n ' . He agrees t h a t they are a b s t r a c t i o n s 
t h a t do n o t p e r t a i n t o s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f . But t h e a b s t r a c -
t i o n space, f o r one, does n o t make t h e o b j e c t appear o u t s i d e our-
s e l v e s . Kant g i v e s t h i s i m p r e s s i o n by r e g a r d i n g space and t i m e 
as sensuous i n t u i t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g t o Hegel Kant argues t h a t 
' t h e r e are t h i n g s o u t s i d e b u t w i t h o u t space o r t i m e . Nov; 
consciousness comes and has w i t h i n i t s e l f t i m e and space as 
p p s s i b i l i t i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e , j u s t as i n o r d e r t o eat i t has a mouth 
and t e e t h as t h e c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r e a t i n g . ' I n genuine 
28. Hegel. We rice 9 ( D i e N a t u r p h i l o s o p n i e ) , pp. kl - 42. 
29. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 341. 
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i d e a l i s m , however, Hegel c l a i m s , space and t i m e do n o t t a k e 
on t h i s d e f e c t i v e s u b j e c t i v e form. I n genuine, o b j e c t i v e , 
i d e a l i s m t h e y are regarded as ' e x t e r n a l u n i v e r s a l s ' . ( i b . ) 
T h i s r e q u i r e s some e x p l a n a t i o n . Hegel r e g a r d s Kant as 
a s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s t i n so f a r as t h e S u b j e c t p r o v i d e s b o t h 
t h e form and t h e m a t t e r o f our knowledge.-^ 0 As we have seen, 
t h e m a t t e r o f our knowledge i s p r o v i d e d by our s e n s a t i o n , t h e 
form by our thought:. So we have t o c o nclude, i f Hegel wishes 
t o oppose t h i s view w i t h the view t h a t space and t i m e are ' e x t e r -
n a l u n i v e r s a l s ' , t h a t m h i s o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m t h e m a t t e r o f 
knowledge i s p r o v i d e d by t h i n g s o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s . To r e t u r n 
t o Hume's example, t h e cause and e f f e c t are n o t then m Hegel's 
e p i s t e m o l o g y s i m p l y i d e a s bhat we p r o v i d e f o r the o b j e c t s o f 
e x p e r i e n c e , t h e y are c a t e g o r i e s which a r e , he says, d e t e r m i n a t i o n s 
o f t h e i r o b j e c t s . ( i b . ) Hegel i s p r e p a r e d t o admit t h a t i t i s 
a r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t may o n l y be d i s c e r n e d by our t h o u g h t but 
i t i s s t i l l , i n n i s view, a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the t h i n g s tnemselves. 
Space and t i m e are e x t e r n a l u n i v e r s a i s m th e sense t h a t a l t h o u g h 
i t i s o n l y we who know them as a b s t r a c t i o n s , we cannot conclude 
t h a t t h e y do n o t p e r t a i n t o t h i n g s m themselves. Of c ourse, 
t h e q u e s t i o n now a r i s e s : where t h e n does the ' t r u e ' i d e a l i s m 
t a k e i t s place? Hegel, a f t e r a l l , appears co be t a k i n g a 
m a t e r i a l i s t s t a n d . The concepts space and t i m e , he argues, 
are e x t e r n a l u n i v e r s a l s , concepts w h i c h are i d e n t i c a l w i t h 
f e a t u r e s o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . They are t h e way m wnich 
t h i n g s m n a t u r e are o r d e r e d . However, he s t r e t c h e s t h i s 
30. Hegel. Werke 8, p. 119. 
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argument t o mean t h a t these concepts are the f e a t u r e s 
o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , o r t h a t t h e y are the o r d e r o f n a t u r e . 
Space i s t h e o r d e r m which t h i n g s are m n a t u r e ; 'however 
i t i s n o t merely an e x t e r n a l d e s i g n a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r e x t e r n -
al 
a l i t y i t s e l f . So the a b s t r a c t i o n , t h e concept space i s 
r egarded m Hegel's o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m as t h e o r d e r i t s e l f . 
The concept, and t h i s i s e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t m u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
Hegel's i d e a l i s m , i s t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . Kant, 
he suggests, f a i l e d t o a t t a i n t h i s ' o b j e c t i v e ' view o f t h i n g s 
because he c o n s i d e r e d t h e n o t i o n s t i m e and space w i t h i n t h e 
Lockean c o n t e x t . The q u e s t i o n s he had o c c u p i e d h i m s e l f w i t h 
were, Hegel says, Are t h e y something e x t e r n a l t o t h e mind o r 
are t h e y m the mind alone? He had n e v e r sought t o d i s c o v e r 
what they were m themselves. Had lie examined t h e n o t i o n o f 
space f o r i t s e l f , we are t o presume from Hegel's account, he 
would have d i s c o v e r e d t h a t i t was n o t j u s t t h e s u b j e c t i v e poss-
i b i l i t y o f e x t e n s i o n b u t t h a t e x t e n s i o n i t s e l f . 
From Kant's account o f i n t u i t i o n , we move on t o the under-
s t a n d i n g . The u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a c c o r d i n g t o Kant i s t h e c a p a b i l -
32 
i t y o f p r o d u c i n g c o n c e p t i o n s , ' the s p o n t a n e i t y o f c o g n i t i o n . 
3 1 . Hegel. Werke 9, p. 43- I t i s t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f i d e a l i s m 
t h a t makes p o s s i b l e the much debated (and d e b a t a b l e ) t r a n s -
i t i o n from the L o g i c t o the P h i l o s o p h y o f Ha cure. The I d e a 
we are t o l d , ( i b i d . , p. 24) passes i n t o N a t u r e t h r o u g h i t s 
s e i f - e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n . I t becomes the o t h e r o f i t s e l f as 
space. Space i s b o t h I d e a ( L o g i c ) and ' e x t e r n a l i t y i t -
s e l f ' ( N a t u r e ) , See a l s o : G.R~. G.Mure. The P h i l o s o p h y 
o f Hegel. Oxfora U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965. pp. i'H 1 - 133-
32. Kant. K r i t i k d e r Remen V e r n u n f t , o o . c i t . , '.. the 
c a p a b i l i t y o f p r o d u c i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ( V o r s t e i l u n g e n ) 
themselves, o f the s p o n t a n e i t y o r c o g n i t i o n i s t h e under-
s t a n d i n g . ' p. 97 • 
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The c a t e g o r i e s produoeo i n t he u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as I have 
a l r e a d y s a i d , are t h e form m which the I reduces t h e sense-
d a t a o f i n t u i t i o n t o a u n i t y . The u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n 
i s t h u s s i m p l y t n e s y n t h e s i s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and t h e 
a c t i v i t y o f t h e I m o r g a n i s i n g t h e m a n i f o l d o f appearance 
i s commensurate w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . We have t h e r e f o r e 
a l r e a d y encountered Kant's n o t i o n o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . As 
I have t r i e d t o d emonstrate, Hegel r e g a r d s i t as p r o v i d i n g a 
more adequate d e s c r i p t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a n t h a t p r o v i d e d by 
the E m p i r i c i s t s . However, t h i s enthusiasm f o r Kant's n o t i o n 
o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s tempered by h i s view t h a t t n e manner 
i n w h i c h Kant d e p i c t s t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n a.s 1 accompany-
m g ' ( b e g l e i t e n ) a l l my c o n c e p t i o n s i s d e f i c i e n t . Hegel 
even f i n d s i t a ' b a r b a r i c ' d e p i c t i o n o f the a c t i v i t y o f t h e I . 
I t g i v e s him t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e ' l t h i n k ' stands t o one 
s i d e as though i t were i t s e l f empty. The a c t i v i t y o f the I 
c o n s e q u e n t l y c o n s i s t s .^n u n i t i n g t h i s e ^ p t y ' I t h i n k ' w i t h t h e 
c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t s t a n d t o one s i d e o f i t . But i f 'the I , t h e 
u n i t y o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i s w h o l l y a b s t r a c t and f u l l y unde-
t e r m i n e d how t h e n ' , he asks, 'are t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f t h e I 
t o be a r r i v e d a t ? ' Now, i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Kant these c a t e -
g o r i e s o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g are d i s c o v e r e d m a v e r y c o n v e n i e n t 
way. ' F o r t u n a t e l y we f i n d e m p i r i c a l l y g i v e n i n o r d i n a r y l o g i c 
the v a r i o u s forms o f the judgement. Because Kant d e p i c t s the 
33- I b i d . , p. 136. 
34. Hegel. Werke 8. p. 117. Hegel adds t h a t i t was, on t h e o t h e r 
hand, the~ r pro found s e r v i c e ' o f the F i c h t e a n p h i l o s o p h y t o 
have p o i n t e d out t h a t 'the d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f t h o u g h t ' are 
' e s s e n t i a l l y t o be d e r i v e d ' . See belo^_, p ±02. 
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u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n as 1 accompanying' my c o n c e p t i o n s he 
i s a b l e t o d e r i v e those c o n c e p t i o n s ( t h e c a t e g o r i e s ) and t h e 
forms o f t h e i r use s i m p l y by t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e c o n t e n t o f 
o r d i n a r y l o g i c t o h i s T r a n s c e n d e n t a l L o g i c . T h i s Hegel 
r e g a r d s as a w h o l l y unwarranted p r o c e d u r e . I n s i m p l y a l i g h -
t i n g on the c a t e g o r i e s i n o r d i n a r y l o g i c Kant has, m h i s 
o p i n i o n , evaded t h e n e c e s s i t y o f de d u c i n g them from t h e n o t i o n 
o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t s e l f . The c a t e g o r i e s are t o be p r o p e r l y 
i n t r o d u c e d m p h i l o s o p h y by t h e i r d e d u c t i o n from t h e u n i t y o f 
a p p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f , o r what Hegel c a l l s , m t h e L o g i c , t h e 
' n o t i o n ' . ^ 
I t i s , as we have seen, f o r i t s i m p l i c i t a t t a c k on -Mie^ 
e m p i r i c i s m t h a t Hegel r a t e s most h i g h l y Kant's account o f t h e 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n h i s view, i t s e t t l e s once and f o r a l l t h e 
problems o f e m p i r i c i s m by showing t h a t t h e ' n o t i o n ' i s m g n e r 
th a n s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n . Indeed, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant's i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the m a t t e r t h a t o ur senses p r o v i d e 
"56 
i s n o t even an o b j e c t , i t i s merely a sensuous m a n i f o l d . I t 
becomes o b j e c t i v e s o l e l y t h r o u g h t he s y n t h e s i s o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . 
Thus i t appears t o Hegel t h a t t h e p r i o r i t i e s o f e m p i r i c i s m are 
35 • I b i d . That Hegel c o n s i d e r s t he two, t h e u n i t y o f apper-
c e p t i o n ( t h e I ) and the n o t i o n , t o be more o r l e s s tne same 
may be seen from t h i s quo c a t i o n from t he Science ot" l o g i c : 
'The n o t i o n m so f a r as i t has been extended i t s e l f t o 
such an e x i s t e n c e win ch i s i t s e l f f r e e i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n 
the I o f t h e pure s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' Werke 6, p. 253-
36. An ' o b j e c t i s ' o n l y ' t h a t i n whose concept t h e m a n i f o l d o f 
a g i v e n i n t u i t i o n i s u r n t e d . ' K r i t i k d e r Remen V e r n u n f t , 
o p . c i t . , p, 139- " 
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r e v e r s e d . 1 S e n s e - p e r e e n t i o n 1 , he says, ' i s now m f a c t 
t h a t which i s a c t u a l l y dependent and secondary and 
t h o u g h t s are i n c o n t r a s t t h a t which i s t r u l y independent 
and p r i m i t i v e . By way o f an example, he suggests, we 
can c o n s i d e r t h e s c i e n c e o f astronomy. A l l t h a t t h e astronom-
i s t i m m e d i a t e l y p e r c e i v e s w i t h h i s senses are t h e changes o f 
o f p o s i t i o n on t h e p a r t o f the s t a r s . I t i s o n l y when he 
b r i n g s h i s t h i n k i n g t o bear on t h i s m a t t e r o f i n t u i t i o n 
(Anschauung) t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n these movements. 
Our knowledge o f t h e heavens d e r i v e s from t h e a b i l i t y o f the 
human u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g t h e c o n t e n t o f s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n 
i n t o r e l a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e c a t e g o r i e s . The laws o f the heavens 
c l e a r l y a r i s e from t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the a s t r o n o m i s t n o t 
from h i s i s o l a t e d s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s . Hegel, as we would e x p e c t , 
does n o t w i s h t o suggest w i t h t h i s t h a t t h e laws o f t h e heavens 
do n o t have t h e i r o r i g i n m e x p e r i e n c e . Rather, i t i s evidence 
f o r him t h a t genuine e x p e r i e n c e i s much h i g h e r t h a n sense-exper-
i e n c e . I n t h i s case i t shows i t s e l f t o be t h e c o n t e n t o f sense-
e x p e r i e n c e subsumed under laws. I m p l i c i t m t h i s , t h e n , i s 
t h a t 'what i s e x p e r i e n c e s h o u l d be u n i v e r s a l , snould count f o r 
a l l t i m e . ' ^ 8 
T h i s i s e v i d e n t l y n o t Kant's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e powers 
o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Kant, as I have a l r e a d y s a i d , r e g a r d e d 
yj . ' i n t h i s sense Kant c a l l e d t h a t w h i c h conformed w i t h t h o u g h t 
o b j e c t i v e and indeed w i t h f u l l j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' , Hegel c o n t -
i n u e s . "/Jerke 8, p. J15. 
38. K e g e l . Werke 20. . p. i]47. 
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the a p p a r a t u s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g as p r o v i d i n g us w i t h 
knowledge which was i n h e r e n t l y s u b j e c t i v e . The knowledge 
p e r t a i n e d t o t h e mode o f c o g n i t i o n o n l y , i t was merely our 
o r i e n t a t i o n m th e w o r l d . Hegel suggests t h a t Kant i s 
' t i m i d ' o n t h i s p o i n t because, j u s t as d i d t h e e m p i r i c i s t s , he 
o n l y c o n s i d e r e d an i n d i v i d u a l , c o n t i n g e n t p e r c e p t i o n and under-
s t a n d i n g . The I i n t h e K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y i s , he says, e n c l o -
sed w i t h i n i t s e l f ' , t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s as such, 
whic h i s opposed t o t h e u n i v e r s a l ' . ^ So t h i s g e n e r a l approach 
t o t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge, i s the same as thac o f t h e e m p u m c i s t 
Kant, m Hegel's o p i n i o n , never t h i n k s t o ask whether wnat t h e 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n t a i n s i s i t s e l f t r u e . Hence h i s a c c usatxon 
i s , as ever, t h a t Kant r e g a r d s our knowledge n o t from the view-
p o i n t o f the a b s t r a c t i o n o f t h e ' t h i n g i n i t s e l f ' . 
T h i s l a s t argument o f Hegel's appears t o c a r r y v e r y i i r t l e 
w e i g h t . The grounds o f h i s c r i t i c i s m seem t o be mere --'ssertions 
39- Kant h i m s e l f suggests t h i s analogy i n n i s essay 'what does 
i t mean: t o o r i e n t a t e y o u r s e l f m t h i n k i n g ' (Was h e i s s t : 
s i c h 1m Denken o r i e n t i e r e n 9 ) . Werke 5« ( S c h r i f t e n z ur 
Metaphysik und L o g i k ) pp. 267 - 283. The e s s e n t i a l p o i n t 
o f t h e essay i s t h a t we o r i e n t a t e o u r s e l v e s g e o g r a p h i c a l l y 
and l o g i c a l l y by means o f 'a s u b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n c f d i f f -
erence' ( d u r c h e m e n ^ u b j e k t i v e n U n t e r s c h e i d u n g s g r u n d ) . 
See i b i d . , p p . 269 - 270. 
40. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 349. Goldmann's t h e s i s ( o p . c i t . ) 
is i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h i s r e s p e c t . He argues t h a t t h e whole 
o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y d e p i c t s the l i m i t a t i o n s o f man i n 
p r e s e n t - d a y b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y . He even c l a i m s t h a t , i n 
some ways, 'Kant l a y s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n f o r a 
most p e n e t r a t i n g c r i t i q u e o f Dourgeois i n d i v i d u a l i s t s c c i e t 
i b i d . , p. 110. T h i s l i m i t a t i o n t h a t Hegel d i s c o v e r s m 
the p h i l o s o p h y o f Kant would be seen t h e n by Goldmann as 
a l i m i t a t i o n i n b o u r g e o i s t h m K i n g m g e n e r a l . 
To i l l u m i n a t e t h e grounds we nave t o r e t u r n t o h i s assessment 
o f Kant's d e p i c t i o n o f t h e ' u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n '. The 
argument d e r i v e s i t s substance from what Hegel reg a r d s t o be 
one o f t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y : t h e 
p r o o f t h a t o b j e c t i v e knowledge i s t o be d e r i v e d from t h e a c t i v -
i t y o f the I a l o n e . Thus we can o n l y d i s c o v e r what i s t r u e by 
a p p e a l i n g t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g we have 
i n common w i t h , a t t h e v e r y l e a s t , o t h e r s c i e n t i s t s and p h i l o s -
ophers. I t i s n o t t h e r e f o r e ' i n d i v i d u a l ' o r ' c o n t i n g e n t ' . 
Consequently, i t seems a c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o Hegel t h a t Kant, who 
had d i s c o v e r e d t h e i d e a o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and reason s h o u l d 
a t t h e same t i m e r e g a r d t h e i r p r o d u c t s as b e i n g p u r e l y s u o j e c t i v 
and, even more, t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d o f t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y s h o u l d be 
something t h a t l a y beyond e x p e r i e n c e : t h e t h i n g m i t s e l f , o r 
t h e noumenon. 
T h i s b r i n g s us t o the t h i r d and l a s t f a c i l i t y , the f a c u l t y 
o f Reason. Reason m th e K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y , ? e g e i t e l l s us, 
i s t h e f a c u l t y t h a t has as i t s o b j e c t t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d , o r t h e 
i n f i n i t e . ^ 1 Since we know from Kant t h a t we 'can make no 
42 
adequate e m p i r i c a l use' o f the p r i n c i p l e s t h a t are d e r i v e d 
from pure Reason we may assume t h a t , i f Reason has an o b j e c t 
a t a l l , i t i s t h e noumenon. I f t h i s i s t h e case, t h e n Reason 
has as i t s o b j e c t something which i t can never a t t a i n . I n t h i s 
4 1 . Hegel. Werke 8, p. 121. 
42. Kant. K r i t i k d o r Rexiieri V e r n u n f t , p. J! 8. 
88, 
r e s p e c t i t would s t a n d below the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . However, 
and t h i s a g a i n I s what Hegel f i n d s c o n t r a d i c t o r y , as opposed 
t o t h e s t r i v i n g o f Reason f o r t h e u n c o n d i t i o n e d , - the noumenon. 
- t h e knowledge whicn t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g f u r n i s h e s Kant r e g a r d s 
• 4 
as l i m i t e d , i t i s ' e x p l a i n e d t o be u n t r u e , t o be o n l y appearance'. 
Reason stands above t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n i t s aim b u t a p p a r e n t l y 
beneath i t m i t s c o n t e n t . 
A l t h o u g h Reason has as i t s aim t h e knowledge o f t h e i n f i n i t e 
i t i s unable t o a t t a i n i t . Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e r e are two 
reasons f o r t h i s , F i r s t l y , he t a k e s Kant t o mean t h a t t h e r e 
are no o b j e c t s m our sense-experience t h a t c o r r e spond t o 
Reason. But t h i s , Hegel suggests, i m p l i e s a p e c u l i a r n o t i o n 
o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t would appear t h a t ' experience, o b s e r v a t i o n 
o f t he w o r l d , s i g n i f i e s t o Kant n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h a t t h e r e 
i s a c a n d l e s t i c k here and a s n u f f - b o x s t a n d i n g t h e r a . " C l e a r l y , 
whether one d i s c o v e r s Reason m e x p e r i e n c e 'depends on how one 
l o o k s a t t h e w o r l d . Kant s p h i l o s o p h y , however, has as 
i t s b a s i s an e m p i r i c a l view o f e x p e r i e n c e . E xperience i s 
r egarded as what I i n t u i t here and now; never, Hegel would 
argue, i t i s regarded i n i t s f u l l u n i v e r s a l i t y . T h i s p o i n t , 
as i t s t a n d s , has g r e a t m e r i t . However, whenever m HegeL's 
43- Hegel. Werke 8, p. 121. 'But w h i l e t he s u b j e c t i v e c l a i m o f 
the u n i t y o f pure a p p e r c e p t i o n was shown t o be r i g h t f u l , 
Kant means t o demonstrate t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v e c l a i m o f 
t h i s s o - c a l l e d fundamental p r i n c i p l e o f reason i s t h e source 
o f a n t i m o n i e s and o t h e r f a l l a c i e s . . ' K o r n e r , c p . c i t . , 
pp. 110 - 119. 
44. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 3^2. 
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p h i l o s o p h y we have ' u n i v e r s a l i t y ' , t h e o l o g y i s n o t f a r away. 
He i s p r epared t o concede t o Kant t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f 
Reason does n o t e x i s t m th e w o r l d c o n s i d e r e d m an e m p i r i c a l 
sense. The I n f i n i t e , o r a b s o l u t e u n i v e r s a l i t y , i s n o t some-
t h i n g t h a n can be s e n s e - p e r c e i v e d . I t i s f o r t h o u g h t a l o n e 
o r , even worse, ' s p i r i t i s f o r s p i r i t a l o n e ' . ^ Hegel r u m s 
h i s argument f o r us by t a k i n g t o the heavens. H i s s e c u l a r 
p o i n t , however, appears t o be t h a t we w i l l n o t be a b l e t o 
comprehend t h e w o r l d r a t i o n a l l y ] f we conceive e x p e r i e n c e o n l y 
as ' a c a n d l e s t i c k here and a s n u f f - b o x t h e r e . ' We ought, 
r a t h e r , he seems t o be s a y i n g , t o c o n s i d e i e x p e r i e n c e as t h i n k -
i n g - e x p e r i e n c e i n v o l v i n g memory as w e l l . On the o t h e r hana, 
h i s t h e o l o g i c a l pom^ appears t o be t h a t i f we c o n s i d e r exper-
i e n c e i n t h i s way t h e n t h e w o r l d w i l l i t s e l f be i n f i n i t e . I t 
seems a g a i n , t h e n , t h a t t h i n k i n g - e x p e r i e n c e i s f o r Hegel m an 
A r i s t o t l e i a n manner, t h e I d e a l , t h e I n f i n i t e i t s e l f . Tne cont 
e m p l a t i v e l i f e , t h e l i l e o f Reason i s t h e d i v i n e l i f e . 
The second e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t Hegel g i v e s t h e n f o r K a n t i a n 
Reason b e i n g unable t o a t t a i n t h e I n f i n i t e , t h e d i v i n e l i f e , 
i s t h a t Kant p l a c e s t o o low a v a l u e on our t h o u g h t . He i n t e r -
p r e t s Kant's account o f e x p e r i e n c e t o mean t h a t our i d e a s are 
n e c e s s a r i l y s u b j e c t i v e . The c a t e g o r i e s o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
we are t o l d by Kant, may be and a r e , l e g i t i m a t e l y a p p l i e d i n 
t h e o r d e r i n g o f our s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n s . T h i s i s a c o n d i t i o n 
t h a t we may have o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e a t a l l . But t h i s o r d e r 
45. ',.der G e i s t i s t n u r f u r den G e i s t . ' Werke 20, p. 353. 
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mg, we are reminded i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f Reason, i s o ur 
own, n o t t h a t o f t h e t h i n g i n i t s e l f . Thus i n e mploying 
these c a t e g o r i e s t o a t t a i n the I n f i n i t e Reason becomes Transcen-
d e n t . I t becomes t r a n s c e n d e n t by s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i e s 
do i n f a c t c o r r e s p o n d t o aspects o f t h e r e a l w o r l d . I t i s 
t h i s t h a t Hegel i n t e r p r e t s as an u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n o f our t h i n k i n g , 
t h a t Reason i n s e e k i n g t o extend our i d e a s t o cover a l l p o s s i b l e 
e x p e r i e n c e f a l l s i n t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n s : t h e Ancisnpriues and makes 
f a l s e c o n c l u s i o n s : P a r a l o g i s m s . T h i s a c c o r d i n g t o Kant i s 
Reason's own D i a l e c t i c . I t i n e v i t a b l y b u t , f a l s e l y , a t t e m p t s 
t o draw i n t o an u n i t y t h e knowledge o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n 
s e e k i n g t h e t o t a l i t y o f c o n d i t i o n s t h a t c o n d i t i o n something 
l i m i t e d . Kant acknowledges t h a t i t i s t h e n a t u r e o f Reason t o 
i n q u i r e a f t e r t h e knoweldge o f f i n a l causes, but because t h e 
means a t i t s d i s p o s a l , t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
a r e i n h e r e n t l y d e f i c i e n t , . t can never a t t a i n t h a t end. 
The s o l u t i o n o f t l . j a n t i flojfiies of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n t o which 
46 
Reason i s n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d i s , Hegel n o t e s , v e r y s i m p l e . 
J u s t as i t i s t h e n a t u r e o f Reason t o seek t h e t o t a l i t y o f a l l 
c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g a c o n t i n g e n t o b j e c t o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
i t i s e q u a l l y i t s n a t u r e t h a t what i t seeks cannot p o s s i b l y 
p e r t a i n t o e x p e r i e n c e . Reason seeks t o know the w o r l d ' j n 
i t s e l f ' , t h a t i s i t s n a t u r e , b u t a l l t h a t i s g i v e n , Kant a s s e r t s , 
i s appearance. Reason f a l s e l y argues, t h e n , from appearance t o 
46. The s o l u t i o n Hegel c l a i m s i s as ' t r i v i a l ' as t h e m s i g n t 
i n t o t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y n a t u r e o f e x p e r i e n c e i s ' p r o f o u n d ' . 
Werke S, p. 1 2 6 . 
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r e a l i t y . So t h e s o l u t i o n i s s i m p l y ' t h a t t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
( i . e . t h e antif t o p r i i e s ) does n o t f a l l m t h e o b j e c t m and f o r 
i t s e l f b u t p e r t a i n s o n l y t o t h e knowing Reason. 1 ( i b . ) As 
we would e x p e c t , t h i s t o Hegel r e p r e s e n t s a fundamental mis-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n o r D i a l e c t i c . Kant r i g h t l y 
p o i n t e d out t h a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , t h e a n t i m o n i e s t h a t Reason 
d i s c o v e r s , are n o t a r b i t a r y . They n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e m t h e 
e f f o r t t o d i s c o v e r t h e t o t a l i t y o f c o n d i t i o n s l i m i t i n g an 
o b j e c t . However, t h e f a c t t h a t Kant r e f e r r e d a l l these c o n t r a d -
i c t i o n s t o t h e f a c u l t y o f Reason i t s e l f r e p r e s e n t s f o r Hegel a 
severe l i m i t a t i o n m h i s p h i l o s o p h y . Rather t h a n r e g a r d exper-
i e n c e i t s e l f as b e i n g i n h e r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y Reason has i t s e l f 
t o t a k e on the burden. The t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t , t h e I , i s i t s e l f 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r b r i n g i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t o e x p e r i e n c e a c c o r d i n g 
t o Kant. Hegel i s supposed t o have remarked m h i s L e c t u r e s 
01 t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y : 'As i t was God p r e v i o u s l y who 
t o o k up a l l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s m h i m s e l f , so now i t i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s -
ness ' . J u s t as vn t h t h e R a t i o n a l i s t s i t was God wh i c h wa.s 
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t h e d r a i n i n t o w h i c h a l l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s f l o w e d so now w i t h 
Kant i t i s t h e I t h a t has t o t a k e on t h e ' n e g a t i v i t y ' o f t h e 
w o r l d . Kant, Hegel b e l i e v e s , shows t o o much tenderness t o 
w o r l d l y t h i n g s ' m t h i s , h i s D i a l e c t i c . ^ j t i s these ' w o r l d l y 
4 7 . Hegel. Werke 2 0 , p. 3 5 9 -
4 8 . See above, p. 3^7- (Chapter l ) . 
4 9 . Hegel. Werke 2 0 , p. 3 5 9 - See also,Werke 8 , p . 1 2 6 . C o n t r a d -
i c t i o n and" ' n e g a t i v i t y ' are t h e n a c c o r d i n g t o ^ -egel f e a t u r e s 
o f t h e r e a l w o r l d . However, t h i s i s n o t i n the s e n s e ( o f 
Marx) t h a t t h e y become i n t o l e r a b l e and we have t o g e t up a n a 
change t h e w o r l d . But i n t h e s e n s e t h a t our t h i n k i n g icnows 
th e w o r l d a s i n h e r e n t l y a n e g a t i v e one and i n t h i s knowledge 
r a i s e s i t s e l f above t h a t n e g a t i v i t y . R e a s o n J.S t h e r e f o r e 
n o t t h e demand t o o v e r t h r o w those n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , o1-" 
the rose m t h e c r o s s o f t h e p r e s e n t . 
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t h i n g s ' , t h e c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e , as he argues a t l e n g t h 
i n t h e Pnenomenoiogy o f Mind and t h e L o g i c , t h a t are i n h e r e n t l y 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y . I t i s indeed t h e t a s k o f Reason t o d i s c o v e r 
t h a t D i a l e c t i c b u t a l s o t o h o l d f a s t t o i t , n o t as i t s own, 
b u t as t h e essence o f the w o r l d . I t has t o r a i s e i t s e l f above 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o the c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f i t s own I d e a by knowing 
t h a t t h e I d e a , D i a l e c t i c , i s t h e essence o f t h e w o r l d . 
( i i ) The C r i t i q u e o f F i c h t e ' s T h e o r e t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y 
Kant's account o f D i a l e c t i c was, j u s t as was h i s g e n e r a l 
account o f e x p e r i e n c e , marred f o r Hegel by t h e e x c e s s i v e t o l e r -
ance he had shown t o ' w o r l d l y t h i n g s ' . Hegel cannot u n d e r s t a n d 
why Kant had p r e f e r r e d t h e a n t i m o n i e s and p a r a l o g i s m s t o f a l l 
w i t h i n t h e I r a t h e r t h a t w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . I t was, Hegel would 
argue, t h e w o r l d t h a t was i n h e r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y . I t was n o t 
t h e case t h a t Reason, our supreme c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t y , s t r a y e d 
o f i t s own a c c o r d i n t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n b u t t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e 
i t sought t o comprehend was d i a l e c t i c a l . What had p r e v e n t e d 
Kant from s i t u a t i n g t h e a n t i m o n i e s m t h e w o r l d m t h i s way 
was t h e l i m i t i n g i d e a o f the ' t h i n g i n i t s e l f ' ( D i n g an s i c h ) . 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s t h i s i d e a t h a t f o r ^ e g e l 
becomes t h e g e n e r a l i n d i c a t i o n o f Kant's ' t i m i d i t y ' i n comprehen 
d i n g e x p e r i e n c e . Kant's c l a i m was, as we have seen, t h a t we 
can have o b j e c t i v e knowledge o n l y o f t h i n g s t h a t o r i g i n a t e m 
our sense p e r c e p t i o n s . As t h e mark o f a t h i n g i n i t s e l f , were 
i t t o e x i s t a t a l l , would be t h a t i t d i d n o t o r i g i n a t e m our 
s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n s , we cannot p o s s i b l y have an o b j e c t i v e know-
ledge o f i t . We can know o n l y phenomena ne v e r noumena. The 
d i a l e c t i c o f Reason, as I have e x p l a i n e d p r e v i o u s l y , i s t h a t i t 
n e c e s s a r i l y seeks knowledge beyond t h e phenomenal w o r l d , a 
knowledge o f how t h i n g s are m themselves ( o f noumena) which i s 
a knowledge i t cannot o f n e c e s s i t y a t t a i n . T h i s b r i n g s us t o 
Hegel's o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y o f B'ichle. 
For i t i s Hegel's o p i n i o n t h a t the p h i l o s o p h y c f F i c h t e t a k e s 
as i t s p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e the K a n t i a n d i a l e c t i c , and m p a r t i c u l 
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the a p p a r e n t l y i n s u r m o u n t a b l e c o n t r a p o s i t i o n o f t h e ! I t h i n k ' 
t o t h e 'the t h i n g m i t s e l f ' . 
I t i s commonly known t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l c a t e g o r y m F i c h t e ' s 
p h i l o s o p h y i s t h e Ego (das I c h ) o r s i m p l y , what I s h a l l c a l l 
i t h e r e , t h e I . Hegel suggests t h a t F i c h t e ' s n o t i o n o f t h e I 
i s merely a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e n o t i o n o f t h e u n i t y o f apper-
c e p t i o n o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y . The d r i f t o f h i s argument 
would seem t o be t h i s . A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, the u n i t y o f apper-
c e p t i o n i s what makes p o s s i b l e any o b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . I t 
i s o n l y t h r o u g h our p e r c e p t i o n s b e i n g accompanied by the ' l 
t h i n k ' c o u l d we p e r c e i v e o b j e c t s a t a l l . T h i s may be t a k e n to 
mean, Hegel adds, t h a t m a c e r t a i n manner t h e I , o r the u n i t y 
o f a p p e r c e p t i o n , c o n s t r u c t s t h e o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e - t h e matce^ 
o f t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n b e i n g s u p p l i e d by o u r s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s , 
th e form by t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f the u n d e r s t a n d i n g and 'the l a b o t r ' 
by t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . Now, m Kant's p h i l o s o p n y t h e r e 
remains an element whic h i s n o t s u p p l i e d by one I i t s e l f . , namely, 
those t h i n g s e x t e r n a l t o o u r s e l v e s (Dinge an s i c h ) t h a t g i v e 
r i s e t o our s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s . F i c h t e , however, and t h i s i s 
where he m o d i f i e s Kant's n o t i o n o f t h e I , takes one s t e p f u r t h e r 
and argues t h a t even those t h i n g s i n themselves are an a t t r i b u t e 
o f t h e I . I n t h e j a r g o n o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y they are what t h e 
I i t s e l f p o s i t s . 
I f t h i s account o f Hegel's i s c o r r e c t i t appears t h a t 
F i c h t e nas extended Kant's t h e o r y o f knowledge i n t o an o n t o l o g y . 
I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t i n Kant's d e s c r i p t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e t h e I 
does n o t o f i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e b e i n g . The u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n 
does i n d e e d c o n s t i t u t e o u r e x p e r i e n c e b u t i t does nor f o r t h a t 
r e a s o n c o n s t i t u t e a l l t h a t i s . I n h i s p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e i s , 
as we know, a g i v e n s u b s t r a t u m w h i c h remains e x t e r n a l t o t h e 
I . I n c o n t r a s t , i n F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y , t h e g i v e n i t s e l f 
becomes a p r o p e r t y , o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e I . The I i t s e l f 
c o n s t i t u t e s a l l b e i n g . I t appears, t h e n , t h a t F i c h t e has 
i n t e r p r e t e d t h e n o t i o n o f t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n t o mean 
n o t o n l y t h a t 1 c o n c e p t u a l l y c o n s t r u c t my w o r l d b u t a l s o t h a t 
I c o n s t r u c t i t p h y s i c a l l y . 
T h i s o n t o l o g y F i c h t e equates w i t h genuine i d e a l i s m . I t 
has i n h i s o p i n i o n t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d e s p e c i a l l y f r o m dogmatism 
Genuine i d e a l i s m , he c l a i m s , i s t h a t p h i l o s o p h y which d e r i v e s 
t h e whole o f e x p e r i e n c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e 'non-ego', from t h e I . 
T h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , s o l i p s i s m , t h e view t h a t t h e s e l f i s the 
o n l y knowable and e x i s t i n g t h i n g . I t i s , however, a complex 
k i n d o f s o l i p s i s m . F i c h t e , as we s h a l l see, i s not concerned 
t o p l a c e knowledge m d o u b t . H i s aim i s , r a t h e ^ , t o g i v e i t 
an unshakeable c e r t a i n t y . I f t h i s i s h i s aim i t must o f necess-
i t y f o l l o w t h a t t h e r e i s something more t h a n t h e s e l f w h i c h i s 
t h e o b j e c t o f knowledge. H i s s o l i p s i s m i s complex, t h e n , i n 
t h a t he a s s e r t s a knowable w o r l d w h i c h , however, must have i t s 
ground i n t h e s e l f . We can perhaps see how i t becomes p o s s i b l e 
f o r F i c h t e t o a s s e r t t h i s i f , as I have a l r e a d y suggested, we 
r e g a r d h i s p h i l o s o p h y as a K a n t i a n o n t o l o g y . So what we have 
t o e x p l a i n i s t he p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e d u c i n g t h e e x t e r n a l 'world 
5 0 . P.Adanson. F i c h t e , Blackwood P h i l o s o p h i c a l C l a s s i c s f o r 
Fn p, 1: sh Re a d e r s . v . 1 2 c . 
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from t h e K a n t i a n u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . Now, as we know, i t 
i s t h i s u n i t y t h a t accompanies our p e r c e p t i o n s which, f o r Kant, 
makes p o s s i b l e an o b j e c t o f e x p e r i e n c e . What F i c h t e appears t o 
do I s t o move from t h i s n o c i o n o f the I as t h e c o g n i t i v e p o s s i b -
i l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e t o a n o t i o n o f the I as the r e a l ground o f 
e x p e r i e n c e . Thus t h e d e d u c t i o n o f an e x t e r n a l w o r l d w i t h i n h i s 
s o l i p s i s m p r e s e n t s no problem. I f m our e x p e r i e n c e we know 
t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d t h i s i s because, F i c h t e would argue, 
t h e I has p o s i t e d i t as such. Any o t h e r argument c o n c e r n i n g 
th e n a t u r e o f e x p e r i e n c e leads m h i s view t o dogmatism. 
U n d e t e r r e d ( o r so we must b e l i e v e ) by t h i s cha.rge o f dog-
matism Hegel f i n d s much t o c r i t i c i s e m t h e i d e a l i s m o f F i c h t e . 
As we would expect t h e s o l i p s i s m o f F i c h t e ' s i d e a l i s m does n o t 
escape h i s n o t i c e . A c c o r d i n g t o him, t h e f o r c e o f F i c h t e ' s 
argument i s t h a t ' E v e r y t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e t h a t the I has, i t 
has t h r o u g h my p o s i t i n g : I maKe a coat and boots m y s e l f i n 
t h a t I put them on'. The source o f t h i s c o n f u s i o n , Hegel 
suggests, i s t h e manner m which F i c h t e expresses t h i s d o c t r i n e . 
I t i s 'the form o f p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t i s u n c o m f o r t a b l e ; I p o s i t , 
so t h a t I always have the I b e f o r e my eyes'-?^ What i m m e d i a t e l y 
comes t o mind i n F i c h t e ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i d e a l i s m i s n o t i t s 
r a t i o n a l e , t h e K a n t i a n u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n , t h e s y n t h e t i c 
a c t i v i t y o f the I t h a t matces the o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e p o s s i b l e , 
b u t t h e i n d i v i d u a l e m p i r i c a l I . When F i c n t e says t h a t t h e I 
5 1 . Hegel. Werke 2 0 , p. 404. 
5 2 . Hegel, i b i d . , p. ^ 0 5 . 
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p o s i t s a w o r l d e x t e r n a l t o i t s e l f as t h e n o t - 1 , as Hegel 
s u g g e s t s , we i m m e d i a t e l y imagine o u r s e l v e s p r o d u c i n g t h i n g s 
such as b o o t s and c o a t s by our mere a c t o f t h i n k i n g o f thern. 
I n t h e most genuine o f i d e a l i s m , however, t h e I as u n d e r s t o o d 
by F i c h t e becomes s u p e r f l u o u s . Thus Hegel i s p r e p a r e d t o 
admit t h e K a n t i a n case t h a t i t i s my t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y t h a t 
o r g a n i s e s e x p e r i e n c e i n t o an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d b u t the e s s e n t i a l 
a s p e c t o f t h i s i d e a i s n o t f o r Hegel t h e o r g a n i s i n g a c t i v i t y 
o f t h e I b u t t h e mode o r manner i n which t h a t u n i t y o f apper-
c e p t i o n i s a t t a i n e d . F i c h t e , Hegel c l a i m s , c o n c e n t r a t e s on 
th e l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t s u b j e c t i v e s i d e o f Kant's i d e a o f t h e 
u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . Hegel h i m s e l f p r e f e r s t o s t r e s s what 
he t a k e s t o be t h e o b j e c t i v e aspect o f t h e i d e a : t h e c a t e g o r i e s 
o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h b r i n g about t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . 
He sug g e s t s t h a t , i f we c o n c e n t r a t e on th e s e concepts and t h e i r 
n e c e s s i t y , we t h e n have genuine i d e a l i s m . T h i s i s o f course 
5 3 
t h e view o f i d e a l i s e p r e s e n t e d i n h i s Science o f L o g i c . 
F i c h t e , I have argued, d e r i v e s t h e whole o f e x p e r i e n c e f r o m 
t h e Ego o r t h e I . He s e t s about t h i s i n t r i g u i n g d e d u c t i o n an 
ti 
a C a r t e s i a n f a s h i o n . I n h i s essay Uber don B e g r i f f d e r Wissen-
s c h a f t s l e h r e he i n f o r m s us t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l problem o f p h i l -
osophy i s t h e se a r c h f o r a p r i n c i p l e t h a t would be t h e a b s o l u t e 
5 3 . We might t h e r e f o r e see Hegel's i d e a l i s m i n t h i s way. Where-
as Kant had r e g a r d e d t ne c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g as 
s u b j e c t i v e Pieans t h r o u g n which we o r i e n t a t e o u r s e l v e s m t h e 
w o i I d , Hegel r e g a r d s t h e c a t e g o r i e s as b o t h o ur comprehension 
o f t h e w o r l d and t h e w o r l d i t s e l f . T h i s i s the c o n c e p t i o n one 
g e t s o f Hegel's i d e a l i s r , vhen r e a d i n g t h e Logi c, espec i a l l y t h e 
Chapter on t n e ' N o t i o n ' (Werke 6 , pp. 2 ; i 3 - 2 o 9 j where he cones 
t o g r i n s w i t h t h e K a n t i a n i c e a o f t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . 
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f i r s t p r i n c i p l e o f a l l human knowledge. H i s view i s t h a t 
i t i s o n l y by d i s c o v e r i n g sucn a p r i n c i p l e t h a t p h i l o s o p h y can 
become a s c i e n c e . As t h a t p r i n c i p l e would be t h e a b s o l u t e 
p r i n c i p l e o f knowledge i t would have as i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
t h a t i t would n o t be open t o p r o o f . To make i t s u b j e c t t o 
p r o o f would be t o induce a c i r c u l a r argument s i n c e i t c o u l d 
o n l y be proved by i t s e l f . I t f o l l o w s , m F i c h t e ' s view, t h a t 
t h a t p r i n c i p l e rray o n l y be d i s c o v e r e d o r d e r i v e d . He under-
t a k e s t h i s t a s k i n n i s C-rundlage d e r Wissenschaf t s i e h r e . 
The procedure he adopts m t h a t work i s t o pose the problem. 
What i s i t i n t h e s i m p l e p r o p o s i t i o n A=^ A t h a t makes i t s e l f -
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e v i d e n t l y t r u e ? " and t h e n t o d e r i v e the grounds f o r i t s 
c e r t a i n t y . The procedure c o n s i s t s m d e r i v i n g from one p i e c e 
o f c e r t a i n knowledge t h e c e r t a i n t y o f Knowled^t m g e n e r a l . I t 
i s t h e same t a s k t h a t D e s c a r t e s s e t s h i m s e l f on d e d u c i n g the 
5 6 
c e r t a i n t y o f t h e c o g n i t o . Since t h e n t h e problem i s C a r t e s i a n 
i n n a t u r e i t r e c e i v e s n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y a C a r t e s i a n r e p l y . F i c h t e 
c l a i m s t h a t t h e c e r t a i n t y o r s e l f - e v i d e n t n a t u r e o f knowledge i s 
d e r i v e d from t h e I i t s e l f . He reasons t h a t A i s t a k e n t o be 
i d e n t i c a l w i t h i t s e l f by analogy w i t h t h e s i m p l e i d e n t i t y o f 
t h e I am. We may accept t h e s e l f - i d e n t i t y o f A as b e i n g c e r t a i n 
and t r u e from the o r i g i n a l c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e I i n e x p e r i e n c e . 
5 4 . F i c h t e . S a m t l i c h e Werke E r s t e r Band, L e i p z i g , Mayer and 
M t i l l e r , p. 4? . rThe s c i e n c e of knowledge( Wissenscnaf t s l e n r e 
he says, i s i t s e l f a s c i e n c e . l t must, however, b e f o r e a l l e l s e 
have a fundamental p r i n c i p l e , wmch cannot be evidenced oy 
i t s e l f b u t musr f o r t h e purpose o f i t s p o s s i b i l i t y as a 
s c i e n c e be presupposed.' 
5 5 - I b i d . , pp. 9 2 - 9 3 . 
5 6 . See above , p.6 . 
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Even i n t h e case o f a t a u t o l o g y t h e I i s t h e ground o f t h e 
c e r t a i n t y and t r u t h . I t f o l l o w s f o r F i c h t e t h a t 'the grounds 
o f a l l t h e f a c t s o f t h e e m p i r i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' i s t h a t ' b e f o r e 
a l l p o s i t i n g i n t h e I , t h e I has i t s e l f p r e v i o u s l y been p o s i t e d . 
W i t h o u t g o i n g i n t o what a l l t h i s m i g h t mean f o r F i c h t e , we can 
see t h e e s s e n t i a l s o f h i s p o i n t o f view. He i s a r g u i n g t h a t 
t h e I i s i m p l i c i t m t h e p o s i t i n g o f t h e w o r l d and i s t h e r e f o r e 
t h e c e r t a i n t y o f t h a t w o r l d . 
H egel i n h i s summary o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y i n t h e L e c t u r e s 
on t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y suggests t h a t t h i s i s t h e f i r s t o f 
t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s from w h i c h F i c h t e d e v e l o p s h i s s u b j e c t i v e 
i d e a l i s m . The t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s are i m m e d i a t e l y r e c o g n i s a b l e 
as t h o s e w i t h w h i c h F i c h t e opens h i s Grundlage. A l l t h r e e 
p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e I . The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e , 
H egel s u g g e s t s , i s t h a t o f i d e n t i t y o r , i n t h e terms o f F i c h t e ' s 
p h i l o s o p h y I c h ( i ) = I c h . I t i s F i c h t e ' s c l a i m t h a i - t h i s p r o p -
o s i t i o n i s t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t l i e s b e h i n d any e m p i r i c a l a s s e r t i o n . 
Hence, what i s c l a i m e d i s t h a t t h e o b j e c t e x c e r n a l t o o u r s e l v e s 
i s what i t i s because i t d e r i v e s i t s c o n t i n u i t y , w h i c h i s i t s 
i d e n t i t y , f rom t h e I i t s e l f . Now what t h i s p r i n c i p l e e x presses 
f o r Hegel i s t h a t ' s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o t dead i d e n c i t y , n o t 
n o n - b e i n g b u t o b j e c t w h i c h i s equal t o me. He i s i n sympathy 
w i t h t h i s view because i t s u g g ests t h a t t h e I i s n o t s i m p l y s e l f -
e n c l o s e d b u t i s o b j e c t i v e . What i s , I t h i n k , meant by t h i s i s 
5 7 • F i c h t e . Grundlage d e r g &sammten Vv'issenscha f t s l e b r e Werko, 
o p . c i t . , p~9b-
5 8 . H e g e l . Werke 2 0 , p. j?95 • 
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t h a t F i c h t e m d e p i c t i n g the I as t h e ground o f t h e c e r t a i n t y 
o f a l l knowledge had t h e r e f o r e come t o r e g a r d t h e I , n o t o n l y 
as a s u b j e c t i v e power b u t as m i t s e l f a c r i t e r i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y 
Hegel c o n t r a s t s t h i s w i t h the p o s i t i o n m Kant's p h i l o s o p h y where 
t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ( t h e ' l t h i n k ' t h a t accompanies a l l 
our p e r c e p t i o n s ) c o n s t r u c t s t h e o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e or., i n 
t h e terms t h a t Hegel employs, i s t he source o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f 
o b j e c t s b u t i s n o t an o b j e c t i v e source o f t h a t i d e n t i t y . Acc-
o r d i n g t o Kant, i t i s an i d e n t i t y t h a t o n l y t h e I f u r m s n e s . 
I t does n o t p e r t a i n t o t h i n g s i n themselves. F i c h t e ' s m e r i t i s , 
i n Hegel's view, t h a t he reasons t h a t t h e i d e n t i t y i s b o t h c o n t -
a i n e d m appearance and has i t s a b s o l u t e ground i n t h e I . T h i s 
i s what t h e f i r s t b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f F i c h t e ' s p m l o s c p h y expresse 
f o r Hegel. I t i m p l i e s t h e view t h a t t h e c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y o f 
t h e I i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e . I t f o l l o w s 
f o r Hegel t h a t i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n e p i s t e m o l o g y t h a t wnat i s 
o b j e c t i v e 'De t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o I m o r d e r t h a t I have o n l y my 
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d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n i t . ^ 
T h i s p r i n c i p l e , though f o r m a l l y c o r r e c t m Hegel's view, 
s u f f e r s from a d e f i c i e n c y , namely i t s l a c k of a c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t . 
' T h e r e f o r e ' , he says, ' i t i s necessary f o r F i c h t e t o p o s i t 
a n o t h e r b a s i c p r i n c i p l e ' . ^ And i t i s t h i s p r i n c i p l e t h a t 
produces what Hegel c a l l s d i f f e r e n c e i n F i c h t e ' s system. I n 
o t h e r words, i t a c t s as t h e source o f an a c t u a l c o n t e n t f o r t h e 
5 9 -
6 0 . 
I b i d . , p. 3 9 5 -
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f o r m a l i d e n t i t y o f t h e system. So the second b a s i c p r i n c i p l e 
o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y i s t h a t t h e I p o s i t s i t s e l f as opposed 
by an n o n - I . I t 13 from t h i s p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d i s d e r i v e d m F i t c h e ' s p h i l s o p h y o r what Hegel c a l l s t h e 
' o t h e r ' o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e r e f o r e m t a l k i n g o f t h i n g s 
e x t e r n a l t o o u r s e l v e s we a r e , m t h e terms o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s -
ophy, t a l k i n g o f a w o r l d t h a t i s e s t a b l i s h e d bv t h e I i t s e l f . 
I n h i s view, a l l e x t e r n a l s are e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e p o s i t i n g o f 
a n o n - I ( n i c h t I c h ) by the I . So the c o n c r e t e w o r l d i n h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y p a r a d o x i c a l l y appears as a n e g a t i v e a f f i r m a t i o n o f 
t h e s u b j e c t . I n t h i s we can see most c l e a r l y F i c h t e ' s s u b j e c t -
i v e i d e a l i s m : ' . . a l l r e a l i t y i s p o s i t e d i n t h e I , t h e n o n - I i s 
however opposed t o t h e I ; c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e r e i s p o s i t e d m t h e 
l a t t e r no r e a l i t y a t a l l b u t pure n e g a t i o n ; and i t has t h e r e f o r e 
no r e a l i t y a t a l l m i t s e l f ' . ^ For even m e s t a b l i s h i n g an 
e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y F i c h t e p o i n t s out thac i t has no r e a l i t y . 
Hegel would s t o p s h o r t a t such an account o f e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y . 
As we saw e a r l i e r m h i s account o f Locke's p h i l o s o p h y , he 
c o n s i d e r s t h a t r e a l i t y has f i r s t o f a l l t o be r egarded as 
e x t e r n a l o r o b j e c t i v e . Only t h e n i s i t t o be shown t o be i d e a l . 
The t h i r d b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l s o p h y i s a 
s y n t h e s i s o f t h e two p r e c e d i n g ones. I t i s what Hegel c a l l s 
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t h e p r o p o s i t i o n o f ground. As ground, he says, the f i r s t 
two p r i n c i p l e s are m u t u a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g so t h a t the n o n - I t h a t 
i s p o s t u l a t e d as d e t e r m i n i n g me w i l l be mediated by t h e s e l f -
6 l . F i c h t e . S a m t l i c h e Werke, o p . c i t . , p. 132. 
6 2. Hegel. WerKe 20, p. 397. 
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i d e n t i t y ( i c h - i c h ) o f t h e I . T w i l l know t h e o p p o s i t e , 
t h e n o n - I , o n l y as my own p o s i t e d o p p o s i t i o n s . E q u a l l y , however, 
the T f i n d s i t s e l f d e termined by t h e n o n - I such t h a t t h e I i s 
o b j e c t i v e o r n o n - I . Hegel t h e n seems r i g h t m s a y i n g t h a t 
t h e p r i n c i p l e o f ground i s , m s h o r t , ' I am l i m i t e d by t h e 
6 "3 
n o n - I and t h e n o n - I i s l i m i t e d by t h e I . ' I t i s t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e , Hegel argues, t h a t r e p r e s e n t s F i c h t e ' s l o g i c a l 
advance over Kant. For i n s t e a d o f f i n d i n g t h e r<ategcries o f 
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n v e n i e n t l y t o hand m f o r m a l l o g i c as d i d 
Kant, F i c h t e s e t s about d e d u c i n g them from t h e m a n i f o l d and 
6^ 
r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s o f t h e I and t h e n o n - I . 
A l s o F i c h t e suggests t h a t , depending on how these mutual 
forms o f l i m i t a t i o n are viewed, we have e i t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l o r 
p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y . The t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n A'ould be t h a t 
I am o b j e c t , I am l i m i t e d by t h e n o n - I . But we have t o remember 
t h a t t h i s i s n o t s i m p l y the second b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f 
F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y s i n c e he r e g a r d s t h i s r e l a t i o n as a r e c i p r o c a l 
one. I n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y t he n c t - I i s n o t merely 
regarded as n e g a t i o n b u t as t h e I ' s own l i m i t a t i o n o f i t s e l f . 
As Hegel would say, I remain I m t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l r e l a t i o n . 
I t i s i n t e n d e d t h a t i t s h o u l d c o n t r a s t wxth t h e e m p i r i c i s t ' s 
account o f t h e r e l a t i o n between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . So t h e 
th e r e l a t i o n i s n o t t o be u n d e r s t o o d as one m which I as t h i n k i n g 
s u b j e c t am merely p a s s i v e b u t one i n w hich I am a l s o a c t i v e . 
We may see i t m t h i s way. I t i s t h a t m an account o f t h e 
6j5. I b i d . 
64. Hegel. Werke 20, p. J>93, 
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p e r c e p t i o n o f an o b j e c t , i t i s n o t o n l y t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e 
I by t h e o b j e c t w h i c h F i c h t e emphasises b u t a l s o t h a t i t i s 
I who p e r c e i v e t h a t I l i m i t t h e o b j e c t i n t h a t way. A l l , t h e r e -
f o r e , t h a t F i c h t e seems t o be p o i n t i n g o u t i s t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a d i a l e c t i c a l one. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e 
p r a c t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n i s t h a t t h e n o n - I i s o b j e c t and I l i m i t 
t h e non--I. But t h i s a g a i n we have n o t t o u n d e r s t a n d i n t h e 
s p i r i t o f t h e f i r s t b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y . 
That would i m p l y t h a t t h e s u b j e c t were a b s o l u t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t 
o f t h e n o n - I . T h i s i s n o t t h e i m p r e s s i o n F i c h t e hopes t o 
convey. A c c o r d i n g t o him the 1's p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y cannot 
s i m p l y be a r b i t a r y . I cannot d e t e r m i n e the n o n - I s i m p l y as 
I w i l l . T h i s a g a i n i s a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n d e t e r -
m i n i n g t h e n o n - I , I am r e c i p r o c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by i t . There-
f o r e when we u n d e r s t a n d t h e I as h a v i n g an a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y 
i n t h e w o r l d , as t h e f i r s t b a s i c p r i n c i p l e o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y 
s u g g e s t s i t does, t h e r e c i p r o c a l n a t u r e o f the p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n 
d e s c r i b e d has t o be borne i n mind. I t i s c a u s a l i t y m r e l a t i o n 
t o a n o t h e r independent world;- t h u s we m i g h t see i t n o t as 
genuine a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y b u t as a r e l a t i v e c a u s a l i t y . Such 
t h e n , i n rough o u t l i n e , i s F i c h t e ' s system o f p h i l o s o p h y . 
I n Hegel's o p i n i o n b o t h t h e s e a c c o u n t s , o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
and p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , f o u n d e r on t h e same problem. I t i s 
t h e same d i f f i c u l t y t h a t i n Hegel's view mars t h e K a n t i a n d i a l e c t i c 
t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f knowing and t h u s a f f e c t i n g t h e t h i n g m i t s e l f 
( D i n g an s i c h ) . I n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y a l t h o u g h t h e 
I and t h e n o n - I are i n a r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n and, moreover, i t 
104 . 
i s t h e I who f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t r e l a t i o n , t h e non-T 
t h a t i t p o s i t s c t i ] 1 remains a beyond t o e x p e r i e n c e . The 
K a n t i a n D i n g an s i c n . H egel a s s e r t s , i s c o n t a i n e d m t h e v e r y 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t s e t s up an e x t e r n a l w o r l d f o r t h e I , s i n c e 
t h e I p o s i t s t h e n o n - I as b e i n g i n i t s e l f i n d e p e n d e n t from 
65 
t h e I . I f t h e n o n - I i s p o s i t e d as b e i n g w h o l l y i n d e p e n d e n t 
o f t h e I that element o f i t , a t t h e l e a s t , must remain an ' o t h e r ' 
f o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s . O t h e r w i s e i t would n o t be t h e n e g a t i o n o f 
t h e I . Hegel argues t h e r e f o r e t h a t i t i s t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f 
the n o n - I p o s i t e d by F i c h t c t h a t i t remain i n an i n t r a c t a b l e -
o p p o s i t i o n t o what p o s i t s i t . C onsequently a l t h o u g h ( j u s t 
as i n t h e K a n t i a n p h i l s o p h y ) a l l t h e q u a l i t i e s o f the e x t e r n a l 
o b j e c t are i n t h e I t h e r e remains an element o f i t w h i c h t h e 
I cannot master.. T h i s much, c o n c e r n i n g t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
p h i l o s o p h y , Hegel b e l i e v e s F i c h t e h i m s e l f would acknowledge. 
Fox F i c h t e was known t o have thought t h a t t n e I as i n t e l l i g e n c e 
was always 'dependent on an u n d e t e r m i n e d n o n - I ' ^  t h a t t h e r e f o r e 
i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy t h e d u a l i s m o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t 
c o u l d n o t be overcome. I t was i n t h e p r a c t i c a l philosophy t h a t 
i n h i s view, t h i s o p p o s i t i o n s h o u l d be surmounted. I t i s i t s 
i n t e n t i o n t h a t I s n o u l d master my d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e n o t - I o r , 
65. P l a n t ( H e g e l , A l l e n & Unwm) suggests t h a t 'because o f 
h i s r e j e c t i o n o f the Kantiai notion of things m themselves. Hegel 
r e g a r d e d t h e v c r k o f F i c h t e as a c o n s i d e r a b l e advance on 
t h a t o f Kant.' (pp. 8 l - 8 2 ) . My v iew i s d i f f e r e n t . 
H e g e l , w i t h o u t d o u b t , approved o f F i c h t e ' s e l f o r t s t o t r a n s 
cend t h e K a n t i a n t h i n g s i n t h e m selves b u t , as I have m d i c a 
he d i d not t h i n k t h a t F i c h t e had w h o l l y a c h i e v e d t h i s . I n 
o t h e r words, F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y d i d n o t r e p i e s e n t a conr i d 
e r a b l e advance o v e r Kant's m t h i s r e s p e c t . 
6 6 . HegeJ . Werke 20, p. -i 04. The q u o t a t i o n i s from the G r ^ n d l ^ r , 
o p . c i t . , p. - 48. 
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m Hegel's terms, t h a t T s h o u l d be at noroe w i t h m y s e l f . I n 
t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y a c c o r d i n g t o F i c h t e , I a l l o w t h e 
n o n - I t o d e t e r m i n e me m o r d e r t h a t I may know t h e w o r l d . 
I n t h e p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y however, ' t h i s b a r r i e r o f t h e 
i n t e l l i g e n c e i s supposed t o be broken t h r o u g h , t h e I alone 
s h o u l d be t h e a c t i v e o n e 1 . ^ But, as we have seen, i n t h e 
F i c h t e a n p h i l o s o p h y s i m p l y m o r d e r t h a t t h e s u b j e c t may have 
a w o r l d m which he has an a o s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y he has t o p o s i t 
an independent element opposed t o h i m s e l f . So the actua . 1 
transcendence o f the o p p o s i t i o n o f the I and t h e n o n - I would 
j n f a c t f i n d t he I w i t h o u t t h e w o r l d w i t h i n which t o have an 
a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y . The I t h e n , and t h i s i s Hegel's p o i n t , 
even i n t h e p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y must have opposed t o i t s e l f 
an u n d e f i n e d impediment t o i t s own a c t i v i t y . T h i s F i c h t e 
c a l l s t h e i n f i n i t e impediment ( u n e n d l i c h e A n s t o s s ) . And i t 
6 8 
i s t h i s t h a t Hegel equates w i t h t h e K a n t i a n D i n g an j i c h . 
F or i t s e x i s t e n c e i m p l i e s t h a t t h e I may extend . t s a c t i v i t y 
as much as i t c a r e } t h e r e w i l l always remain a. b a r r i e r t o i t s 
freedom. Thus f o r F i c h t e moral a c t i v i t y i s always a s t r i v i n g . 
6 7 . Hegel, i b i d . , p. 4 0 6 . 
6 8 . I b i d . , p. 404. 
6 9 . Hegel. Werke 2 , ( D i f f e r e n z s c h n f t ) . I n F i c h ^ e ' s p h i l o s o p h y , 
Hegel c l a i m s , ougnt t o negate the o b j e c t i v e 'world. I 
s h o u l d nave a b s o l u t e c a u s a l i t y i n t he n o n - I ; t m s i s found 
t o be c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r a t one and the same ti m e the n o n - I 
would be overcome and the p o s i t i n g o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n o r the 
p o s i t i n g o f a n o n - I i s a b s o l u t e . T h i s r e l a t i o n o f pure 
a c t i v i t y t o an o b j e c t can o n l y be p o s i t e d as s t r i v i n g . ' 
p. 6 8 (Hegel's emphasis). I t i s I t h i n k l e g i t i m a t e t o 
t a k e t h i s as an i n d i c a t i o n o f Hegel's mature p o s i t i o n on 
F i c h t e . As Helmut G i r n d t i n h i s book, Die D i f f e r e n t des 
F i c h t e s c h e n und Hegelsonen Systems i n d e r liege J sere T J I f f e r -
e n u s c h n f t 1 . (BonrT,"Bouvi er,T965~,Tnt r o d u c t : 67~-'Q~i^y s H e g e l 
never r e v i s e d t h Q i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t he p r e s e n t s o f the 
p h i l o s o p h y o f F i c h t e i n t he D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t . . ' 
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m Hegel's terms, t h a t I should be at home w i t h myself. I n 
the t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy according to F i c h t e , I allow the 
non-I to determine me m order t h a t I may know the world. 
I n the p r a c t i c a l philosophy however, ' t h i s b a r r i e r of the 
i n t e l l i g e n c e i s supposed t o be broken through, the I alone 
should be the a c t i v e one'.^ But, as we have seen, m the 
Fichtean philosophy simply i n order t h a t the subject may have 
a world m which he has an absolute c a u s a l i t y he has t o p o s i t 
an Independent element opposed t o himself. So the a c t u a l 
transcendence of the o p p o s i t i o n of the I and the non-I would 
I n f a c t f i n d the I without the world w i t h i n which t o have an 
absolute c a u s a l i t y . The I then, and t h i s i s Kege]'s p o i n t , 
even i n the p r a c t i c a l philosophy must have opposed to i t s e l f 
an undefined impediment t o i t s own a c t i v i t y . This F i c h t e 
c a l l s the i n f i n i t e impediment (unendliche Anstoss). And i t 
68 
i s t h i s t h a t Hegel equates v i t h the Kantian Ding an s i eh. 
For i t s existence implies t h a t the I may extend i t s a c t i v i t y 
as much as i t care there w i l l always remain a b a r r i e r to i t s 
freedom. Thus f o r F i c h t e moral a c t i v i t y i s always a s t r i v i n g . 
67. Hegel, i b i d . , p. 406. 
68. I b i d . , p. 404. 
69. Hegel. Werke 2, ( D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t ) . I n Fichte's philosophy, 
Hegel claims^ T ought to negate the o b j e c t i v e world. I 
should have absolute c a u s a l i t y m the non-I; t h i s i s found 
to be c o n t r a d i c t o r y f o r at one and the same time the non-I 
would be overcome and the p o s i t i n g of the o p p o s i t i o n or the 
p o s i t i n g of a non-I i s aosolute. This r e l a t i o n of pure 
a c t i v i t y t o an obj e c t can only be posited as s t r i v i n g . ' 
p. 68 (Hegel's emphasis). I t i s I t h i n k l e g i t i m a t e to 
take t h i s as an i n d i c a t i o n of Hegel's mature p o s i t i o n on 
F i c h t e . As Helmut Girndt 111 h i s book, Die D i f f e r e n z des 
F-LChtescnen und Hegel soner Systems m der Heg^lsche "'In f f e r ~ 
e n z s c h r i f t ' ."(Bona, 3 ovvTevTl 965, IntToduct i o n ic J "say c , g e 1 
never revised the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t he presents of the 
philosophy of Fi c h t e m the D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t . , 
106. 
I t i s a s t r i v i n g t o overcome the opposition between the J and 
t h a t which i s n o t - I . That s t r i v i n g becomes an eterna] e f f o r t 
as t h a t o p p o s i t i o n i s i t s e l f a part of existence. I t I s an 
unendliche Anstoss. This idea of s t r i v i n g i s e s s e n t i a l l y the 
same n o t i o n , Hegel b e l i e v e s , as the ought (das So l l e n ) of the 
7 0 
Kantian philosophy. I t i s t h a t ought t h a t i s embodied i n the 
Kantian c a t e g o r i c a l imperative. Likewise m Kant's moral 
philosophy there i s an element m ourselves which i s beyond 
our c o n t r o l . This i s man considered as phenomenon where he 
i s subject t o the same kind of n a t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s as other 
phenomena.. Our e f f o r t as noumenal beings i s t o overcome t h i s 
l i m i t a t i o n of ourselves but i t i s i n h e r e n t l y impossible t h a t 
we do since we are both noumenal and phenomenal beings. Hegel 
suggests then t h a t t h ^ same kind of i n f i n i t e impediment t o 
freedom i s present m Kant's philosophy. For t h a t reason he, 
l i k e F i c h t e , can only p o i n t to f a i t h as the element m which 
t h i s d u a l i t y or b i f u r c a t i o n between the I and the world may be 
overcome. 
Hegel f i n d s t h i s account of experience u n s a t i s f a c t o r y 
because i t does not answer the need or requirement of philosophy. 
I n h i s Jena essay on the 'Difference of the Fichtean and S c h e l l -
i n g i a n Systems of Philosophy, 1 Hegel argues t h a t the requirement 
of philosophy i s t h a t 'the o p p o s i t i o n of r i g i d s u b j e c t i v i t y and 
7 1 
o b j e c t i v i t y be overcome'.' There i s i n each and every epoch, 
he says, a necessary b i f u r c a t i o n between the u n i t y of mind and 
the broken harmony of i c s being or our existence. I t i s from 
70.Hegel. Werke 20, p. 407. See Plant, o p . c i t . , p 8 2 -82, 
?'l. Hegel, werke 2, p. 22. 
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t h i s necessary b i f u r c a t i o n t h a t philosophy i t s e l f a r i s e s . 
Accordingly, Hegel suggests, ' i t i s the sole i n t e r e s t of Reason 
7 ? 
t o overcome such r i g i d o p p o s i t i o n s ' t h a t appear t o ma'-re im-
possible any harmony between mind and existence. Reason or 
philosophy, he adds, does not have t h i s i n t e r e s t m the sense 
t h a t i t s t r i v e s t o overcome op p o s i t i o n and l i m i t a t i o n per se, 
'since necessary b i f u r c a t i o n i s a f a c t o r of l i f e ' . ^ Rather 
i t has t h i s i n t e r e s t m the sense t h a t out of t h i s extreme 
d i v i s i o n i t seeks to create the highest u n i t y of philosophy. 
Now m Hegel's view, Fichte's philosophy does not a t t a i n 
t h i s highest u n i t y which philosophy might achieve because, he 
claims, i t i s a s u b j e c t i v e u n i t y of thought and r e a l i t y . The 
u n i t y , we are t o l d , takes on the form of a p o s i t i n g a c t i v i t y 
of the I alone. I n the Fichtean philosophy, we are f u r t h e r 
t o understand, the u n i t y of thought and r e a l i t y does not l i e 
3n the object i t s e l f , so t h a t the object remains f o r e v e r a 
beyond i n and to experience. Therefore m experience as F i c h t 
d e p i c t s i t there i s always an element of the non-I which i s 
unknowable because, the I p o s i t s the o b j e c t as something 
d i s t i n c t from i t s e l f m the crudest sense - m a t e r i a l l y . As we 
have seen, there always remains something other to man h i m s e l f 
m Fichte's d e r i v a t i o n of experience, q u i t e simply what he c a l l 
the non-I. We might regard t h i s as a note of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
s o b r i e t y i n Fichte's otherwise extravagant system. Hegel, how 
ever, looks on t h i s 'beyond' m Fichte's n o t i o n of experience 
72. I b i d . , p. 2 1 . 
73- I b i d . 
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as a f a i l u r e on Fichte's p a r t t o philosophise c o r r e c t l y . 
Experience m Fichte's p h i l o s o p h i c a l account i s s t i l l b i f u r -
cated. As Kegel himself would put i t , i n F ichte's account of 
experience, I am not at home w i t h myself. 
Hegel does indeed i n t e r p r e t Fichte's system as an attempt 
t o overcome the b i f u r c a t i o n of the I and the e x t e r n a l world, 
But he i n t e r p r e t s i t as an attempt t h a t f a i l e d . Fichte's 
e r r o r he argues i n the ' D i f f e r e n z s c h n f t ' was t h a t he sought 
t o overcome i n e v i t a b l e Entzweiung by p o s t u l a t i n g on tne one s i d 
of the equation of existence, Subject = Object, the I or the 
subject as absolute. I n the Fichtean philosophy the I , as 
we have seen* possesses a preponderance over the e x t e r n a l world. 
We might say t h a t , i n a sense, i t subsumes i t . But, Hegel 
i n s i s t s , 'the o p p o s i t i o n remains m t h i s way because t h a t which 
i s p o s ited as absolute i s determined through another, so i n the 
same fashion as i t remains, the other remains as w e l l . I n 
order t h a t the b i f u r c a t i o n m existence be genuinely aufgehoben 
(both transcended and preserved)Hegel asserts t n a t 'both the 
opposites, subject and object must be overcome (aufgehoben) 
i n t h a t they are posited as i d e n t i c a l . ' ^ We s h a l l see t h a t 
Hegel's t h e s i s i s t h a t m t r u e philosophy (which i s , of course, 
i d e a l i s m ) independent substance and the independent I are both 




I b i d . , p. 95. 
I b i d . 
10Q. 
So Hegel understands F i c h t e as having constructed a philosophy 
which l i k e a l l other philosophies aims at r e s t o r i n g the 'shat-
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tered harmony' of temporal existence. But according to h i s 
' D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t 1 the dissonance between the subject and the 
e x t e r n a l world can only be overcome where both the I and the 
world lose t h e i r independent value. Where the world i s 
regarded as being s u b j e c t i v e and the ego as being o b j e c t i v e 
or concrete. Subject has t o be equal t o object and object 
equal to subject. This does not happen i n Fichte's philosophy. 
Indeed the only manner i n which t h i s i s t o be achieved, H^gel 
would assert, i s through the subject t h i n k i n g o b j e c t i v e l y or 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y such t h a t the o b j e c t i v e world i s shown to conform 
to my t h i n k i n g . This, t h e r e f o r e , i s why s c i e n t i f i c or system-
a t i c t h i n k i n g plays such an important r o l e i n Hegel's philosophy, 
f o r i t alone, m Hegel's view, i s the overcoming of the i n e v i t -
able b i f u r c a t i o n of existence. I t alone meets the requirement 
of philosophy. 
Fichte's philosophy, t h e r e f o r e , i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y system-
a t i c f o r Hegel. I n h i s philosophy Substance and Subject are -
s t i l l opposed. This i s so since h i s philosophy remains c o n d i t -
ioned by the Kantian n o t i o n of the Ding an s i c h . None the less 
there i s m Hegel's e s t i m a t i o n much m Fichte's philosophy 
o 
t h a t adds up t o ^ s e n s i b l e epistemology. I n c o n t r a s t to Kant, 
f o r instance, F i c h t e does i n s i s t t h a t the 'Ego i s not t o be 
77 
regarded as subject merely, but at once subject and o b j e c t ' . 
76. I b i d . , p. 20. 
77' R.Adamson, o p . c i t . , p. 12b. 
110. 
Kant had regarded the r o l e of the u n i t y of apperception as 
merely a s u b j e c t i v e one. But F i c h t e , as I have suggested, 
i n t e r p r e t s the concept of the u n i t y of apperception f a r more 
comprehensively. For him the I both provides as w i t h an 
o r i e n t a t i o n m experience and w i t h the matter of t h a t experience 
i t s e l f . He makes an e f f o r t to have done w i t h the Kantian Ding 
an s i c h . Although Hegel judges the outcome of t h i s e f f o r t 
t o be unsuccessful the e f f o r t i t s e l f meets w i t h h i s approval. 
We may then be f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t Hegel would be at one "with 
the c r i t i c i s m t h a t F i c h t e , according t o Adamson, has to make 
of Kant t h a t Kant had never a t t a i n e d genuine idealism because 
he had 'regarded consciousness as merely so much t o be known, 
- as a se r i e s of s t a t e s , from which n o t h i n g can possibly be 
ex t r a c t e d . ' He had 'not considered how consciousness comes 
to be, what c o n d i t i o n s are n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d i n i t s e x i s -
78 
tence what are the laws undir which i t a cts. 
To do this, m Fichte's view, philosophy has t o become the r e f l e c t i v e 
consciousness of the t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y of the I . I t has to 
become the consciousness of consciousness i t s e l f , or what Hegel 
a p t l y describes as the ' a r t i f i c i a l consciousness' ( n u n s t l i c h e s 
B e w u s s t s e m ) . ^ We need hardly say t h a t t h i s n o t i o n of p h i l o s -
ophy also plays an important r o l e i n the make-up of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel suggests t h a t we can see the 
beginning of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of philosophy m Kant's 
C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason. I t was Kant who brought out the s i g n i f -
icance of the u n i t y of apperception which, as he put i t , accompanies 
the I t h i n k . I t was he, then, who taught us t o t h i n k about 
78. I b i d . , p. 127. 
79- Hegel. Werke 20, p. 593. 
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t h e ' I tli±nk'. J u t what d i s t i n g u i s h e s the a r t i f i c i a l consciousness 
he recon-nends f o r p h i l o s o p h y from t h a t recommended by F i c h t e i s 
t h a t i t i s i n t e n d e d not so much as a r e f l e c t i o n on consciousness 
i t s e l f as a r e f l e c t i o n on the p o s s i b i l i t y o f knowledge. H i s 
p h i l o s o p h y i s , a f t e r a l l , i n t e n d e d t o be t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . I t 
i s the manner o f our c o g n i t i o n o f o b j e c t s which concerns i t . 
Q u i t e s i m p l y , as Hegel says, the c o n t e x t o f Kant's p h i l o s o p h y i s 
s t i l l t h a t o f the problem o f knowledge, F i c h t e , however, i s not 
w h o l l y concerned w i t h t h a t problem. He i s , as I have emphasised, 
a l s o concerned w i t h the problem o f what c o n s t i t u t e s an adequate 
account o f r e a l i t y . Kant's i n t e r e s t i n t h e I ( t h e u n i t y o f 
a p p e r c e p t i o n ) was aroused by h i s need t o e x p l a i n the s y n t h e t i c 
p r o p o s i t i o n s a p r i o r i he t h o u g h t t o be p r e s e n t j.n a l l our knowled-
ge. I t i s m t h i s way t h a t he h i t upon L o g i c . A c c o r d i n g t o him 
i t s u p p l i e d t h e c a t e g o r i e s t h r o u g h which the u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
reduced the n a m f i d o f appearance i n t o a w o r l d o f o b j e c t s . I n 
d o i n g t h i s , Hegel says, Kant had g i v e n t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t we 
v/ere not able t o i n v e s t i g a t e the o r i g i n o f t h e c o n t e n t o f 
consciousness. «./e can, f o r example, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant f i n d i n 
consciousness the n o t i o n o f c a u s a l i t y out how i t cones t o be 
t h e r e i s a n o t h e r r a t t e r . T/e cannot p e n e t r a t e b e h i n d i t s appear-
ance i n consciousness. F i c h t e however (whose view i s t h a t the I 
c o n s t i t u t e s b e i n g ) takes the c a t e g o r i e s as the o b j e c t s o f a genet-
i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T h i s he can do s i n c e the genesis o f the 
c a t e g o r i e s from t h e r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s o f the I and n o n - I i s f o r 
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him one and the same t h i n g as the genesis of r e a l i t y . 
I n c o n t r a s t t o Kant, the content of t h e ' I think'becomes h i s 
o b j e c t . And i t i s t h i s t h a t Hegel d e p i c t s as the conscious-
ness of consciousness or the a r t i f i c i a l consciousness. 
I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel maintains t h a t , w i t h 
F i c h t e , philosophy d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f d e c i s i v e l y from 
ordinary t h i n k i n g . I n h i s view F i c h t e was the philosopher 
who had ' f i r s t brought to consciousness the knowledge of 
8 l 
knowledge'. What Hegel means by or d i n a r y t h i n k i n g i s not 
simply the reasoning of everyday l i f e or else he and Fic h t e 
would be merely cl a i m i n g tne commonplace m d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i t 
from philosophy. Ordinary t h i n k i n g i s indeed s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
knowledge of objects and p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . But i t i s 
knowledge t h a t i s bound up w i t h something t h a t j s e x t e r n a l 
t o consciousness. I t i s t h e r e f o r e knowledge which 'does not 
82 
make i t s e l f i t s consciousness i n t o the o b j e c t ' . Ordinary 
thought i s always about something other than thought i t s e l f . 
The t h i n k e r does not nave h i s t h i n k i n g as h i s object and (and 
t h i s i s the most s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t f o r Hegel) the t h i n k e r does 
80. The 'employment' of the categories ceases to be a problem 
f o r him (Fichte)...The imagination not only produces the 
schema of the forms of thought, as Kant has taught, not 
only space, time and the mathematical cbjeccs, as Maimun 
wanted, hot also produces e m p i r i c a l objects as such.' 
R.Kroner. Von Kant b i s Hegel, Mohr Verlag, p. ^89. 
81. Hegel. Werke 20, p. 393. 
82. I b i d , 'not make i t s e l f ' i s a d m i t t e d l y an awkwari r e n d e r i n 
but note the use Hegel makes of t h i s phrase. 
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not make the obje c t i n t o h i s consciousness. I n other words, 
I n o r d i n a r y t h i n k i n g the object i s not r e t r a c t e d i n t o conscious-
ness. Ordinary t h i n k i n g i s then f o r Hegel t h i n k i n g t h a t has 
as i t s object an 'other' to i t s e l f . I t i s what we can regard 
q u i t e simply as being m a t e r i a l i s t t h i n k i n g . I t i s t h i n k i n g 
which i n s i s t s t h a t i t i s t o an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y i t r e f e r s . 
Hegel i s of the opi n i o n , as we have seen, t h a t i t i s the r e q u i r e 
ment of philosophy t h a t such b i f u r c a t e d t h i n k i n g be overcome. 
Fichte's conception of philosophy as the a r t i f i c i a l conscieusnes 
does, i n Hegel's view, go some way toward achieving t h i s . I n 
standing 'behind my ordi n a r y consciousness' -y, Hegel argues, 
I am i n a p o s i t i o n to r a i s e myself above b i f u r c a t e d t h i n k i n g . 
As I have already i n d i c a t e d , t h i s n o t i o n of philosophy plays 
an important r o l e m the c o n s t r u c t i o n of Hegel's Fhenomeno]ogy 
of Mind. We may now approach t h a t work by a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
the philosophy of Hegel's one-time i n t e l l e c t u a l companion~S cbeli 
84 
mg. 
83. I b i d . 
8 4 . For a short while at Jena when they were co- e d i t o r s of 
the C r i t i c a l Journal of Philosophy they d i d not d: s t m g u i s 
t h e i r w r i t i n g s . " See Cairo, Hegel, Blackwood, p. 48. 
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Hegel's C r i t i q u e of Schellmg's Philosophy 
I have suggested t h a t F i c h t e ' s philosophy f a l l s down i n 
Hegel's o p i n i o n since i t f a i l s t o overcome the b i f u r c a t i o n 
t h a t Hegd b e l i e v e s t o be inherent i n experience. As I have 
suggested, Hegel regards i t as the task o f philosophy to over-
come t h i s b i f u r c a t i o n . Philosophy, i n h i s view, has t o a t t a i n 
t h a t 'highest u n i t y ' i n which . a l l o p p o s i t i o n and d i v i s i o n i s 
ext i n g u i s h e d . F i c h t e , Hegel maintained, f a i l e d t o a t t a i n 
t h i s h i g h e s t u n i t y because h i s t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy p o s t u l a t e d 
only a s u b j e c t i v e u n i t y o f subject and o b j e c t or thought and 
r e a l i t y . 'The su b j e c t = o b j e c t t h e r e f o r e , he claims, 'becomes 
a s u b j e c t i v e one, and i t does not succeed i n overcoming t h i s 
85 
s u b j e c t i v i t y and p o s i t i n g i t e s e l f o b j e c t i v e l y . ' I n comparison 
the proper conception of philosophy i s , according t o Hegel, 
more f u l l y worked out i n S c h e l l i n g ' s system. This i s so, Hegel 
argues, because 'the p r i n c i p l e of i d e n t i t y i s the absolute 
p r i n c i p l e o f the whole S c h e l l m g i a n system; philosophy and system 
f a l l t o g e t h e r ; the i d e n t i t y i s not l o s t i n the p a r t s , even l e s s 
i n the r e s u l t ' . ^ Hegel claims t h a t m Ficht e ' s philosophy 
t h a t the i d e n t i t y o f subject and o b j e c t was only an o r i g i n a l 
i d e n t i t y . Both subject and o b j e c t d i d indeed have t h e i r genesis 
m the 1 but m the system i t s e l f (say when F i c h t e i s d e a l i n g 
w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t l i k e l a w ) , the p a r t i c u l a r f a l l s out-
side t h a t i d e n t i t y . On Hegel's reading, the p a r t i c u l a r i n 
85. Hegel. Werke 2, p. 94. 
86. I b i d . 
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Fichte's system i s simply object ( f a l l i n g outside the supposed 
u n i t y of subject and o b j e c t ) a t h i n g outside the subject, merely 
a f f e c t i n g i t . We can see t h i s , Hegel argues, m t h a t the parts 
of the system are derived from the various aspects of lack of 
i d e n t i t y . For instance, he claims, the t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy 
i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by the precedence which the I takes over the 
non-I. I n c o n t r a s t S c h e l l m g makes the p r i n c i p l e of i d e n t i t y 
permeate the whole of h i s system. I n the D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t 
Hegel argues t h a t S c h e l l m g understands whet has t o be done f o r 
the highest i d e n t i t y of philosophy t o be a t t a i n e d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , 
he sees t h a t 'the subject and o b j e c t ' have 'both ( t o be) p o s i t e d 
87 
as subject-object'. I n t h a t highest u n i t y we nave to regard 
not only the I as s u b j e c t - o b j e c t but also the object i t s e l f . 
The e r r o r of F i c h t e , then, was t o regard the I as the only 
r e a l i t y , t o t h i n k of o b j e c t i v i t y , s o l e l y as the negation or 
l i m i t a t i o n of che I . 
S c h e l l m g explains nis p o s i t i o n concisely, and c e r t a i n l y 
m a mariner which i s adequate f o r our purpose, m the essay 
'Depiction of my System of Philosophy' ( D a r s t e l l u n g memes 
88 
Systems der P h i l o s o p h i e ) . Here he takes the view t h a t i f 
we are t o understand the idealism of F i c h t e as c l a i m i n g t h a t 
the I i s e v e r y t h i n g , we may understand h i s i d e a l i s m as c l a i m i n g 
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s the I . S c h e l l m g , then, wishes to s t r e s s 
87. I b i d . 
88. S c n e l l m g . Werke (Jubilaumsdruck), K u n c f i . V o l . 5. 
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the order m which the subject i s said t o be equivalent 
w i t h r e a l i t y . I n Pichte's philosophy, he f e e l s , the emphasis 
i s wrongly placed on the s u b j e c t i v e side of the equation. He, 
the c o n t r a r y , wishes t o place the emphasis on the o b j e c t i v e 
aspect: t h a t r e a l i t y i s i t s e l f s u b j e c t i v e . By s e t t i n g out 
from the o b j e c t i v e pole of the s u b j e c t - o b j e c t equation he hopes 
to prove t h a t o b j e c t i v e experience i s i t s e l f s u b j e c t i v e . He 
t h e r e f o r e presupposes a separation of subject and object or, 
m Hegel's terms, an Entzweiung m experience. And i t i s 
from t h i s p o i n t of view t h a t t h e i r u n i t y i s t o be achieved. 
For S c h e l l m g t h i s u n i t y can be achieved because ev e r y t h i n g i s 
89 
t h i s i d e n t i t y of subject and object or the Absolute I d e n t i t y . 
For S c h e l l m g and Hegel t h i s Absolute i d e n t i t y takes the 
place of the ordinary r e l i g i o u s conception of God. I say 
'takes the place' although t h i s i s not the manner i n which 
Hegel i n t e r p r e t s the i d e n t i f y of the Absolute w i t h God. He 
sees no break w i t h r e l i g i o n . I t i s i n h i s view the proper 
comprehension of God, as h i s c r i t i c i s m s of Descartes w i l l have 
i n d i c a t e d . There he argued t h a t God, p r o p e r l y conceived, was 
the n o t i o n of the u n i t y of thought and being. I t i s f o r t h i s 
reason t h a t he t h i n k s of Schellmg's system as the knowledge of 
God. God, Hegel asserted i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of Descartes, shoul 
be depicted not as a t h i r d term mediating between subject and 
object but as t h e i r Absolute i d e n t i t y . God i s where r e a l i t y 
meets thought and thought r e a l i t y , not an e n t i t y independent 
of e i t h e r . Now ±t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how, i f t h i s i s the 
89. I b i d . , p. 15-
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proper n o t i o n of God, how i t may be r e l a t e d i n any way at a l l t o 
the o r d i n a r y t h e o l o g i c a l conception of God. At the minimum, 
the n o t i o n of God must i n v o l v e the n o t i o n of a being t h a t i s 
e x t e r n a l t o our own self-consciousness. And i t i s c l e a r t h a t 
the Hegelian God f a l l s w i t h i n self-consciousness. I t seems 
d i f f i c u l t t o avoid the conclusion t h a t , as I suggested at the 
outset, the break w i t h theology i s absolute w i t h the philosophies 
of S c h e l l m g and Hegel. Hegel might say m h i s defence t h a t the 
n o t i o n of the absolute i d e n t i t y of subject and object i s the 
r a t i o n a l content of the r e l i g i o u s experience. We might even 
agree w i t h t h i s . However t h i s bears l i t t l e r e l a t i o n t o what 
the r e l i g i o u s person a c t u a l l y t h i n k s he i s about. 
Be t h a t as i t may, the not i o n of the Absolute m the guise 
of Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Idea and the Absolute S p i r i t , 
plays a"n important r o l e m Hegel's philosophy. I t i s also 
one of i t s most confusing n o t i o n s . One of the reasons f o r 
t h i s i s t h a t i t enters i n t o h i s philosophy as one of i t s pre-
suppositions, but t h a t m some way i t also forms i t s goal. 
What we make of t h i s idea when i t f i r s t enters the vocabulary 
of philosophy might then help to c l e a r some of ,the confusion. 
There are various f o r m u l a t i o n s of t h i s idea of S c h e l l m g ' s , a l l 
of which re q u i r e some explanation. F i r s t l y , S c h e l l m g suggests 
t h a t we regard the Absolute as f o l l o w s : 'Absolute i d e n t i t y 
90 
simply i s and i s as c e r t a i n as the p r o p o s i t i o n A ~ A. 
His p o i n t of reference here seems to be the philosophy of F i c h t e . 
The c e r t a i n t y of tne Absolute i d e n t i t y , S c h e i l i n g appears to 
90. I b i d . , p. Ik. 
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imply, i s the c e r t a i n t y of a f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of philosophy 
such as t h a t which Fichte sought. Just as w i t h F i c h t e , 
t h a t p r i n c i p l e was not i t s e l f subject t o proof. With S c h e l l -
mg, however, i t i s not even open to d e r i v a t i o n since i t i s a 
f u r t h e r suggestion of S c h e l l m g t h a t we look on 'the being of 
the Absolute i d e n t i t y ' as 'an e t e r n a l t r u t h ' . ^ S c h e l l i n g 
believes an enquiry i n t o the grounds of the c e r t a i n t y of the 
Absolute i s unnecessary because i t i s an ever-present t r u t h . 
I t can, he i n s i s t s , only be i n t u i t e d as being t r u e . Futher-
more we are t o understand i t as being t r u e not only an a formal 
sense but also m a concrete sense. Taken m a formal 
sense i t would merely imply t h a t o b j e c t s , when properly known 
were t h i s absolute i d e n t i t y . S c h e l l i n g wishes i t t o imply 
more. I n h i s view, and t h i s i s the l a s t of h i s f o r m u l a t i o n s 
t h a t we s h a l l consider, 'Everything t h a t i s , i s the Absolute 
, op 
i d e n t i t y i t s e l f . ^ S c h e l l i n g believes t h a t the whole of 
being i s m i t s e l f the . d e n t i t y of subject and o b j e c t . So, 
as I have s a i d , i t i s not simply t h a t when th i n g s are known t h a t 
they are t h i s Absolute but, S c h e l l i n g suggests, they are m 
themselves Absolute. S c h e l l i n g , j u s t as d i d F i c h t e , extends 
a theory t h a t has i t s r a t i o n a l e m the theory of knowledge 
i n t o an ontology. 
I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t S c h e l l i n g ' s philosophy does 
not i t seems t o me, r e s t on sound l o g i c a l grounds. His p h i l o s -
ophy assumes what i t ought to prove. Nothing i s more m need 
91. I b i d . 
92. I b i d . , p. 15. 
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of proof than the n o t i o n of r e a l i t y as Absolute i d e n t i t y . 
Hegel, I think,shares t h i s view of Schelimg's philosophy. 
I n h i s l a t e r years he 'would not, I b e l i e v e , have defended 
Schellmg's system on the grounds of i t s l o g i c a l consistency. 
He would have defended i t more on the grounds t h a t he gives 
m h i s Lectures on the H i s t o r y of Philosophy, namely, t h a t 
Schellmg's n o t i o n of Absolute I d e n t i t y met- a need or r e q u i r e -
ment of contemporary philosophy. Such a view would not, of 
course, be incompatible w i t h h i s e a r l i e r whole-hearted defence 
of Schellmg's system against t h a t of F i c h t e i n the D i f f e r e n z -
s c h r i f t . For, as we have seen, the p o i n t of view from which 
S c h e l l m g i s defended here i s t h a t of the need or requirement 
9^ 
of philosophy. 
Hegel's view, then, i s t h a t Schellmg's ontology was 
necessitated by the i n t e r n a l development of Modern Philosophy. 
The explanation of t h i s runs back to Cartesian d u a l i s m . I t 
was Descartes, Hegel suggests, who had f i r s t seer extension and 
94 
thought as two d i s t i n c t elements or sides and so, paradoxical 
f i r s t awakened the need t o mediate the two. Hegel t h i n k s , as 
we have seen, t h a t Descartes had only achieved t h i s mediation 
i n a very u n s a t i s f a c t o r y manner. He had a t t a i n e d the u n i t y 
of thought and extension by the expedient of inv o k i n g God as 
the c r e a t o r of both. I t was Spinoza, Hegel argues, t h a t 
undertook t o u n i t e these two ideas of extension and thought m 
93- See Plant, o p . c i t . , p.86 f o r a view of Hegel's p o s i t i o n 
v.i s-a-vis S c h e l l i n g m the D_L f f e r e n z s c h r i f t . 
94. Hegel, werke 20, p. k2.?. 
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a more systematic way. He had done t h i s by conceiving God 
as Substance, as the one Substance w i t h the two a t t r i b u t e s of 
thought and extension. At l e a s t , m t n i s mediation of thought 
and r e a l i t y we can see t h a t God was immanent even though as 
'motionless Substance . However, t h i s , as we have seen, 
was not s u f f i c i e n t f o r Hegel or, more p r e c i s e l y , f o r what 
Hegel c a l l s the development of philosophy. Opposed to the 
motionless Substance of Spinoza there developed, p a r t i a l l y 
m the philosophy of Kant and p a r t i a l l y m the n a t u r a l sciences 
an awareness of the s i g n i f i c a n c e of form ( i b . ) . The categories 
of the understanding came t o be recognised as important i n 
comprehending experience. This emphasis on form, Hegel suggests 
reaches i t s highest p o i n t m the philosophy of Fiehte. i n 
h i s philosophy, Hegel says, 'form was f o r i t s e l f as s u b j e c t i v i t y ' 
From the formal I ' a l l determinations were supposed to develop 
, 96 
themselves . I t was fro-n t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y of the Fichtean 
system t h a t the contemporary need of philosophy, of which Hegel 
t a l k s , flowed. I t was t h a t philosophy be d e l i v e r e d from i t s 
bias f o r Form ' m order t h a t i t be u n i t e d w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y 
and s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . ' Hegel also taices t h i s to mean t h a t 
'the Substance of Spinoza should not be conceived as the unmoved, 
but the i n t e l l i g e n t , as a form which i s i n i t s e l f a c t i v e . I t 
must be conceived according to the necessity of i t s form, so 
t h a t i t i s the c r e a t i n g of Nature but even so knowledge and 
95-
96. 
I b i d . 
I b i d . 
121. 
c o g n i t i o n ' . 'Philosophy 1,, Hegel adds, 'as e s s e n t i a l l y t o 
do w i t h t h i s p o i n t o f view.' The A b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y t h e n , o f 
S c h e l l m g ' s system i m p l i e s f o r him n o t t h e a b s t r a c t u n i t y o f 
Spinoza's Substance, n o r t h e ' s u b j e c t i v e t o t a l i t y ' as m 
F i c h t e s p h i l o s o p h y , b u t t o t a l i t y w i t h i n f i n i t e f orm. 
But i t i s s t i l l n o t e v i d e n t what t h e n o t i o n o f t h e A b s o l -
u t e means t o him. We are perhaps c l e a r on t h e p o i n t t h a t i t 
i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t h e contemporary r e q u i r e m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y 
and what p h i l o s o p h y i s ' e s s e n t i a l l y ' a l l about. However, t h e 
r e s t o f h i s c r y p t i c comments c o n c e r n i n g t h e i d e a as i t appears 
i n S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y requare some r e f o r m u l a t i o n i f t h e y 
are t o mean much t o us. T h i s need n o t be a d i f f i c u l t t a s k 
s i n c e we have covered much o f t n e ground from which the? i d s a 
d e r i v e s i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r Hegel. T h i s ground i s o f course 
Hegel's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e development o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y . 
Norfj i t seems t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h i e s o f Spinoza and F i c h t e 
r e p r e s e n t f o r Hegel t h e two opposing p o l e s from w h i c h t h e need 
f o r S c h e l l i n g ' s n o t i o n o f A b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y i s d e r i v e d . 
Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y , Hegel suggests, i s m erely an a b s t r a c t 
u n i t y o f t h o u g h t and b e i n g . As we have seen him c l a i m e a r l i e r , 
i t i s a u n i t y o f t h o u g h t and e x t e n s i o n w h i c h a l l o w s no s e l f -
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o r i n d i v i d u a t i o n w i t h i n e i t h e r . On t h e o t h e r 
hand, F i c h t e ' s system merely r e p r e s e n t s i n f i n i t e form. I t 
d e s c r i b e s s e l f - d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h o u t u n i t y o r a t o t a l i t y . 
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The r e q u i r e m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y i s t h a t t h i s o p p o s i t i o n be 
mediated. T h i s e n t a i l s m Hegel's o p i n i o n t h a t t h e Spinoz-
l s t i c p h i l o s o p h y has t o t a k e i n t o account the s i g m f i c a n c e 
o f form. I n t a l k i n g o f form m t h i s i n s t a n c e we know what 
Hegel has i n mind. I t i s t h e form o f t h e K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y . 
He i s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e manner m which Kant d e p i c t e d phenomenal 
r e a l i t y as a r i s i n g i n t he u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n , and, m p a r t -
i c u l a r . , t o Kant's view thac i t was t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m s u p p l y i n g 
t h e form t o t h e m a t t e r o f i n t u i t : o n (Anchauung), th a c gave us 
t h e o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s i m p l i e s , t h e n , t h a t Hegel 
c o n s i d e r s t h e c o r r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view t o be one 
o f t e n s i o n between an impevsena 1 r e a l i t y and a s u b j e c t t h a t sees 
i n i t s e l f t h e o r i g i n o f i t s w o r l d , a t e n s i o n between S^bstance 
and S u b j e c t . I f t h i s i s so we can see t h a t i t e n t e i l s an 
amendment t o t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h e F i c h t e a n p h i l o s o p h y s i n c e 
i t i s m t h a t p h i l o s o p h y , as Hegel p o i n t s o u t , t h a t „he K a n t i a n 
d o c t r i n e o f form i s g i v e n i t s most s u b j e c t i v e m o r p r e ^ a t i o n . 
I t e n t a i l s t h a t t h a t p h i l o s o p h y be amended t o a l l o w f o r a 
w o r l d t h a t o r i g i n a t e s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e I . However, there-
i s more t o Hegel's p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view ( t h e a b s o l u t e 
p o i n t o f v i e w ) t h a n t h i s . As we know, he i s n o t c o n t e n t t o 
a l l o w t h e i n e v i t a b l e t e n s i o n between the independent s u b j e c t 
and independent r e a l i t y t o p e r s i s t . T h i t i s where S c h e i l n n g 
comes i n . The F i c h t e a n I and t h e Spmoz: s t i e Substance have 
t o be mediated, n o t s i m p l y c o n f r o n t e d . I t i s S c l i e l l m g t h a t 
p l a y s t i n s i m p o r t a n t r o l e m the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y . H i s 
p h i l o s o p h y i s m c o n c e p t i o n the u n i t y o f Substance and S u b j e c t . 
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I t i s t h e 'Substance o f Spin o z a . . . c o n c e i v e d as t h e i n t e l l i g e n t ' - ^ 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e , f o r Hegel, as we noted e a r l i e r , t h e o b j e c t i v e 
u n i t y o f S u b j e c t and O b j e c t . T h i s i s , I suggest, the o r i g i n 
o f t h e H e g e l i a n A b s o l u t e : S c h e l l m g ' s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t e v e r y t h i n g 
i s t h e A b s o l u t e I d e n t i t y o f S u b j e c t and O b j e c t . 
The manner m which t h i s i s reasoned by S c n e l l m g i n h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y i s n o t w i t h o u t p l a u s i b i l i t y . He b e g i n s w i t h t h e 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t ' a l l knowledge r e s t s on the harmony o f an 
100 
o b j e c t i v e w i t h a s u b j e c t i v e . ' " 1 He t h e n proposes t h a t we gave 
t h e name 'Nature' t o t h e t o t a l i t y o f a l l t h a t i s o b j e c t i v e 
and t h e name ' i n t e l l i g e n c e ' ( i n t e l l i g e n z ) t o t h e e n t i r e s u b j e c t i v e 
c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t i s n o r m a l l y assumed, he c o n t i n u e s , 
t h a t these two, I n t e l l i g e n c e and N a t u r e , form two o p p o s i t e p o l e s . 
The reason i s because I n t e l l i g e n c e i s o r i g i n a l l y t h o u g h t o f as 
b e i n g c o n s c i o u s and N a t u r e as n o t b e i n g conscious ( B e w u s s t l o s e ) . 
Now, m any knowledge, S c h e l l i n g c l a i m s , t h e r e i s a r r ^ e t m g o f 
b o t h , o f t h a t w h i c h he d e s c r i b e s as co n s c i o u s anc o f t h a t w h i c h 
he d e s c r i b e s as n o t b e i n g c o n s c i o u s . At t h i s p o i n t S c h e l l i n g 
makes an un w a r r a n t e d jump; t h e me e t i n g o f Nat u r e and I n t e l l i g e n c e 
i n knowledge i m p l i e s , he suggests, t h a t t h e y are n o t s i m p l y 
o p p o s i t e s because where t h e y meet n e i t h e r t a k e s precedence over 
t h e o t h e r . B o t h , he i n s i s t s , are e q u a l l y necessary. I n what 
i s knowledge n e i t h e r t h e t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t n o r t h e t h o u g h t o b j ^ c t 
99- I b i d . 
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t a k e s p r i o r i t y . They are s i m p l y i d e n t i c a l . 
There are two ways i n w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o S c h e l l m g , we 
can s e t about e x p l a i n i n g t h i s i d e n t i t y . The aim o f b o t h 
p r o c e d u r e s has t o be t h e same however. We may e i t h e r b e g i n 
f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e p o l e t o i l l u s t r a t e how i t n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d s 
t o t h e o t h e r o r from t h e s u b j e c t i v e p o l e t o prove t h e same. 
I n s c h e l l i n g ' s view, i t i s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f knowledge i t s e l f 
w h i c h a l l o w s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e approaches s i n c e ' i f a l l knowledge 
has two p o l e s w h i c h m u t u a l l y presuppose and r e q u i r e one a n o t h e r . . . 
t h e r e must be two f u n d a m e n t a l s c i e n c e s and i t must be i m p o s s i b l e 
t o b e g i n f r o m one p o l e w i t h o u t b e i n g d r i v e n t o t h e o t h e r . ' 1 0 " 1 
Those two s c i e n c e s would be t h e s c i e n c e o f n a t u r e , w h i c h i s t h e 
s c i e n c e t h a t b e g i n s a . t h e o b j e c t i v e p o l e and t h e T r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
p h i l o s o p h y wh:ch i s t h e s c i e n c e t h a t b e g i n s from t h e s u b j e c t i v e 
p o l e . Consequently, what S c n e l l m g c l a i m s i s t h a t t h e s t u d y 
o f n a t u r e n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d s us t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e p r i o r c o n d i t -
i o n s o f knowledge and t h a t T r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y n e c e s s a r i l y 
l e a d s us t o t h e s t u d y o f n a t u r e . E p i s t e m o l o g y and n a t u r a l 
s c i e n c e , he seems t o be s u g g e s t i n g , have one and t h e same 
r e s u l t , namely, t h e i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . 
We can r e a d i l y see ( i f n o t r e a d i l y a c c e p t ) how S c h e l l m g 
deduces, from t h e s u b j e c t i v e p o l e o f T r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y 
t h e o b j e c t i v e p o l e o f n a t u r e . I t i s a d e d u c t i o n o f n a t u r a l 
e x i s t e n c e t h a t h i s p h i i o s o p n y has i n common w i t h t h a t o f F i c h t e . 1 ^ 
101. I b i d . , p. JAO. 
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N a t u r e i s d e r i v e d from t h e s u b j e c t i v e p o l e t h r o u g h b e i n g p o s i t e d 
by t h e I . As we are aware, i t i s seen as a n o n - I which i s 
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e s u b j e c t h i m s e l f . What i s new, however, and 
o f some s i g n i f i c a n c e m u n d e r s t a n d i n g Hegel's o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m , 
i s t h e manner m which S c h e l l m g s e t s about d e d u c i n g I n t e l l i g e n c e 
f rom N a t u r e . The argument t h a t forms t h e d e d u c t i o n i s i n t e n d e d 
t o be i l l u s t r a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n p e r s u a s i v e s i n c e , as we a l r e a d y 
know, at i s an a b s o l u t e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h y 
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g n a t u r e , i s b o t h s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . 
He i l l u s t r a t e s h i s p o i n t m t h i s way. Reasonably enough., he 
t a k e s as t h e aim o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e the e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e f a c t s 
o f n a t u r e by subsuming them under genera] laws. Less reason-
a b l y , b u t i n a mariner t h a t i s c r u c i a l t o h i s argument, he 
d e s c r i b e s t h i s process o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e as t n e i n t e l l e c t u a l -
i s a t i o n o f s p i r i t u a l i s a t i o n o f n a t u r e ( N a t u r i s t v e r g e i s t a g t ) . 
I t would be nonsense t o suppose, he suggests, t h a t t l " ; aim o f 
n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s was s i m p l y t o p r o v i d e us w i t h a p i c t u r e o f 
n a t u r a l o b j e c t s as t h e y appear t o our senses. I t s aim and 
o b j e c t i s i n t e l l e c t u a l m k i n d . I t i s t o d i s c o v e r t h e laws 
t h a t govern those appearances. So S c h e l l a n g t a k e s at t h a t i t 
i s t h e outcome o f s c i e n c e t h a t we are g i v e n n o t c o n c r e t e phenomen 
bu t s i m p l y t h e i r t h o u g h t - e x p l a n a t i o n . I n t h e most consummate 
for m o f s c i e n c e , he says, 'the phenomena ( t h e m a t e r i a l ) have t o 
f u l l y d i s a p p e a r , and o n l y t h e laws ( t h e f o r m a l ) remain.' J 
The most consummate form o f s c i e n c e he i m p l i e s i s m i t s r e s u l t 
a t one w i t h i d e a l i s m . Science i s what u n i t e s t h e c o n s c i o u s 
103. S c h e l l m g . i b i d . , p. 3^0. 
126. 
s u b j e c t i v e p o l e o f knowledge t o t h e unconscious o b j e c t i v e 
p o l e . I t i s t h e manner m which n a t u r e r a i s e s i t s e l f t o 
i n t e l l i g e n c e ; , i n t h a t man who i s h i m s e l f p a r t o f n a t u r e comes 
104 
t o know i t as t h o u g h t . 
We a l r e a d y know from o u r dis c u s s i o n s ' o f Hegel's o b j e c t i o n s 
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t o t h e e p i s t e m o l o g y o f Locke t h a t Hegel r e g a r d s i t as t h e 
t a s k o f s c i e n c e t o know what i s e x p e r i e n c e d 1 m i t s e l f ' . I t 
i s m t h i s way t h a t s c i e n c e i s f c r Hegel b o t h t h e overcoming 
o f o t h e r n e s s and genuine i d e a l i s m . T h i s view o f s c i e n c e i s 
c e r t a i n l y n o t the p i c t u r e t h a t n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s themselves 
have o f t h e i r r e s e a r c h e s . I t has i t s o r i g i n i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y 
o f S c h e l l i n g , f o r Hegel c l a i m s , i t i s t h e g r e a t m e r i t o f S c h e l l m 
t o have b r o u g h t out t h e s p e c u l a t i v e s i d e o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e . 
By t h i s s p e c u l a t i v e s i d e o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e K e g e l , o f course, 
means t h a t aspect o f i t s e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d t h a t c o i n c i d e s 
w i t h h i s i d e a l i s m . T h i s 13 m c o n t r a s t , as I have i n d i c a t e d , 
t o t h e s c i e n t i s t ' s own a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h i s work, and Hegel 
acknowledges t h i s . F o r i n t h a t 'system o f N a t u r e ' , Hegel 
says, ' i t i s f o r g o t t e n t h a t n a t u r e i s something known: t h e i d e a l 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s «$g#0h which n a t u r e r e c e i v e s i n s c i e n c e are a t t h e 
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same t i m e immanent m i t s e l f . ' N a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s . Hegel 
t h i n k s , view t he w o r l d w h i c h t h e y i n t e n d t o e x p l a i n as a m a t e r i a l 
r e a l i t y w h i c h i s e x t e r n a l t o themselves. I n t h i s , and Hegel 
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o v e r l o o k t h a t what th e y are e s s e n t i a l l y d e a l i n g w i t h are what 
Hegel c a l l s ' i d e a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ' r a t h e r t h a n e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . 
The r e s u l t o f t h e i r e f f o r t s Hegel b e l i e v e s , and we have seen 
S c h e l l m g argue t h i s , i s t h a t n a t u r e becomes known o r s p i r i t -
u a l i s e d . I n t h u s becoming known, N a t u r e , w h i c h t h e s c i e n t i s t 
c o n c e i v e s as something e x t e r n a l t o h i m s e l f , becomes, a t l e a s t 
f o r S c h e l l m g and Hegel, i n t e r n a l t o him. I t i s h i s t h o u g h t 
as opposed t o an e x t e r n a l w o r l d . I t was t h e e m p i r i c i s t s , as 
we have seen, who had advocated a t h e o r y o f knowledge based 
on t h e method o f the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s and t h e r e f o r e shared i t s 
a ssumption o f a w o r l d e x t e r n a l t o our t h o u g h t . S c h e l l m g ' s 
p h i l o s o p h y t h e n has t h e a d d i t i o n a l m e r i t f o r Hegel o f t a c k l i n g 
t h e e m p i r i c i s t t h e s i s on i t s own ground and d i s p l a y i n g i t s 
i n h e r e n t i d e a l i s m . As we have seen, Hegel h i m s e l f adopted 
t h i s procedure i n c r i t i c i s i n g t h e t h e o r i e s o f knowledge o f 
Locke and Hume. 
The t h e s i s t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g i s i n h e r e n t l y i d e a l i s t 
t h e n becomes a p a r t o f Hegel's own p h i l o s o p h y . We s h a l l e n c o u n t e r 
t h i s t h e s i s a g a i n i n t h e Phenomenology o f Mind. Hegel sees i t , 
as he does t h e whole o f S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h y , as a f r u i t f u l 
response t o t h e problem o f knowledge, because he argues ' the 
main t h i n g i n S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y i s t h a r i t has t o do w i t h 
a c o n t e n t w i t h what i s t r u e and t h a t i s c o n c e i v e d c o n c r e t e l y . ' 1 ^ 
S c h e l l i n g m e l a b o r a t i n g on t h e ' s p e c u l a t i v e s i d e ' o f n a t u r a l 
s c i e n c e had c o n t r i b u t e d a view o f t h e c o n c r e t e n a t u r e o f know-
ledge t o t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate and, a t t h e same t i m e , Hegel 
107. Hegel. Werke 20, p. ^53. 
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t h i n k s , he had r e t u r n e d p h i l o s o p h y t o what s h o u l d be i t s 
p r i n c i p a l concern, the concern w i t h t h e c o n t e n t o f t h o u g h t . 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s , t h e Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s p r e c e d i n g him 
had merely been concerned w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h o u g h t t o 
i t s o b j e c t . The r e s u l t had been t h a t p h i l o s o p h y had n e i t h e r 
d e p i c t e d t h e t r u e n a t u r e o f knowledge n o r come up w i t n a 
c o n c r e t e concent f o r i t s e l f . T h i s , Hegel t h i n k s , i s put-
r i g h t m S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f i d e n t i t y . P r e c e d i n g 
p h i l o s o p h y had n o t , m h i s view, been a b l e t o a t t a i n t r u t h 
o r a c o n t e n t because m i t t h e o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e s i d e s 
o f knowledge were a l t e r n a t e l y s t r e s s e d . T r u t h , Hegel suggests, 
was f o r p r e c e d i n g p h i l o s o p h y , e i t h e r I n t e l l i g e n c e o r S u b j e c t . 
P h i l o s o p h y and e p i s t e m c l o g y m p a r t i c u l a r had r e v o l v e d around 
t h e two opposing p o l e s o f m a t e r i a l i s m and s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m . 
S c h e l l m g had overcome t h i s o p p o s i t i o n by a r g u i n g t h a t the 
essence o f n a t u r e was i n t e l l i g e n c e , he had shown tha„ we may-
pass from t h e o b j e c t i v e p o l e o f knowledge f o i t s s u b j e c t i v e 
p o l e . I n S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y n e i t h e r s u b j e c t n o r o b j e c t 
f a l l s t o one s i d e t h r o u g h t h e one b e i n g g i v e n precedence ever 
th e o t h e r , because i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y 'thought i s . , i n i t s e l f 
c o n c r e t e ' conceives i t s e l f as w o r l d , b u t n o t as an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
w o r l d b u t as an i n t e l l e c t u a l - r e a l world'." The d u a l i s m o f 
p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h y , Hegel c l a i m s , i s e x t i n g u i s h e d i n t h i s 
A b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y . This, I t h i n k , i s Hegel's answer t o the 
'problem o f knowledge'. However, m the s t a t u s o f t h i s p r m c i p l 
o f A b s o l u t e I d e n t i t y he d i f f e r s markedly from S c h e l l m g ; and 
i t i s , I t h i n k , t h i s d i f f e r e n c e t h a t l e d him t o w r i t e t h e Phenom-
enology o f Mind, 
108. I b i d . 
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We may c a r r y t h i s s u g g e s t i o n f u r t h e r by d r a w i n g a 
p a r a l l e l between t h e method o f S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y and 
t h a t o f Hegel m t h e Phenomenology. I t w i l l , a t t h e l e a s t 
s e rve as an i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e x t m w h i c h 
t h e Phenomenology was w r i t t e n . That p a r a l l e l concerns S c h e l l i n g ' 
System o f T r a n s c e n d e n t a l I d e a l i s m . S c h e l l i n g c o n c e i v e d t h e 
purpose o f t h a t system t o be t o e x t e n d T r a n s c e n d e n t a l I d e a l i s m 
' i n t o what i t r e a l l y s h o u l d be, namely i n t o a system o f t h e 
whole o f knowledge. The Wissenschaf tslehre o f F i c h t e was 
t o be h i s g u i d e m t h i s . The system o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l I d e a l i s m 
had t o u n d e r t a k e t h e s u b j e c t i v e d e d u c t i o n o f t h e w o r l d n o t m 
g e n e r a l b u t i n i t s p a r t i c u l a r s . T h i s was i n t e n d e d LO be an 
advance o v e r F i c h t e ' s i d e a l s i m s i n c e 'the means..through w h i c h 
t h e a u t h o r has sought t o p r e s e n t I d e a l i s m m i t s whole e x t e n t 
i s t h a t he has d e p i c t e d t h e p a r t s o f p h i l o s o p h y i n a c o n t i n u i t y 
and t h e whole o f p h i l o s o p h y as what i t i s , namely as an o n g o i n g 
h i s t o r y o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , f o r w h i c h t h a t d e p o s i t e d i n 
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e x p e r i e n c e s e r v e s o n l y as, as i t were, document and monument.' 
To t h o s e who are f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e Phenomenology o f Mind t h i s 
may w e l l appear as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f Hegel's method m t h a t work. 
As we s h a l l see, he t h i n k s o f t h e p a r t s o f p h i l o s o p h y as f o r m i n g 
a c o n t i n u i t y and, i n t h e Phenomenology m p a r t i c u l a r , p r e s e n t s 
- i n T 
p h i l o s o p h y as 'the ong o i n g h i s t o r y o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' " 1 x 
109. S c h e l l m g . o p . c i t . , p. 330. 
110. I b i d . , p. 331 . 
111 . Both K r o n e r ( o p . c i t . ) and Werner Me rx. K e g e l s r i i m o i leno 1 o;> i 
des Go i s teg,, K l c s i e n i a n n , F r a n k f u r t ) poinT xT6~~ml3~~ph raTic" 
between t h e pmlot-opny o f S c h e l l i n g and HegeT. They a l s o 
t r a c e t h e view o f p h i l o s o o n y back t o F i c h t e . See K r o n e r pp 
372 - 373, ( Z w e i t e r Band) and Marx. pp. 14 - 15. 
130. 
S c h e l l i n g t r a c e s t he development o f t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n 
( t h e I o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y ) i n h i s system of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
i d e a l i s m m t h i s way, t h r o u g h t h e v a r i o u s forms o f i n t u i t i o n 
t o where i t reaches i t s h i g h e s t potency. What m o t i v a t e s 
S c h e l l i n g i n p r e s e n t i n g ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y ' as t h i s ' s e r i e s 
o f stages o f i n t u i t i o n ' i s t h e i d e n t i t y t h a t , as we have seen, he 
t h i n k s e x i s t s between n a t u r e and i n t e l l i g e n c e . I t i s a p p a r e n t 
from n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y , he says, ' t h a t t h e same p o t e n c i e s o f 
i n t u i t i o n w h i c h are t o be found m t h e I can, t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , 
112 
be p o i n t e d out m n a t u r e . ' The h i g h e s t potency w i l l be, 
as s h o u l d a l r e a d y be e v i d e n t , where i n t e l l i g e n c e and n a t u r e 
meet. To a t t a i n t h i s end, S c h e l l m g suggests, the p h i l o s o p h e r 
must f o l l o w s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h r o u g h i t s v a r i o u s epochs d e p i c t -
i n g how t h e one n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s f^orn the o t h e r . 
A l l t h i s i s r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h e Phenomenology. There i s 
however, one s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e . S c h e l l i n g , u n l L k e H egel, 
rega r d s t h e h i g h e s t pot-^icy ( t h e h i g h e s t i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t 
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and o b j e c t ) as A r t . J T h i s i s f u l l y m k e e p i n g w i t h t r i e 
s p i r i t o f S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h y s i n c e he t h i n k s o f t h e 
A b s o l u t e I d e n t i t y n o t o n l y as a p o i n t o f e q u i v a l e n c e o f s u b j e c t 
and o b j e c t b u t e q u a l l y as a p o i n t o f i n d i f f e r e n c e . T h i s i s 
because n e i t h e r , as we know, t a k e s precedence over t h e o t h e r . 
The h i g h e s t u n i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t must t h e r e f o r e be a 
u n i t y w i t h o u t p r e f e r e n c e g i v e n t o e i t h e r p o l e . The s p e c i a l 
m e r i t o f A r t i s t h a t i t meets w i t h t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t . I t 
u n i t e s t h e i n t u i t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t and h i s p r o d u c t i n t h e most 
112. S c h e l l i n g , o p . c i t . p. 331 . 
113- I b i d . p. 634. 
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c o n c r e t e manner. I n A r t t h e o b j e c t o f the s u b j e c t i v e a c t 
o f i n t u i t i o n can be observed t c e x i s t . I t i s t h e r e f o r e , 
S c h e l l m g t h i n k s , c o n c r e t e evidence o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f 
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . I n one and t h e same i n t u i t i o n t h e I i s 
c o n s c i o u s o f i t s e l f and n o t - c o n s c i o u s . For S c h e l l i n g t h e work 
o f a r t i s , as Hegel says, 'the h i g h e s t manner o f t h e o b j e e t i f -
l c a t i o n o f Reason because t h e r e sensuous r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s 
1114 
u n i t e d w i t h i n t e l l e c t u a l i t y . 
I t i s because Reason i s g i v e n a 'sensuous e x i s t e n c e ' 
m t h i s f a s h i o n t h a t Hegel o b j e c t s t o t h e d e p i c t i o n o f A r t as 
the h i g h e s t u n i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . I n t a k i n g t h i s a t t i r u d e 
11 K 
Hegel shows h i m s e l f t o be more o f an i d e a l i s t t h a n S c h e l l m ^ . 
114. Hegel. WerKe 20, p. k~5J>. 
115- Hegel has a l s o a sound m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n (which i c . 
n o t u n r e l a t e d t o h i s i d e a l i s m ) t o the d e p i c t i o n o f A r t as 
th e h i g h e s t i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . I n r e g a r d i n g 
A r t as t h e h i g h e s t form o f Reason S c h e l l i n g , m Hege]'s 
view, j u s t i f i e d h i s own s t a n d m r e s p e c t o f p h i l o s o p h y : 
t h a t i t was a l s o a fo-rm o f A r t . T h e r e f o r e wnat was m 
S c h e l l i n g ' s o p i n i o n r e q u i r e d t o be a p h i l o s o p h e r was n o t 
the a b i l i t y t o t h i n k s y s t e m a t i c a l l y b a t r a t h e r t h e g i f t o f 
g e n i u s . I t was o n l y such genius t h a t made t h e p h i l o s o p h e r 
capable o f i n t u i t i n g t h e A b s o l u t e I d e n t i t y i n h e r e n t m 
t h i n g s . T h i s , Hegel suggests, i s why S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h 
t a k e s on i t s o r a c u l a r form. As we know, t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f 
i d e n t i t y r e q u i r e s no p r o o f , i t s i m p l y i s , and i s everywhere 
S c h e l l i n g can a v o i d t h e burden o f p r o o f s i n c e t h e m t u i t i o 
o f t h i s A b s o l u t e i s a work o f g e n i u s . So Hegel argues t h a 
h i s o n l y response t o an o b j e c t i o n t o t h e fundamentals o f h i 
p h i l o s o p h y would be t o say ' t h a t you have n o t t h e m t e l l 
e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n ' t h a t would p e r m i t you t o see i t s t r u t h . 
Werke 20, p. 43^) Thus w i t h S c h e l l i n g , Hegel t h i n k s , ' p h i l -
osophy appears as a t a l e n t f o r A r t , g e n i u s , as though o n l y 
Sunday's c h i l d had i t . ' ( i b i d . , p. 428. ) 
1 
He b e l i e v e s S c h e l l m g t o have demeaned S p i r i t i n d e p i c t i n g 
i t s h i g h e s t potency as A r t . S p i r i t , as he s a i d m h i s c r i t i c i s m 
o f Kant, i s f o r S p i r i t a l o n e . No 'sensuous e x i s t e n c e ' , Hegel 
would say i s adequate t o i t s n a t u r e . S p i r i t , he i n s i s t s , i s 
o n l y capable o f i d e n t i t y w i t h t h o u g h t a l o n e . T h e i d e n t i t y 
o f t h o u g h t and o b j e c t has f o r him t o come down i n f a v o u r o f 
t h o u g h t . I n o t h e r words, m i t s r e s u l t i t i s n o t t o be an 
i d e n t i t y ; t h o u g h t has t o have the upper hand. Thought has 
indeed t o be o b j e c t i v e - r e a l b u t has m the end t o show i t s e l f 
t o be h i g h e r t h a n t h a t o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . A r t as t h e h i g h e s t 
potency o f s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and t h i s would be Hegel's o p i n i o n , 
comes nowhere n e a r t o b a n i s h i n g t h e a l i e n o b j e c t from t h e p u r v i e w 
o f p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s t a s k , we are t o presume, remains f o r 
t h e Phenomenology o f Mmd.to a c c o m p l i s h . 
116. C a i r d , o p . c i t . , says o f S c h e l l m g ' s i d e n t i t y : 'His u n i t y 
..as H e g e l . . s a i d , was a u n i t y o f 'substance' r a t h e r than 
o f s p i r i t 1 and p o i n t s t o the n o t i o n o f _Ge 1 s t as t h e p o i n t 




THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND: 
(1) A g e n e r a l view o f Hegel's System 
I n t h i s essay I am concerned p r i m a r i l y t o defend a p o i n t 
o f view c o n c e r n i n g Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y . That p o i n t o f view,as 
ought t o be c l e a r by now, i s t h a t h i s p h i l o s o p h y p r e s e n t s a 
n o v e l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e problem o f knowledge t h a t had p r e -
o c c u p i e d Modern P h i l o s o p h y . The n o v e l t y o f h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
c o n s i s t s , I have a l r e a d y argued, m i t s account o f e x p e r i e n c e . 
So f a r we have c o n s i d e r e d Hegel's n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e s o l e l y 
i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s c r i t i c i s m o f what I have c a l l e d t r a d i t i o n a l 
e p i s t e m o l o g y . We s h o u l d now be m a p o s i t i o n t o v e n t u r e on 
Hegel's s y s t e m a t i c account o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e most comprehen-
s i v e account o f which we s h a l l f i n d m t h e Phenomenology o f Mind. 
A l t h o u g h I am p r i n c i p a l l y concerned w i t h t h i s : t h e defence 
o f my p o i n t o f view on an aspect o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y , I must 
n e v e r t h e l e s s g i v e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y as a 
whole, because t o argue t h a t Hegel p r e s e n t s a c e r t a i n view o f 
ex p e r i e n c e i s a t t h e same t i m e t o argue t h a t he p r e s e n t s a 
c e r t a i n view o f p h i l o s o p h y . We have a l r e a d y seen how c l o s e l y 
connected t h e two concepts o f p h i l o s o p h y and e x p e r i e n c e are m 
our r e v i e w o f Hegel's h i s t o r y o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y . Indeed 
we found t h a t t h e view o f e x p e r i e n c e a p h i l o s o p h e r adopted was, J. 
g e n e r a l , a t one w i t h h i s assessment o f t h e scope and aims o f 
p h i l o s o p h y . For -instance we observed t h a t Hume and Locke 
l i m i t e d p h i l o s o p h y t o the knowledge o f the appearance o f t h i n g s 
t o our senses as they were o f the b e l i e f t h a t o ur e x p e r i e n c e 
d i d n o t extend beyona t h a t appearance o f t h i n g s . S i m i l a r l y , 
r $ 4 . 
we found t h a t Kant l i m i t e d p h i l o s o p h y t o t h e knowledge o f 
phenomena because he t h o u g h t e x p e r i e n c e t o be a compound o f 
a p r i o r i i d e a s and sense i m p r e s s i o n s . And, c e r t a i n l y , t h e r e 
can be no doubt t h a t t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n n e c t i o n 
between t h e n o t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e and p h i l o s o p h y m Hegel's 
system. 
When d e a l i n g w i t h t h e Phenomenology o f Mind i t i s t r a d i t -
i o n a l t o a t t e m p t some k i n d o f commentary. 1 I s h a l l f o l l o w 
t he e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n i n t h i s i n s t a n c e because, u n l i k e 
some t r a d i t i o n s , i t i s n o t w i t h o u t good cause. What 1 s h a l l 
do i s t o a t t e m p t an e x p o s i t i o n o f what, f o r my purposes, 
are t h e major arguements o f t h e Preface and I n t r o d u c t i o n and 
a s i m i l a r , but b r i e f e r , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e f i r s t t h r e e 
Chapters o f the work. I n each case the argument ' w i l l proceed 
w i t h c l o s e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t e x t . T h i s might by some be 
regarded as evidence f o r a. l a c k o f o r i g i n a l i t y on the p a r t 
o f t h e a u t h o r . I n so f a r as t h i s charge merely concerns my 
f o l l o w i n g t h e u s u a l p r a c t i c e i t i s a l r e a d y p a r t l y answered. 
But t h e r e i s a s t r o n g e r charge t h a n t h i s i m p l i e d , namely, t h a t 
t h e p r a c t i c e o f p r e s e n t i n g a commentary t o the Phenomenology 
o f Mind i s an e v a s i o n o f the o b l i g a t i o n t o s u p p l y an independent 
e s t i m a t i o n o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y . But an independent e s t i m a t i o n 
c f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y has t o be one t h a t has come t o terms w i t h 
1. F i n d l a y ( H e g e l : A R e - e x a m i n a t i o n ) , Stace (The P h i l o s o p h y o f 
H e g e l ) , Marcuse (Reason"and P e v o i u t i o n ) , Mure (Tne Ph 1 1 e s o pnv 
o f H e g e l ) , W.Becker [Hegel" 1 s Phanorrenolcgi e des Geis'ces) and, 
o f course, H y p p o l i t e ("Genese e t S t r u c t u r e de 1 a Phanomenologie 
de 1 ' E s p r i t de H egel) a l l do "this". 
i t . T h i s , I b e l i e v e , i s where the s t r e n g t h o f the e x p o s i t i o n 
o r commentary l i e s . For such i s t h e n a t u r e o f Hegel's p h i l -
osophy t h a t a n y t h i n g o t h e r than an a t t e m p t at s y s t e m a t i c 
commentary i s an e v a s i o n of t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o u n d e r s t a n d 
i t p r o p e r l y . T h i s i s n o t s i m p l y because m Hegel's work -
and t h e Phenomenology o f Mind j s amongst t h e most d i f f i c u l t 
i n t h i s r e s p e c t - t h e argument i s always e x t r e m e l y condensed 
and o f t e n obscure. I t i s beoause (and t h i s i s Hegel's 
emphasis) h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s t o be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y i n i t s 
s y s t e m a t i c e x p o s i t i o n . I n o t h e r words, i t i s h i s view 
t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h i s n o t t o be found i n a s i m p l e 
s e r i e s o f d e f i n i t i o n a l o r a x i o m a t i c s t a t e m e n t s . I t i s 
r a t h e r a s u s t a i n e d argument. An independent judgement o f 
h i s p h i l o s o p h y might do w e l l t o r e s p e c t t h i s view. I t seems 
t o me t h e r e f o r e t h a t o n l y a s u s t a i n e d commentary can come t o 
t r r m s w i t h such a p h i l o s o p h y . 
A t t h e o u t s e t I made the a s s e r t i o n t h a t o u r r e v i e w o f 
Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y , i n c l u d i n g h i s f e l l o w 
German I d e a l i s t s would p l a c e us m an e x c e l l e n t p o s i t i o n t o 
u n d e r s t a n d t h e Phenomenology o f Mind. Me must now s u p p o r t t h i 
c l a i m . I n my view Hegel's account o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s -
ophy e n t e r s i n t o t h e v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e Phenomenology o f 
Mind. The manner i n wh i c h i t does so i s complex -^nd I 
suggest we b e g i n our e x p l a n a t i o n o f i t by c o n s i d e r i n g one 
o f Hegel's remarks c o n c e r n i n g t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y m 
h i s Enzyklopad l e : 'The h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y p r e s e n t s m t h e 
v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i e s t h a t appear p a r t l y t h e one p h i l o s o p h y a t 
2. Hegel. Phanomenologie des G e i s t e s , Kerke 3J> PP 1 1 - I T . T h i s o 
course, i s ho*; Hegel e x p l a i n s h i s r e t i c e n c e wh^n g i v r n g a p r 
l i m i n a r y view o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y m h i s P r e f a c e s . See a l s o 
W i s s e n s c h a f t d e r h o g i k , WerKe j, p. ^6. 
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v a r i o u s stages o f i t s f o r m a t i o n and p a r t l y t h a t t he p a r t i c u l a r 
p r i n c i p l e s , w h i c h o n l y have one system as t h e i r b a s i s , are 
o n l y branches o f one and the same whole.' Hegel adds - and 
t h i s may be t a k e n as a p p l y i n g t o h i s own p h i l o s o p h y - 'The 
p h i l o s o p h y t h a t comes l a s t i n o r d e r o f t i m e i s the r e s u l t o f 
a l l p r e c e d i n g p h i l o s o p h i e s and must t h e r e f o r e c o n t a i n the 
p r i n c i p l e s o f a l l ; i t i s t h e r e f o r e , i f i t i s indeed p h i l o s o p h y , 
t h e most developed, the r i c h e s t and the most c o n c r e t e . 
T h i s , t o say t h e l e a s t , i s a s t a r t l i n g a s s e r t i o n . For, n o t 
o n l y i s Hegel c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e i s a p r o g r e s s i v e development 
m t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , b u t t h a t t h i s development i s 
t e l e o l o g i c a l and, i n some sense, c u m u l a t i v e . The development 
o f p h i l o s o p h y , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, r e f l e c t s n e t so much the 
purposes o f each and every i n d i v i d u a l p h i l o s o p h e r as a purpose 
t h a t t r a n s c e n d s them a l l . I t i s a c c o r d i n g l y n o t t h e development 
o f a v a r i e d number o f d i f f e r i n g systems b u t t h e development o f 
one and t h e same system. We are presumably t o u n d e r s t a n d 
t h a t somehow a l l the g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s were w r i t i n g , o r a t 
l e a s t c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e w r i t i n g o f , one p h i l o s o p h y . There 
were, i f we r e c a l l , i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t Hegel h e l d such a view 
m the c r i t i c i s m s t h a t he l e v e l l e d a t h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s and 
t h e o t h e r Modern P h i l s c p h e r s . As we n o t e d , those p h i l o s o p h e r s 
were c r i t i c i s e d n o t from what he would t a k e t o be a p a r t i c u l a r 
s t a n d p o i n t b u t from t h e v i e w p o i n t o f a s y s t e m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n 
o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p m l o s o p h y . We nay remember the i n s t a n c e 
when he c l a i m e d t h a t t he d e f i c i e n c i e s o f Descartes'and .Spinoza's 
3. Hegel. Werke 8. p.58 
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philosophies were made up by the philosophies of t h e i r 
immediate f o l l o w e r s i n the H i s t o r y of Philosophy, L e i b n i z and 
Locke There was an i m p l i c a t i o n here t n a t tne development 
was t e l e o l o g i c a l . S i m i l a r l y we found t h a t Hegel c r i t i c i s e d 
F i c hte not from a p a r t i c u l a r point of view but from the poi n t 
of view of philosophy as a whole. His c r i t i c i s m s were motiv-
ated by what he thought to be the contemporary need or r e q u i r e -
ment of philosophy. The i m p l i c a t i o n there again was t h a t 
philosophy had an aim t h a t was independent of the aims of 
the philosopher h i m s e l f . Indeed ^egel's suggestion i s • 
t h a t m reviewing the h i s t o r y of pnilosophy we are reviewing 
a consistent whole. This means t h a t the various p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
systems i n so f a r as they are t r u e are branches of one and 
the same system. 
This brings us t o Hegel's pnilosophy. I t would appear-
t h a t Hegel would have t o l e s i g n h i m s e l f t o an i n e v i t a b l e 
p a r t i a l i t y m developing h i s own system of philosoony. But 
t h i s i s not the case, f o r Hegel grants the most recent philosopi 
i n the h i s t o r y of philosophy a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n . Because 
i t i s the l a s t , i t i s 'the most developed, the r i c h e s t and 
most concrete'. And i t i s a l l t h i s , Hegel claims, because i t 
contains w i t h i n i t s e l f the c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s of a l l the others 
I t i s t h i s idea t h a t l i e s at the heart of Kegel's philosophy. 
I n h i s philosophy then Hegel attempts to synthesisc the 
t r u t h of a l ] previous philosophy. I t i s t h i s t h a t makes 
Hegel s philosophy unique. ' No philosopher p r i o r to Hegel. 
h. To b e sure, i t i s well-known t n a t t h i s i s a n aspect o f Kegel 
philosophy b u t m my v i e w f a r t o o l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has b e e n 
paid t o the f a c t . I t i s n o t , as we s h a l l s e e , simply an 
t r i i claim t n a t Hegel m a K e s b a t one t n a t h e attempts t o c a r 
out. 
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or since, has consciously set h i m s e l f t h a t task. I must 
add, however, t h a t Hegel himself does not hold t h i s view. 
He does not regard i t as a p e c u l i a r i t y of h i s own philosophy 
t h a t i t i s an attempt t o synthesise what i s t r u e m previous 
philosophies. One reason f o r h i s b e l i e v i n g t h i s i s evident. 
I f , l i k e Hegel, we see a l l philosophies as making a c o n t r i b u t -
i o n t o the progressive development of the one p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
system, then we must regard the l a s t as being the synthesis 
of what i s t r u e i n philosophies p r i o r t o i t . We would have 
to admit t h a t regardless of at what stage the chain of devel-
opment of philosophy i s broken o f f , t h a t stage represents 
the d i s t i l l a t i o n of a l l the t r u t h s of previous philosophy. 
This, t h e n , i s one reason why Hegel does not regard i t as a 
p e c u l i a r i t y of h i s philosophy t h a t i t seeks oo incorporate 
the r e s u l t s of the whole h i s t o r y of philosophy. His claim 
i s t h a t t h i s happens anyway i f a body of theory i s indeed 
philosophy. I t i s the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of t h i s occurrence i n 
Hegel's mind t h a t gives us the second reason f o r h i s t h i n k i n g 
t h a t i t i s n o t h i n g p e c u l i a r t o h i s philosophy. This synthesis 
i s i n e v i t a b l e m Hegel's view because a l l philosophy i s the 
work of one s p i r i t . He says m h i s Enzyklopadle again: 'The 
a r c h i t e c t of t h i s work of thousands of years' which i s the 
work embodied m the h i s t o r y of philosophy' i s the one l i v i n g 
s p i r i t whose_thinking nature i t i s i s t o b r i n g what i t i s t o 
consciousness. The synthesis then i s not Hegel's because 
i t i s brought about by the a c t i v i t y of the one s p i r i t (Geiso) 
t h a t transcends any p a r t i c u l a r system of philosophy. Hegel 
5- Hegel. Werke 8, p.58. The empbaas i s Hegel's. 
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believes t h a t he i s only p a r t i c i p a t i n g m t h a t a c t i v i t y . 
We might say t h a t he sees himself as the servant of s p i r i t 
i n the matter of philosophy. But we, of course, do not 
have t o take t h i s view. We may regard h i s philosophy t o 
be unique i n these two respects: t h a t i t i s consciously 
regarded as the r e s u l t of a l l previous philosophy and t h a t 
t h e r e f o r e i t regards the h i s t o r y of philosophy as the devel-
opment of t h i s one p o i n t of view. I t i s , I maintain, a 
p e c u l i a r i t y of Hegel's philosophy, and a view t h a t l i e s at 
i t s h e a r t , t h a t i t i s seen as the embodiment of the c o r r e c t 
i n s i g h t s of a l l previous philosophy. 
1"0. 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
We are now b e t t e r placed t o understand the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of what I have c a l l e d Hegel's C r i t i q u e of Modern Philosophy 
i n the understanding of Hegel's f i r s t major work the Phenomen-
ology of Mind. Hegel sees h i s task i n philosophy as being 
t o undertake the work of s p i r i t : t o synthesise previous 
philosophy and t o b r i n g i t t o i t s proper conclusion. A 
knowledge of the h i s t o r y of philosophy as Hegel understands 
i t does, then, go a long way towards understanding the o r i g i n 
and content of h i s philosophy. Indeed I would go so f a r 
as t o suggest t h a t t h i s h i s t o r i c a l approach t o h i s philosophy 
i s the most f r u i t f u l . Of course, to do f u l l j u s t i c e t o sucn 
an approach we would have to examine the whole of Hegel's 
account of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy.^ But we might take 
comfort m the f a c t , t h a t on Hegel's own account, the most 
xecent philosophies co n t a i n w i t i u n themselves the t r u t h s 0 1 
a l l those preceding. 
We are, i n any case, concerned wi t h the f a t e of Modern 
Philosophy m the w r i t i n g s of Hegel and Marx. As I have 
already sand. Modern Philosophy was preoccupxed w i t h .:he 
Problem of Knowledge or, m Hegel's terms, the r e l a t i o n of 
thought to i t s o b j e c t . We have examined Hegel's c r i t i q u e 
of Modern Philosophy t o e l u c i d a t e h i s approach t o the problem. 
One of the contentions t h a t we have sought t o r e f u t e i s t h a t 
of Habermas: t h a t Marx and Hege.l 'demolished' t r a d i t i o n a l 
epistemology. I t ought t o be c l e a i b; row th a t Hegel's 
6. Tne worxs of M.Foster fThe P o l i t i c a l Philosophies of Plato and 
Hegel) and Mure (I n t r o d u c t a o'rT'co HegcT^, f ~ r instance, £Thcw~ioV 
valuable i s the comparison with"the philosophies of Plato and 
A r i s t o t l e . 
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account of c h e r e l a t i o n of h i s philosophy, and mdeea of a l l 
philosophy, t o the h i s t o r y of philosophy goes some way t o -
wards meeting Habermas' c r i t i c i s m . For, i f Hegel sees the 
task of philosophy m general as the conscious e f f o r t t o 
l i n k i t s e l f t o and b u i l d on the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , the 
accusation t h a t he simply negates or ignores an achievement 
of previous philosophy seems, on the face o f i t , to be 
i m p l a u s i b l e ; and our discussion of the r e l a t i o n between the 
H i s t o r y of Philosophy and the Phenomenology o f Mind should 
make i t seem even more so. 
In the conclusion of the short essay e n t i t l e d 'Result' 
w i t h which he ends h i s Lectures on the Hiscory c f Philosophy, 
Hegel says 'Accordingly ( i . e . according t o the O u t c o m e c f 
the H i s t o r y of Philosophy-H.W.) our standpoint i s now the 
r e c o g n i t i o n of the Idea. The knowledge o f the Idea as S p i r a t 
L3 Absolute S p i r i t which i s thus o p p o s e d t o another s p i r i t -
t o the f i n i t e ; and the p r i n c i p l e o f t h i s s p i r i t ( o r mind) i s 
t o know, so t h a t Absolute S p i r i t i s f o r i t . I have t r i e d 
t o develop and b r i n g before your thoughts t h i s t r a i n of s p i r i t 
u a l forms (Gestaltungen) of philosophy m t h e i r progression 
at the same time i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r connection. This ser i e s 
i s the t r u e realm of s p i r i t s , the only realm of s p i r i t s t h a t 
there i s - a s e r i e s which i s not a d i v e r s i t y , ncr does i t 
remain a series merely as a succession, bat a s e r i e s j u s t 
as i t s s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n i n t o moments of the one s p i r i t which 
makes i t s e l f i n t o one and the s a m e present-day s p i m t . And 
t h i s long t r a i n o f s p i r i t s are t h e only pulses which i t ases 
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up i n i t s l i f e ; they are the organist,i of our Substance. We 
have t o give ear to i t s urgency - when the mole w i t h i n burrows 
on - and give i t r e a l i t y . Those s p i r i t s are simply a 
necessary progression which express nothing other than the 
nature of s p i r i t i t s e l f and l i v e i n us a l l . I hope t h a t t h i s 
H i s t o r y of Philosophy may contain f o r you the demand t o grasp 
the s p i r i t of our time which i s m us n a t u r a l l y , t o draw i t 
out of i t s naturalness i . e . i t s t a c i t u r n i t y , l i f e l e s s n e s s t o 
the l i g h t of day and - each i n h i s place - consciously b r i n g 
i t t o l i g h t ' . ' This i s a remarkable, i f obscure, conclusion. 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t i s of some s i g n i f i c a n c e to our enquiry. 
As I have i n d i c a t e d , i t appears t h a t the conclusion i s not 
only Hegel's but S p i r i t ' s as w e l l . And t o add t o the confusion 
S p i r i t seems t o be p l a y i n g two r o l e s m t h a t conclusion: Absolute 
S p i r i t and f i n i t e s p i r i t . Hegel's suggestion i s t h a t at the 
outcome of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy they bear a s r g n i f i e a n t 
r e l a t i o n t o each other. We are t o IOOK on one,ri as being 
opposed t o each other but because i t i s the nature of f i n i t e 
s p i r i t t o know, 'Absolute S p i r i t i s f o r i t ' . What sense are 
we t o make of t h i s ? I t seems t h a t Absolute S p i r i t i s s h o r t -
hand f o r the r e s u l t of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy. I t would, 
t h e r e f o r e , be the most h i g h l y developed form of philosophy of 
the day. I f we were t o couch t h i s claim m r e l i g i o u s terms 
i t would be t h a t God i s the development of philosophy and 
i n any one epoch i s tc be found i n the most advanced philosophy. 
Strange though t h i s conclusion may seem, i t i s what Hegel 
bel i e v e s . He speaks of the h i s t o r y of philosophy as the 
7- Hegel. Werke 20, pp. 46l - 2. 
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t r u e theodicy and, i n the same essay, as 'the r e v e l a t i o n 
8 
of God as he knows h i m s e l f ' . * Again, as we have seen, 
Hegel t h i n k s of the progressive development of philosophy as 
the only realm of s p i r i t t h ere i s . We must conclude t h a t 
i t i s the only heaven there i s . I t i s a p e c u l i a r heaven, 
however, since i t has an existence here on e a r t h . The realm 
of s p i n us of the h i s t o r y of philosophy, according t o Hegel, 
'makes i t s e l f i n t o one and the same present-day s p i r i t . ' 
They a t t a i n t n i s happy s t a t e of a f f a i r s by t h e i r ' s e l f - r e c o g -
n i t i o n ' i n t o moments of the one whole. I t i s t h i s process 
t h a t i s the t r u e theodicy and culminates w i t h f i n i t e mind 
knowing i t as such. 
There i s much we could conclude from t h i s a n a l y s i s about 
Hegel's views i n general. For example, we could pursue 
the view of r e l i g i o n i t I m p l i e d or, f o r t h a t matter, the view 
of h i s t o r y i t . i m p l i e d . However these t o p i c s do not g r e a t l y 
concern us here. What i n t e r e s t s us i s the view of philosophy 
i t i m p l i e s and e s p e c i a l l y what view does i t present us w i t h 
of the r e l a t i o n o f the H i s t o r y of Philosophy t o Hegel's p h i l -
osophy . I n pursuing t h a t aspect we must emohasize t h a t , 
whatever VJXW Hegel may have of the matter, the thoughts of 
dead philosophers are not the k i n d of t h i n g s t h a t organise 
themselves i n t o a whole or are even capable of s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n , 
i n t o or w i t h i n the one s p i r i t . But Hegel t h i n k s - t h e y are. 
I n h i s view t h i s i s wr.at d i s t i n g u i s h e s the account t h a t the 
H i s t o r y °^__?hJ.l_oscphv gives from an account which woula preceii* 
8. I b i d . , p. 457-
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a mere d i v e r s i t y of modes of tnought and t h i n k e r s . I t s 
subject-matter organises i t s e l f i n t o a complete whole. 
He w r i t e s the h i s t o r y of philosophy, therefore, as though 
s p i r i t had w i l l e d i t a l l from the beginning. But, c l e a r l y , 
there i s no such s p i r i t . Hegel admits t h i s h i m s e l f , i n 
e f f e c t , when he makes che f u r t h e r suggestion t h a t t h i s 'long 
succession of s p i r i t s ' of the h i s t o r y of philosophy i s the 
'organism of our Substance'. S e t t i n g aside f o r the moment 
the question of the precise meaning of the n o t i o n of Substance 
i n Hegel's philosophy ( f o r our present purpose we might simply 
take the term to mean ' l i f e ' ) we can see t h a t the i m p l i c a t i o n 
of saying t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s c f previous philosophy are 
organic moments m the s p i r i t of the present i s t h a t they are 
not consciously elements of our l i f e . I f they are not 
consciously present m our l i f e Hegel has to admit t h a t n e i t h e r 
i s t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n i n t o a ' s p i r i t u a l whole* past or present, 
ready at hand. As he himself says, they have to be brought 
t o the l i g h t of day and only then, we must assume, i s i t poss-
i b l e f o r them t o be k n i t i n t o a systematic whole. This the 
philosopher must do because the ' s p i r i t of the time' which 
i s i n us ' n a t u r a l l y ' does not possess t h a t order. That order, 
and t h i s i s supposed to be the demand contained m Hegel's 
own account of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy, i s only t o be a t t a i n e d by 
drawing out from t h e i r naturalness those s p i r i t u a l forms. 
This s t i l l leaves us f a r from c l e a r on what J.S the out-
come of Hegel's H i s t o r y of Philosophy. The ambiguity of the 
paragraph 1 quoted i s , I t h i n k , t y p i c a l of the general complexity 
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of Hegel's philosophy. He makes a number of assumptions t h a t 
are simply not argued and o f t e n appears to move i l l e g i t i m a t e l y 
from one area of discourse t o another. At present there i s 
c e r t a i n t o be confusion because m one and the same context 
Hegel invokes the " s p i r i t of the time" and the " r e s u l t of 
the h i s t o r y of philosophy". Prima f a c i e there appears t o 
be no d i r e c t connection between the two. Not so f o r Hegel, 
however. His assumption i s , and t h i s plays an important 
r o l e m h i s account of experience m the Phenomenology, t h a t 
'the h i s t o r y of philosophy i s the innermost ( s o u l ) of world 
h i s t o r y , - t h i s work of the mind of nan m h i s inner thought 
i s p a r a l l e l w i t h a l l the stages of r e a l i t y . Ko philosophy 
can go beyond i t s own time. ^ For Hegel, then, the a b s t r a c t -
ions of philosophy c:e a b s t r a c t i o n s from the s p i r i t of the 
epoch. That i s t h e i r d i r e c t connection. This, he suggests, 
i s not t o be understood i n the sense t h a t philosophy i s m 
a dependent r e l a t i o n t o the s p i r i t of the time. I t i s r a t h e r 
i t s essence. I n h i s t o r i c a l terms t h i s means th a t the h i s t o r y 
of the world i s d i s t i l l e d i n t o the h i s t o r y of philosophy. 
The r e l a t i o n between n i s t o r i c a l development and the development 
of the h i s t o r y of philosophy i s f o r Hegel the r e l a t i o n between 
an outer contingent l i f e and i t s innermost soul. This i s 
how the h i s t o r y of philosophy comes t o be found n a t u r a l l y m 
the s p i r i t of the time. 
Armed w i t h t h i s i n s i g h t we are now able t o say w i t h much 
more c e r t a i n t y whac the r e s u l t of the h i s t o r y of philosophy 
i s f o r Hegel. As we have seen, Fegel suggests t h a t our 
9- I b i d . , p. ^56. 
146. 
reading of h i s H i s t o r y of Philosophy might move us to grasp 
the s p i r i t of our epoch i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l manner. This i s 
p o t e n t i a l l y possible because past philosophies are ' n a t u r a l l y ' 
present m the c u l t u r e of the day. We may f i n d t h i s improb-
able, but m Hegel's view, those past philosophies are the 
pulse-beats of 'the s p i r i t of the time'. Grasping the s p i r i t 
of time i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l manner i m p l i e s then t h a t we draw 
out those pulse-beats or p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas. So the argument 
would appear to be t h i s : I n any one epoch the philosophy of 
t h a t epoch represents i t s s e l f consciousness or, more s t r o n g l y , 
the essence of t h a t epoch. Now, what happens m h i s t o r y ( of 
the e x o t e r i c k i n d ) i s according t o Hegel t h a t one epoch 
succeeds another w i t h no apparent l o g i c a l connection between 
them. The c u l t u r a l outcome i s t h a t the s p i r i t of the preced-
i n g epoch i s i n h e r i t e d m a contingent or n a t u r a l fashion by 
the s o c i e t y of the f o l l o w i n g epoch and m t h i s way forms a 
pa r t of the ordi n a r y m^n's self-awareness m the new epoch. 
So t h a t the events of h i s t o r y themselves appear to give no 
sign of p h i l o s o p h i c a l r i g o u r . Nevertheless, Hegel claims, 
beneath the surface there l i e s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l order. His 
suggestion i s t h a t both the ordi n a r y man's consciousness and 
philosophy are something more than what they appear to be. 
That something more i s m botn cases supplied by h i s t o r y 
( o f the e s o t e r i c k i n d ) . Hegel's view i s t h a t the or d i n a r y 
consciousness i s not only the n a t u r a l consciousness of i t s 
time but contains w i t h i n i t ( i m p l i c i t l y ) the consciousness 
of preceding epochs. The s p i r i t of the present i s also 
the s p i r i t of the past. S i m i l a r l y Hegel claims t h ? t tne 
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philosophy of an epoch has w i t h i n i t s e l f , as moments, the 
philosophies of past epochs. Both from the viewpoint of 
e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y have an immanent order. However the 
h i s t o r y i n which philosophy p a r t i c i p a t e s i s o i the p r i v i l -
eged k i n d . Unlike the n a t u r a l consciousness of an epoch i t 
knows the r e a l i t y of t h a t epoch - i t i s i t s self-consciousness. 
Philosophy p a r t i c i p a t e s m the h i s t o r y of u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y . 
I t i s the e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y of man-kind. Because i t i s the 
r e a l i t y of h i s t o r y the study of the h i s t o r y of philosophy 
brings w i t h i t the demand t h a t we understand our l i f e m t h a t 
way - as i m p l i c i t l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l . 
We 
What *m may/, now conclude about the r e l a t i o n of Hegel s 
Lectures on the H i s t o r y of Philosophy t o the Phenomenology of 
Mmd 9 We have to decide what the outcome of the f o r n i e r has 
to do w i t h the idea of a phenomenology of rnind. Those who 
are f a m i l i a r w i t h the Phenomenology of Mind w i l l already have 
an i n t i m a t i o n of what I have to say on t h i s . Tne s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the one f o r the other, m my view, l i e s i n t r e account t h a t 
Hegel gives i n the Lectures of the r e l a t i o n of philosophy t o 
the c u l t u r e of time. For Hegel, as we have seen, philosophy 
i s the self-consciousness of t h a t c u l t u r e or i t s essence, and 
i t i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the merely n a t u r a l consciousness 
of a c u l t u r e . Philosophy, he suggests, i s the systematic under-
10. I have t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e here between the two aspects of Kegel's 
view of H i s t o r y . Hegel cannot have i t both ways. H i s t o r y seen 
as a contingent serie s of events (what I have c a l l e d e x o t e r i c 
h i s t o r y ) i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from history" seen as an immanent -
l y ordered s e r i e s of events ( e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y ) . D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g 
the two c e r t a i n l y makes more sense of Hegel's claims about the 
n a t u r a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness. Whether the d i s t i n c t -
ion would apply t o Hege]'s philosophy of h i s t o r y as a whole i s 
another matter, Marx, whose concepts these are, appears t o 
t h i n k so. See K i i t i k des Hegels^hen Staatsrechts, Mar^-Sngej_s 
Werke, Dietz VerJag, B e r l i n p. 20b. 
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standing and synthesis of tne n a t u r a l consciousness. We s h a l l 
f i n d t h a t the same d i s t i n c t i o n i s made m the Phenomenology of 
Mind, m t h a t the phenomenology of mind i s intended t o de p i c t 
the path of n a t u r a l consciousness t o science. Hegel, i t seems, 
has taken h i s own m j u c t i o n s e r i o u s l y ' t o grasp the s p i r i t of 
our time which i s m us n a t u r a l l y ' and 'draw i t of i t s n a t u r a l -
ness'."'""'" From our reading of the conclusion t o Hegel's h i s t o r y 
of philosophy we already have some idea of what i s i n v o l v e d i n 
the n a t u r a l consciousness t a k i n g t h a t path. The stages of the 
path t o science are, according t o Hegel, already t o be found i n 
the n a t u r a l consciousness, f o r these stages are past philosophies 
which have been superceded and are incorporated m the c u l t u r e 
of the time. So the path of the n a t u r a l consciousness takes 
i t through the 'realm of s p i r i t s ' m so f a r these ' s p i r i t s ' 
are contemporarily present. I n one way, then, Hegel's account 
of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy provides the subject-matter of 
the Phenomenology. I t i s the 'long t r a m of s p i r i t s ' which 
12 
' l i v e s m us a l l ' which has t o be c r i t i c a l l y reviewed before 
the n a t u r a l consciousness can a t t a i n to science. However, the 
H i s t o r y of Philosophy i s not per s_e the content of the Hegelian 
n a t u r a l consciousness but i s , I b e l i e v e , i t s content as something 
dead and past. I t would not do simply t o lepeat, m p h i l o s -
ophy i t s e l f , the h i s t o r y of philosophy. Rather Hegel's p o s i t i o n 
i s t h i s : 'The same development of thought which i s portrayed i n 
the h i s t o r y of philosophy i s presented m the philosophy i t s e l f but 
freed from t h a t h i s t o r i c a l e x t e r n a l i t y , purely m tne element of 
t h o u g h t ' . 1 ^ 
1 1 . Hegel. Werke 20, p. 4 62. 
12. I b i d . 
13. Hegel. Werke 8, p. 59. 
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This view stands at the centre of Hegel's philosophy. 
I t i s not one t h a t i s s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y however. Indeed we 
have yet t o examine what would be the nature of such an account 
t h a t aimed at b r i n g i n g out the s i g n i f i c a n c e of various forms 
of superceded philosophy f o r present philosophy. What we are 
concerned w i t h p a r t i c u l a r l y i s the r o l e t h a t such a view plays 
m Hegel's theory of experience The Phenomenology of Mind. 
And i t i s t o t h i s we now t u r n . I n the Phenomenology of Mmd, 
Hegel undertakes the task of r a i s i n g philosophy t o a science oy 
t r a c i n g the path of the n a t u r a l consciousness t o Absolute Knowledge. 
His aim i s , as he says, t h a t philosophy be able to set t o one 
side 'the name of being the love of knowledge' and 'be r e a l 
knowledge'. This aim i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what I have suggested 
i s Hegel's general view of philosophy. Hegel's i n t e n t i o n m 
the Phenomenology i s t o transform past and contemporary philosophy 
employing h i s understanding of both as h i s p o i n t of o r i e n t a t i o n . 
I n what he has t o say there i s , however, one t h i n g we might not 
have expected. He suggests t h a t he i s working w i t h others to 
achieve h i s aim. This i s unexpected because we have, by now, 
a f i r m p i c t u r e of Hegel as a philosopher who i s extremely c r i t i c a l 
of the e f f o r t s of others. But as ne puts i t h i m s e l f : 'To show 
t h a t the time has now come f o r pnilosophy to be raised t o a science-
t h i s would be the only t r u e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the attempts which 
have t h i s purpose', ( i b . ) I n Hegel's view then, other philosophers-
and we must assume t h a t these are the ones immediately preceding 
him, Kant, Fichte and S c r o l l i n g - had a l l but rais e d philosophy 
14. Hegel. Weike_3, p. \A. 
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t o science. What Hegel has to do i s simply t o b r i n g the process 
t o a successful end. I t appears then t h a t Hegel t h i n k s of h i s 
Pheaorneno 1 ogy as being i n a c r i t i c a l c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past and 
contemporary philosophy. What i s more, and i s perhaps more 
s t r i k i n g , Hegel t h i n k s of the Phenomenology as i t s e l f making 
h i s t o r y . The time has come, he claims, f o r science t o come 
on the scene. The sense of h i s t o r i c a l occasion which Kroner 
detects i n the whole of German I d e a l i s t Philosophy i s nowhere 
more evident than m Hegel's Phenomenology, and i t i s i n the 
Preface, as i s the case w i t h a l l h i s Prefaces, t h a t t h i s sense 
of h i s t o r y comes p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the f o r e . Kroner compares t h i s 
atmosphere of in n o v a t i o n w i t h t h a t surrounding the founding of 
the C h r i s t i a n Church and suggests t h a t the same eschatolcg.i c a l 
15 
a s p i r a t i o n s are to be found among the German I d e a l i s t s . 
Whether t h i s i s t r u e or not we have t o admit t h a t Hegel's 
philosophy summons up the same s o r t of sense of occasion. 
Philosophy i s f o r him part and pa r c e l of the h i s t o r i c a l world. 
I n w r i t i n g the Phenomenology of Mind, then, Hegel addresses 
hi m s e l f both t o the c u l t u r e of the time and t o the h i s t o r y of 
philosophy, e s p e c i a l l y i t s most recent h i s t o r y . I t i s t h i s 
t h a t explains h i s t w o f o l d i n t e n t i o n i n w r i t i n g the work. I t 
i s h i s i n t e n t i o n , as we have seen, to r a i s e philosophy t o a 
science and t o show t h a t i t i s the demand of S p i r i t i n h i s 
time. I t i s the l a t t e r t h a t i n v o l v e s the examination of con-
temporary c u l t u r e . Along w i t h t h i s t w o f o l d i n t e n t i o n Hegel 
makes a t w o f o l d assumption. He assumes t h a t philosophy i s 
developing m the d i r e c t i o n of science and the assumption t h a t 
che contemporary c u l t u r e has the p o t e n t i a l f o r such a develop-
15- R.Kroner. Von Kant bi s Heftel, p. 1 'Something of t h ; n r of 
esebatologicai hones 0 1 the cine of the b i r t h o i C h r i s t i a n i t y 
W ^ f f e a i ? ^e e m^Siil^ t°or bnr^?£ f t eafi§gtQ{ t r u t h ™ & t h l 
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merit. Since a c u l t u r e i s n o t h i n g without i t s 
p a r t i c i p a n t s the assumption t h a t he has to make i n the 
second instance i s t h a t the ordinary person's consciousness 
of the p r e v a i l i n g c u l t u r e i s i m p l i c i t l y s c i e n t i f i c . He 
argues t h a t the t r a n s i t i o n to science t h a t the Phenomenology 
demands i s overdue: 'For the r e s t ' , he says, ' i t i s not d i f f i -
c u l t t o see t h a t our times are a time of b i r t h and t r a n s i t i o n -
i n g a new period. S p i r i t has broken w i t h the h i t h e r t o 
e x i s t i n g world of i t s being and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( V o r s t e l l e n s ) 
and i s i n the process of the work of transforming i t and l e t t m 
i t sink i n t o the past.' The Phenomenology requires no more 
of us than t h a t we become aware of what was already i n progress 
i n our c u l t u r e . 
We have examined at some l e n g t h the r e l a t i o n of the 
h i s t o r y of philosophy to the Phenomenology f^om the viewpoint 
of Hegel's d e p i c t i o n of the h i s t o r y of philosophy. As I 
have sa i d , what now i n t e r e s t s us i s the r o l e the r e l a t i o n 
plays i n the Phenomenology i t s e l f . This i s again extremely 
complex. I t means t h a t we have to unravel what Hegel intends 
by the n o t i o n of S p i r i t . We have t o break i t up i n t o the 
many c o n s t i t u e n t p a i t s t h a t i t has i n the Phenomenology, 
We might begin w i t h the ' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s i n S p i r i t ' t h a t 
Hegel h i m s e l f p o s i t s m the Preface. We have j u s t seen t h a t 
Hegel believes t h a t , m h i s time, S p i r i t i s on the p o i n t o f 
l e t t i n g the h i t h e r t o e x i t i n g world of i t s being sink i n t o the 
past and i s i n v o lved m the work of transforming i t . The 
' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of s p i r i t ' begins w i t h r e f i n i n g t h i s idea. 
S p i r i t , Hegel argues, has not f o r t h i s reason a t t a i n e d i t s 
f a l l r e a . l i t y . The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h a t i t desires has oeen 
16. Hegel. Werke 3 > p . l 8 . 
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achieved i n concept alone and t h i s ' l i k e a new-born c h i l d ' 
has no ' f u l l reality'."'"'' 1' Nov/, i n saying t h i s of S p i r i t , i t 
i s c l e a r t h a t Hegel i s t a l k i n g about s p i r i t as philosophy 
since i t can only be i n philosophy t h a t s p i r i t i s r e a l i s e d 
'm concept a l o n e 1 , and t h i s i s only the beginning of the 
r e a l i s a t i o n of s p i r i t . But, he adds, we must remember 
'that the beginning of the new s p i r i t i s the product of a 
f a r - r e a c h i n g r e v o l u t i o n of numerous forms of c u l t u r e (Bildung) 
and the p r i z e of a very tortuous path and equally great s t r a i n 
l 8 
and e f f o r t . ' I n other words, Hegel misses i n e x i s t i n g 
philosophy an awareness t h a t s p i r i t i s not merely conceptual 
but also has a concrete r e a l i t y . S p i r i t i s also, m one of 
i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s , c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l r e a l i t y . I t 
may be t h a t s p i r i t IA i t s concrete r e a l i t y appeared overnight 
( I t h i n k t h a t Hegel has i n mind here the Frencn Revolution) 
but he a s s e r t s , philosophy must not underestimate the t r a n s -
formation of c u l t u r e t h a t had prepared the ground. I t was 
the f a i l u r e of contemporary philosophy t o take t h i s p o i n t t h a t , 
i n Hegel's view, accounts f o r the f a c t t h a t I t bears witness 
only t o the 'simple concept' of the great t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . 
The r e a l i t y of the p r e v a i l i n g philosophy however was not 
t h a t mere concept but the 'far-reaching r e v o l u t i o n of numerous 
forms of c u l t u r e ' of which i t represented the ' p r i z e ' . I t 
i s t h e r e f o r e one of the p r i n c i p a l aims of the Phenomenology 
of Mind t o prove t h a t 'the r e a l i t y of t h i s simple "whole con-
s i s t s m t h i s , t n a t those forms which have become moments 
develop thenselves anew i n t h e i r received sense and give 17. 
18. 
I b i d . , p. 19. 
I b i d . 
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themselves form but i n t h e i r new element. 
I t seems then t n a t one of the p r i n c i p a l aims of the 
Phenomenology i s t h a t contemporary philosophy be made conscious 
of i t s i n h e r i t a n c e . Hegel recommends t h a t i t should look back 
at preceding forms of philosophy from the standpoint of i t s 
present achievement and work again on i t s received ideas t o 
r a i s e them a l l t o the present l e v e l of s p e c u l a t i o n . This i s 
one manner i n which s p i r i t might a t t a i n i t s f u l l r e a l i t y . This 
would be through what Hegel c a l l s self-conscious s p i r i t knowing 
the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of i t s ' s i m p l e concept'. However s p i r i t , as 
1 have already i n d i c a t e d , has another "aspect. Hegel r e f e r s t o 
20 
i t here as consciousness. I t i s the e x o t e r i c aspects of s p i r i t : 
consciousness caught up m s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y , t h a t i s 
t o say, the n a t u r a l or o r d i n a r y consciousness of the time. How 
Kegel says t h a t m the n a t u r a l consciousness ( m c o n t r a s t t o s e l f -
conscious s p i r i t ) ' t h e wealth of preceding being i s s t i l l present 
21 
as r e c o l l e c t i o n ' . A ccordingly, Hegel suggests, : t misses i n 
the new form of philosophy the 'extension and p a r t i c u l a r i s a t i o n 
of content' and most of a l l the s y s t e m a t i s a t i o n of such a content, 
( i b . ) What i t misses, above a l l , i s a form or s t r u c t u r e t o i t s 
w o rld. So, from t h i s p o i n t of view, one of the p r i n c i p a l aims 
of the Phenomenology i s t o give a s t r u c t u r e t o the world of the 
19- I b i d . 
20. There would appear to be l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e m the uses t h a t 
Hegel makes of the terms Consciousness, the n a t u r a l conscious-
ness and the ordinary consciousness. I f there i s any d i f f e r e n c e 
at a l l i t would be t h a t Consciousness has a s l i g h t l y more cecn-
n i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l meaning than the other two being e x c l u s i v e l y 
confined t o the stages of mind of sense-certainty, perception 
and Understanding. Here, however,Hegel uses the term m a 
manner which would make i t synonymous w i t h the other two so t h a t 
even t h a t t e c h n i c a l meaning h a s , i t appears,to be understood m 
the loose sense. 
21. Hegel. Werke 3, p. 19. 
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n a t u r a l consciousness. I n i t Hegel intends t o give consciou-
ness a path t o the f u l l r e a l i t y of the new world I n mind. 
What he has t o say of the ' r e a l i t y of t h i s simple whole' 
also means t h a t philosophy must'develop anew' f o r conscious-
ness the 'numerous forms of past c u l t u r e ' which have'become 
moments' i n the e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e . What i s more, i t means 
t h a t t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s of past forms m present 
c u l t u r e i s the r e a l i t y of the n a t u r a l consciousness. I t 
i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel's meaning i s less than c l e a r : 
because the f u l l real i t y of s p i r i t t h a t the Phenomenology us 
supposed t o a t t a i n a pplies to both self-conscious s p i r i t 
and s p i r i t as consciousness. 
There i s one possible confusion which vte must be c a r e f u l 
t o avoid. We r e c a l l t h a t , at the end of h i s H i s t o r y of 
Philosophy Hegel spoke of s p i r i t d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g i t s e l f i n t o 
f i n i t e s p i r i t and Absolute s p i r i t . We also r e c a l l t h a t the 
p r i n c i p l e of the f i n i t e s p i r i t was t o know and the p r i n c i p l e 
of the Absolute s p i r i t t h a t i t be known as Idea. I t seems 
then t h a t what f i n i t e s p i r i t has t o achieve i s p a r a l l e l w i t h 
what the n a t u r a l consciousness of the Phenomenology has t o 
achieve: science or systematic knowledge. There i s a d i f f e r -
ence between the two, however. The d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t f i n i t e 
s p i r i t i s able t o know the Absolute whereas the n a t u r a l consc-
iousness has t o be led to that goal. As we have seen, f i n i t e 
s p i r i t does not have t o be led t o t h a t goal because i t i s 
already there and t h e r e f o r e i n a p o s i t i o n to 'grasp the s p i r i t 
of the time'. I t i s , as we know capable of knowing the s p i m 
t h a t 'dwells i n us a l l ' whereas the n a t u r a l consciousness miss 
the s y s t e m a t i s a t i o a t h a t such knowledge would provide. T n 
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s h o r t , f i n i t e s p i r i t i s already self-conscious. I t i s s e l f -
conscious s p i r i t or, q u i t e simply, the consciousness of a 
philosopher. I t i s t h e r e f o r e at one w i t h the r e a l i t y of 
i t s time. I t i s t h i s t h a t defines self-conscious s p i r i t 
f o r us. What s p i r i t as consciousness or n a t u r a l conscious-
ness J .s, f o l l o w s from t h i s . I t i s s p i r i t which i s not at 
one w i t h the r e a l i t y of i t s time. I n the n a t u r a l conscious-
ness there as s t i l l a b i f u r c a t i o n (Entzweiung) between i t s e l f 
and the world. I t i s not self-conscious so t h a t the 'wealth 
of preceding being' i s only present i n i t as r e c o l l e c t i o n . 
Tn other words, what Hegel c a l l s 'the s p i r i t t h a t dwells m 
us a l l ' i s only present m i t unself-eonsciously. 
This i s an important conclusion because the task t h a t 
Hegel sets h i m s e l f m the Phenomenology of Mind i s t o b r i n g 
t h i s s p i r i t t o consciousness i n the n a t u r a l or ordina.ry 
consciousness. At the same time he hopes t o prove t o s e l f -
conscious s p i r i t or philosophy t h a t such i s the f u l l r e a l i t y 
2° 
of i t s simple concept. As we have seen, he himself appears 
not to d i s t i n g u i s h h i s account of the path of the n a t u r a l 
consciousness t o science from the p h i l o s o p h i c a l proof of the 
correctness of h i s p o s i t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , cannot hold t h a t 
the content of the n a t u r a l consciousness i s a l l t h a t f a r 
removed from philosophy. Now i t can be seen what was meant 
when I argued e a r l i e r t h a t the h i s t o r y of philosophy i s not 
per se the content of the Hegelian n a t u r a l consciousness but 
i t s content as something dead and past. The content of the 
n a t u r a l consciousness t h a t Kegel analyses i n the Phenomenology 
i s indeed past philosophy but past philosophy i n i t s present 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t i s past philosophy as i t i s to be found m 
22.Hegel sees h i s way of s e t t i n g about: the business of philosoph 
m the Phenomeno]ogv as being the most convincing proof of t n 
e r r o r s of S c h e l l i r i g ' s oracular, m t u i t i o n i s t approach. See ±b 
p.20 and above, Chapter 3, foo t n o t e 115. 
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the contemporary mind. And t h a t contemporary mind I s on i t s 
way t o science. I t goes without saying then t h a t past p h i l -
osophies are not unearthed m t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y but 
as they c o n t r i b u t e to the development of Absolute knowledge 
i n the n a t u r a l consciousness, I t i s t h i s t h a t i s t h e i r 'new 
element': the element of the Absolute. As we Know, Hegel 
believes t h a t philosophy had reached t h i s stage w i t h the 
philosophy o f Sc h e l l m g . So what he t h i n k s of hi m s e l f as 
doing i s g i v i n g S c h e l l i n g ' s p r i n c i p l e i t s ' f u l l r e a l i t y ' . 
I n the Phenomenology philosophy reaches i t s goal at tne same 
time t h a t the n a t u r a l consciousness reaches i t s goal. " 
So the Phenomenology of Mind presents what Hegel c a l l s 
the becoming of science i n general or of knowledge . I t s 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t , he suggests, i s t h i n k i n g i n i+~s irninediacy or 
simply self-consciousness, I n order t h a t t h i s uneducated, 
naive t h i n k i n g become science, a long path has to be trav e r s e d . 
I n h i s own advertisement t o the book (which appeared m a 
23. Hegel ends the Phenomenology on t h i s note:(a misquotation 
from a poem of S c h i l l e r j n u r - ' a u s dem Kelche dieses G e i s t e r r -
eiches (only out of the cup'of t h i s realm of s p i r i t foams 
f o r t h t o i t i t s i n f i n i t y ) schaumt lhm seine U n e n d l i c h k e i t ' . 
Poetry aside, the force of what Hegel has to say here i s 
t h a t the Absolute I d e n t i t y of S p i r i t i s only t o be achieved 
through d e p i c t i n g the 'realm of s p i r i t s ' m i t s f u l l r e a l i t y 
The p o i n t , as I have i n d i c a t e d , i s being made against 
S c h e l l i n g . S c h e l l m g , i n Kegel's view, merely declares the 
Absolute or I n f i n i t y to e x i s t . The po i n t i s thougn, Hegel 
claims, to prove m an examination of the 'realm of s p i r i t s ' 
that i t does e x i s t . 
24. Hegel. V/erke 3, p. 33. 
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l i t e r a r y j o u r n a l :n Jena October 1807) Hegel describes the 
process m t h i s way. ' i t (the Phenomenology - H.W.) composes 
the various snapes (Gestalten) of irund as s t a t i o n s on the way 
througn whicn i t becomes pure knowledge or Absolute S p i r i t , ' 
so t h a t 'what at f i r s t glance presents i t s e l f as a chaos -
the wealth of the appearance of s p i r i t - i s brought i n t o a 
s c i e n t i f i c order. This presents them according t o t h e i r 
n ecessity i n which the imperfect d i s s o l v e themselves and pass 
i n t o higher appearances of s p i r i t which c o n s t i t u t e t h e i r next 
t r u t h . The f i n a l t r u t h they f i n d f i r s t of a l l m r e l i g i o n 
25 
and then m science as the r e s u l t of the whole'. There-
f o r e what the philosopner does i n t r a v e r s i n g the various 
modes of consciousness le a d i n g t o science i s not simply t o 
describe what i s ready at hand i n h i s s o c i e t y . I t i s net 
the n a t u r a l consciousness i n i t s naturalness t h a t concerns 
Hegel f o r what l i e s ready at hand i s a chaos. A13 t h a t we 
have are the mere appearances of s p i r i t . I t i s the task of 
the philosopher t o b r i n g order t o those appearances. He has 
to b r i n g out t h e i r necessary r e l a t L o n , or the superceded p h i l -
osophies t h a t are present m those appearances. This i s tfhy 
Hegel's undertaking i s a phenomenology c f s p i r i t . I t i s 
only a phenomenology of s p i r i t t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n w i l l show 
t h a t there are necessary connections among the contemporary 
spheres of mind. His suggestion i s even more r a d i c a l than 
t h i s , however; according t o him those spheres or appearances 
of s p i r i t d i s s o l v e one i n t o the other u n t i l m t h e i r progress 
absolute knowledge i s brought about. 
25. I b i d . , p. 593 under E d i t o r ' s Notes. 
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Past philosophies, then, enter i n t o the make-up c f the 
Phenomenology of Mind i n two ways. F i r s t l y , they are present 
i n the contemporary appearance of Mind t h a t Hegel examines 
as a c t u a l p o i n t s of view of i n d i v i d u a l s . They survive as 
l i v i n g viewpoints and, m the case of some, as l i v i n g i d e o l o g i e s . 
For example, the Unhappy Consciousness i s not only an unconscious 
element m contemporary ' s p i r i t ' taut also a conscious element-
i n , say, a strongly r e l i g i o u s person. Secondly, past p h i l o s -
ophies would appear to be present m contemporary c u l t u r e as 
superceded forms of c u l t u r a l shapes or Gestalten, as Hegel 
c a l l s them, which have c o n t r i b u t e d t o and are superceded 
elements m the e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e . For example, the s t o i c a l 
frame of mind i s u n l i k e l y t o have dominated the consciousness 
of any one i n d i v i d u a l m Hegel's time but i t i s s t i l l a stage 
i n the development of the consciousness of the species and 
t h e r e f o r e , Hegel claims,present m i t . This as another 
reason why there can be two i n d i v i d u a l approaches t o the 
Phenomenology of Mind. There can be e i t h e r tne approach 
of the uneducated person of h i s time - t h i s i s of course 
s p i r i t as consciousness or the n a t u r a l consciousness - or 
the approach of the 'universal i n d i v i d u a l ' who has t o regard 
'self-conscious s p i r i t i n i t s formation and education (Bildung)'."~ 
This, of course, i s the approach of s p i r i t as self-consciousness 
or the approach of the philosopher. Tt i s only he t h a t i s 
able t o understand the various elements of the e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e 
_ . -
26. I b i d . , p. 31. 
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i n t h e i r necessary connection. The n a t u r a l consciousness 
being caught up j n what Hege] c a l l s the 'organism of our 
Substance' must approach the Phenomenology from the point 
of view of one of the modes of consciousness which i t possesses. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n between the two approaches makes the 
s t r u c t u r e of the Phenomenology most complex. Hegel h i m s e l f 
devotes a long s e c t i o n of the Preface to e x p l a i n i n g and elab-
o r a t i n g i t . The p a r t i c u l a r , uneducated i n d i v i d u a l i s , 
he argues, 'incomplete s p i r i t ' a concrete c o n f i g u r a t i o n , i n 
27 
whose whole being one de t e r m i n a t i o n governs'. The other 
appearances of mind, he claims, e x i s t i n i t only as obscured 
t r a c e s . The prevalence of a higher uode of consciousness 
HI the experience of the i n d i v i d u a l expunges the lower modes. 
The l a t t e r becomes a moment only i n the new p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t 
of view. Vie might understand b e t t e r what Hegel has to say 
here i f we consider two such p a r t i c u l a r modes of consciousness: 
Protestantism and Catnolicism. Now there i s nc doubt t h a t 
Protestantism o r i g i n a t e d m Catholicism; but m a p a r t i c u l a r 
consciousness t h a t i s Protestant the element of Catholicism 
i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r consciousness, Hegel would argue, has 
disappeared. The p a r t i c u l a r consciousness t h i n k s i t i s 
P r o t e s t a n t m so f a r as i t i s not C a t h o l i c . Tn other words, 
the Protestant l i k e s t o stand above the l e v e l of t h i n k i n g t h a t 
i s the o r i g i n of h i s own outlook. He i s vain about his own 
view and contemptuous about the C a t h o l i c view. Now Hegel 
generalises t h i s to say t h a t He, the p a r t i c u l a r or m d i v i d u a l 
consciousness, l i k e s to stand above h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l 
27. I o i d . , p. 32. 
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h i s t o r v . He l i k e s to t h i n k of i t as something l e f t behind. 
On the other hand, the u n i v e r s a l i n d i v i d u a l approaches the 
various modes of consciousness without t h i s v a n i t y . I t sees 
every stage as necessary so t h a t each m i t s mind possesses 
the same value as the other. For i t , each mode of conscious-
28 
ness i s ' i t s e l f an i n d i v i d u a l whole c o n f i g u r a t i o n ' . As 
we have seen, i t s task i s to b r i n g t o mind eacn p a r t i c u l a r 
mode of consciousness - each one m i t s place - and, as Hegel 
puts i t here, survey the whole as i t s element. This i s not 
to say t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c u l a r consciousness does 
not p a r t i c i p a t e m a l l the shapes of consciousness t h a t 
precede i t . They are already p a r t of i t s consciousness 
"because t h i s past existence i s property t h a t has already 
been acquired by the 1 m v e r s a l s p i r i t t h a t makes up the 
Substance of the i n d i v i d u a l ' . ^ Therefore as one p a r t i c u l a r 
consciousness, say f o r instance t h a t of M o r a l i t y , the i n d i v i d u a l 
w i l l not only p a r t i c i p a t e m the world of e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g 
and the forms of e t h i c a l consciousness t h a t have immediately 
preceded i t but also, through the general c u l t u r e of h i s 
epoch, he w i l l be p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the general process of 
S p i r i t t h a t Hegel de p i c t s i n the Phenomenology'of Mind. This 
does not however amount to the same l e v e l of involvement as 
t h a t of the u n i v e r s a l or self-conscious mind. Since the 
general process only 'appears e x t e r n a l l y ' t o the i n d i v i d u a l 
as the property of the general consciousness c f the time. 
So i t merely fon^f the i d e o l o g i c a l backdrop c f h i s existence 
28. 
29. 
I b i d . , p. 33. 
I b i d . , p. 32. 
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or, Hegel suggests, hj s 'inorganic nature'. I n Hegel's 
view, then, we may dep i c t the two approaches t o the Phenomenology 
an t h i s way: ' i t c o n s i s t s , seen from the side of the i n d i v i d u a l , 
i n t h i s , t h a t i t acquires what i s at hand, draws i n t o i t s e l f 
i t s organic nature and takes possession of i t f o r h i m s e l f . 
This from the side of the u n i v e r s a l s p i r i t c o n sists m not h i n g 
ether than i t give i t s e l f t h i s i t s self-consciousness and 
"51 
b r i n g out i n i t s e l f i t s becoming and r e f l e c t i o n . What 
the i n d i v i d u a l or n a t u r a l consciousness has t o do t h e r e f o r e 
i s to reappropriate i t s own inorg a n i c nature. B a i l l i e seems 
to be c o r r e c t here when he suggests i n h i s rendering of 
the phrase that the p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l has t o make h i s 
i n o r g a n i c nature organic t o h i m s e l f . ^ This i s c e r t a i n l y 
what Hegel i m p l i e s : t h a t the n a t u r a l consciousness become 
thoroughly acquainted w i t h a l l t h a t i t has taken t o make up 
i t s own consciousness and so make the general consciousness 
of the time h i s own. Hegel adds t h a t t h i s process from the 
po i n t of view of the u n i v e r s a l i n d i v i d u a l i s simply the process 
of i t s coming t o i t s e l f . I t becomes e x p l i c i t l y wnat i t 
i m p l i c i t l y i s , the self-consciousness of Suostance. This 
approach t o the Phenomenology can i t i s c l e a r only be open 
to the philosopher who has already a t t a i n e d the l e v e l of 
'self-consciousness' of s p i r i t . Or, as Hegel suggests here, 
i t i s only open t o those who know the content of the inorg a n i c 
nature of the general s p i r i t of 1 he time. The content of 
t h a t inorganic nature i s whai Hegel c a l l s the p r i o r 'laoour 
30. I b i d . 
31. I b i d . , P-331-
32. J . B . B a i l l t e . T r a n s l a t i o n of The Phenomenology of Mir-d 
( A l i e n & Unwm) p. 90. 
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of world s p i r i t ' whose essence,as we know, i s the h i s t o r y 
of philosophy. I t f o l l o w s then t h a t t h i s approach can only 
be taken by the philosopher who knows, as Hegel claims he 
does, the outcome of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy. I t i s 
only such a philosopher who can possibly present the Phenomen-
ology of Mind. 
163. 
UNDERSTANDING AND REASON, OR THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD 
I n order t o elaborate the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Hegel's view 
of philosophy, we s h a l l now take a look at how he describes 
the process of tne Phenomenology. This d e s c r i p t i o n gives 
a clue t o the understanding of many of the most important 
concepts of Hegel's system: 'science', he says, 'presents 
not only t h i s educational process m i t s f u l l n e s s and necess-
i t y but also t n a t which m i t s formation has already sunk 
i n t o a moment and property of mind.'"^ So what the n a t u r a l 
consciousness undergoes i n i t s course c o n s t i t u t e s the educat-
ional process of the Phenomenology. And i s , as we can see, 
the Phenomenology 'viewed from the side of the i n d i v i d u a l ' . 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e the se r i e s of changes t h a t leads t o the i n -
organic nature of the n a t u r a l consciousness becoming organic 
to i t s e l f . - I t i s t h i s s e r i e s of changes t h a t , Hegel suggests, 
revives i n both the i n d i v i d u a l and philosophy what 'has already 
sunk i n t o a moment and property of mind.' Saying t h i s n a t u r a l 
leads Hegel to e x p l a i n how i t i s t h a t the educational process 
b r i n g s about t h i s change. I n h i s view i t does so because 
'the world s p i r i t 1 has already 'had the patience to go through 
these forms m the long expanse of time' and were t h e r e f o r e 
deposits m i t s present form. We are by now f a m i l i a r w i t h 
t h i s suggestion of Hegel. What more he has to say, however, 
brin g s us on to less f a m i l i a r t e r r i t o r y . He t e l l s us t h a t , 
i n t h a t substance, the past philosophies are but a b b r e v i a t i o n s ; 
33 Hegel. Werke 3JP« J53 • 
I o i d . , p, 34. 
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i n other words, t h a t those past philosophers as they are 
found i n contemporary c u l t u r e are ' r e a l i t i e s extinguished i n t o 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' . ' " ' For t h i s reason Hegel t h i n k s they are 
thoughts which have no s u b s t a n t i a l hold. They are thoughts 
of which me might say t h a t they have had t h e i r day. This 
i s what Hegel means when he says t h a t they are present as 
' r e c o l l e c t i o n ' only. The past forms of consciousness t h a t 
he i s analysing are not, he claims, present as 'being m then-
selves' ( e r m n e r t e Ansich). This p o i n t i s of some considerabl 
importance because the process of the Phenomenology c o n s i s t s 
p r e c i s e l y i n i n v e r t i n g these remembered 'm themselves' i n t o 
36 
the form of ' f o r themselves' ( F u r s i c h s e m s ) . I t i s m the 
l i g h t of t h i s account t n a t we ought t o complete our p i c t u r e of 
the r o l e of the h i s t o r y of philosophy i r the Phenomenolo gy of 
Mind. I t appears now th a t the PhenomenoIogy us not simply a 
process of making past forms of consciousness contemporaneous 
but of making contemporaneous past forms of consciousness known 
The Phenomenology i s t h e r e f o r e not the h i s t o r y of corse2 out-
ness but the consciousness of the h i s t o r y of consciousness i n 
consciousness. So i t i s not the h i s t o r y of philosophy but 
the consciousness of the h i s t o r y of philosophy m the present 
stage of philosophy. 
35- I b i d . 
J;6. I b i d . 'Already something thought the content i s the proce 
of Substance; i t i s nor longer (required J to i n v e r t e x i s t 
i n t o the form of being m i t s e l f but only t o i n v e r t t h a t 
which i s n e i t h e r no longer merely o r i g i n a l nor sunk m 
existence, r a t h e r already remetaooJ cd m 1 c s e l f i n t o the 
form of being f o r i t s e l f ' . ' 
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We s h a l l now see how Hegel explains the process of the 
Phenomenology to see whether i t accords w i t h our view. A 
d i s t i n c t i o n ne f e e l s we mast make before we can understand 
t h i s process i s t h a t between what we might c a l l 'being f a m i l -
i a r w i t h something' and knowing i t . Since he argues (and 
here the German i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e ) : 'Das Bekannte uberhaupt 
i s t darum, w e i l es bekannt i s t , n i c h t erkannt'. Now. 
bekannt sem can mean to know m German but m the sense of 
being acquainted w i t n or being f a m i l i a r w i t h . For example, 
a Bekannte i s an acquaintance. So when Hegel i s d i s t i n g u i -
shing genuine knowing (erkennen) from bekannt sein, as he i s 
i n t h i s instance, he i s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g knowledge w i t h which 
we are merely acquainted or knowledge which i s legarded as 
well-known f a c t w i t h knowledge we r e a l l y do know w e i l . The 
force of Hegel's epigram i s then t h a t 'the well-known j u s t 
because i t i s well-known i s not known'. The adequacy of 
t h i s rendering however doeo depend on our remembering t h a t 
well-known i s only intended m the sense of bem^ f a m i l i a r 
w i t h or being acquainted w i t h . This i s not a minor p o i n t . 
I t i s of some s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t we know p r e c i s e l y what Hegel's 
epigram means because Hegel t h i n k s of the process of the 
Phenomenology as the overcoming of our Bekanntschait, or 
the well-known nature, of the forms of consciousness t h a t 
make up the contemporary spectrum of mind. I n Hegel's view, 
we as having only an ordi n a r y consciousness of our epoch show 
a v a n i t y towards the forms of consciousness t h a t are 'well-know 
37- I b i d . , p. _?5' 
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but have been h i s t o r i c a l l y superceded. An i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c u l a r 
consciousness, such as we have, i s thus i n d i f f e r e n t t o the 
past forms t h a t make up i t s i n organic nature so t h a t ' t n i s 
property i t has acquired s t i l l has the same character of 
unconceptualised ( u n b e g r i f f e n e r ) immediacy, unmoved i n d i f f e r e n c e . . 1 
Therefore the p a r t i c u l a r consciousness of the day, Hegel 
claims, sees the superceded forms as simply something 
w i t h which i t i s f i n i s h e d 'wherein t h e r e f o r e i t s a c t i v i t y 
and thus i t s i n t e r e s t no longer i s . Hegel suggests t h a t 
the i n t e r e s t of the u n i v e r s a l i n d i v i d u a l , or we might simply 
say the philosopher, i s d i r e c t e d against t h i s i n d i f f e r e n c e . 
The task of the philosopher i s to subvert our mere 
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the superceded forms of t h i n k i n g t h a t 
make up the inorganic nature of our n a t u r a l consciousness. 
As we have seen, these forms of t h i n k i n g are merely remembered 
i n themselves (An s i c h ) f o r us. More p r e c i s e l y , Hegel says, 
they are remembered m the form of Vorste]lungen. The t r a n -
s l a t i o n of t h i s Hegelian term also presents p e c u l i a r d i f f i c u l -
t i e s . V o r s t e l l u n g - i s a compound word made up of the prep-
o s i t i o n von which means simply i n f r o n t of or before, and tne 
noun S t e l l u n g which means p o s i t i o n or placement. Hegel w i l l 
not have been i n d i f f e r e n t to the l i t e r a l meaning of V o r s t e l l u n g 
when employing i t so t h a t m i t s use of i t we would expect 
t h a t he intends an admixture of i t s a b s t r a c t connotation -
idea or conception and t h i s i t s l i t e r a l connotation - p o s i t i o n 
m f r o n t of. V o r s t e l l u n g , we see, Hegel employs t o describe 
the ideas t h a t the n a t u r a l consciousness has of i t s i n o r g a n i c 
38. I b i d . , pp. J>k 
39. I b i d , , p. 35. 
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nature or i t s Substance. The suggestion i s t h a t such an 
idea takes en the form of unconceptualised immediacy. This 
seems to r e l y h e a v i l y on the l i t e r a l meaning of V o r s t e l l u n g . 
For Hegel appears to be c l a i m i n g t h a t Vo r s t e l l u n g e n are ideas 
of something chat i s p o s i t i o n e d before me ( i . e . immediate to me) 
and are f o r t h a t reason imprecise ideas. They are, he claims, 
ideas t h a t take on t h e i r form e x t e r n a l t o my t h i n k i n g . We can, 
I t h i n k , understand t h i s c r i t i c i s m of Vorstellungen m two ways. 
I n the f i r s t place i t seems t n a t Hegel associates the t h i n k i n g 
t h a t c o n s i s t s merely of such ideas w i t h b i f u r c a t i o n ( E n t z w e i u n g ) . 
B i f u r c a t e d t h i n k i n g , as we saw e a r l i e r , Kegel holds t o be 
t h i n k i n g t h a t i s always bound up w i t h otherness and t h a t i s 
t h e r e f o r e unable to r e s t o r e the s h a t t e r e d Harmony of e x i s t e n c e . — 
Philosophy, we also saw Hegel claim, aims at r e s t o r i n g t h a t 
harmony and i s t h e r e f o r e d i r e c t e d against t h i n k i n g t h a t i s 
b i f u r c a t e d . One aspect tnen of the c r i t i c i s m of V o r s t e l l u n g e n 
i s t h a t b i f u r c a t e d t h i n k i n g expresses i t s e l f i n that form. 
V o r s t e l l e n i s appropriate t o t h a t mode of t h i n k i n g because 
i t i s t h i n k i n g t h a t assumes t h a t i t s ideas always r e f l e c t an 
object e x t e r n a l to i t s e l f . The c r i t i c i s m , as I have i n d i c a t e d , 
has another and more s i g n i f i c a n t aspect. Here the V o r s t e l l u n g e n 
are ideas t n a t the n a t u r a l consciousness has of i t s i n o r g a n i c 
nature. As we know, t h a t inorganic nature i s the past forms 
of c u l t u r e t h a t are superceded i n the e x i s t i n g c u l t u r e . They 
are inorganic t o the n a t u r a l consciousness because they only — -
become part of i t s consciousness through the general ideology 
of the time. The n a t u r a l consciousness simpl;, receives ideas 
of those past forn.^ as part and parcel of l i v i n g m tnat age. 
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So m t h a t sense also they are ideas which are externa] t o 
t h e i r t h i n k e r . Hegel's c r i t i c i s m of Vorstellungen i s then, 
i n the second place, t h a t they r e f l e c t too r e a d i l y the preconcep-
t i o n s of the age. They tend-m t h i s sense-to be i d e o l o g i c a l . 
This does not mean t h a t V o r s t e l l u n g e n are merely p r e j u d i c e s . 
Hegel i n s i s t s t h a t they are ideas t h a t take on an objective-
form for t h e i r t h i n k e r . I f we were t o employ a term which i s 
probably nearest to the o r i g i n a l , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , we might say 
t h a t V o r s t e l l u n g e n are the ideas m wmch the ordinary conscious-
ness represents the world t o i t s e l f . I t i s the world as i t 
40 
t r u ] y imagines i t to be. 
40. Malcolm Clarke m h i s Logic and System ( N i j h o f f , The Hague, 
1971) deals at le n g t h w i t h He g e l ' s n o t i o n Vo rsjte IJjing« He 
i s concerned (as the s u b - t i t l e to the worn: i n d i c a t e s ) wicii 
'the Study of the T r a n s i t i o n f r o m " V o r s t e l 1 ung''to Thougnt m 
the Philosophy of Hegel . Many of the conclusions I have 
drawn are s i m i l a r to h i s e.g. 
l ) ' l n t r a n s l a t i n g the term V o r s t e l ] u n g we must, he says, not 
f a i l t o convey the l i t e r a l sense of the German (''secting 
b e f o r e " ) ' o p . c i t . , p.27. 
l i ) 'The stage of VorsteJlung i s t h e r e f o r e the f i r s i at winch 
one may speak of o b j e c t i v i t y . . . V o r s t e l l r r g i s thus described 
as n e i t h e r a merely i n n e r image ( B i l d ) nor a merely outer 
existence (Dasein), but a synthesis o f the two which i s 
thereby set before the o b j e c t i v e a p p r e c i a t i o n of che i n t e l l -
ect . .V o r s t e l l u n g must be seen both as thought and the ''other" 
of thought.' i b i d . , p. 28. 
111) 'Vorstellung i s a ''gememsames Memen" (common meaning-II.W. ). 
I t i s the way i n which t r u t h may be o f f e r e d to a l l men. 
Hence the t r a n s i t i o n from V o r s t e l l o n g t o thought i s from 
s u b j e c t i v e to o b j e c t i v e and from a mass to a personal e x i s t -
ence .' i b i d . , p. 32. 
I V ) 1That i s , when we speak of V o r s t e l l u n g , we are r e f e r r i n g t o 
t h a t e f f o r t of thought to r i s e from expression of i t s e l f , 
which i s the u n i t i n g of an a b s t r a c t s i g n i f i c a t i o n (merely 
i n n e r "image'') and an experience (Dasein) which i s deepened 
( e r m n e r t ) as the s i g n i f i c a t i o n seeko i t s v e r i f i c a t i o n m 
i t . But the union remains a "Synthese", a p u t t i n g together 
from w i t h o u t . The s i g n i f i c a t i o n i s not f u l l v v e r i f i e d m 
the experience, i t remains a b s t r a c t l y outside.' i b i d . , p.60. 
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The process of the Phenomeno]ogy as Hegel describes i t , 
i s aimed at overcoming these representations t h a t are found 
i n the n a t u r a l consciousness. As I have already i n d i c a t e d , 
the object i s to transform them from being remembered m 
themselves (An s i c h ) i n t o ideas t h a t are known f o r themselves 
( i n t o the form of Fursichsems). The n a t u r a l consciousness 
i s shown how to re-appropriate those e x t e r n a l ideas i n order 
t h a t i t may be at home w i t h them. The Phenomenology has, 
then, not only t o b r i n g the or d i n a r y consciousness out of 
i t s naturalness but also t o overcome i t s b i f u r c a t i o n . The 
f i r s t stage of t h i s process i s the a n a l y s i s of Vorstellungen. 
As might be guessed, what Hegel means by analysis in t h i s 
context i s complex. I n h i s view t h i s a c t i v i t y i s the d i s -
t i n g u i s h i n g mark of the Understanding. I t involves 'br^ak:ng 
down a conception i n t o i t s o r i g i n a l elements' and thereby 
'revoking the form of i t s being f a m i l i a r or well-known ( j n r e s 
Bekanntseins) 1 . ^  Hegel acknowledges that the ^6.eas t h a t 
we have as a r e s u l t of the a n a l y s i s are 'indeed' themselves 
' f i x e d ' and t h e r e f o r e not wholly appropriate ro overcoming 
the n a t u r a l consciousness' f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the V e r s t e t l u n g 
but they do have the advantage of b r i n g i n g uneertamity t o 
the f i x e d world of t h a t consciousness. Through separating 
and s i f t i n g out the ideas of the n a t u r a l consciousness tne 
a c t i v i t y of the Understanding makes i t s world unreal. I n 
Hegel's view t h i s power of the Understanding i s "che 'most 
amazing and greatest of powers CP r a t h e r the absolute power . 
Ve are already aware c f the respect t h a t Hegel has f o r the 
Hi. 
h2. 
Hegel. Werke ~), p. ^ . 
I b i d . , p. 36. 
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Understanding. As we know, he regards .it as the p a r t i c u l a r 
discovery of Kant. His respect, I t h i n k , i s f o r i t s power 
to regard the world empirjcally and t h e r e f o r e as something 
e x t e r n a l and opposed to the mind. The d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Hegel 
p a r t i c u l a r l y has m mind i s the one t h a t Kant makes between 
phenomena and ncumena (the An s i c h ) . So t h a t i n the Under-
standing r e a l i t y i s not f i n i s h e d and done w i t h as i t i s . 
Hegel believes, m a self-enclosed system of philosophy saeh 
as t h a t of Spinoza. I t i s not, he reasons, subsumed under 
an a b s t r a c t schema. Rather the Understanding 'looks the 
4 "3 
negative m the face, stays w i t h i t . ' v I n Hegel's view 
i t .LS the power of working w i t h the data of experience m 
i t s f u l l complexity and richness, t h e r e f o r e c f opposing our 
t h i n k i n g t o an ex.ternal r e a l i t y and maintaining t h a t d i v i s i o n . 
I t i s t h i s t h a t Hegel means m cla i m i n g here t h a t the Under-
standing stays w i t h the negative ( b e i ihm v e r w e i l t ) , EDJL: 
Hegel the negative i s e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y . And i t i s the 'absol-
ute power' of the Understanding which d i v i d e s m t h i s way. 
There i s however, another aspect to the Understanding as 
Hegel presents i t here m the Phenomenology. We are again 
conversant w i t h t h i s view of Hegel's from our review of h i s 
C r i t i q u e of Modern Philosophy. This aspect i s t h a t the 
Understanding 'only gams i t o t r u t h i n t h a t i t f i n d s i t s e l f 
44 
m t h a t absolute d i v i s i o n t h a t i t i t s e l f p o s i t s . I f we 
r e c a l l , i t was Kant who, making the assumption t h a t experience 
was splxt i n t o a p r i o r i ideas and impressions of a world 'witheu 
derived a n o t i o n of the Understanding as the u n i f y i n g a c t i v i t y ^3>. I b i d . 
44. I b i d . 
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of the subject or, what Hegel and Fichte simply c a l l . , the I . 
The import of t h a t d e r i v a t i o n i n Hegel's view, we may again 
remember, was t h a t the world 'without' was shown t o be subjec-
t i v e . He has the same here t o say of the Understanding 'that 
i t f i n d s i t s e l f m t h a t absolute d i v i s i o n ' . Kant, Hegel con-
cluded, proved t h a t the o b j e c t i v e world that the Understanding 
describes w i t h the Categories i s a world t h a t i s organised by 
the I i t s e l f , or the u n i t y of apperception as Kant h i m s e l f c a l l s 
i t . ' I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel here assumes t h a t the out-
come of the a c t i v i t y of the Understanding i s t h a t 'das Vorgestellte 
Eigentum des reinen Seibstbewusstsems w i r d ' , t n a t the received 
and apparently e x t e r n a l representations of che ordi n a r y conscicus-
ness becomes the property of a pure sejf-consciousness. 
This though i s not the end of the process of the Phenomenology. 
N e i t h e r would we expect so from what we have l e a r n t from our 
discussion of Hegel's C r i t i q u e of Modern Philosophy For a l t n o j g h 
Hegel regards the Understanding as v i t a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r p h i l o s -
ophy, he does not regard i t as the highest form of t h i n k i n g . 
The task Hegel sets himself m the Phenomenology of Mind i s to 
a t t a i n the l e v e l of science f o r philosophy. That goal cannot 
be a t t a i n e d simply through the Understanding's revocation of 
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l ideas of the n a t u r a l consciousness. Patner 
Understanding has to be superceded by Reason. Hegel seeks to 
i l l u m i n a t e t h i s stage i n the process of the Phenorneno 1 cgy by 
c o n t r a s t i n g the form of (philosophn c a l ) study m modern tj.rnes w i t h 
t h a t p r a c t i c e d i n Ancient Greece. I n ancient times, Hegel sugg-
ests the problem was co educate thoroughly the n a t u r a l conscious-
ness. I n order t h a t t h i s might be achieved the n a t u r a l con&ciojc. • 
45. I b i d . 
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ness was encouraged to r e f l e c t on i t s own a c t i v i t i e s and indeed 
a l l else t h a t might crop up m i t s l i f e . (Hegel appears t o 
have tne Socrat i c method very much i n mnd here.) On the otner 
handj Hegel t h i n k s t h a t m modern times the ' i n d i v i d u a l f i n d s 
the a b s t r a c t form already prepared'. The i n d i v i d u a l ' s e f f o r t 
t o make i t h i s own, to understand i t , i s t h e r e f o r e not an e f f o r t 
t o r a i s e h i m s e l f from the concrete and manifold t o the a b s t r a c t 
but make known what i s already i n t e r n a l to him s e l f , i n otner 
words, t o make h i s a b s t r a c t ideas concrete. What has happened 
w i t h the general development of c u l t u r e i n Hegel's view i s t h a t 
the o r d i n a r y consciousness of the time i s not so much sunk i n 
i t s own p a r t i c u l a r existence as unaware of uhe existence of the 
general l e v e l of consciousness i n i t s e l f . 'Therefore the worK 
we have to do now is not so much to p u r i f y the i n d i v i d u a l from the 
immediate sensuous manner and t o make him i n t o thought and t h i n k -
i n g Substance as much more the opposite: through overcoming 
f i x e d , determinate thoughts we have to give r e a l i t y t o the 
, 2(.v , 
u n i v e r s a l , i n f u s e i t w i t h s p i r i t . ' I n Hegel s o p i n i o n the 
ord i n a r y consciousness m the Modern world already has a sophis-
t i c a t e d view of the world. I t i s , as we have seen, a consciuusnes 
t h a t contains w i t h i n i t s e l f , as i t s inorganic nature, a l l previous 
forms of c u l t u r e . We have also seen Hegel suggest t h a t these 
past forms e x i s t m t h a t consciousness as remembered i n themselves 
Wnat he has to suggest here i s t h a t i t i s not s u f f i c i e n t t h a t the 
understanding analyse these received forms but t h a t they have also 
t o be rendered f l u i d or infused w i t h s p i r i t . This i s tne r o l e or 
^6. I b i d . , p. J7 
4?. I b i d . 
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Peason. The attainment of i t s goal i s , however, a f a r more 
d i f f i c u l t task than what Hegel c a l l s education from sensuous 
immediacy because the a c t i v i t y of the Understanding i t s e l f has 
to be superceded;and i t i s m t h i s , the t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y of the 
Understanding, t h a t the I has i t s c e r t a i n t y . This i s an obstacle 
to Reason because the T has a v a n i t y towards the p a r t i c u l a r con-
ceptions t h a t i t holds. I n Hegel's view, the n a t u r a l conscious-
ness of the modern epoch w i l l have no o b j e c t i o n to the educational 1 
process of the Phenomenology m so f a r as i t merely p o i n t s out 
the content of i t s experience through r e v i v i n g and analysing the 
past forms t h a t provide i t s background. However i t w i l l stop 
short at the p o i n t where i t s own f i x e d thougnts are abrogated, 
where the contemporary s i g n i f i c a n c e of i t s ideas are not only 
questioned but also denied, because i t i s m those ideas,Hegel 
again p o i n t s out, t h a t i t f i n d s i t s c e r t a i n t y . Reason, nevertheless, 
has t o overcome t h i s dogmatism of the Understanding. This i s 
achieved, according t o Hegel, where t h i n k i n g a b s t r a c t s i t s e l f 
from mere c e r t a i n t y . What i s asked i s not t h a t consciousness 
set t o one side 1cs S e l f m t h i n k i n g . This would be c o n t r a r y to 
the whole s p i r i t of Hegel's philosopny. (As we know, r e a l i t y 
has to have the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the I f o r Hegel). Rather what i s 
asked i s t h a t the subject 'give up the f i x i t y of the a c t i v i t y of 
p o s i t i n g i t s e l f ' j u s t as much as i t ' g i v e s up the f i x i t y of the 
pure concrete'. ^ What Hegel i s demanding, and t h i s i t s e l f i s 
p a r t of the process of the Phenomenology, i s t h a t the s u b j e c t , 
t o transend mere Understanding, give up tne stance or assumption 
of the absolute d i v i s i o n c f subject and o b j e c t . I t J S t h i s 
^8. I b i d . 
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assumption of a f i x e d subject and a f i x e d world which, although 
e s s e n t i a l m the process of knowing, Reason has t o transcend. 
The stance 'which i s I i t s e l f m o p p o s i t i o n to a d i f f e r e n t 
149 I 
content i s necessary m Hegel s view when we embark on science 
but i n the course of science i t s e l f the stance i s shown to be 
inadequate. I n Reason, then, the n o t i o n of an e x t e r n a l world 
i s set aside and m s e t t i n g aside t h i s n o t i o n the v a n i t y of 
th e I i s overcome or, m Hegel's words, i t s f i x i t y m p o s i t i n g 
i t s e l f . This has the r e s u l t t h a t the subject's ideas become 
f u l l y f l u i d , because i t s world has become f u l l y f l u i d . ' I t i s 
through t h i s movement', Hegel says, t h a t the Understanding's 
'pure thoughts become concepts and are f o r the f i r s t time <vhac 
they are i n t r u t h , self-movements, c i r c l e s , t h a t whicn t h e i r 
50 
Substance i s , s p i r i t u a l e s s e n t i a l i t i e s ' . " Hegel's suggestion 
appears to be then t h a t the world of Reason i s simply a world of 
ideas and not of d i f f e r e n c e between thought and extension, su'cjeet 
and o b j e c t . For t h a t reason the r a t i o n a l subject has no d e s i r e 
t o s e t t l e at any p a r t i c u l a r thought such as mere c e r t a i n t y of 
i t s e l f o r i t s world oecause i t i s the thought of thought or 
self-consciousness. 
I t might w e l l be f o r us t o r e c a p i t u l a t e wnat we have con-
cluded t h i s f a r about the process of the Phenomenology, i f only 
to regain the c r i t i c a l distance which i s e s s e n t i a l i n assessing 
49. I b i d . 
50. I b i d . B e g n f f e (concepts) t h e r e f o r e 'comprise Hegel's 
highest grout of l o g i c a l categories, which aefme no t h i n g 
less concrete than self-conscious spi r i l . The Notion ^b'egrii f 
i s t h e r e f o r e Reason and not understanding. I t 13 thought 
e y p l i c i r i y a r t i c u l a t i n g the u n i t y o f thought and being, the 
movement of s p i r i t ' s s e l f - n e g a t i o n and s e J f - r e c c n c i l i d t i c n or 
r e t u r n upon s e l f . ' G.P.O.Sure. The Philosophy 0 1 Hegel,p.21. 
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such an imaginative and ambitious a t h i n k e r as Hegel. The 
goal t h a t Hegel sets h i m s e l f i n the Phenomenology i s , as we 
know, to r a i s e philosophy to a science. By now we should be 
c l e a r e r as to wnat t h i s e n t a i l s . At the same time as being 
the proof of the s c i e n t i f i c nature of philosophy i t i s the 
r a i s i n g of consciousness or the n a t u r a l consciousness t o science. 
Why i s i t t h a t the two are compatible? We have gone some way 
towards d i s c o v e r i n g the reason f o r t h i s . They are compatible 
because the n a t u r a l consciousness has w i t h i n i t s e l f as ' r e c o l l e c -
t i o n ' the 'labour of world s p i r i t . ' The path of the n a t u r a l 
consciousness t o science i s t h e r e f o r e one and the same as the 
proof of the s c i e n t i f i c nature of philosophy si nee the former 
ok 
process consists in systemtising the oast forms of consciousness t h a t 
f 
form the i n o r g a n i c nature contemporary consciousness whose 
systematic form i s philosophy, or, more p r e c i s e l y , the system--
a t i s a t i o n of previous p h i l o s o p h i c a l outlooks. The aim of r a i s i n g 
philosophy t o a science means t h a t past forms of philosopny have 
to be r e c a l l e d as they ~ x i s t i m p e r f e c t l y m the contemporary 
mind and organised by means of the understanding superceded by 
reason. As we have seen, i t i s the understanding t h a t Hegel 
regards as the 'absolute power'in t h i s . I t becomes the means of 
raising consciousness to science through i t s power of negating 
our f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the superceded forms of t h i n k i n g t h a t e x i s t 
m our c u l t u r e . I t teaches us, Hegel claims, t h a t p r e c i s e l y 
because a t h i n g i s w e l l known i t i s not p r o p e r l y known. I t 
destroys the presuppositions t h a t we have about our world; i t 
t h e r e f o r e negates the form of t h i n k i n g which Hegel c a l l s V o r s t e l l 
I t does t n a t through breaking up the idea 0 1 V o r s t e l l u n g i n t o i t s 
c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s . Now Hegel believes t n a t m the course of tna 
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analysis the subject discovers himself; he discovers t h a t what 
he took t o be o b j e c t i v e and e x t e r n a l t o h i m s e l f was simply h i s 
own a c t i v i t y . Hegel's suggestion i s , then, t h a t the a n a l y s i s 
of the content of the o r d i n a r y consciousness has the r e s u l t 
t h a t the content analysed becomes the property of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s -
ness. This corresponds w i t h the t r a n s i t ] o n from V o r s t e l l e n t o 
conceptual t h i n k i n g , or from the Understanding to Reason. The 
Understanding t h a t brings about t h i s r e s u l t has t o be superceded 
as a means m the Fhenomenology of Mind because what f o l l o w s i s 
p l a i n l y not w i t h i n i t s province or, what Kegel c a l l s , i t s p r m c i p l 
the d i v i s i o n of subject and o b j e c t . I t cannot f o l l o w through 
the r e s u l t s of i t s own a n a l y s i s f o r t h a t i s the province of 
Reason. Reason, according t o Hegel, broons no f i x i t y of subject 
nor o b j e c t . Both, i t seems, have t o subordinate themselves t o 
conceptual t h i n k i n g . And conceptual t h i n k i n g i s t h i n k i n g t h a t 
i s not intended t o be a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of an o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y 
hob 
but i s t h a t o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . I t i s t h i n k i n g which does(aliow 
a residue, such as the l ^ n g an Si oh of Kant and F i c h t e . I t i s 
t h i n k i n g which m Hegel's view i s the essence of i t s o b j e c t . I t 
i s t h i s t h a t i s the goal of the Phenomenology. The outcome then 
of r a i s i n g philosophy t o a science i s t h a t the n o t i o n of a subject 
as a contingent, s e l f - s e e k i n g , v a i n , l i m i t e d and egocentric 
i n d i v i d u a l opposed to an impersonal, e x t e r n a l , n a t u r a l , negative 
object i s shown to be f a l s e over the whole range of apparent opp-
o s i t i o n m the contemporary mind. Science i s t h i s , Hegel says, 
'pure s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n i n absolute otherness'; i t i s t h i s 'ether 
SI 
as such' J rthich i s n e i t h e r subject nor o b j e c t , I nor nature, 
but the conceptual knowledge of them. 
51. Hegel. Werke ) , p. 2y. 
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As I have already pointed out, Hegel regards the phenomen-
o l o g i c a l process t h a t b r i n g s us t o t h i s conclusion as merely 
the beginning of science. Tt i s so. Hegel says, because i t 
always includes the 'element of immediate presence ( u n m i t t e l -
baren D a s e i n s ) 1 . ^ What Hegel means by t n i s i s t h a t s p i r i t as 
i t forms the object of Phenomenology i s (a) s p i r i t as contempor-
ary s p i r i t , and (b) s p i r i t as the consciousness of a r e a l i t y 
opposed t o mind. Both are s p i r i t i n i t s immediate presence. 
I t ought by now to be c l e a r t h a t , although the phenomenological 
process deals w i t h s p i r i t at each of i t s stages m t h i s form 
t h a t , i t s aim i s the overcoming of t h a t immediacy. Hegel regards 
the general r e s u l t of t h i s process of overcoming the element of 
immediate presence i n s p i r i t as expenence. As w e would expect. 
• he i s aware t h a t t h i s use of the n o t i o n of experience runs coun-
t e r t o the accepted p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t ; but 
he employs i t because the accepted p h i l o s o p h i c a l connotations 
or the word form part of h i s meaning. He t h e r e f o r e grants one 
conventional meaning, e s t a b l i s h e d by the E m p i r i c i s t philosopners, 
which denotes mind m i t s ' r e c e p t i v i t y only'. I n consciousness, 
there are ''two moments', of knowledge and t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y which 
i s the negative of knowledge'. So experience i s m the f i r s t 
i n stance, as Hdgel sayq m h i s C r i t i q u e of Locke, 'nothing but 
the form of o b j e c t i v i t y . For indeed consciousness knows ana 
comprehends nothing which i s not i n i t s experience . ^  However 
52. I b i d . , p. 38. 
53- I b i d . 
5-^ . Hegel. (^£_rk_e_20, p. 215. 
55- Hegel. Phanomenolog1e, We rue 3, p. 38. 
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i n Hegel's view there i s much more to experience than t h a t . 
Experience, m f a c t , i s n o thing other than the whole process 
of the Phenomenology of Mind, t h a t leads through the Understand-
in g and Reason to Absolute Knowledge. 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s are profound. I t gives us a 
completely new view of experience. I t i s not t o be doubted 
t h a t Hegel hi m s e l f was aware t h a t t h i s was one of the most 
important aspects of h i s Phenomenology of Mind. As Fulda and 
H e m r i c h have pointed out ne o r i g i n a l l y intended t o e n t i t l e the 
56 
work The Science of the Experience of Consciousness. indeed 
I would argue t h a t the Phenomeno]ogy was intended as a comprehen-
sive r e f o r m u l a t i o n of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l n o t i o n of experience. I f 
t h i s i s t r u e i t "would appear t n a t we have already examined two 
aspects of t h a t r e f o r m u l a t i o n . F i r s t l y , m examining tne 
r e l a t i o n of the Phenomenology t o the H i s t o r y of Philosophy we 
came to the conclusion t h a t Hegel regards h i s Phenomenology as 
the s y s t e m a t i s a t i o n of past forms of philosophy m ~s much as 
they are p a r t of the inorganic nature of the p a r t i c u l a r conscious-
ness of h i s time. Thus i f Hegel wants to regard t h i s p h i losophic 
undertaking as the necessary content of experience, room has t o be 
made i n the n o t i o n of experience f o r both h i s t o r y and whac Hegel 
c a l l s science. ' Secondly (and the J replications of t h i s are prob-
ably more complex) m analysing the process of tne Phenomenology 
we came to the conclusion t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l consciousness had 
to undergo two transformations oefore i t could a t t a i n science. 
At the hand of Understanding i t nas t o s u f f e r the break-up of 
56. H.F. Fulda und D. H e i n r i e h . M a t t , j i a l i e n zu Kegels PhMno^en-
olo g i e df_^_ Ce isie_3, fuhrkamp Veflog". FrarikfaYc, ]Y7 3,Tat~oo~ 
ucti u n " p. " l ! . ~ 
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i t s own p a r t i c u l a r conceptions and subsequently, at the hand 
of Reason, i t had t o s u f f e r the d i s s o l u t i o n of the f i x i t y or 
o b j e c t i v i t y of i t s world. A l l t h i s , we now know, forms part 
of experience f o r Hegel. We would do we]1 then t o reconsider 
our conclusions m t h i s l i g h t . 
F i r s t , we ought t o consider what r o l e h i s t o r y and science 
play m Hegel's account of experience. We have seen t h a t h i s t o r y 
enters i n t o the Phenomenology m two senses: m an e s o t e r i c and 
e x o t e r i c sense. I t comes on the scene i n i t s e s o t e r i c sense as 
par t of the consciousness of the philosopher who unfolds the 
phenomenological process. The philosopher, as we have seen, 
through h i s understanding of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy p a r t i c i -
pates i n the h i s t o r y of u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y . The e x o t e r i c sense 
m which h i s t o r y makes i t s appearance i s as the content of the 
n a t u r a l consciousness. I t can only be e x o t e r i c h i s t o r y t h a t 
f u rnishes the inorganic nature of the ordinary consciousness. 
I t would appear then t h a t experience xs h i s t o r i c a l , f o r Hegel, 
m these two senses. I t i s h i s t o r i c a l because each and every — 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s consciousness i s h i s t o r i c a l i n the e x o t e r i c sense 
and because the philosopher m order t o understand the o r d m s r y 
consciousness must possess the appropriate h i s t o r i c a l understand-
i n g . This i s not s u f f i c i e n t m i t s e l f , however. The philosoph-
er's account of experience, m order t h a t i t get at the heart of 
experience, has t o be s c i e n t i f i c as w e l l . The philosopher must •— 
not simply be content to ennumerate past forms of t h i n k i n g buc 
must order them s y s t e m a t i c a l l y as w e l l . He has t o show t h a t 
those past and present modes of t h i n k i n g form an interconnected 
whole which i s the path of the n a t u r a l corsciousness to science. 
i8o . 
That i s how science enters Hegel's account of experience as 
both means and end. I t i s means as the manner m which the 
philosopher e x h i b i t s the proper content of experience and end 
as the goal t h a t the philosopher has m mind f o r the experiencing 
consciousness. 
We must now consider what r o l e Reason and Understanding 
play m Hegel's account of experience. As we know the stages 
of Understanding and Reason form part of the process of the 
Phenomenology. They do so as methods of a n a l y s i s . These methods 
have to be regarded as the content of experience. A complexity 
a r i s e s here. I t i s that, these methods are the content of exp-
erience not only as the philosopher's awareness of the necessary 
development of a p a r t i c u l a r Weltanschauung, but also as what 
a c t u a l l y occurs i n t h o experience of the ordinary consciousness. 
This i s , of course, the force of Hegel's claim t h a t Reason i s 
trie ' l i f e of the o b j e c t ' . Not only i s Reason the philosopher's 
understanding of the experience of the ordinary consciousness 
but i t i s also the person's a c t u a l experience. I n i t s simplest 
form the complexity i s a r e s u l t of the Phenomenology having 
two subj e c t s : the ordinary and p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness. 
The ordinary consciousness i s only i m p l i c i t l y Understanding 
and Reason whereas the p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness i s e x p l i c i t l y 
so. I t appears then t h a t we can look at experience from two 
angles. F i r s t of a l l , we can see i t as the experience of 
the o r d i n a r y consciousness and from t h i s p o i n t of view exper-
ience could be seen as the process of overcoming t h e o b j e c t i o n s 
t o Reason and Understanding, as, m s h o r t , an educative pro-
cess. I n the second place, we can see i t as the e x p e r i e n c e 
of the pi i L l o s o p h e r t h a t both observes and brings about t h i s 
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educational process- Prom t h i s p o i n t of view, experience 
i s the process of working out the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
Understanding and Reason. On the one hand we appear t o 
have the i n t e l l e c t u a l biography of the ordinary consciousness 
and on the other, a p l a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument. They are 
not, however, d i s t i n c t m Hegel's mind. Experience from 
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t of view i s n o thing other than the 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of the experience the ordinary conscious 
ness undergoes. Hence when the ord i n a r y consciousness has 
experienced the phenomenology of mind i t i s or.p and the 
same as i t s mentor: the p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness. 
182. 
A CONTRADICTION IN HEGEL'8 ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENCE 
This, c l e a r l y , gives us a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t view of 
experience from t h a t of Locke. Where, f o r Locke experience 
was what I sense-perceive and my r e f l e c t i o n s on t h a t perception, 
Hegel claims t h a t what I experience as ordinary consciousness 
i s both a world of ideas (Vorstellungen) and a h i s t o r i c a l world. 
I t i s a h i s t o r i c a l world because I , the ordinary consciousness, 
am the r e s u l t of a complex and lengthy development - the develop-
ment of my c u l t u r e . And i t i s a world of ideas because t h a t i s 
the only way I can i n h e r i t t h a t c u l t u r e . Hegel even makes the 
suggestion t h a t experience i s i m p l i c i t l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l . For 
h i s claim i s , as we know, t h a t through systematismg the world 
of ideas of the ordinary consciousness we can a t t a i n science. 
Thus whereas Locke's view i s t h a t experience begins w i t h a tabv1a 
rasa, Hegel's view i s t h a t experience i n the raw sense i s s o c i a l , 
h i s t o r i c a l and p o t e n t i a l l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l . What I may experience-
as philosopher draws out the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s c laim. As 
philosopher, m Hegel's view, I am able t o have systematic know-
ledge of the h i s t o r y and of the present c o n d i t i o n of conscious-
ness. I n t h i s way I am able t o show t h a t each mode of conscious-
ness t h a t has appeared forms part of an interconnected whole. 
I n sum, then, experience i s the phenomenology of mind: a knowledge 
of the phenomenon of consciousness i n a l l i t s contemporary 
complexity. ^ 7 
57 • I t i s f o r t h i s reason that~Kroher s a y s - i n h i s Von Kant b i s He 
P.37^,Book 2:'Das Pioblem des Erkennens v e r t i e f t und erwe±rer~ 
si c h b e i lhm zum Problem des Erlebens. Zwar f m d e t s i c h sond 
barerweise weder bei Hegel fooch bei emem seiner Vorganger 
(soweit i c h sehe)di^ses V/ort :dennoch d a r f man das, was Hegel 
m der Phanomenologie E>f ahrung nennt,auch a l s Erleben oezs±ci 
nen. ' Kroner's point i s that'the experience rhat consciousness ^res 
not limited to the experience of the senses' even oi the understanding 1 b 
expresses i t s e l f i n the whole of ' ' l i f e " . ' i b i d . p. 375. 
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We must stress t h a t , although experience i s both the pnenomenon 
and the r e a l i t y , botn the appearance of mind and the know-
» 
ledge of t h a t appearance, the apperanee of mind m the 
process of the Phenomenology i s not the t r u e r e a l i t y of 
experience. I t s t r u e r e a l i t y i s only t o be found a t the 
end o f the Phenomenology of Mind i n Absolute Knowledge. 
HegeJ argues then t h a t , m comparison w i t h t h i s r e s u l t , the 
preceding development of consciousness from s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y 
i s somehow by the way. I t i s , Hegel assures us, merely 
the appearance of experience. 
Before we look at the problems t h a t are attached t o 
t h i s view of Hegel's about the outcome of the Phenomenology 
we might remind ourselves of an important f e a t u r e o f t h a t work, 
namely, t h a t A outcome of the pnenomonological process i s shared 
by both subjects of the process. Both the o r d i n a r y conbCiou-
ness and self-conscious s p i r i t , or the philosopher, l e a r n 
t h a t the concrete experience of mind i f not i t s r e a l i t y . 
They, as we already know, are the two aspects of s p i r i t as 
i t presents i t s e l f m the Phenomenology. So Hege1 i s able 
to d e p i c t the outcome of experience i n t h i s way. I t i s 
f i r s t l y , he says, the process i n which s p i r i t - becomes o o j e c t 
' f o r i t i s t h i s movement of i t s e l f becoming an other i . e . 
,58 
o b j e c t of J I s e l f and of overcoming t i n s other being. ' 
here our d i f f i c u l t i e s begin 6gam. I t appears t h a t the 
r e s u l t of experience LS the i d e a l i s m o f s p i r i t or simply 
what Hegel would c a l l genuine i d e a l i s m . This genuine i d e a l -
ism, as we discovered from .Hegel's C r i t i q u e of Pi cht e , i s the 
attempt t o o^e^c >e th° b i f u r c a t i o n (•iiit rweiung) thai i s 
58. Hegel. Werice 3, p. 38. 
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i n e v i t a b l e m human experience. Since th a t b i f u r c a t i o n 
i s i n e v i t a b l y an aspect of experience the philosopher i n 
Hegel's view must recognise i t and even more must stay 
w i t h the 'negative'. This much i s already c l e a r t o us. 
Philosophy has, however, the other side t o i t according t o 
Hegel t h a t w h i l s t d w e l l i n g m a l i e n o b j e c t i v i t y i t i s able 
i . 59 
to r e s t o r e t o t a l i t y m i t s highest v i t a l i t y . ^ Genuine 
ide a l i s m , we are t o take i t , i s able t o re s t o r e the broken 
harmony of existence. This then i s the experience of s p i r i t 
whose understanding t r o u b l e s us. I t i s , according t o Hegel, 
a process of s p i r i t e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f m an e x t e r n a l and 
a l i e n existence and subsequently r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s own 
s e l f w i t h i n t h a t a l i e n a t i o n so t h a t i t s freedom i s r e s t o red 
and the a l i e n a t i o n overcome. We have t o understand t h a t 
a l i e n a t i o n i s a necessary aspect of the l i f e of s p i r i t 
but we have also to understand t h a t the higher necessity i s 
the abrogation of t h i s a l i e n a t i o n m the s e l f - i d e n t i t y of 
s p i r i t . 
Thus 'experience i s simply the name f o r t h i s movement 
i n which the immediate, the unexperienced, i . e . the a b s t r a c t -
be i t of sensuous being or of the merely thought simple 
(das Emfache) ~ a l i e n a t e s i t s e l f and then from t h i s a l i e n a t i o n 
r e t u r n s to i t s e l f and then only f o r the f i r s t time i s i t s 
r e a l i t y and t r u t h depicted, as also t n a t i t i s the property 
60 
of consciousness.' As t h i s passage suggests, the diverse 
e f f e c t s t h a t bodies surrounding us nave on our f a c u l t i e s 
have t n e i r place m Heeel's account of experience but merely 
59. Hegel. Werke_2, p75T7 
60, Hegel. Wer^e 3, p.39-
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as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t . They a r e , i t appears, t h e unexper-
ie n c e d element m e x p e r i e n c e n o t , as Locke and Hume would 
c l a i m , e x p e r i e n c e i t s e l f . The 'immediate' becomes g e n u i n e l y 
e x p e r i e n c e d m Hegel's o p i n i o n when i t becomes t h e p r o p e r t y 
o f t h e I . We c a n , I t h i n k , r e g a r d t h i s c o n c l u s i o n as 
p a r a l l e l w i t h one t h a t Hegel draws i n t h e L e c t u r e s on t h e 
H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y . T h i s i s t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t i s 
o n l y w i t h Kant's n o t i o n o f t h e r o l e o f t h e I i n knowledge 
(as t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ) t h a t t h e c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e 
was p r o p e r l y d e p i c t e d . I t was t h e n known, m Hegel's o p i n i o n 
t h a t what we t h o u g h t o f as merely s u p p l i e d by e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s 
was t h e a c t i v i t y o f consciousness i t s e l f . I n Hegel's mind 
t h i s proves t h a t t h e immediate o r the unexp e r i e n c e d comes 
about t h r o u g h consciousness a l i e n a t i n g i t s e l f , or, m more 
t e c h n i c a l t erms, t h a t t h e immediate i s p o s i t e d by consciousness 
and e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e r e f o r e t h e process whereby t he a b s t r a c t 
form o f consciousness r e t u r n s t o i t s e l f from i t s own a l i e n a t i o 
T h i s a g a i n we might see as e q u i v a l e n t t o a process t h a t Hegel 
t h i n k s t a k e s p l a c e m t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l s o p h y , t h i s t i m e w i t h 
the advent o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y . P r i o r t o F i c h t e , Hegel 
claims, e x p e r i e n c e was a n o t i o n that, d e s c r i b e d t h e d i r e c t 
r e l a t i o n between consciousness and e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . I t 
was i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h i s n o t i o n t h a t Locke came t o t a l k o f 
t h i n g s 'by themselves', and Kant o f t h e Ding an s i c h , as 
the raw c o n t e n t o f experience.. F i c h t e , however, a t t e m p t e d 
t o show t h a t such Dmpe an s i c h , ( o r t h e a b s t r a c t , immediate 
as Hege] c a l l s i t Here) were themselves p o s i t e d by t h e I . 
186. 
F i c h t e ceased t o r e g a r d e x p e r i e n c e as a f i x e d and d i r e c t 
r e l a t i o n between consciousness and the o b j e c t and came t o 
r e g a r d i t as a complex d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
two. T h i s i s , o f course., a r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t i s e s t a b l i s h e d 
by t h e s u b j e c t , so i t m a i n t a i n s t h e o t h e r v i t a l i n g r e d i e n t 
f o r Hegel o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f overcoming o t h e r n e s s . For 
him e x p e r i e n c e i s b o t h c o n c r e t e - h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i a l , i f 
one w i l l s - and y e t u l t i m a t e l y i d e a l . 
As I have suggested p r e v i o u s l y , we may r e a d i l y under-
stan d t h i s as p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l i s m . I t i s , as C o l l e t t i 
p o i n t s o u t , 'the p o i n t o f view t h a t d e n i e s t h a t t h i n g s , and 
the f i n i t e w o r l d have t r u e r e a l i t y . 1 ^ I t i s c l e a r enough 
t h a t Hegel would w i s h t o defend such a p o i n t o f view. What 
i s more d i f f i c u l t t o comprehend i s t h a t Hegel, when d e a l i n g 
w i t h t h e s i s o f m a t e r i a l i s m m h i s p h i l o s o p h y c r i t i c i s e s 
i t n o t only f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y 
b u t a l s o f o r m a i n t a i n i n g a view w h i c h i m p l i e s t h e a l i e n -
a t i o n o f t h e mind. Hegel, m o t h e r words, i d e n t i f i e s p h i l -
o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m w i t h a l i e n a t i o n . To e s t a b l i s h t h a t 
t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s , i n Hegel's view, a t t h e same 
time t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t n e r e i s an a l i e n e x t e r n a l w o r l d . 
There i s , o f course, no reason a t a l l why t h i s s h o u l d be so. 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m says n o t h i n g d i r e c t l y about t h e 
n a t u r e o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . Indeed, as f a r as the t h e s i s 
i t s e l f i s concerned i t c o u l d j u s t as w e l l be heaven as h a l l . 
But i f Hegel's view were c o r r e c t i t would f o l l o w t h a t Locke, 
par e x c e l l e n c e , were the p h i l o s o p h e r ot a l i e n a t i o n . He, m 
61. L . C o l l e t t i . Marxism and Hegel, NLB, 1973* P 7-
187. 
h i s a p p a r e n t l y innocuous a t t e m p t t o p h i l o s o p h i s e on t n e 
Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , would have d e p i c t e d tni nd m i t s 
a l i e n a t i o n . And t h i s indeed i s what Hegel b e l i e v e s , 
t h a t t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g r e p r e s e n t s t h a t l e v e l o f t h o u g h t 
which corresponds w i t h t n e b i f u r c a t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e . But 
why s h o u l d he see the a c t i v i t y o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g m t h i s 
way? I t h i n k we would search m v a i n m h i s p h i l o s o p h y , 
o r c e r t a i n l y h i s e p i s t e r n o l o g y , f o r the reason f o r t h i s . I t 
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i s , as L u l o c s and Marcuse have argued, s i m p l y an assumption 
t h a t he ta k e s w i t h him t o p h i l o s o p h y . The e x p e r i e n c e o f 
the everyday w o r l d , the e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e o r d i n a r y under-
s t a n d i n g , i s , Hegel c l a i m s , an a l i e n , h o s t i l e e x p e r i e n c e 
which i s n o t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e demands o f human reason. 
Reason t h e r e f o r e , Hegel concludes, i s o n l y a t home w i t h 
i t s e l f as t h o u g h t . I t i s o n l y t h e r a t i o n a l knowledge o f 
r e a l i t y t h a t i s adequate t o i t . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , oat t h e 
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'rose m t h e c r o s s o f the p r e s e n t 1 , J unable t c t r a n s f o r m 
r e a l i t y as i t s t a n d s . Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y i s shaped oy t h i s 
r e s i g n a t i o n b e f o r e t h e p r a c t i c a l impotence o f Reason. P h i l -
osophy i s f o r him t n e s u s t a i n e d a t t e m p t - i n t h o u g h t a l o n e -
t o r i s e above t h e n e g a t i v i t y o f e x i s t e n c e . 
What happens t h e r e f o r e a t t h e end o f the Phenomenology 
i s t h a t t h e whole o f e x p e r i e n c e i s absorbed i n t o t h e S e l f . 
So t h a t i t appears t h a t t h e d e p i c t i o n o f a c o n c r e t e o b j e c t i v e 
e x p e r i e n c e , e x p e r i e n c e o f a n o t h e r opposed t o mind, i s g r a t u i t -
ous. Hegel, o f course, would r e j e c t t h e view wh i c h i m p l i e s 
t h a t t h e outcome o f the phenomenoJogical process i s s o l e l y 
62. What t h e y have argued m p_er Junge Hegel and Reason nnd Revol 
u t i o n , r e s p e c t i v e l y , i s t h a t i t i s an assumption t h a t i t d e r j 
from Hegel's view o f nascent c a p i t a l i s m . 
63. Hegel. Werke 7, p. 2b 
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n e g a t i v e . He argues t h a t such a view i s based on a mis-
c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f t r u t h and f a l s e h o o d . By 
l e a r n i n g what e x p e r i e n c e us n o t we a l s o l e a r n what i t j s. 
But i t i s n o t t h i s t h a t i s j n d i s p u t e . What ±s m d i s p u t e i s 
w h e t h e r an account o f e x p e r i e n c e s h o u ] d have a n e g a t i v e o u t -
come a t a l l . There i s Indeed much t o be s a i d f o r the c l a i m 
t h a t t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e n e g a t i o n i s a l s o p o s i t i v e but Hegel 
cannot .in t h i s way escape t h e a c c u s a t i o n o f p e m t i o p n n c i p p i 
i n t h e manner w h i c h he d e p i c t s t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f mind. I t 
i s assumed t h a t t h e l i f e o f rnmd br o o k s no o p p o s i t i o n , no 
o t h e r n e s s ^ buc t h e v e r y o b j e c t o f t h e Phe.io.renelogy a s t o 
prove t h i s . I t appears t h a t an o b j e c t i v e c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e 
i s summoned f o r t h merely t o show t h e 'serene e q u a l i t y and 
u n i t y w i t h i t s e l f ' o f M m d . ^ The same s u s p a c j o n i s aroused 
i n us by t h e account t h a t Hegel g i v e s o f p h i l o s o p h y m t h e 
D i f f e r e n z s c h n f t . There he argues t h a t t h e r o l e o f p h i l o s o p n y 
i s t o overcome t h e b i f u r c a t i o n t h a t i s i n h e r e n t i n human 
e x i s t e n c e . But i f t n e r o ] e o f p h i l o s o p h y i s t o h e a l t h e 
breach between r e a l i t y and mind, why does p h i l o s o p h y assume 
t h a t t h e br e a c h e x i s t s i n the f i r s t place? Hegel m i g h t w e l l 
answer t h a t t h e brea c h i s n o t o f p h i l o s o p h y ' s making, t h a t 
t h e p h i l o s o p h e r f i n d s i t a l r e a d y t h e r e an t h e n a t u r a l c o n s c i o u s -
ness. But t h i s 'would n o t be c o m p a t i b l e 'with what e l s e he 
wants t o c l a i m about Mand, namely chat a ] 1 r e a l i t y i s mind. 
I f t h i s i s so t h e r e J s c l e a r l y no room f o r t h e ' o t h e r ' o f mand, 
even i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s . P h i l c s o p n y , w^th H e g e l , 
i s a l r e a d y i n i t s e l f what j. c i n t e n d s l o a c h i e v e o r , i n o t h e r 
6k. Hegel.Werke 3, p. 40. 65. I b i d . , p. 24. 
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words, assumes what i t has t o prove. Hegel assumes t h a t 
t h e r e i s an a l i e n e x i s t e n c e merely m o r d e r t h a t p h i l o s o p h y 
can t r a n s c e n d i t . T h i s i s t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n m h i s account 
o f e x p e r i e n c e . 
I f t h i s i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n m Hegel's account o f 
e x p e r i e n c e i t i s , f o r reasons we have suggested, j u s t as 
much a c o n t r a d i c t i o n m h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y . A g a i n we 
can see t h a t t h i s must be so because tne Phenomenology o f 
Mind which, as we have argued, i s Hegel's account o f e x p e r i e n c e , 
i s i n t e n d e d t o form t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the system and m 
t h a t system t a k e s i t s p l a c e i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g the Science 
o f L o g i c . I t i s w o r t h f o l l o w i n g out t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
t h i s i n some d e t a i l . 
I n t h e Preface t o t h e Phenomenology Hegel w r i t e s : ' i n 
my view, wh i c h must o n l y be j u s t i f i e d t h r o u g h t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
o f the system i t s e l f , i t a l l depends on c o n c e i v i n g and e x p r e s s -
i n g t h e t r u t h n o t as Substance but j u s t as much as s u b j e c t ' . ' 
We can be sure t h a t ±n e x p r e s s i n g t h i s view o f h i s system in-
g e n e r a l Hegel t a k e s as one o f n i s most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t s o f 
r e f e r e n c e t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f Spinoza. The s t a r t i n g - p o i n t 
o f p h i l o s o p h y , he i s c l a i m i n g , has t o be b o t h Substance and 
S u b j e c t . We have a l r e a d y seen Hegel make t h e s u g g e s t i o n m 
h i s L e c t u r e s t h a t Substance must form p a r t o f t h e s t a r t i n g -
p o i n t o f p h i l o s o p h y . As we saw, he i n s i s t e d t h a t we must 
' a l l bathe m the e t h e r o f t h e one Substance m which e v e r y -
68 
t h i n g t h a t i s h e l d t o be t r u e p e r i s h e s . ' Even i f t h i s 
6?. I b i d . , pp.22-23. 68. See above. Chapter One p.17. 
190. 
were n o t s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f t h a t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e Hegel does 
have Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y i n mind t h e q u e s t i o n i s s e t t l e d 
beyond doubt m t h e passage t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w s where 
Hegel r e p e a t s a c r i t i c i s m he made o f Spinoza m the L e c t u r e s . 
I t i s t h a t Spinoza made a m i s t a k e i n p r e s e n t i n g Substance 
as a medium i n w h i c h ' s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s p e r i s h e s o n l y , i t 
i s n o t p r e s e r v e d . The p r o p e r view, as Hegel c l a i m s 
b o t h here and i n the L e c t u r e s , i s t h a t r e a l i t y o r Substance 
has t o have t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e I . T r u t h , he says, has 
t o be co n c e i v e d and expressed as ' j u s t as much s u b j e c t ' . 
As we a l s o have a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f what HegeJ i n t e n d s 
by S u b j e c t o r t h e I from our r e v i e w o f h i s c r i t i q u e o f Kant 
and F i c h t e we are w e l l placed t o p r e s e n t o ur views on Hegel's 
summary o f h i s system. As w i l l become e v i d e n t , t h e y w i l l 
have an i m p o r t a n t b e a r i n g on our assessment o f t h e c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n , i f i t i s indeed a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , m Hegel's system. 
Since Spinoza's n o t i o n o f Substance p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t 
r o l e m t h e account t h a t Hegel g i v e s o f h i s system he cannot 
w h o l l y escape t h e a c c u s a t i o n t h a t he compromised w i t h r e l i g i o n . 
Nor would Hegel w i s h t o do so. Spinoza's Substance i s , as 
we have remarked, God. Spinoza does indeed b e l i e v e t h a t 
he i s g i v i n g an account o f r e a l i t y when he i s d e p i c t i n g 
Substance w i t h i t s a t t r i b u t e s and modes. I n h i s view, t h e r e -
f o r e , t h e account t h a t he g i v e s o f God i s a l s o t he account 
o f how t h i n g s a r e . T h i s , I b e l i e v e , i s t h e a t t r a c t i o n o f 
h i s n o t i o n o f God f o r Hegel s i n c e without, g i v i n g up t h e 
o b l i g a t i o n t o e x p l a i n t he 'world i t p r e s e n t s j t as a u n i f i e d 
69. Hegel. Werke 3. p. 23. 
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whole. Indeed Spinoza's view o f t h i n g s accords w i t h t h a t 
o f Hegel m i t s d e t a i l . Spinoza r e g a r d s t n e d e t e r m i n a t e 
t h i n g s o f e x i s t e n c e as f i n i t e i n f i n i t e s . I n terms t h a t 
Hegel would use, as f i n i t e s whose v e r y b e i n g i s t h a t t h e y 
70 
s h o u l d become the o p p o s i t e o f themselves. I t i s f o r 
t h i s reason t h a t Hegel would n o t r e p u d i a t e t n e l i n k w i t h 
r e l i g i o n . The t a s k o f p h i l o s o p h y , he would m a i n t a i n , j u s t 
as much as t h a t o f r e l i g i o n i s t o c o n s t r u c t an i n f i n i t e r e a l -
i t y . P h i l o s o p h y , as Hegel b e l i e v e s Spinoza shows us, has 
n o t t o accept a f i n i t e m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y e x t e r n a l t o i t s e l f . 
I t s t a s k , m Hegel's view, i s t o subsume w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e 
f i n i t e and e x t e r n a l . 
T h i s sheds some l i g h t on t h e ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' aspect o f 
Hegel's t h e s i s t h a t Substance be con c e i v e d j u s t as much as 
S u b j e c t . But as I have a l r e a d y m i i c a t e d , m o r d e r t h a t 
we can d i s c o v e r t h e f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Hegel's n o t i o n o f 
S u b j e c t , t h e o t h e r aspect o f h i s t h e s i s , we have t o t u r n t o 
h i s assessment o f the p h i l o s o p h i e s o f Kant and F i c h t e . B o t h 
Kant and F i c h t e , we w i l l r e c a l l , r e g a r d the S u b j e c t o r the 
I as m some way h a v i n g a hand m t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f o u r 
w o r l d . W i t h Kant t h i s i s i n t e n d e d i n t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
sense and w i t n F i c h t e , as we have seen, m t h e o n t o l o g i c a l 
sense. I n t h e K a n t i a n view t n e o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e are 
c o n s t r u c t e d by b r i n g i n g t o bear w i t h t h e ' I t h i n k 1 an u n i t y 
i n t h e u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d d a t a o f sense-experience. Kant, as 
we have seen, c a l l s t h a t u n i t y t h e u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n . 
70. As C o l l e t t i says:'The f 1 m t e ' , f o r Hege1,'is s i m p l y t h a t which 
must become i n f i n i t e by i t s e l f as a conseq_uenee o f i t s v e r y 
n a t u r e , "The i n f i n i t e i s i t s a f f i r m a t i v e d e t e r m n a t i o n , m a t 
which i t t r u l y i s m i t s e l f . Thus t h e f i n i t e has vani.-hed i n 
t h e i n f i n i t e and what i s , i s o n l y j-n t h e i n f i n i t e " , ' o p . o i t . p . 1 6 
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We know t h a t H egel r e g a r d s t h i s as a g r e a t i n s i g h t o f 
K a n t ' s ; and now i n an amended form he c a r r i e s i t m t o h i s 
system. He amenas i t m a F i c h t e a n f a s h i o n . T h i s , o f 
co u r s e , a c c o r d s w i t h h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e h i s t o r y o f 
P h i l o s o p h y . T t i s w h o l l y a p p r o p r i a t e from Hegel's p o i n t 
o f v iew t h a t i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y t h e K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y be 
mediated by t h e F i c h t e a n s i n c e b o t h F i c h t e and Kant a,re 
seen as c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e p r o g r e s s i v e development o f t h e 
one system o f p h i l o s o p h y . What F i c h t e does i s t o see r e a l i t y 
as c e n t r i n g on t h e i n d i v i d u a l I so t h a t what I may f i n d 
e x t e r n a l t o m y s e l f i n my e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e r e as a r e s u l t o f 
an o r i g i n a l a c t o f p o s i t i n g by t h e I . Tn s h o r t , t h e r e i s 
a w o r l d because t h e s u b j e c t d e c i d e s t o c r e a t e i t t h r o u g h h i s 
t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y . T h i s by now i s f a m i l i a r ground f o r 
us. Nov;, some o f t h i s s o l i p s i s m , as we know, s u r v i v e s i n 
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s c l e a r , however, f r o i Hegel's 
C r i t i q u e o f F i c h t e ' s p h i l o s o p h y t h a t Hegel d i s t c ' i c c s h i m s e l f 
from t h e extreme s u b j e c t i v i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the F i c h t e a n 
view o f t h e w o r l d . H i s c l a i m i s , as we know, t h a t a l l p i e v i o u s 
p h i l o s o p h i e s a r e mediated by those w n i c h f o l l o w i n h i s system. 
So, i n t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e r o l e o f F i c h t e ' s system i n h i s p h i l -
osophy has t o be seen m t h e l i g h t o f S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y . 
Now, what we know fr o m Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f 
S e h e l l i n g i s t h a t some i m p o r t a n c e has t o be p l a c e d on t h e 
o r d e r m wh i c h S u b j e c t and O b j e c t , o r S u b j e c t and Suostance, 
appear. T h i s has an i m p o r t a n t b e a n r g on t h e r o l e o f t h e 
F i c h t e a n T i n Hegel's system, be—'^se Substance, as we see. 
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must precede S u b j e c t . T h i s i s t o show t h a t Hegel's p h i l -
osophy d e p i c t s an o b j e c t i v e i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t 
and n o t a s u b j e c t i v e one. F o r i t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t 
Hegel acknowledges m h i s system t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l 
r e a l i t y w h i c h i s n o t m e r e l y t h a t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l e o n s c i o u -
ness. Not o n l y would t h i s o f course d i s t i n g u i s h Hegel's 
i d e a l i s m from t h a t o f F i c h t e b u t t h a t o f B e r k e l e y as w e l l . 
We have from t h e c o r r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view, Hegel 
b e l i e v e s , t o t h i n k i n i t i a l l y o f an e x t e r n a l , o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . 
Only t h e n , subsequent t o a d m i t t i n g t h a t such a c o n c r e t e w o r l d 
e x i s t s , are we t o r-hink o f i t e s s e n t i a l l y m terms o f s u b j e c t . 
T h e r e f o r e we have n o t , as does F i c h t e , t o t h a n k o f t h a t 
i n i t i a l p o s i t i n g o f t h e w o r l d as a s u b j e c t i v e -.ct. As 
th e M a t e r i a l i s t s i n s i s t , y e t i s o n l y c a r r i e d o u t m t h e 
a p p r o p r i a t e f a s h i o n by Spanoza, we have t o t h i n k o f t h a t 
w o r l d as g i v e n o r datum. I t i s o n l y t h e n t h a t we a^e t o 
become F i c h t e a n s and t h r nk i t throug,h as S u b j e c t . 
T h i s i s t h e essence o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f 
view. A t t h e same t i m e i t i s how he would chose t o summar-
i s e h i s system. The meie a s s e r t i o n o f t h i s , ho? Tever, i s n o t 
i n h i s view t h e p r o o f o f i t s v a l i d i t y . As he says ' i t i s 
o n l y t h e system i t s e l f t h a t must j u s t i f y i t ' . 1 ' F o r t h i s 
reason he p l a c e s a g i e a t d e a l o f emphasis or. t h i s t h i n k i n g 
t h r o u g h r e a l i t y u n u i l (what we m i g h t c a l l ) , i t s o b j e ^ t i v e -
s u b j e c t i v i t y i s d e r i v e d . I n Die P^ejrom^Mjlogy, f c r example 
i t i s o n l y a t the end o f tne a n a l y s i s o f trie U n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s observed t o r e c o g n i s e i t s e l f as s e l f -
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . S i m i l a r l y , i n The Science o f L o g i c t h e sub-
71. H e g e l . Werke 3, p. 23. 
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j e c t i v i t y o f the O b j e c t i v e L o g i c , o f b e i n g and essence i s n o t 
s i m p l y assumed. There i s an e x t r e m e l y i n v o l v e d and complex 
d e r i v a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e l o g i c from the o b j e c t i v e l o g i c 
w hich Hegel c l a i m s i s t h e immanent c r i t i q u e o f Spinoza's 
72 
n o t i o n o f Substance. Indeed i n t h a t s e c t i o n o f the L o g i c 
what, i n e f f e c t , Hegel argues i s t h a t the h i g h e s t r e a l i t y o f 
r e a l i t y i s t h e S u b j e c t o r freedom. I t i s p r e c i s e l y m t h i s 
e f f o r t t o prove t h a t r e a l i t y i s s u b j e c t and so t h e i d e n t i t y 
o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , t h a t , m Hegel's view, h i s p h i l o s o p h y 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f from t h a t o f S c h e l l m g . The d e f e c t o f 
S c h e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y , he c l a i m s , i s t h a t l i k e a shot from a 
p i s t o l i t s i m p l y assumes t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s an i d e n t i t y o f 
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . The i d e n t i t y o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t i s i n 
S c h e l l m g ' s o p i n i o n , a p r i v i l e g e d i n t u i t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r . 
But f a r from a p p e a r i n g t o be t h i s , Hegel argues, S c h e l l i n g ' s 
p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f Substance i s 'a knowledge.. 
t h a t g i v e s out i t s A b s o l u t e t o be t h e n i g h t m wnich a l l cows 
7 3 
are b l a c k ' . J The k i n d o f s u b j e c t o o j e c t i d e n t i t y t n a t S c h e l l i n g ' s 
system p r e s e n t s i s one t h a t m Hegel's view i s i n d i f f e r e n t t o 
t h e o b j e c t which i s s t u d i e d . The o b j e c t i s m advance d e c l a r e d t o 
be b o t h s u b j e c t and o b j e c t as though there were n o t h i n g m p a r t -
i c u l a r t o d i s c u s s . 
Hegel's system t h e n has as i t s aim the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f 
i t s approach: t h a t Substance i s j u s t as mucii S u b j e c t . For, 
u n l i k e S c h e l l i n g ' s p h i l o s o p h y , i t does n o t merely assume t h a t 
t h e A b s o l u t e i s S u b j e c t . C e n t r a l t o such a p r o o f m Hegel's 
view i s t h e assumption o f an e x t e r n a l , a l i e n r e a l i t y . Suostance 
'as pure si m p l e n e g a t i v i t y ' , he says, has n o t merely t o be a 
72. I b i d . Werke 6, pp. 250-2.51. 
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h y p o t h e s i s b u t a g i v e n m e x p e r i e n c e . To t h i s e x t e n t Hegel 
acknowledges t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ' s p o s i t i o n . D i f f e r e n c e between 
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , he a d m i t s , i s i n h e r e n t m e x p e r i e n c e . 
Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t he i s b e i n g a b s o l u t e l y s i n c e r e m t h i s . 
But we are i n c l i n e d t o doubt the genuineness of Hegel's m a t e r i a l -
i s t premiss i f as t h e r e s u l t o f p h i l o s o p h y we are a b l e t o 
d i s r e g a r d i t . I f , as so happens, we are a b l e t o d i s c a r d 
i t a t any p o i n t m t h e argument t h e n , q u i t e s i m p l y , we do n o t 
need i t . T h i s , o f course, makes Hegel's argument c i r c u i a r , 
he i s e s t a b l i s h i n g something which he has a l r e a d y assumed t o 
be t h e case. T h i s , as I have p o i n t e d o u t , i s the c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s n o t though a e o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t 
Hegel sought t o evade. The c i r c u l a r i t y m h i s argument he 
i d e n t i f i e s w i t h t h e b u s i n e s s o f p h i l o s o p n y as such. The b u s i n -
ess o f p h i l o s o p h y i s , he claims, t h e c r e a t i o n o f a s e i f - e n c l o s e d 
system. The system, he says, ' i s t he becoming o f i t s e l f , t h e 
c i r c l e w hich presupposes i t s end as i t s purpose ana has i t as 
i t s b e g i n n i n g , and o n l y t h r o u g h i t s b e i n g c a r r i t d o u t and i t s 
end i s r e a l . ' ^ ^ We are n o t i n e r r o r , he b e l i e v e s , m assuming 
t h a t t h e outcome o f a system w i l l be the same as i t s purpose. 
T h i s i s because r e a l i t y , which the system i s , i s i t s e l f t e l e o l o g j eal 
'What has been s a i d ' , he says, 'can a l s o be expressed m t h i s 
way: t h a t Reason i s p u r p o s e f u l a c t i v i t y . ..The r e s u l t i s t h e r e -
75- See above Chapter One, pAO ,'"The a c t i v i t y o f mind",Hegel 
argues i s " f i r s t r e a c t i o n ; o n l y i n t h i s way w i l ] i t become 
consc i o u s o f i t s essence".' e t c . 
76. Hegel.Werke_5, p. 23. As C l a r k e says : ' T h e " c i r c u l a n t y " w h i c h Hegel 
f r e q u e n t l y emphasised as the form o f h i s t h o u g h t a t once suppl-
i e s him w i t h a ready escape from c r i t i c i s m and l e a v e s him p e c u l -
i a r l y open t o i t . ' I t s u p p l i e s him w i t h a ready escape from 
c r i t i c i s m b e c a u s e ' i t become?, i m p o s s i b l e t o i s o l a t e from h i s 
whole system any p a r t o f i t , and t o submit t h i s co a norm o f 
" v e r i f i c a t i on"which appears f rom"out s i o e " . ' op. c i t . . p. 19'l • 
Cla.rke says l i t t l e about why Hege! 's c i r c u l a r i t y l e a v e s him 
p e c u l i a r l y open t o c r i t i c i s m . Tne reason i s p l a i n t o see, r,o,\-
e ver. I f Hegel's system i s c i r c u l a r i t cannot be s a i d t h a t 
proved i t t o be t r u e . A l l ne i s e s t a b l i s h i n g :s what he c l a i m s 
t o be t r u e a l r e a d y . 
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f o r e o n l y t h e same as t h e b e g i n n i n g because t h e b e g i n n i n g i s 
purpose; - o r t h e r e a l i s o n l y t h e same as i t s concept because 
the immediate has i n i t s e l f as i t s purpose the s e l f o r 
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pure r e a l i t y . ' ' ' Hegel then b e l i e v e s he i s s i n c e r e m 
h i s assumption o f an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , which i s however 
overcome m th e p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f , because he i s c onvinced 
t h a t t h a t i s t h e purpose o f r e a l i t y i t s e l f . The immediate 
i s r e t r a c t e d i n t o t h e S e l f a t t h e end o f t h e Phenomenology 
because, somehow, t h a t i s how t h i n g s a r e . Concrete exper-
i e n c e i s , he s uggests, o f i t s own accord i d e a l e x p e r i e n c e . 
Hence the system i s c i r c u l a r because what i t d e s c r i b e s i s 
c i r c u l a r . The c o r r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach reg a r d s Sub-
stance as S u b j e c t , Hegel would say, because Substance i c 
S u b j e c t . A l l h i s system does m h i s view i s t o d e p i c t 
t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y . 
I t i s f a r from b e i n g my purpose t o defend t h i s c i r c u l -
a r i t y i n Hegel's system. Since I r e g a r d i t as a c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n i t ought t o be c l e a r t h a t I b e l i e v e i t t o be u l t i m a t e l y 
i n d e f e n s i b l e . My purpose i s r a t h e r t o e x p l a i n wiiy he might 
have t n o u g h t t h i s . I have argued t h a t Hegel sees h i s system 
as t h e r e s u l t o f a complex and e x t e n s i v e development i n t h e 
h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y . I have c l a i m e d t h a t h i s m t e r p f e t a -
t i o n o f t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y e n t e r s i n t o h i s system m 
two ways, f i r s t l y , as t h e s t a n d p o i n t from w h i c h Hegel b e g i n s 
h i s e n q u i r i e s and,secondly, as t h e c o n t e n t o f much o f h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y . I n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h how e x a c t l y i t became 
the c o n t e n t o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y we d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h t h e 
r o l e o f past p h i l o s o o h i e s m the Phenomenology. Our g e n e r a l 
c o n c l u s i o n was t h a t Hegel t h o u g h t o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y as o e i a g 
7? • Hegel. Werke Z>, p.26. Hegel's emphasis. 
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i n a c r i t i c a l c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past and contemporary p h i l o s -
ophy. T h i s , o f course, e x p l a i n s why he chooses t o d e p i c t 
h i s system as one m which Substance i s S u b j e c t . A l s o , I 
b e l i e v e , i t goes some way towards e x p l a i n i n g Hegel's un-
q u e s t i o n i n g acceptance o f t h e t r u t h o f h i s t h e s i s . I n h i s 
view t h i s - t h a t Substance i s S u b j e c t - i s n o t o n l y the 
p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y i t i s t h e r e s u l t o f the 
h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y . He thanks i t t o be n o t o n l y h i s 
c o n c l u s i o n about- the n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y b u t t h e l e v e l t o which 
p h i l o s o p h y has r a i s e d i t s e l f m h i s t i m e . Spinoza, he b e l -
i e v e d , had shown t h a t t h e d u a l i t y between e x t e n s i o n and t h o u g h t 
c o u l d o n l y be overcome by r e g a r d i n g r e a l i t y as the one Sub-
st a n c e . L e i b n i z and t h e E m p i r i c i s t s , we have seen Hegel 
argue, had p r e j u d i c e d t h i s h o l i s t view by showing t h a t t h e r e 
was n e c e s s a r i l y an i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t i c u l a r aspect t o r e a l i t y . 
C onsequently, t h e t a s k f o i t h e German I d e a l i s t s : Kant, 
F i c h t e and S c h e l l m g i v i been, m Hegel's words, t o r e s t o r e 
u n i t y out o f d i f f e r e n c e . What Hegei t h i n k s t h e y d i d i s t o 
show t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l , s u b j e c t i v e view c f r e a l i t y was com-
p l e t e l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a h c l i s t view. Kant i s t h e most 
c r u c i a l f i g u r e f o r Hegel i n t h i s l a s t stage m the development 
c f p h i l o s o p h y p r i o r t o h i s own. A f t e r Kant, he t n m k s , 
i t would be i m p o s s i b l e f o r p h i l o s o p h y t o c o n c e i v e o f an 
i n d i v i d u a l , p a r t i c u l a r r e a l i t y opposed t o mind which was n o t 
i t s e l f t h e p r o d u c t o f mind. T h i s i s so i n h i s view because 
Kant had c o n c l u s i v e l y shown t h a t e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e was 
i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e s u b j e c t ( o r the u n i t y o f a p p e r c e p t i o n ) . 
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I t i s t h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i s most c r u c i a l m Kegel's 
f o r m i n g t he o p i n i o n wh3 en, as we can see, becomes the 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y , t h a t r e a l i t y i s 
i t s e l f s u b j e c t . F o r g o t t e n i n t h i s o f course i s t h a t Kant 
regarded h i m s e l f as e x p l a i n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f a phenomenal 
r e a l i t y , t h a t t h e r e f o r e f o r Kant, p h i l o s o p h y was n o t c i r c u l a r . 
I n h i s view t h e r e was a (noumenal) r e a l i t y which c o u l d n o t 
be absorbed by mind. As we know, Hegel does n o t agree on 
t h i s p o i n t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t i t i s c l e a r t h a t Hegel sees 
Kant t h r o u g h t h e eyes o f F i c h t e s i n c e he shares F i c h t e ' s 
o p i n i o n t h a t t h e Ding an s i c h i s a p o s t u l a t e o f the s u b j e c t 
h i m s e l f . By removing t he n o t i o n o f D i n g an s i c n from t h e 
K a n t i a n e p i s t e m o l o g y t n e way i s made c l e a r f o r t he whole 
K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y t o be made i n t o an o n t o l o g y . From such 
a p o i n t o f view Bein g ( o r indeed Substance) can be seen t o 
Le s u b j e c t . Hegel c a r r i e s t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i n t o h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y as a r e s u l t o f t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y . 
The I , o r t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l s u b j e c t , t h e r e f o r e can 
r e g a r d 'what appears t o be g o i n g on o u t s i d e i t s e l f , an 
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a c t i v i t y opposed t o i t s e l f ' as ' i t s own d o i n g ' . For 
t h i s i s t h e stage t h a t p h i l o s o p h y has reached w i c h t h e 
i d e a l i s m o f Kant, F i c h t e and S c h e l l m g . But Hegel, as we 
know, n o t o n l y r e g a r d s h i m s e l f as c a r r y i n g i n t o h i s p h i l o s o p h y 
th e r e s u l t o f p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p n y but a l s o as c a r r y i n g out 
t h a t r e s u l t m h i s p h i l o s o p h y , So what, he says, i s now 
r e q u i r e d i s t h a t t h i s r e s u l t be shewn t o be t r u e f o r t h e whole 
78. I b i d . , p.39-
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c f o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . The Phenomenology has t o prove 
t h a t 'what appears t o be g o i n g on o u t s i d e ' raxnd i s ' i t s 
own d o i n g ' and t h i s f c r t h e whole contemporary appearance 
o f mind. I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e outcome o f t h e Phenomenology 
has t o be t h a t 'Being i s a b s o l u t e l y mediated; - i t i s a SUD-
s t a n t i a l c o n t e n t w h i c h i s even so t h e immediate p r o p e r t y 
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of t h e I , i t i s s e l f - i s h ( s e l b s t i s c h ) o r the concept.' y 
I t i s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , which because o f t h e c i r c u l a r n a t u r e 
o f Hegel's system was never i n d oubt, t h a t forms t h e t r a n s i t i o n 
t o t h e L o g i c . The t a s k o f e p i s t e m o l o g y Hegel says m t h e 
Pre f a c e t o tne Phenomenology i s new accomplished, 'the element 
o f knowledge i s p r e p a r e d . For the f u l l account o f t h e 
contemporary appearance o f mind, Hegel b e l i e v e s , i s a 
f u l l account o f t h e n a t u r e o f knowing. T h i s i s e x p e r i e n c e . 
The e x p e r i e n c e o f a r e a l i t y which i s t h e n e g a t i v e o f i t s e l f 
w h ich becomes t h r o u g h t h a t e x p e r i e n c e the p r o p e r t y o f s e l f . 
The n a t u r e o f knowing t'ien f o r Hegel i s t o know an o t h e r o f 
o n e s e l f as o n e s e l f . The forms o f mind, as a r e s u l t , do n o t 
have t h e c h a r a c t e r o f d i v i s i o n o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , o r know-
ledge and t r u t h , what i s l e f t i s s i m p l y t h e knowledge o f t h e i r 
p r o c ess. The forms o f mind, Hegel c l a i m s , t h e n t a k e on t h e 
i , 8 l 
form o f s i m p l i c i t y . They a r e , i n h i s view, seen as 
what t h e y a r e , i d e a s m e r e l y . They are what r e s u l t s from 
t h e phenomenology o f mind. The Phenomenology o f F i n d shows 
th e w o r l d t o be merely a w o r l d o f i d e a s . But t h e Phenomenology 
i s n o t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e form f o r t h e i r o r g a n i s a t i o n . R a ther 79- I b i d . 80. I b i d . 
8 l . I b i d . Hegel's emphasis. 
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' t h e i r movement which o r g a n i s e s them i n t o t h e i r s p e c u l a t i v e 
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whole i s L o g i c o r s p e c u l a t i v e p h i l o s o p h y . 
I n d e f e n d i n g a view o f Kegel's p h i l o s o p h y m t h i s Chapter 
I have been p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h t h e Phenomenology o f 
Mind. As a view o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y i t must, however, be o f 
s i g n i f i c a n c e m t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a l l h i s works. As an 
i n d i c a t i o n o f how t h i s might be so I s h o u l d l i k e t o t a k e 
a b r i e f l o o k a t the c o n c e p t i o n t h a t l i e s a t t h e back o f t h e 
Science o f L o g i c . We can t a k e as our s t a r t i n g - p o i n t t h i s 
a b b r e v i a t e d account I have j u s t g i v e n o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n from 
t h e Phenomenology t o t h e L o g i c . I t appears t h a t t h e p o i n t 
o f t r a n s i t i o n i s t ne stage i n t he e x p e r i e n c e o f mind at which 
Mind o r S p i r i t becomes known as a w o r l d o f i d e a s . I t i s 
these p u r e l y e s s e n t i a l i t i e s , Kegel c l a i m s , t h a t become t h e 
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r o f t h e L o g i c . They are n o t , thougn, as t h e y 
s t a n d w h o l l y l o g i c a l . A g a i n , m Hegel's view, i t w i l l n o t 
do Bimply t o ennumerate those as t h e y s u r f a c e m the o r d i n a r y 
consciousness and p h i l o s o p h y . As tney are found i n o r d i n a r y 
language and f o r m a l l o g i c t h e y a r e , m h i s view, permeated 
by t h e same o p p o s i t i o n o f t h o u g h t and r e a l i t y as t h e modes 
o f consciousness d e p i c t e d i n the PhenomenoJ ogy. T h e r e f o r e 
th e same process o f overcoming the o b j e c t i o n s o f t h e Under-
s t a n d i n g t o d i a l e c t i c a l Reason has t o t a k e p l a c e m th e L o g i c 
as w e l l . The L o g i c ha.s t o p u r i f y t h e forms o f t h o u g h t o f 
t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o show t h a t B e i n g m i t s Essence i s t h e 
N o t i o n o r S u b j e c t . T h i s , seated i n t h e b r i e f e s t form p o s s i b l e 
i s the process o f t h e L o g i c . I t , l i k e t n e Pheno.nen.o2 ogy 
82. I b i d . A g a i n Hegel's emphasis. 
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involves r a i s i n g our t h i n k i n g from the l e v e l of V o r s t e l l e n 
t o the l e v e l of Vernunft or conceptual t h i n k i n g . Tne 
course of t h a t t r a n s i t i o n i s from Objective Logic 10 
Subjective Logic. I would t h e r e f o r e argue t h a t the concept 
of philosophy t h a t informs the Phenomenology remains at 
the basis of what was t o be the crowning g l o r y of Hegel's 
system: the Logic. The e f f o r t to overcome the otherness 
t h a t i s i nherent m experience i s c l e a r l y sustained i n t h a t 
work as w e l l . That e f f o r t , does, a d m i t t e d l y , take cn a 
d i f f e r e n t form i n the Science of Logic since i t I s d i r e c t e d 
at the manner m whicn o p p o s i t i o n , and u l t i m a t e l y a l i e n a t i o n , 
has permeated our language and t h e r e f o r e formal l o g i c . None 
the less 3 t I s the same basic concern t h a t l i e s at the Lock 
of Hegel's view of Logic, For t h i s reason I believe t h a t 
the Science of Logic may be seen as a phenomenology of ideas. 
This, J t h i n k , i s tne view t h a t Hegel h i m s e l f i m p l i e s when 
he says m the Preface t o the second e d i t i o n of the Logi_c 
t h a t 'the l o f t i e r business of l o g i c i s t o p u r i f y the s e e a t e -
gories...which are f i r s t brought i n t o the consciousness of 
s p i r i t m an i s o l a t e d fashion and t h e r e f o r e are changeable 
and confusing and so only a f f o r d i t an i s o l a t e d and unce r t a i n 
r e a l i t y , and consequently m them ra i s e s p i r i t t o i t s freedom 
84 
and t r u t h , 1 Hegel argues t h a t ideas as they appear m 
the ordinary language and A r i s t o t l e i a n l o g i c do not adequately 
d e p i c t the nature of r e a l i t y . They have t o oe p u r i f i e d 
so t h a t mind can be raised to i t s freedom. And the realm 
85- 'The Objective Logic seems to be so termed becruso i t t r a c e s , 
at the l e v e l of the Logic, tne path of Phe?iQinenol j g v from a 
t h i n k i n g t h a t is''me r e l y " o b j e c t i v e ("aoout1" experience), t h i n k -
i n g which i s at the same l e v e l of V o r s t e l l e n to 'a thougnt - - . ^ t 
i s t r u l y o b j e c t i v e , m the sense t h a t i t i s f i n a l l y c o n s t i t -
u t i v e of experience'.Clarke,op.cit.,p.73. 
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of freedom, he argues i n the body of the work, i s a t t a i n e d 
when Substance i s shown t o be Subject. The Logic consequently 
i s the process of the Phenomenology w i t h i n thought i t s e l f , 
w i t h o u t , as Hegel says, the element of immediate presence 
(unm i t t e l b a r e s Dasein). The phenomenology of ideas (the 
Logic) d i f f e r s then from the phenomenology of mind m t h a t 
the l a t t e r i s d i r e c t e d against the appearance of an e x t e r n a l 
r e a l i t y i n consciousness and the former at the vocabulary 
t h a t makes such a conception possible. Both phenomenologies 
are t h e r e f o r e intended to e s t a b l i s h the t h e s i s of id e a l i s m . 
Both t h e r e f o r e , I wish to claim, e x h i b i t the same type o f 
c i r c u l a r i t y . The d i a l e c t i c t h a t i s t o show t h a t Substance 
i s Subject i s t h a t already. 
84. Hegel. Werke_5, p. 27. Kroner op.cit.,, Book two, 
appears to have come to the same conclusion: 'To t h i s 
extent the method of Logic i s t h e r e f o r e phenomenoxogical, 
j u s t as on the' other hand the method of the Phenomenology 
w a s ^ l o g i c a l : both are d i a l e c t i c a l . ' p. 422. Hy" ppoXi t e 
Genese et S t r u c t u r e de l a Pheriome'nologie de L'Esprit de 
Hegel) goes so f a r as to say t h a t '"there i s a p e r f e c t 
correspondence between the Phenomenology of Mind and the 
Logic', since ' i t i s always the same content, the sa_me 
determinetions that present themselves m the Phenomeno1ugy 
under the aspect of forms of consciousness, i n the LogTcT'" 
under the aspect c f determinate concepts, p. 565. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 
( l i ) Epistemology and Experience 
I n h i s seminal work Von Kant b i s Hegel Richard Kroner 
argues t h a t Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind represents a 
''return t o the problem of knowledge'. ^  His reasons f o r 
making t h i s claim are not immediately evident but a l l of 
them, i t seems ?concern what Hegel has to say which i s new'. I n 
Kroner's view t h i s may be 'compressed i n the n o t i o n of 
Geist'. I t i s worth f o l l o w i n g h i s reasoning m d e t a i l . 
Before we dc so. however, we might note t h a t Chapter Two 
ended i n a s i m i l a r v e i n . There we also suggested t h a t 
the n o t i o n of Geist played an important r o l e m d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
Hegel's system from t h a t of other p h i l s c p h e r s . We p a r t i c u l a r 
emphasised the r o l e i t played m d i s t i n g u i s h i n g Hegel's p h i l o s 
ophy from t h a t of S c h e l l m g . And, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , we 
came t o the conclusion t h a t Hegel objected t o S c h e l l m g depicc 
i n g A r t as the highest u n i t y of subject and object because i t 
was an u n i t y which was not adequate t o Geist. Geist, Hegel 
claimed, was higher than any sensuous existence, and t h e r e f o r e 
higher than any mere work of A r t . We were t h e r e f o r e able 
t o share Caird's o p i n i o n t h a t i t i s Hegel's n o t i o n of Geist 
t h a t takes him beyond Schell^ng. The reasoning t h a t lies 
behind Kroner's suggestion t h a t the Phenomenology represents 
a r e t u r n to the problem of knowledge r.as t o do w i t h the same 
p o i n t . Kroner sees the Phenomeaology as a re t u r n t o the 
p r e - S c h e l l m g i a n philosophy of German Ideali s m i n which the 
1. R.Kroner. Vor Kent b i s hegel ; p. 362, Book 2. 
2. I b i d . 
3. See above, Chapter Footnote 116. 
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Subject has precedence over the o b j e c t . But t h i s takes 
place, Kroner adds, m the more o b j e c t i v e form of Geist. 
This i s so because Hegel only 'revives the Kantian-Fichtean 
s u b j e c t i v i t y ' by r a i s i n g ' i t t o the l e v e l of absolute i d e a l -
ism a t t a i n e d by S c h e l l m g . 1 This r e t u r n t o the Kantian-
Fichtean standpoint e n t a i l s a r e t u r n to the problem of 
knowledge (and t h i s i s where Kroner an unclear) because 'only 
m that philosophy makes the I , consciousness i n t o i t s p i v o t a l 
p o i n t can i t avoid the c l i f f s of Spmozism on which S o h e l l i n g 
foundered and set f o r t h the t r u t h of Spinozism i t s e l f . ' ^ I t 
i s not, of course, immediately evident t h a t Hegel, m adopting 
such a p o s i t i o n , would as a consequence have t o r e t u r n t o the 
problem of knowledge. I t would of course though be evident 
i f l i k e Kioner we assumed t h a t the F:chtean-Kantian standpoint 
of Subject n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s philosophy i n the problem of 
knowledge. 
I t i s t h i s p o i n t t h a t i s the clue t u understanding Kroner's 
reasoning. Kroner i d e n t i f i e s the standpoint of Subject w i t h 
the standpoint of the ordinary or n a t u r a l consciousness of 
the Phenomenology of Mind. As we have seen, Kegel makes 
the n a t u r a l consciousness i n t o h i s ob j e c t i n the Phenomenology 
so t h a t he can lead i t t o science. Now Kroner believes t h a t 
t h i s i n volves the r e s u r r e c t i o n of the problem of knowledge 
because m ordinary t h i n k i n g the same presupposition i s made 
t h a t l i e s at the base of t h a t problem, namely, t h a t there i s 
a separation and t h e r e f o r e o p p o s i t i o n between subject and 
4. Kroner, o p . c i t . , p. y<oh. 
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o b j e c t . Simply m s e t t i n g out t o prove t h a t e v e r y t h i n g 
i s an Absolute I d e n t i t y , m co n t r a s t to S c h e l l m g who merely 
assumes t h a t i s so, Hegel, Kroner claims, has to r e t u r n t o 
the standpoint of the problem of knowledge, or as Hegel 
would put i t , a standpoint t h a t concerns i t s e l f w i t h tne 
r e l a t i o n of thought t o i t s o b j e c t . We can now see why i t 
i s t h a t Kroner t h i n k s t h i s avoids the p i t - f a l l s of Spmozism. 
Hegel wishes t_o prove t o the ordinary consciousness t h a t a] 1 
r e a l i t y i s an i d e n t i t y of subject and o b j e c t . I t i s not simply 
a t r u t h t h a t i s revealed to the i n d i v i d u a l . I t i s r a t h e r one 
m which the subject has h i s place and t h e r e f o r e , Hegel believes 
preserves h i s freedom. As we know, Hegel claims t h a t the 
u n i t y of subject and ob j e c t has t o be one m wmch the in d i v i c L j a 
independence i s not extinguished. Hegel t h e r e f o r e revives 
the problem of knowledge m order t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l can f i n d 
h i s c e r t a i n t y and c e r t a i n knowledge m philosophy. This, 
then, -is what Kroner concludes on behaLf of Hegel: 'Philosophy 
has t o begin w i t h the theory of experience, i t has t o prove 
the c e r t a i n t y of knowledge; only through c e r t a i n t y hardened 
by examination i s the t r u t h of knowledge guaranteed. '~J 
We began t h i s enquiry w i t h a t h e s i s of Haoermas' which, 
i f we r e c a l l , d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h i s conclusion of Kroner's. 
That t h e s i s was t h a t Hegel and Marx had demolished (abgebaut) 
the e n t e r p r i s e of the theory of knoxvledge and t h a t very l i t t l e 
t h a t was p o s i t i v e emerged from t h e i r r e j e c t i o n of the problem 
of knowledge. I suggested, at the time, t h a t Habermas' 
judgement was too bleak a view of the matter, c l a i m i n g t h a t 
5- I b i d . , p. >6j5. 
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the problem of knowledge i s not superceded without deep 
r e f l e c t i o n i n the Hegelian and Marxist accounts of experience. 
I have since t r i e d t o show how comprehensively and conscien-
t i o u s l y Hegel deals w i t h the problem as i t occurs m the 
H i s t o r y of Modern Philosophy. This account should be 
s u f f i c i e n t to demonstrate t h a t the problem i s not r e j e c t e d 
out o f hand by Hegel. Now we have t h i s claim of Kroner 
t h a t Hegel's f i r s t major p h i l o s o p h i c a l work, one view of 
which we have already presented, represents a recurrence of 
the emphasis on the theory of knowledge w i t h i n tjae h i s t o r y 
of German Idealism. I t i s t h i s view of the Phenomenology 
thau I wish to explore m t h i s Chapter. 
I n e x p l o r i n g t h i s view there i s an important conclusion 
of Hegel's t h a t we nave t o bear i n mmd: h i s conclusion t h a t 
knowledge i s not about r e a l i t y but i s r e a l i t y . We have 
already encountered t h i s as the view t h a t i n genuine philosophy 
or i d e a l i s m a l l otherness i s overcome. This view brings us 
to the same conclusion because of the manner m which Hegel 
argues h i s i d e a l i s m . As I have pointed out, he prides h i m s e l f 
on the o b j e c t i v i t y of h i s id e a l i s m and t h e r e f o r e r e l i e s on 
tne tendencies w i t h i n science i t s e l f t o b o l s t e r up h i s claim. 
What he, l i k e S c h e l l i n g , s i n g l e s out m science t o support 
h i s claim i s i t s tendency t o ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i s e ' nature, f o r , 
m science, he claims, nature t u r n s out t o be not h i n g other 
than tne s c i e n t i f i c lav/ we formulate aoout i t . S c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge, he concludes, i s not about the o b j e c t i v e world 
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but i s t h a t world. I n general, then, Hege] presupposes 
t h a t m knowledge the op p o s i t i o n between subject and object 
i s transcended. Since t h i s i s such an important aspect of 
Hegel's philosophy i t i s now time t h a t we have a more formal 
view of the matter. And ' f o r m a l l y ' , Hegel claims, 'what has 
been said may be expressed i n t h i s way, t h a t the nature of the 
judgement or p r o p o s i t i o n i n general which includes w i t h i n 
i t s e l f the d i f f e r e n c e of subject and predicate i s destroyed 
by the speculative p r o p o s i t i o n . . ' . ^ I n Hegel's opinion, tnen, 
knowledge i s the ' d e s t r u c t i v e u n i t y of the concept' ( l b . ) m 
which thought 'loses j u s t as much i t s f i x e d o b j e c t i v e basis 
which i t had m the Subject as i t i s thrown back on to the 
predicates of the same and, i n t h i s , r e t u r n s not to i t s e l f but 
i n t o the subject of the content'. There i s l i t t l e p o i n t 
i n denying t h a t these are obscure p o i n t s . Hegel may have 
washed to make h i s system accessible to the o r i d m a r y consciou-
ness of h i s time but he can ha r d l y hope t o have succeeded w i t h 
such an i n s c r u t a b l e s t y l e . However, i t i s c l e a r t h a t what 
i s under f i r e m these passages i s the conventional idea of 
tne r e l a t i o n of subject and predicate m a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n . 
An example from Hegel's Logic w i l l , I t n i n k , help us here. 
I n e x p l a i n i n g the l o g i c a l form which he believes i s a ppropriate 
to convey the t r u t h he draws our a t t e n t i o n t o the p o s i t i v e 
judgement 'the rose i s red'. A p o s i t i v e judgement i s , of 
course, of the form the i n d i v i d u a l i s the u n i v e r s a l , and s e r v s 
to i n d i c a t e f o r Hegel the inadequacy of the form of judgement 
i n general f o r tne ta.sk of im p a r t i n g t r u t h . Hegel argues 
6. Hegel, Ph^nomenologie des Geistes, Werke 3, p. 59• 
7. I b i d . , p. 60. 
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t h a t t h a t p o s i t i v e judgement i s inadequate t o convey t r u t h 
since such a p r e p o s i t i o n does not e n t a i l t h a t thought 
corresponds w i t h i t s o b j e c t . For when I judge t h a t a rose 
i s red I have simply postulated t h a t a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s 
between an object and an idea. 'A mere q u a l i t a t i v e judge-
ment', as Mure points out, ' l i k e "the rose i s red" may be 
, Q 
co r r e c t , but i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y n e i t h e r t r u e nor f a l s e . 
I t i s n e i t h e r t r u e nor f a l s e because i t does not show t h a t 
there i s a necessary r e l a t i o n between the subject and i t s 
p r e d i c a t e . Hegel t h i n k s t h a t the same i s the case w i t h 
any judgement or p r o p o s i t i o n . I n any judgement, he suggests, 
subject and predicate are l i n k e d i n an a b s t r a c t way. They 
would only be l i n k e d i n a concrete, t r u e way i f the subject 
were the p r e d i c a t e . But i t i s p r e c i s e l y the struocure 01 
the judgement t h a t makes t h i s impossible. A p r o p o s i t i o n or 
judgement only allows us t o a t t r i b u t e one predicate at a 
time t o the subject. For instance, i t may be c o r r e c t t o ssy 
t h a t the rose i s red but i t i s also vaguely c i r c u l a r m shape, 
p a r t of a p l a n t , e t c . a l l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t the judgement might 
c o n t a i n but none of which are the subject of the judgement 
i n i t s t o t a l i t y . Mure puts i t i n t h i s way: ' i n "This rose 
i s red"...S(subject) has other q u a l i t i e s beside red, and 
P ( p r e d i c a t e ) q u a l i f i e s other subjects besides the rose: they 
o u t f l a n k eacn o c h e r ' . ^ N e i t h e r the p r e d i c a t e i s adequate 
t o the subject nor the subject adequate t o the p r e d i c a t e . 
That i s why the s p e c u l a t i v e judgement has to destroy the 
'difference of subject and p r e d i c a t e . ' 
8. Hegel. Wissenschaf t der Log a k, \'erx:e 6, p. 263. 
9. G.R.G.Mure. The_ Philosophy of Hegel, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P 
p. 21. " 
30. I b i d . , p. ±-j>K. 
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The n o t i o n of t r u t h t h a t Hegel i s defending, and which 
l i e s at the back of h i s a t t i t u d e t o the problem of knowledge 
i s t h a t i t i s the concrete object of knowledge i t s e l f . 
This i s why t r u t h , as he views i t , cannot be conveyed m 
a s i n g l e p r o p o s i t i o n or judgement.1"1" The subject of the 
judgement i s of course said t o be the predicate but i t i s 
not, m Hegel's op i n i o n , commensurate w i t h i t . T r u t h f o r 
Hegel, i s the whole. Therefore, i n any judgement, the f a c t 
t h a t the predicate i s incommensurate w i t h the subject makes 
the judgement untrue. For a judgement t o be t r u e the pred-
i c a t e would have to be the subject. This b r i n g s us again 
t o Hegel's " s p e c u l a t i v e judgement". For i n the s p e c u l a t i v e 
judgment, Hegel claims, the subject passes i n t o the p r e d i c a t e . 
For pass Hegel employs the verb vergehen whose i m p l i c a t i o n s 
are broader since i t can also mean fade away i n t o or even 
disappear i n t o . 'what, I t h i n k , Hegel wishes to convey by 
using t h i s term i s the sense t h a t m the course of a p h i l o s -
o p h i c a l enquiry our concept of i t s subject undergoes a r a d i c a l 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . And i t does so i n a remarkable sen^e: through 
becoming i t s predicates. I n becoming i t s predicates the 
subject of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l enquiry loses i t s i n i t i a l i d e n t i t y 
and gains another. This new i d e n t i t y , Hegel suggests, i s the 
i d e n t i t y of i t s concrete r e a l i t y . Another look at the process 
of the Phenomenology might help to c l a r i f y the matter. The 
subject t h a t formed the s t a r t i n g - p o i n t was, we e s t a b l i s h e d , 
the o r d i n a r y consciousness of Hegel's time. That o r d i n a r y 
consciousness was at the outset merely an a b s t r a c t concept 
f o r us. We were aware t h a t i t had several d i f f e r e n t aspects 
( o r , more ge n e r a l l y , p r e d i c a t e s ) but v\Te were not, Hegel would_ 
11 . See Werke 3, p. ^7, where lie maKes t h i s , by now, famous claim. 
210. 
claim, aware of i t s f u l l r e a l i t y . I t s t r u t h or concrete 
r e a l i t y , could m no way be a t t a i n e d by simply l i s t i n g i t s 
p redicates e.g. the Unhappy Consciousness, Observing Reason, 
M o r a l i t y and R e l i g i o n . We can only know the o r d i n a r y con-
sciousness of the time, Hegel concludes ;through knowing i t 
as each of i t s p r e d i c a t e s . The subject, the o r d i n a r y con-
sciousness, must become i t s predicates f o r us. I t i s f o r 
t h i s reason t h a t we might even say, as Hegel suggests, t h a t 
the subject has t o disappear i n the p r e d i c a t e . I t would 
however be f a l s e t o t h i n k t h a t t h i s i m p l i e d t h a t the subject 
were somehow ] o s t w i t h o u t t r a c e . I t i s , of course, preserved 
as the subject of i t s p r e dicates. 
We may now see why Hegel's view of t r u t h i s t h a t i t i s 
thought which 'loses j u s t as much i t s f i x e d objective basis 
which i t had m the subject as i t i s thrown back on t o the 
predicates of the same and, m t h i s , r e t u r n s not t o i t s e l f 
but i n t o the subject of the content' (above),-because i t i s 
t h i s t h a t i s involved m making our Knowledge r e a l . Real 
knowing i s a process i n which we give up our presuppositions 
about an ooject or a c t i v i t y through l e a r n i n g wnat i t i s m 
and f o r i t s e l f . There appears t o be l i t t l e t h a t i s uncommon 
m what Hegel has t o suggest here. But the s t o r y i s a 
d i f f e r e n t one i f we take a close look at how Hegel describes 
the outcome f o r the knower hi m s e l f . As a r e s u l t of the 
process of c o g n i t i o n we who are the knowers, according t o 
Hegel, f i n d our t h i n k i n g t o be the subject i n i t s concrete 
r e a l i t y . Even t h i s appears to be an innocuous ciajm i f WP 
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do not examine i t c l o s e l y . What Hegel i s c l a i m i n g , though, 
i s t h a t I f we know an object our thought i s the o b j e c t . 
This i s how the s p e c u l a t i v e judgement destroys the g u l f t h a t 
12 
separates t h i n k e r and o b j e c t . 
As we know, Hegel would argue t h a t Modern Philosophy i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by t h i s dualism, t h i s o i f u r c a t i o n of thought 
and r e a l i t y . We have seen Hegel claim t h a t Descartes f i r s t 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s b i f u r c a t i o n m Modern Philosophy by p o s t u l -
a t i n g t h a t there were two d i s t i n c t substances: extension and 
thought. F o l l o w i n g t h a t , i t was Spinoza who had e s t a b l i s h e d 
an a b s t r a c t i d e n t i t y of the two by p o s t u l a t i n g t h a t there was 
but One Substance. His i d e n t i t y , since i t was a b s t r a c t , had 
neglected what Hegel believes t o be an e s s e n t i a l aspect of 
r e a l i t y : i n d i v i d u a t i o n . Locke and L e i b n i z , however, had 
pointed out t h i s omission i n Spinoza's philosophy. Locke 
d i d so by sharpening the b i f u r c a t i o n between thougnt and 
12. Herbert Marcuse i n h i s Reason and Revolution also s i n g l e s out 
Hegel's n o t i o n of the speculative judgement as being of p a r t i c 
u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e m the understanding of Hegel's philosophy. 
His view i s t h a t the n o t i o n ' s t r i k e s the d e c i s i v e blow against 
t r a d i t i o n a l formal l o g i c . ' ( p . 1 0 2 ) This i s c e r t a i n l y not the 
case m the broad sense but i t i s , p l a u s i b l y , Hegel's view of 
the matter. C e r t a i n l y what Hegel intends w i t h the s p e c u l a t i v e 
judgement i s , as Marcuse suggests,that the'locus of t r u t h ' be 
snown to be 'the dynamic system of s p e c u l a t i v e judgements i n 
which every s i n g l e judgement must be 'sublated' by another, so 
t h a t only the whole process represents the t r u t h . 1 ( i b i d . ) And, 
as I have argued, the speculative judgement i s intended to 
c o n t r a s t w i t h 'the l o g i c of common sense which t r e a t s propos-
i t i o n s as c o n s i s t i n g of a subject, which serves as a f i x e d 
and s t a b l e base and a predicate attached t o i t . ' ( p . 1 0 1 ) . The 
one p o i n t t h a t Marcuse misses i n making t h i s c o n t r a s t i s t h a t 
Hegel's speculative judgement i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of h i s i d e a l 
ism. Or else he would not t h i n k t h a t t h i s 'protest against 
d i v o r c i n g t r u t n and i t s forms from concrete processes' was a l s 
'a p r o t e s t against severing t r u t h from any d i r e c t guiding 
i n f l u e n c e on r e a l i t y . ' (p. 102). 
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r e a l i t y i n h i s empiricism. But L e i b n i z went some way toward 
remedying t m s defect through presenting a system of i n t e l l -
e c t u a l i n d i v i d u a t i o n m h i s philosophy, the world o f monads. 
This d i d not, however, meet the f u l l requirement of philosophy, 
as Hegel understood t h a t requirement, since i t continued t o 
develop along d u a l i s t l i n e s . Berkeley and Hume set t o work 
on the r e v i s i o n of Locke's mat e r i a l i s m , the one from an i d e a l -
i s t p o i n t of view, the other from a s c e p t i c a l p o i n t o f view. 
I t i s Hume's s c e p t i c a l empiricism t h a t represents the most 
extreme consequence of the dualism of Modern Philosophy f o r 
Hegel. Philosophy, he argued, cannot descend lower than i t 
does i n Hume's system. What i r k s Hegel most about Hume's 
philosophy i s t h a t i t reduces a l l problems of t r u t h t o a 
matter of custom. Kant, as we know, takes h i s s t a r t i n g - p o i n t 
from t h i s scepticism of Hume seeking t o point out t h a t know-
lodge does indeed have a r e a l i t y . But because t h i s i s depicted 
as merely a phenomenal r e a l i t y the b i f u r c a t i o n of experience 
i s not overcome. For t h a t reason Hegel believes t h a t Kant 
remains at the standpoint of Locke and Hume. I t i s only w i t h 
S c h e l l m g and Fic h t e t h a t the proper attempt t o overcome the 
dualism of Modern Philosophy i s begun. But both, m Hegel's 
view, f a i l m t h i s task. Fichte f a i l s , because he has the 
wrong s t a r t i n g point m the I and S c h e l l m g because he does 
not a t t a i n a l o g i c a l view of t h i n g s , i n other words, because 
he f a i l s t o prove h i s p o i n t of view. The whole h i s t o r y of 
Modern Philosophy i s from t h j s Hegelian standpoint a h i s t o r y 
of the g a t h e r i n g together of the conceptual equipment to over-
come dualism m the theory of knowledge but of the f a i l u r e t o 
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put i t t o i t s proper use. This f a i l u r e , I t h i n k , Hegel would 
a t t r i b u t e t o a r a d i c a l misconception of knowledge t h a t was 
i m p l i c i t m much of Modern Philosophy. This misconception 
was fundamental t o the posing of the problem of knowledge, 
Hegel's speculative judgement i s , I b e l i e v e , d i r e c t e d at t h i s 
mi sconception. 
The misconception i s t h i s : knowledge had been seen as 
an instrument (Werkzeug) or a means ( M i t t e l ) w i t h which we 
1"^ 
might a t t a i n the t r u t h . " I t was t h e r e f o r e n a t u r a l to 
suppose tha t before we enter 'on the t h i n g i t s e l f , namely 
the r e a l knowledge of t h a t which i s i n t r u t h ' i n philosophy 
t h a t we ought t o examine the instrument or means wich which 
"i 4 
we were able to possess i t . J I n h i s I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the 
Phenomenology Hegel suggests t h a t t h i s apprehension appears 
t o be c o r r e c t f o r two reasons. I n the f i r s t place we mighc 
suppose t h a t there are various types of c o g n i t i o n and t h e r e -
f o r e t h a t one mode might be more appropriate f o r our purposes 
than another. I n the second place we might suppose 1 m th a t 
c o g n i t i o n i s a c a p a b i l i t y of a ^ e r t a m kin d and scope t h a t w i t h -
out the more accurate determination of i t s nature and l i m i t s 
the cloudsof e r r o r w i l l be taken hold of instead of the heavens 
of t r u t h . ' " ^ I t i s the second supposition t h a t i s most t y p i c -
a l l y made by the Modern Philosophers and, of course, presents 
them w i t h the problem of knowledge. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of 
t h a t t r a d i t i o n Hegel i s most l i k e l y t o have m mind i s Kant. 
l ^ . Hegel. Werke ~5, p. 68. 
14. I b i d . 15. I b i d . 
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Although we cannot be c e r t a i n of t h i s , i t I s i n s t r u c t i v e 
t o n o t i c e the terms m which Hegel s t a t e s h i s p o i n t . I t 
i s Kant, of course, who regards our p r i n c i p a l c o g n i t i v e 
f a c u l t y , Reason, as a c a p a b i l i t y and t h e r e f o r e terms h i s 
whole enquiry transcendental. His aim i n t h a t enquiry i s 
consequently t o concern h i m s e l f 'not so much w i t h o b j e c t s as 
w i t h our mode of c o g n i t i o n of o b j e c t s . ' 1 ^ So, as we know, 
i t s use from the p o i n t of view of s p e c u l a t i o n would only 
be negative; i t would serve, as Hegel suggests here, 'not 
to extend but only t o p u r i f y our reason and preserve i t from 
17 
e r r o r s ' . Indeed, the whole d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Kant makes 
between transcendental and transcendent philosophy i s intended 
t o prevent Reason from becoming enveloped i n what Hegel a p t l y 
c a l l s 'the clouds of e r r o r ' . For Kant, 'the more accurate 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n ' of the nature and l i m i t s of c o g n i t i o n would 
prevent our knowledge from over-reaching i t s e l f . Hegel claims, 
however, t h a t t h i s apprehension e a s i l y transforms i t s e l f i n t o 
the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i t i s f u t i l e t o hope t h a t through c o g n i t i o n 
we can l e a r n what the t h i n g i s i n i t s e l f . There t h e r e f o r e 
develops i n the mind of the t h i n k e r , now turned s c e p t i c , 
an insurmountable b a r r i e r between t r u t h and our knowledge. 
'For given t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s an instrument w i t h which t o 
take possession of the absolute essence i t immediately occurs 
to one t h a t t h i s employment of an instrument on a t h i n g not 
so much leaves the t h i n g as i t i s i n i t s e l f , but r a t h e r 
l 8 
e f f e c t s a change i n i t and a forming of i c ' What we nave 
Kant. Kr1 t i k _ dev Rei.nen Vernunf t , o p . c i t . , p. 6j? • 




taken to oe the su p p o s i t i o n t h a t Kant makes, 
Hegel claims, leads n a t u r a l l y to s c e p t i c a l conclusions. 
Simply because knowledge i s conceived as an instrument w i t h 
which t o a t t a i n r e a l i t y there a r i s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t 
may m the event f a l l short of t h a t r e a l i t y or a l t e r i t i n 
some way m being appl i e d . I t i s , as we have seen, such 
apprehensions t h a t lead Kant t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the t h i n g 
i n i t s e l f (Ding an s i c h ) which would be the t h i n g as i t remains 
unaffected by the human c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s , and the obje c t 
or phenomenon which i s the t h i n g as i t i s formed by the human 
c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s , p r i n c i p a l l y the Understanding. Since 
Kant regards our c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s as, at best, p r o v i d i n g 
us w j t h an o r i e n t a t i o n i n the world he deems the phenomenon 
only to be knowable. The phenomenon may indeed be a l l t h a t 
we can know; however, i t i s also Kant's claim t h a t we always 
aim t o Know the t h i n g m i t s e l f or the nournenon. Thus as 
Kegel suggests, w i t h such a view of knowledge trie 'clouds 
of e r ^ o r ' can never be f a r away. I f t h i s suggestion i s corvee 
i t would seem t h a t the antimonies of Reason which Kant o u t l i n e s 
i n h i s t h e o r e t i c a l philosophy a r i s e from the overambitious 
use of our instrument of knowledge. 
We might on the other hand take the view, Hegel suggests, 
t h a t c o g n i t i o n should not be seen as a t o o l but r a t h e r as a 
passive medium. We no longer decide t o see i t as p l a y i n g 
an a c t i v e r o l e in our a c q u i s i t i o n of the t r u t h . The view 
of knowledge t h a t I t h i n k Hegel nas i n mind here i s t h a t of 
the E m p i r i c i s t s . We r e c a l l t h a t Locke and Hume thougnt o f 
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knowledge as che agreement of cur ideas w i t h the appearance 
of t h i n g s t o our senses. This i s no more c l e a r than i n 
Hume's i n s i s t e n c e on t h a t 'as long as we confine our specul-
a t i o n s t o the appearance of objects to our senses, w i t h o u t 
e n t e r i n g i n t o d i s q u i s i t i o n s concerning t h e i r r e a l nature and 
operations, we are safe from a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s , and can never 
i 19 . 
be embarrassed by any question . ^  Only i f we carry our 
i n q u i r y beyond the appearance of objects to the senses' w i l l 
'most of our conclusions..be f u l l of scepticism and uncertainty'. 
T r u t h , then, i s conveyed to us by our sense-experience. 
A l l t h a t i s r equired i n our using i t as a means i s t h a t we 
do not intervene i n any way i n i t s o p eration. "We are required 
to remain passive or merely r e c e p t i v e . I t i s t o t h i s model 
of knowledge, then, t h a t I take Hegel t o be r e f e r r i n g w i t h 
h i s n o t i o n of i t as a passive medium. The problem 'with such 
a n o t i o n , Hegel argues, i s t h a t according t c i t we receive 
knowledge 'not as i t 1-> m i t s e l f , but as i t i s m and through 
t h i s medium'. For example, Locke and Hume suppose t h a t 
knowledge i s conveyed t o us v i a the senses but since sense-
perception i s only the medium through which we a t t a i n know-
ledge they have t c conclude t h a t what we sense-perceive i s 
not n e c e s s a r i l y a l l t r u e and t h a t our f a c u l t i e s (the medium 
i t s e l f ) of sense-perception are not wholly adequate t o convey 
the t r u t h . As Hegel says, the poi n t i s t h a t what knowledge 
we would receive would only be 'through and m t h i s medium'. 
I f i t deceived there would be no knowing how i t d i d so as 




I b i d . 
A T r e a t i s e of Human Nature I , op.cat., p.110. 
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ledge o u t s i d e t h a t medium. 
Whichever p o s i t i o n we h o l d , t h e K a n t i a n one, t h a t 
c o g n i t i o n i s an i n s t r u m e n t t h r o u g h w h i c h we a c h i e v e know-
l e d g e , o r t h e Lockean one, t h a t c o g n i t i o n i s a p a s s i v e medium 
t h r o u g h w h i c h 'the l i g h t o f t r u t h reaches us', Hegel b e l i e v e s 
t h a t ' i n b o t h i n s t a n c e s we employ a means t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y 
21 
induces t h e o p p o s i t e o f i t s i n t e n t i o n (Zwecks)'. T h i s 
seems t o be r a t h e r a h a r s h c o n c l u s i o n . Indeed i t may l e a d 
us t o t h i n k t h a t Hegel adopts a procedure w h i c h i s n o t irnman-
22 
e n t . For t h i s c r i t i c i s m appears t o t a k e no account o f 
Kant and Locke's own a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the drawbacks o f t h e i r 
t h e o r i e s o f knowledge. Kant i s o f course 'well aware t h a t 
by c o n c e i v i n g our c o g n i t i o n as t h e m e n t a l a p p a r a t u s t h r o u g h 
w h i c h we merely o r i e n t a t e o u r s e l v e s m the w o r l d we c a s t 
doubt on t h e c e r t a i n t y o f o u r knowledge. Indeed he conclude 
t h a t i f we are t o have any dependaole knowledge th e n we nave 
t o t ake a c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e t o our c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s , espec-
i a l l y o ur p r i n c i p a l one, Reason. Locke, e q u a l l y , i s w e l l 
aware t h a t i f we r e g a r d knowledge as b e i n g i m p a r t e d by t h e 
p a s s i v e medium o f t h e senses we have n o t t o accept a l l sense-
p e r c e p t i o n s as t r u e . Indeed, he t r i e s t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h e 
more dependable modes o f s e n s i n g from those w h i c h are l e s s 
so. But a l l t h i s Hegel acknowledges m h i s L e c t u r e s on t n e 
21. Hegel. Werke 3, p. 68. 
22. Habermas. Erkenntnns und I r t e r e s s e , o p . c i t . p . 2 1 . He 
suggests t h i s i s so because Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f c l a s s i c a l 
e p i s t e m o l o g y presupposes e x a c t l y what t h e l a t t e r p u t s m 
q u e s t i o n : a b s o l u t e knowledge. 
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H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y . So we would n o t expect t h a t he 
now adopt a procedure which i s n o t immanent by i g n o r i n g 
these r e s e r v a t i o n s t h a t Locke and Kant have about our 
knowledge. And, as we s h a l l see, we w i l l n o t be d i s a p p o i n t e d 
i n t h i s e x p e c t a t i o n . 
F o r Hegel now suggests t h a t we might make a few emenda-
t i o n s t o the I n s t r u m e n t model o f knowledge Co ta k e account 
o f what appear t o be i t s i n i t i a l f a i l i n g s , and these emend-
a t i o n s a r e , I t h i n k , o f t h e same k i n d as the r e s e r v a t i o n s 
t h a t Kant has about our a b i l i t y t o know the w o r l d o b j e c t i v e l y . 
Hegel suggests f o r i n s t a n c e t h a t a way out o f t h e i n i t i a l 
d i f f i c u l t y posed by t h e i n s t r u m e n t model o f knowledge may be 
found t h r o u g h s e t t i n g o u r s e l v e s the t a s k o f l e a r n i n g how t h e 
i n s t r u m e n t o p e r a t e s . For w i t h t h a t knowledge, Hegel says, 
i t would seem t h a t we s h o u l d be a b l e t o p u r i f y whatever know-
ledge t h e i n s t r u m e n t p r o c u r e s . Kant adopts a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n 
i n u n d e r t a k i n g t h e C r i t i q u e o f Pure Reason m t n a t 'he f l a t t e r s 
h i m s e l f ' t o t h i n k t h a t m t h a t work he had 'rret w i t h . . a l ] e r r o r 
w h i c h had p r e v i o u s l y s e t reason at v a r i a n c e w i t h i t s e l f i n 
i t s use f r e e o f e x p e r i e n c e . ^ He b e l i e v e s t h a t t h r o u g h 
d e p i c t i n g the D i a l e c t i c o f Reason he makes i t p o s s i b l e t o f r e e 
t h e i n s t r u m e n t o f knowledge from t h e i l l u s i o n t h s t i t b r o u g h t 
about and t h u s p r o v i d e us w i t h a c l e a r e r view o f what we 
can know. The m o t i v e o f h i s C r i t i q u e i s , m s h o r t , t o 
23. Kant. K r i t i k d e r Re men V e m u n f t , o p . c i t . o. 13. 
2h. I b i d , , p. 63. 
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se p a r a t e t h e wheat from the c h a f f w i t h i n our c o g n i t i o n . 
We a l r e a d y know what the c o n c l u s i o n s o f Kant's e n q u i r y were. 
I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e he concludes t h a t t he U n d e r s t a n d i n g may 
l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m t o know phenomena but n o t noumena. And 
t h e r e f o r e , I n t h e second p l a c e , t h a t Reason makes demands on 
the c o n t e n t o f our e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h corresponds w i t h n o t h i n g 
i n t h e t h i n g s o f e x p e r i e n c e themselves. These are t h e A n t i -
monies o f Reason. Hegel, as we have seen, b e l i e v e s i t t o 
be a s i g n o f t i m i d i t y on Kant's p a r t t h a t he l o c a t e s t h e con-
t r a d i c t i o n s t h a t Reason observes m Reason i t s e l f . But t h e 
o b j e c t i o n he has t o Kant's procedure m th e Phenomenology i s , 
I t h i n k , more funda m e n t a l . He i s opposed t o the whole c r i t -
i c a l c o n c e p t i o n t h a t l i e s b e h i n d Kant's p h i l o s o p h y . I n 
Hegel's o p i n i o n t h e n o t i o n t h a t we can p u r i f y o u r c o g n i t i v e 
f a c u l t i e s t h r o u g h s e p a r a t i n g , i n c o g n i t i o n , what p e r t a i n s t o 
o u r t h i n k i n g a c t i v i t y and what p e r t a i n s t o t h e o b j e c t o f 
t h o u g h t i s c o m p l e t e l y m i s g u i d e d , because, m h i s view, che 
supposed improvement m ou r i n s t r u m e n t o f knowledge would 
o n l y p u t us back where we began; ' i f , he says, we t a k e away 
fro m a formed t h i n g ' m t h i s i n s t a n c e our knowledge,' what 
th e i n s t r u m e n t has done t o i t 'our knowledge stands m e x a c t l 
25 
the same p o s i t i o n as b e f o r e we had begun t h e e x e r c i s e . 
Since t h i s argument depends on an analogy we might b e s t c l a n 
i t w i t h an example o f i t s w o r k i n g . I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , we 
removed ( i f t h a t were p o s s i b l e ) from a completed b u i l d i n g 
t h e e f f e c t s b r o u g h t about by t h e use o f a l l t h e t o o l s m 
25- Hegel . werke ~j, p. 69. 
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c o n s t r u c t i n g i t we would s i m p l y be l e f t w i t h t h e raw 
m a t e r i a l s t n a t went i n t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n . We would, o f 
course, have no b u i l d i n g a t a l l . S i m i l a r l y Hegel sees Kant 
as a t t e r n t p i n g t o remove from a 'formed' body o f knowledge a l l 
t h a t we d i d m f o r m i n g i t . What r e s u l t s , i n Kegel's view, 
i s t h a t we are l e f t w i t h o u t a ' b u i l d i n g ' o f knowledge a t a l l . 
I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t our Knowledge 
i s n o t advanced one b i t by a c r i t i q u e o f R e a s o n . ^ 
I have suggested t h a t Hegel has i n mind t h e E m p i r i c i s t 
view o f knowledge when he employs t h e analogy w i t h t h e 
pa s s i v e medium. We would e x p e c t , t h e n , chat m what he has 
t o say about t h i s model o f knowledge thai- he a l s o taice n o t e 
o f Locke and Hume's a t t e m p t s t o c l a r i f y t h e i r v±^w o f know-
le d g e . What e s p e c i a l l y comes t o mind m t h i s r e s p e c t are 
the endeavours o f Locke and Hume t o e s t a b l i s h what comes t o 
u t h r o u g h t he medium o f s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n i m m e d i a r e l y f r o m 
t h e o b j e c t and what elements b e l o n g s o l e l y t o t h e medium i t -
s e l f . We may r e c a l l how Locke sought t o d i s t i n g u i s h i d e a s 
'as t h e y are i d e a s o r p e r c e p t i o n s m our minds; and as t h e y 
are m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f m a t t e r m t h e bod i e s t h a t cause such 
. 27 
p e r c e p t i o n s i n us', and a l s o Hume's a t t e m p t t o d i s t i n g -
u i s h between what; we a c t u a l l y observe from what we u s u a l l y 
i n f e r when we are l e d t o say t h a t two t h i n g s o r events are 
28 
c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d . Indeed we found m Hume's case t h a t such 
Ilabermas. op. c i r . pp. 19-20, e s p e c i a l l y Note 6. 
J.Locke. An Essay Concerning t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , 
o p . c i t . , p.~or3- Locke h i m s e l f empnasies a i l but t h e 
'and *. 





was h i s c r i t i c a l a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e problems i n v o l v e d m 
the model o f knowledge t h a t i t l e d him i n t o a s p e c i e s o f 
s c e p t i c i s m . Hegel suggests h e r e , as he does i n t h e Lec-
t u r e s , t h a t t h i s i s an i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t i f one h o l d s r i g -
o r o u s l y t o t h e E m p i r i c i s t model o f knowledge. I n t h e 
L e c t u r e s , he p o i n t e d o u t t h a t Locke i s o b l i g e d t o r e c o g n i s e 
t h a t h i s own c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h , p e r c e p t i o n , i s i t s e l f u n t r u e . 
Hume, m Hegel's view, d i d no more t h a n c a r r y t h i s Lockean 
s t a n d p o i n t t o i t s l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n . And he makes t h e 
same p o i n t m h i s ' i n t r o d u c t i o n ' t o t h e Phenomenology• Any 
a t t e m p t t o improve o r modify t h e Lockean model i s , he argues, 
c e r t a i n t o end i n f a i l u r e . F or even ' i f t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f 
knowledge w h i c h we r e p r e s e n t t o o u r s e l v e s as a medium a c q u a i n t 
us w i t h t h e law o f i t s r e f r a c t i o n t h e r e i s j u s t as much l i t t l e 
p o i n t m removing i t from t h e r e s u l t , f o r knowledge i s n o t 
the d i v e r g e n c e o f t h e r a y out t h e ray i t s e l f t h r o u g h w h i c h 
th e t r u t h comes i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h us.'-^ I n Kegel's view, 
t h e n , t h e i d e a 'which gave t h e f i r s t r i s e ' t o Locke's Essay 
Concerning t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , namely, ' t h a t t h e f i r s t 
s t e p t o w a r d s a t i s f y i n g s e v e r a l i n q u i r i e s t h e mind o f man was 
very apt t o run i n t o ' i s 'to t a k e a survey o f our own under-
s t a n d i n g , examine our own powers, and see t o what t h i n g s t h e y 
31 
were a d a p t e d , ' ^ i s e rroneous. I t i s o f course t h i s i d e a 
t h a t a l s o gave r i s e t o t h e problem o f knowledge m Modern 
P h i l o s o p h y . I t i s an erroneous i d e a m Hegel's o p i n i o n 
because even i f we d i d as i t recommended and l e a r n t how our 
29. See above. Chapter One, pp. 31 - 52. 
30- Hegel, werke 3, p. 69. 
31. 1ocke o p . c i t . , I n t r o d u c t i o n . 
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powers d i s t o r t e d o ur knowledge we would n o t know what 
knowing was because knowing i s n o t t h e knowledge o f how we 
d i s t o r t knowledge b u t how we know t n a t we have done so. I n 
o t h e r words, we w i l l n o t l e a r n what knowledge i s by e x a m i n i n g 
'our own powers, and see t o what t h i n g s t h e y ' are 'adapted' 
s i n c e i t JLS t h a t v e r y a d a p t i o n o f our powers. The s i m p l e 
p o i n t t h a t Hegel i s making i s t h a t we w i l l n o t know what 
knowledge i s t h r o u g h l e a r n i n g i t s scope and l i m i t a t i o n s . 
I t i s o n l y t h r o u g h knowing wnat i t i s t h a t we can know what 
i t i s . I t i s f o r t h i s reason t h a t Hegel f o r g o e s t h e se a r c h f o r an 
a b s o l u t e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y and w i t h t h a t , 
o f course, abandons the problem o f knowledge. 
I t m i g h t be o b j e c t e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h we do n o t (as Hegel 
s u g g e s t s ) , know a l l t h e r e i s t o know about t h e process o f 
c o g n i t i o n t h r o u g h knowing i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , we might a r r i v e 
. i t t h a t c o v e t e d p o s i t i o n t h r o u g h s i m p l e i n f e r e n c e . For i f 
we e s t a b l i s h what our c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s cannot do we can 
merely by i n v e r t i n g these n e g a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s _mto p o s i t i v e 
ones d i s c o v e r what t h e y can do. Kant d i d something l i k e 
t h i s when he i n f e r r e d from h i s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e u n d e r s t -
a n d i n g was i n c a p a b l e o f knowing t h i n g s m themselves t h a t i t 
was p e r f e c t l y capable o f knowing phenomena. S i m i l a r l y , we 
might i n f e r innumerable p o s i t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n s about our know-
ledge t h r o u g h D e t e r m i n i n g i t s scope and l i m i t a t i o n s . T h i s 
i s where t h e c l a s s i c a l approach t o e p i s t e r n o l o g y d e r i v e s i t s 
s t r e n g t h : I t i s f e l t t h a t i f we know bef o r e h a n d our c a p a b i l i t y 
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t o know t h e n we may a v o i d e r r o r . T h i s i s what l e a d s t o 
what i s o f t e n c a l l e d t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l approach o f what I 
have c a l l e d t h e c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l c g i s t s . Hume perhaps 
expresses t h e i r hopes b e s t when he says: 'Here t h e n i s t h e 
o n l y e x p e d i e n t , from which we can hope f o r success i n o u r 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e s e a r c h e s , t o l e a v e t h e t e d i o u s l i n g e r i n g 
method, whic h we have h i t h e r t o f o l l o w e d and i n s t e a d o f 
t a k i n g now and t h e n a c a s t l e o r v i l l a g e on t h e f r o n t i e r , t o 
march up d i r e c t l y t o t h e c a p i t a l o r c e n t r e o f these s c i e n c e s , 
t o human n a t u r e i t s e l f ; w hich b e i n g once masters o f , we may 
32 
everywhere e l s e hope f o r an easy v i c t o r y ' . The b e l i e f 
i s , t h a t by t h e e x a m i n a t i o n s of cur i n t e l l e c t u a l powers we may 
s t r e n g t h e n and secure o ur c l a i m s t o knowledge. Hegel i s 
o f course aware o f t h i s approach t o e p i s t e m o l o g y , b u t he 
b e l i e v e s i t t o be an approach t h a t i s m a l l e s s e n t i a l s neg-
a t i v e . Indeed he c h a r a c t e r i s e s i t as an approach whi c h f e a r s 
e r r o r i n human t h i n k i n g and arouses a m i s t r u s t 'm sci e n c e 
which w i t h o u t t h e same d o u b t f u l n e s s s e t s t o work and r e a l l y 
k n o w s ' . ^ To e s t a b l i s h t h i s c l a i m Hegel c o u l d w e l l p o i n t 
t o a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t he comes t o i n h i s L e c t u r e s or t h e H i s t o r y 
, — — 
o f P h i l o s o p h y m r e v i e w i n g Locke's p h i l o s o p h y . There he 
p o i n t s o u t , as we have seen, t h a t Locke's apprenension about 
t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f our i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c u l t i e s l e a d s him 
t o doubt t h e r e s u l t s o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e ; and i t i s t h e same 
p o i n t t h a t Hegel i s making h e r e : t h a t t o t h i n k a p r o p a d e r t i c 
i s necessary t o sc i e n c e i s t o presuppose t h a t t h e knowledge 
32. Hume. o p . c i t . , p.41. 
33- Hegel. Werke 3.- P< 69. 
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t h a t we a l r e a d y have i n s c i e n c e i s open t o doubt. The 
v e r y approach i t s e l f c r e a t e s t h a t doubt. But i f on t h e i r 
p a r t those who f a v o u r such an approach t h i n k i t r i g h t t o arouse 
d i s t r u s t m t h e f i n d i n g s o f sci e n c e Hegel b e l i e v e s I t j u s t as 
l e g i t i m a t e ' t h a t i n v e r s e l y a m i s t r u s t i s t h i s m i s t r u s t . . . be 
t 34 
e s t a b l i s h e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , he c l a i m s , i t c o u l d w e l l be 
t h a t ' t h i s f e a r t o e r r i s i t s e l f e r r o r ' . The Transcenden-
t a l p h i l o s o p h e r demands t h a t we must know t h e scope o f t h e 
f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n b e f o r e we may know c o r r e c t l y . But as 
Hegel says, a g a i n m t h e L e c t u r e s , i t i s t h e o l d problem o f 
36, 
t h e c h i l d who w i l l n o t go i n t o t h e w a t e r u n t i l he can swim. 
What t h e T r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h e r o v e r l o o k s ii_> t h a t t n e 
'examination o f t h e f a c u l t y o f c o g n i t i o n i s i t s e l f c o g n i s i n g ' 
so t h a t u l t i m a t e l y i t i t s e l f r e l i e s on a n o t i o n o f knowledge 
which i t has n o t examined. The p o i n t i s s i m p l y t n a t t o know 
.'here t o l i m i t Knowledge a l r e a d y presupposes t h a t we know 
what knowledge i s . A T r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y cannot t h e r e -
f o r e remain t r u e t o i t s p r i n c i p l e because, c l a i m as i t may 
t h a t i t i s o n l y concerned w i t h o ur manner o f c o g n i t i o n o f 
o b j e c t s , i t i s i t s e l f a manner o f c o g n i t i o n o f o b j e c t s . I n -
deed, as we d i s c o v e r e d i n our r e v i e w o f Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f 
Modern P h i l o s o p h y , i t i s a manner o f c o g n i t i o n f o r which Hegel 
has a g r e a t d e a l o f r e s p e c t . The p i c t u r e o f Kant r a n s a c k i n g 
our f a c u l t i e s o f c o g n i t i o n t o g et a p r o p e r view o f knowledge 
i s t h e n one t h a t i s n o t w i t h o u t i t s i r o n y f o r Hegel. I n 
Hegel's view many o f the id e a s t h a t l a y behin d t h a t quest 
34. I b i d . 35. I b i d . 
36. Hegel. Werke 20.,p. 334• 
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were a l r e a d y t r u e : so t h a t much o f what was sought, was 
a l r e a d y t o be found :n t h e s e e k i n g . Hegel compares i t 
t o t h e p l i g h t o f t h e Jews a f t e r t h e coming o f C h r i s t 'the 
s p i r i t passed t h r o u g h t h e m i d s t o f them and t h e y knew i t 
n o t ' . 5 7 
37- I b i d . 
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THE PHENOXEI\ALITY OF KNOV/LEDGE 
I n Hegel's o p i n i o n , t h e r e f o r e , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
approach t o p h i l o s o p h y i s i n a d e q u a t e . I t has t o be r e p l a c e d . 
How t h e n does he r e p l a c e i t " I n o t h e r words, what i s Hegel's 
answer t o t h e proolem o f Knowledge? We have, o f course, now 
come t o t he core o f our problem. Hegel's answer i s s t r a i g h t -
f o r w a r d enough. I n h i s view knowledge i s a phenomenon l i k e 
any o t h e r . There i s n o t f o r Hegel the doubt c o n c e r n i n g t h e 
r e a l i t y o f our knowledge n o r t h e need t o e s t a b l i s h b eforehand 
i t s n a t u r e and e x t e n t because f o r hirn i t i s s i m p l y a f a c t o f 
e x p e r i e n c e t h a t knowledge or sci e n c e ( W i s s e n s c h a f t ) has 
38 
appeared. To use i t , as does Kant, t o doubt i t s own 
r e a l i t y o r t o s e t l i m i t s on i t s r e a l i t y seems t n e n t o Hegel 
t o be t h e h e i g h t o f f o l l y . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t K a n t i a n C r i t i q u e 
assumes i t to be a means, a t o o l o r i n s t r u m e n t t h a t comes 
between t h e s u b j e c t and o b j e c t t o u n i t e them. He supposes, 
Hegel would c l a i m , t h a t on t h e one s i d e t n e r e i s knowledge 
and on t n e o t h e r i t s g o a l . From t h i s p o i n t o f view, t h e 
C r i t i q u e i s t h e a n a l y s i s and t e s t i n g o f t h e e f f i c i c a e y o f 
t h e human c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s m m e d i a t i n g t h e two. T h i s 
i s i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t and, i t i s a l s o , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, 
t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness when 
i t d e l i b e r a t e s about Knowledge. B u t , Hegel suggests, i f 
knowledge i s a phenomenon l i k e any o t h e r , something which i s 
a l r e a d y a t hand, i t w i ] I have ach i e v e d i t s g o a l a l r e a d y . 
I t w i l l a l r e a d y be the knowledge o f an o b j e c t . I n o t h e r 
38. Hegel. Werke j ) , p. 7--
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words, i t w i l l a l r e a d y have mediated t n e two opposing p o l e s 
o f knowledge: s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . Nowhere, Hegel t h e r e f o r e 
i m p l i e s , w i l l we f i n d knowledge which i s merely a means, 
whether we conceive i t as a t o o l o r a medium. I t w i l l a l -
ready be an end i n i t s e l f , a l r e a d y t h e t r u e c o n c e p t i o n o f 
something. We cannot, Hegel c o n c l u d e s * f c r c e i t away from 
t h a t something i n o r d e r t h a t i t m ight a c t as a g e n e r a l means 
w i t h which t o a t t a i n t h e t r u t h , because i t i s what i t i s 
o n l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w:th i t s o b j e c t . Knowledge t h e r e f o r e 
does n o t e x i s t m us as a c a p a b i l i t y which i s i n d i f f e r e n t t o 
i t s supposed o b j e c t so t h a t we are a b l e t o t e s t i t a g a i n s t 
t h a t o b j e c t . I t i s n o t a c a p a b i l i t y but a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , 
I n w h i c h t h e o b j e c t i s a l r e a d y i m p l i c a t e d . 
However, knowledge o r s c i e n c e , we ha/e seen Hegel 
suggest, has a l r e a d y appeared, and t h i s i s where h i s answer 
t o t h e problem o f knowledge becomes l e s s t h a n s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
F o r he now goes on t o argue t h a t s i n c e knowledge i s an appear 
ance i n h i s t i m e i t i s n o t o n l y a h i s t o r i c a l f a c t out a f a c t 
whose p o t e n t i a l has y e t t o be f u l l y r e a l i s e d . What Hegel 
i s p o i n t i n g t o here i s o f course t h e two senses i n w hich we 
use t h e word appearance: m th e f i r s t p l a c e t o s i g n i f y t h a t 
something has come on t h e scene, a n d , i n the second p l a c e t o 
s i g n i f y e x t e r n a l appearance as opposed t o r e a l i t y o r t r u t h . 
I t i s t h e second sense t h a t he 'wishes t o s t r e s s . Knowledge, 
he says, I n t.nat i t i s w i t n us ' i s i t s e l f an appearance; i t s 
a r r i v a l ' does n o t mean t h a t i t has y e t been 'implemented and 
expanded m c c i t s t r u t h ' . ^ The task o f p h i l o s o p h y t h e n , 
39- I b i d . , p . 7 1 . 
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as Hegel sees i t , i s t h a t i t f r e e i t s e l f from t h i s semblance 
o f knowledge ' t h a t i t t u r n i t s e l f a g a i n s t i t ' and make t h a t 
appearance i n t o a r e a l i t y . ( i b . ) Consequently what t h e t h e o r y 
o f knowledge has t o a c h i e v e m Hegel's view i s t n e s u b v e r s i o n 
o f t h e merely phenomenal e x i s t e n c e o f knowledge m our c u l t u r e . 
I have suggested e a r l i e r t h a t t h e ilea tnat lies a t t h e h e a r t 
o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y i s t h a t a l l p h i l o s o p h y , i n c l u d i n g h i s 
own, e x i s t s i n a c r i t i c a l c o n t i n u i t y w i t h t h e whole h i s t o r y 
o f p h i l o s o p n y . I have t r i e d t o show t h a t t h i s assumption 
dominates h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y . We s h a l l f i n d t h a t h i s view 
o f knowledge i s no e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s . Knowledge, he c l a i m s , 
has a l r e a d y appeared. Who t h e n are we t o suppose i s respon-
s i b l e f o r t h i s appearance? I n t h e ' I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 t o t h e Pben-
omenology Hegel suggests t h a t we can l o o k a t t h i s appearance 
i n two ways: e i t h e r as t h e 'untrue knowledge' r e p r e s e n t e d by 
those p h i l o s o p h i e s t h a t r e g a r d knowledge as a means o r , as 
t h a t p h i l o s o p h y which possesses t h e t r u e c o n c e p t i o n o f know-
ledge b u t merely 'appears b e s i d e t h e o t h e r ' . ^ P h i l o s o p h y , 
t h e n , m these two ways i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e appearance o f 
knowledge. I n d e t a i l , what Hegel i s s u g g e s t i n g i s t h a t wc 
can r e g a r d t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y as t r e c o n t e x t i n w hich 
knowledge appears b u t n o t m a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d sense: know-
ledge appears as a s t r i f e w i t h i n p h i l o s o p h y . I t appears 
t h a t Hegel a p p o r t i o n s t h e r o l e s o f the v a r i o u s p h i l o s o p h e r s 
i n t h i s s t r i f e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e two aspects o f rhe n o t i o n o f 
appearance. Knowledge, he seems t o be s u g g e s t i n g , may be 
seen t o have appeared as an e x t e r n a l appearance m che p h i l -
^0. i b i d . 
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osophies o f t h e E m p i r i c i s t s , Kant and F i o h t e . I n h i s view 
t h e y were t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s t h a t had i n s i s t e d t h a t t r u t h was 
the knowledge o f an ' i n i t s e l f ' u l t i m a t e l y i n a c c e s s i b l e t o 
t h e human consciousness. On t h e o t h e r hand, Hegel suggests, 
knowledge may be seen as coming on t h e scene f o r t h e f i r s t 
t i m e m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f S c h e l l m g . N e i t h e r f a c t i o n r e p -
r e s e n t s t h e t r u e r e a l i t y o f knowledge because t h e f o r m e r f a c -
t i o n l a c k s t h e t r u e c o n c e p t i o n o f knowledge w h i l e t h e l a t t e r 
f a c t i o n l a c k s m i t s c o n c e p t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y t h e p r o p e r 
background f o r t h a t c o n c e p t i o n . That p r o p e r background can 
o n l y be a c q u i r e d , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, by u n c o v e r i n g t h e r e a l i t y 
o f knowledge as i t appears m t h e u n t r u e knowledge o f t n e d u a l -
1 s t p h i l o s o p h e r s . So, i n g e t t i n g a t t h e r e a l i t y o f Knowledge, 
n o t o n l y do t h e d e f e c t s o f t h e d u a l i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s have t o 
be made up by S c h e l l m g ' s n o t i o n o f I d e n t i t y b u t a l s o t n e 
d e f e c t s o f t h e l a t t e r by t le p o s i t i - - = c o n t e n t o f t h e d u a l i s t 
p h i l o s o p h i e s . The appearance o f knowledge has t o be overcome 
i n b o t h i t s a s p e c t s . I t i s t h i s t h a t has t o be accomplished 
m t n e Phenomenology and i s , i n Hegel's view, t h e t r u e r e a l i t y 
o f knowledge. Thus i t appears t h a t Hegel's answer t o t h e 
problem o f knowledge i s the process o f the Phenomenology o f 
Mind. T h i s process we d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h m t h e l a s t Chapter. 
Hegel must make h i s s t a n d on i t . The f u l l account o f t h e 
phen o m e n a l i t y o f knowledge i s h i s o n l y r e p l y t o those who ask 
how t h o u g h t i s r e l a t e d t o i t s o b j e c t . 
I t i s , however, a p e c u l i a r r e p l y . Hegel does n e t a t t e m p t 
t o r e p l y d i r e c t l y t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed by Locke, Hume. Kant 
2^0. 
o r , come t o t h a t , S c h e l l m g about t h e n a t u r e o f knowledge. 
There i s no a t t e m p t t o d i s c u s s a p r i o r i t h e r e l a t i o n o f 
t h o u g h t t o i t s o b j e c t . To t h i s e x t e n t i t i s t r u e t o say, 
as does Habermas, t h a t Hegel abandons t h e problem o f know-
l e d g e , and m t h e ' i n t r o d u c t i o n ' t o t h e Phenomenology, as 
we have seen, he produces s t r o n g reasons f o r d o i n g t h i s . 
What Hegel does t a k e up m t h e body o f t h e Phenomenology, 
however, i s those past p h i l o s o p h i e s i n so f a r as t h e y are t o 
be found i n t n e o r d i n a r y consciousness o f the t i m e . They 
are subsumed under t h e account o f t h e appearance o f knowledge 
m t h e contemporary c u l t u r e . So what we might choose t o 
see as a problem p e c u l i a r t o p h i l o s o p h y Hegel sees as p a r t 
and p a r c e l o f t h e g e n e r a l o u t l o o k o f the t i m e . He suggests 
t h a t t h e problem i s g e n e r a t e d by t h i n k i n g which opposes 
t h o u g h t t o an An s i c h o r mind t o r e a l i t y . I t i s a g a i n The 
problem posed by b i f u r c a t e i t h i n k i n g . Vrhat Hegel argues i s 
t h a t t h i s problem p e r t a i n s j u s t as much t o the 'problem o f 
knowledge' o f p h i l o s o p h y as t o t h e t h i n k i n g o f t h e n a t u r a l 
consciousness o f h i s epoch. Thus t h e process o f l e a d i n g 
t h e n a t u r a l consciousness t o s c i e n c e i s a l s o i n h i s view t h e 
d e f i n i t i v e answer, i f one i s r e q u i r e d , t o t h e problem concern-
i n g t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h o u g h t t o i t s o b j e c t . We have y e t a n o t h e r 
reason t h e n why t h e r e s h o u l d be two s u b j e c t s t o the Phenonenoiogy. 
There i s , as we know, t h e o r d i n a r y p a r t i c u l a r consciousness 
w h i c h has t o be l e d from p a r t i a l knowledge t o s c i e n c e and t h e 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness which has now a l s o t o be c o n v i n c e d 
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o f t h e n a t u r e o f knowledge. I n o t h e r words, a p a r t from 
h i s many o t h e r aims, Hegel wants t o convince o t h e r p h i l o s o p h -
e r s t h a t h i s e p i s t e m o l o g y i s r i g h t . P h i l o s o p h e r s may o f 
course o b j e c t t o t h i s , a r g u i n g t h a t i t i s an aim t h a t ought 
t o be pursued s e p a r a t e l y . A f t e r a l l , t h e y would c l a i m , 
t e a c h i n g t h e n a t u r a l consciousness t o t h i n k p r o p e r l y has 
v e r y l i t t l e t o do w i t h r e f u t i n g t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i e s o f t h e 
p r i n c i p a l Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s . Hegel c o u l d , however, say 
t h a t h i s e d u c a t i o n o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness m t h e Phen-
omenology i n v o l v e d r e v i v i n g t h ose p a s t t h e o r i e s o f knowledge 
i n such a manner t h a t t h e i r most t e l l i n g arguments had t o be met. 
He might even c l a i m t h a t t h e manner i n "which he d e a l s w i t h 
them m th e Phenomenology makes these arguments appear more 
c o n v i n c i n g s i n c e t h e y are d e a l t w i t h as viewL o f t h e contemp-
o r a r y man and n o t o f a past p h i l o s o p h e r . T h i s c l a i m i s n o t , 
a t f i r s t g l a n c e , a p l a u s i b l e one. I t i s however rne - l i k e 
Hegel's g e n e r a l defence o f h i s view - on which , Te ought t o 
r e s e r v e judgement u n t i l we have c o n s i d e r e d a s e c t i o n o f t h e 
Phenomeno1ogy t o which i t ought a p t l y t o a p p l y . We s h a l l 
come t o such a s e c t i o n l a t e r . 
F or t h e moment, however, we s h a l l s t a y w i t h Hegel's 
argument m the ' i n t r o d u c t i o n ' t o t he Phenomenology. For t h e 
argument now t a k e s an i n t e r e s t i n g t u r n . A f t e r a d m i t t i n g 
t h a t t o a l l i n t e n t s and purposes he w i l l abandon t h e problem 
o f knowledge Hegel confesses t h a t t h e r e i s something t o be 
s a i d f o r t h e apprehension f e l t by t h e Moderr P h i l o s o p h e r s 
about e n t e r i n g on p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t a c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h . 
2^2. 
Indeed, he says, h i s e n q u i r y 'seems unable t o t a k e p l a c e 
w i t h o u t some p r e s u p p o s i t i o n w h i c h can be l a i d as i t s b a s i s 
t o t e s t t h e r e a l i t y o f knowledge i t would appear t h a t such 
a s t a n d a r d was e s s e n t i a l . Hegel suggests t h a t we m i g h t 
c l a r i f y o u r i d e a s about t h i s n a t u r a l a p prehension o f ours i f 
we examine what we n o r n a l l y suppose t o t a k e p l a c e i n t h e 
process o f knowing. N o r m a l l y we suppose t h a t what i s t r u e 
about an o b j e c t i s what t h a t o b j e c t i s i n i t s e l f . I n our 
e x p e r i e n c e , Hegel c o n t i n u e s , t h i s assumption amounts t o t h e 
f a c t t h a t we d i f f e r e n t i a t e something from o u r s e l v e s t o w h i c h 
we a l s o r e l a t e . We r e g a r d "Che o b j e c t as something f o r us 
m t h i n k i n g o f i t as something known, but e q u a l l y we r e g a r d 
i t as something m i t s e l f i n o r d e r t h a t something may be 
known. Hegel t a k e s t h i s l a t t e r aspect o f t h e process o f 
knowing t o i m p l y t h a t t h e o b j e c t assumes the form o f b e i n g 
f o r us. Now, Hegel p o i n t s o u t t h a t b o t h t h e o b j e c t as i t 
i s f o r us and i s i n i t s e l f i s something t h a t we p o s i t . We 
may d i s t i n g u i s h t h e two m ou r e x p e r i e n c e b u t we have t o r e -
member t h a t i t i s a l l our e x p e r i e n c e and t h a t t h e r e f o r e i t 
i s a l l our d o i n g . As i t i s a l l o u r d o i n g , Hegel says, 'the 
i n i t s e l f o f t h e same., would much more so be i t s b e i n g f o r 
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us . I t would t h e n be wrong t o suppose t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d 
o f t r u t h were something e x t e r n a l t o o u r s e l v e s . I t i s most 
c e r t a i n l y , Hegel c l a i m s , i n t e r n a l t o o u r s e l v e s . By a c c e p t m 
as a s t a n d a r d 41 I f i t i s t o be an e n q u i r y w h i c h p u r p o r t s 
41. 
42. 
I b i d . , p.75-
i b i d . , p. J6. 
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t h i s view, however, we would l a n d o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h e 
a p p a r e n t l y i n s o l u b l e problem ' t h a t t h e essence o r s t a n d a r d 
would f a l l m us and t h a t w i t h w h i c h i t s h ould be compared 
and over which t h e comparison s h o u l d decide would n o t necess-
we had s e t up a s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h (what the t h i n g i s m i t s e l f ) 
w h i c h because i t was ours need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have a n y t h i n g 
t o do w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f t h e t h i n g . Because i t i s we who 
p o s i t t h e An s i c h i t appears as though we have a s t a n d a r d o f 
t r u t h t h a t i s n o t o b j e c t i v e . We would s i m p l y be comparing 
one t h o u g h t w i t h a n o t h e r . 
I t i s Hegel's view t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t h e c l a s s i c a l 
e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s have t h e i r f o u n d a t i o n i n an apparent c o n t r a d -
i c t i o n m t h e n o t i o n o f knowledge i t s e l f , a c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
w h i c h seemed t o r u l e out m advance any p o s s i b i l i t y o f depend-
a o l e knowledge. But t h e same appears t o h o l d f o r t h e Phenomen-
o l o g y . 'However,' Hegel argues, 'the n a t u r e o f t h e o b j e c t 
we are i n v e s t i g a t i n g t r a n s c e n d s t h i s d i v i s i o n o r t h i s sernblence 
, 44 
o f d i v i s i o n and p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . The o b j e c t t h a t Hegel 
i s i n v e s t i g a t i n g m th e Phenomeno]ogy i s , o f course, c o n s c i o u s -
ness. The s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h does n o t t h e r e f o r e b e l o n g 
merely t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r s i n c e t h e o b j e c t a t s e l f i s a b l e 
to d i s t i n g u i s h between what i t i s i n i t s e l f and what i t may 
appear t o be. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e n , t h e scandard of t r u t h 
a r i l y have t o r e c o g n i s e i t 43 The problem would be t h a t 
43- I b i d . 
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i s one t h a t belongs t o t h e objeec as w e l l . Consciousness 
can i t s e l f t e s t t h e t r u t h o f what i s s a i d o f i t . 'For 
consciousness, 'Hegel argues, ' i s cn t h e one hand c o n s c i o u s -
ness o f t h e o b j e c t , on t h e o t h e r hand consciousness o f i t -
s e l f : consciousness o f t h a t which t o i t i s t h e t r u t h and t h e 
consciousness o f i t s knowledge o f i t . T h e r e f o r e m what 
consciousness i t s e l f d e c l a r e s t o be t r u e we have our o b j e c t i v e 
s t a n d a r d of t r u t h . However Hegel h i m s e l f does n o t s e t g r e a t 
s t o r e by t h i s e v a s i o n o f t h e apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t h e 
n o t i o n o f knowledge. Rather what he s h o u l d l i k e t o see as 
a r e s u l t o f i t i s an e x t e n s i o n o f consciousness' own immanent 
s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h t o a l l t h e s c i e n c e s . I f t h a t e x t e n s i o n 
t o o k p l a c e t h e r e would, as we can see, be no c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
m t h e n o t i o n o f knowledge. We would do w e l l t o r e c a l l 
a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t Hegel's aim m th e Phenomenology i s i d e a l i s t . 
As we have seen, he wishes t o prove t h a t the ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' 
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n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y i s t h a t i t becomes S e l f . '.'he Phenomenol-
ogy i s t h e r e f o r e i n t e n d e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e r e i s no r e a l i t y 
which f a l l s o u t s i d e c onsciousness. So i t i s p r e c i s e l y m 
what consciousness i t s e l f d e c l a r e s t o be t r u e t h a t we have 
our o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h f o r , a l l b e i n g and t h e r e f o r e 
a l l t h e s c i e n c e s . A l l B e i n g i s c o n sciousness. The c o n t r a d -
i c t i o n o r what Hegel c a l l s t h e 'semblance o f d i v i s i o n and 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ' m th e n o t i o n o f knowledge now f a l l s away 
s i n c e what r e a l i t y i s m i t s e l f i s t h o u g h t . Since a l l t h a t 
t h e r e i s i s t h o u g h t , t r u t h can o n l y be a s c e r t a i n e d chrough 
the comparison o f one t h o u g h t w i t h a n o t h e r . 
T h i s , t h e n , i s t he view t h a t Hegel recommends t o those who 
have r e s e r v a t i o n s about knowledge. The view, as I have s t r e s s -
ed, i s v e r y p l a i n l y i d e a l i s t . We might t h e r e f o r e a l s o suppose 
t h a t i t i s t o o s u b j e c t i v e and t h u s l i k e l y t o encourage a r b i t -
a r i n e s s m th e s c i e n c e s . There i s however more t o Hegel's 
view t h a n t h a t . We have t o remember t h a t t h e consciousness 
o f w h i c h Hegel speaks m h i s n o t i o n o f t r u t h i s t h e c o n s c i o u s -
ness o f t h e s p i r i t o f t h e t i m e . I t i s t h e r e f o r e n o t an 
i s o l a t e d , merely a r b i t a r y c o nsciousness. Indeed the p a r t i c -
u l a r consciousness t h a t i s l e d t o s c i e n c e i s , we w i l l r e c a l l } 
a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l consciousness. The s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h 
t h a t consciousness c a r r i e s w i t h i n i t s e l f i s c o n s e q u e n t l y , 
even a t i t s l o w e r l e v e l s , a shared s t a n d a r d . The c o n s c i o u s -
ness o f 'what t o i t i s t r u t h 1 bears t h e marks o f what t r u t h 
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i s t o o t h e r s . ' T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y so f o r t h e consciousness 
o f A b s o l u t e Knowledge, Lhe l a s t stage i n t h e phenomenology 
o f mind, whi c h i s supposed t o c o n t a i n w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e r e a l i t y 
o f a l l t h e superceded modes o f consciousness. Thus p a r t o f 
Hegel's c l a i m i s t h a t what consciousness h o l d s t o be t r u e 
shows a r e s p e c t f o r what o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s h o l d t o be t r u e . 
47. P l a n t ( H e g e l , o p . c i t . , p. 87) would appear t o have t h e same 
p o i n t m mind when he says: 'Whereas f o r S c h e l l m g t h e A b s o l -
u t e which secured t h e harmony between man and t h e w o r l d was 
beyond Knowledge and amenable o n l y t o a p r i v a t e form o f i n t u -
i t i o n , f o r Hegel S p i r i t , t h e s t r u c t u r i n g p r i n c i p l e o f t h e 
w o r l d , showing i t s e l f b o t n i n n a t u r e and i n human l ^ f e and 
c u l t u r e , can b^ known by reason - an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e f a c u l t y . 
(My emphasis). 
2j6. 
The consciousness o f A b s o l u t e Knowledge does nob s i m p l y 
d i s c a r d t h e t h i n k i n g d i s p l a y e d by t h e o t h e r modes o f c o n s c i o u s -
ness; i t i ndeed seeks t o r a i s e i t s e l f above those o t h e r nodes 
o f t h i n k i n g b u t m a manner which p r e s e r v e s t h e e s s e n t i a l s 
o f those modes o f t h i n k i n g . Hegel t h e n has t o espouse an 
m t e r s u b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h . I n t h i s sense t h e H e g e l i a n 
s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h . , though i d e a l i s t , i s n o t a r b i t a r i l y s u b j e c t i v e 
I n h i s v i e w , t r u t h i s e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o f an m t e l l 
e c t u a l community. A l t h o u g h t h a t community does n o t e s t a b l i s h 
t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t forms t h e background 
a g a i n s t which he d e c i d e s on such a s t a n d a r d . 
The t r u t h - t e s t he expects t o take p l a c e i n each i n d i v i d -
u a l ' s mind when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a h y p o t h e s i s about t h e w o r l d iz 
o f some im p o r t a n c e t o Hegel's account o f t h e phenomenology 
o f mind. As we have seen,what Hegel t h i n k s t a k e s p l a c e i n i t i a l l y 
^s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e o b j e c t t o be known 
i n two s i g n i f i c a n t ways. F i r s t l y , t h e r e i s che o b j e c t as 
we i n t u i t i t as something f o r us t o know; second l y t n e r e i s 
t h e o b j e c t as we are t o know i t , t h e r e f o r e , as i t i s i n i t s e l f . 
I n t h e f i r s t r e l a t i o n we are a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel a c t i v e and 
i n t h e second p a s s i v e . Hegel b e l i e v e s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
normaLly t a k e s t h i s second p a s s i v e r e l a t i o n t o be t h e t r u t h . 
Now,as we have j a s t seen, Kegel c l a i m s t h a t an the s c i e n c e o f 
consciousness these two aspects o f t r u t h f a l l t o g e t h e r m th e 
one o b j e c t - c o n s c i o j s n e s s . Consciousnpss i s a b l e t o d i s t i n g -
u i s h f o r i t s e l f what i t i s i n i t s e l f . I t i s t h e r e f o r e a o l e 
t o t e s t f o r i t s e l f whether the t h e o r y o f consciousness d e p i c t s 
consciousness as i t i s m i t s e l f . Since i t i s c o n v e r s a n t 
w i t h concepts ( t h e 'for us') and i s t h e o b j e c t o f t h e t h e o r y 
( t h e 'm i t s e l f ' ) i t i s , m Hegel's words, a b l e t o t e s t whether 
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t h e concept corresponds t o t h e o b j e c t . I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
where t h a t t h e o r y i s found t o be i n a d e q u a t e i t has t o be 
a l t e r e d t o co r r e s p o n d w i t h i t s o b j e c t . 'However', Hegel 
c l a i m s , 'm t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s knowledge t h e o b j e c t 
i t s e l f i n f a c t changes, f o r t h e e x i s t i n g knowledge was essen-
t i a l l y a knowledge o f the o b j e c t ; w i t h t h e knowledge i t 
i t s e l f becomes a n o t h e r f o r i t e s s e n t i a l l y belonged t o t h i s 
. 4Q 
knowledge . - T h i s i s an odd c l a i m . We are f i r s t t o l d 
t h a t where t h e t h e o r y w r o ngly d e p i c t s consciousness i t ' ought 
t o be changed, b u t we are th e n t o l d t h a t t h i s c o r r e c t i o n 
e n t a i l s t h a t what consciousness i s b o t h f o r i t s e l f and i n 
i t s e l f has changed. What are we t o make o f t h i s 9 We have 
now t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t what consciousness d i s t i n g u i s h e s from 
i t s e l f t h e _an s i c h t h a t serves as t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h , i s 
s u b j e c t t o change. I t changes a p p a r e n t l y as t h e t h e o r y o f 
consciousness i s r e v i s e d . But i t would seem t h a t t h e 
an s i c h i f i t i s t o be t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h , s h o u l d remain 
unchanged. I t ought, we might suppose, t o be t h e f i x e d 
g o a l o f t h e e n q u i r y . What Hegel apnears t o be s a y i n g howeve 
i s t h a t i n t h e course o f t h e s t u d y o f consciousness t h e t r u t h 




t h a t ' m the uransformation o f t h i s knowledge t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f 
i n f a c t changes'. But, whatever Hegel's view o f t h e m a t t e r 
may be, o b j e c t s are n o t t h e k i n d o f t h i n g s t h a t a l t e r as a 
r e s u l t o f a change i n our knowledge. I t may w e l l be t h e 
case, as Hegel c l a i m s , t h a t as a r e s u l t o f t e s t i n g t h e t h e o r y 
o f consciousness our view o f what our consciousness i s and 
t h e r e f o r e o ur consciousness w i l l be a l t e r e d . None o f t h i s 
i s t o say however t h a t what i s supposed t o be t h e o b j e c t o f 
t h e Phenomenology, consciousness m i t s e l f , has changed. 
Because what has changed as a r e s u l t o f new knowledge i s n o t 
t n e o b j e c t o f Hegel's e n q u i r y b u t merely t h e t h i n k i n g o f one o f 
i t s r e a d e r s . Even l e - s w i l l i t do f o r Hegel t o c l a i m t h a t 
j u s t t h a t r e p r e s e n t s a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e o b j e c t o f h i s 
t h e o r y because t h e t h e o r y p r e c i s e l y foresaw ohe change. I f 
t h e t h e o r y has t o a w a i t a r e a d e r b e f o r e i t s o b j e c t changes 
i t cannot i t s e l f be s a i d t o have changed i t s o b j e c t . Tnere-
f o r e i t i s o n l y m a m i s l e a d i n g sense t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f 
consciousness can be s a i d t o cnange i t s o b j e c t . I t i s even 
more m i s l e a d i n g when i t r e s t s on t h e more g e n e r a l c l a i m , as 
i t does w i t h Hegel, t h a t knowledge somehow a l t e r s o b j e c t s ; 
because what i s i m p l i e d i s t h a t t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h t he Phenomen-
o l o g y w i l l g i v e us a new c o n c r e t e o b j e c t . 
I n d eed, t h e t r u t h - t e s t t h a t consciousness o p e r a t e s 
i n r e a d i n g t h e Phencrneao 1 ogy i s so i m p o r t a n t t o Hegel precis-
e l y because i t has t h a t i m probable r e s u l t : a new o b j e c t appears. 
Consciousness m t e s t i n g t h e Irneory o f i t s e l f f i n d s t h a t t he 
' o b j e c t i t s e l f does n o t h o l d o u t ' 5 0 because i t d i s c o v e r s 
50. i b i d . p. 73 - 79-
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t h a t what : t t h o u g h t i t was m I t s o I f was n o t c o r r e c t . We 
have a l r e a d y p r o t e s t e d , however, t h a t o b j e c t s are n o t t h e 
k i n d s o f t h i n g s t h a t are t r a n s f o r m e d by a change m our 
knowledge. I t may w e l l be t h a t we can say t h a t my c o n s c i o u s -
ness has a l t e r e d as a r e s u l t o f a change m what I know, b u t 
as an o b j e c t i t has n o t a l t e r e d m t h e l e a s t s i n c e one o f 
S I 
i t s p r o p e r t i e s as an o b j e c t i s t h a t i t i s s u b j e c t t o change.-" 
We s h a l l have t o bear w i t h Hegel on t h i s p o i n t , however, as 
what he has t o say about i t i s o f c e n t r a ] i m portance t o our 
i n t e r e s t . Our i n t e r e s t i s , o f course, i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f 
Hegel's e p i s t e m o l o g y t o h i s t h e o r y o f e x p e r i e n c e . And i t 
i s t h e process o f consciousness g a i n i n g a new view o f i t s e l f 
i n t h e Phenomenology o f Mind t h a t Hegel d e s c r i b e s as e x p e r i e n c e : 
'This d i a l e c t i c a l movement which consciousness p e r p e t r a t e s 
on i t s e l f as w e l l as on i t s knowledge and i t s o b j e c t - i n 
so f a r as a new o b j e c t a r : s e s from i t - i s i n f a c t t h a t which 
i s c a l l e d e x p e r i e n c e / We may t a k e i t t h a t what g i v e s 
r i s e t o e x p e r i e n c e i s t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s -
ness t e s t i n g t h e t r u t h o f s t a t e m e n t s about i t s e l f . Even-
t h e n i t cannot be s a i d t o have 'experienced' u n l e s s , as a 
r e s u l t o f comparing t h e account o f i t s e l f w i t h i t s p i c t u r e 
o f i t s e l f , i t s own view o f i t s e l f has changed. Only when 
an i n d i v i d u a l ' s consciousness appears m a new l i g h t t o 
51. Hegel's clanm i s o f t h e same K i n d as t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t 
because the weather has changed weather i t s e l f h a s changed. 
Weather, as we a l l know, does n o t however become a new o o j e c r 
f o r u s as a r e s u l t o f a change m i t . I t i s t h e same old 
weather. We may f o r i n s t a n c e d e s c r i b e a h o t s p e l l a s m a r K i n p , 
'a change i n t h e w e a t h e r 1 . Bui. we c a n h a r d l y say t h a t weather 
qaa o b j e c t has changed. Otherwise a change m t h e weather 
would almost c e r t a i n l y e n t a i l t h e e n d o f mete o r o l o g y . 
52. Hegel. Werke^J, p. ?8. 
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h i m s e l f has he, a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, 'experienced'. Since 
Hegel a s s o c i a t e s t h i s w i t h t h e appearance o f a new o b j e c t he 
p u t s i t m t h i s way: s i n c e t h a t 'new o b j e c t c o n t a i n s a n o t h i n g -
ness o f t h e f i r s t , i t i s t h e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s made about 
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i t ' . ^ The i n d i v i d u a l must appear i n a new l i g h t t o h i m s e l f , 
t h e n , m t h e sense t h a t he has a c q u i r e d a new consciousness 
o f h i m s e l f . The e x p e r i e n c e t h a t he has o f h i m s e l f , t h e r e f o r e , 
i s o f t h e b r e a k i n g - u p o f h i s i n i t i a l e s t i m a t i o n o f h i m s e l f . 
F o r t h i s reason Hegel d e s c r i b e s t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e o r d i n a r y 
consciousness m t h e Phenomenology as 'the l o s s o f i t s e l f ' 
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f o r on t h a t p a t h i t l o s e s i t s t r u t h . The account o f 
e x p e r i e n c e can t h e r e f o r e 'be seen as the p a t h o f doubt o r 
more p r e c i s e l y as t h e p a t h o f d e s p a i r ' , ( l b . ) But s i n c e 
t h i s p a t h o f d e s p a i r i s a l s o t h e 'conscious i n s i g h t i n t o t h e 
u n t r u t h o f seeming knowledge' i t i s t h e most a p p o s i t e and 
complete t h e o r y o f knowledge. Consciousness m l o s i n g 
i t s e l f g a m s , m Hegel's view, s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and u l t i m -
a t e l y A b s o l u t e Knoweldge. 
Ex p e r i e n c e and e p i s t e m o l o g y , f o r Hegel, c o i n c i d e i n t h e 
t r u t h - t e s t t o which consciousness s u b j e c t s i t s e l f m t h e s c i e n c e 
o f c o nsciousness. Through t h a t t e s t consciousness l e a r n s 
b o t h t h e f a l s e h o o d o f seeming knowledge and t h e t r u e n a t u r e 
o f e x p e r i e n c e . That t e s t i s t h e r e f o r e a l l i m p o r t a n t m t h e 
make-up o f t h e phenomenology o f mind. I t i s t h e comparison 
o f t h e i n i t s e l f o f consciousness w i t h t h e t h e o r y o f c o n s c i o u s -
ness whic h i s f o r i t s e J f which produces e'c each stage t h e new 
53- I b i d . , p. (1 
54. I b i d . , p. 72. 
2 4 l . 
mode o f consciousness. I n o t h e r words, i t i s t h a t t e s t t h a t 
i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e t r a n s i t i o n from one mode o f c o n s c i o u s -
ness t o a n o t h e r . I t i s t h e r e f o r e what we might c a l l t h e 
motor o f t h e process o f t h e Phenomenology o f Mind. I t i s 
what i n d u c e s t h e change i n t h e V o r s t e l l u n g e n i n consciousness 
i t s e l f . I t b r i n g s about f o r consciousness i t s e l f , Under-
s t a n d i n g and Reason, o r what Hegel c a l l s das F u r - e s - S e l n d i e s e s 
An s i c h : t h e b e i n g f o r i t s e l f o f t h i s m i t s e l f . Through 
th e process the o t h e r n e s s o f consciousness' n o t i o n of what 
i t i s i n i t s e l f i s s u b v e r t e d . From i t s b e i n g a consciousness 
o f i t s e l f w h i c h i s f i x e d and unchangeable i t becomes one w h i c h 
i t a p p r o p r i a t e s t o i t s e l f and t h e r e b y g i v e s i t s e l f a new con-
s c i o u s n e s s m t h e Phenomenology. I t d r i v e s i t on because 
i t s f i x e d and s t a b l e view o f i t s e l f becomes s u b j e c t t o doubt. 
The c o l l a p s e o f i t s o l d w o r l d l e a d s i t t o b u i l d a new one. 
At t h e same t i m e , however, doubt i s r e v i v e d by t h e t r u t h - t e s t , 
so t h e new w o r l d c o l l a p r e s m i t s t u r n . Hegel's cheory o f 
knowledge, i n d e e d , shakes t h e w o r l d o f t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s -
ness t o i t s f o u n d a t i o n s wxth t h e most r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m ; b u t 
i t o f f e r s m i t s p l a c e , t h r o u g h b r i n g i n g i n t o s y s t e m a t i c o r d e r 
t h e v a r i o u s modes o f consciousness, e v e n t u a l peace o f mind. 
T r u t h o r t h e r e a l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e i s not, Hegel cla.ims, t h e 
c o n t i n u e d c o l l a p s e o f t h e w o r l d o f the o r d i n a r y consciousness 
bu t t he s c i e n t i f i c knowledge o f t h a t p r o cess. As 'the exper-
i e n c e t h a t consciousness makes about i t s e l f can, a c c o r d i n g 
t o i t s concept, comprise i n n o t h i n g l e s s t h a t t h e whole system 
o f consciousness o r t h e wnole realm o f t h e t r u t h o f Mind..'-' 
55- I b i d . p. 80. 
W i t h t h i s Hegei b r i n g s t o an end h i s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t l e d t o t h e problem o f knowledge i n Modern 
P h i l o s o p h y . The r e a d e r may w e l l b r e a t h e a s i g h o f r e l i e f , 
f o r Hegel's argument f o l l o w s so many r a p i d t w i s t s and t u r n s 
t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o keep i n mind t h e e s s e n t i a l s o f h i s 
p o s i t i o n . We might do w e l l t h e n t o r e v i e w the most i m p o r t a n t 
o f o u r c o n c l u s i o n s m o r d e r t h a t we may ensure t h a t we have 
n o t l o s t t r a c k o f our theme. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e we may see 
Hegel's c o n c l u s i o n as a f a r c r y from t h e account o f e x p e r i e n c e 
t h a t gave us t h e problem o f knowledge. A f t e r a l l , e x p e r i e n c e 
m much o f Modern P h i l o s o p n y meant no more t h a n what e n t e r e d 
t h e mind v i a t h e senses. But i t ought by now t o be c l e a r 
t h a t Hegel's account o f e x p e r i e n c e has e v e r y t h i n g t o do w i t h 
h i s r e c e p t i o n o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y . As I have argued, t h e 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f Modern P h i l o s o p h y was w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g t r i e 
l i m i t s o r r e a l i t y o f knowledge. T h i s we can see m s e v e r a l 
ways: perhaps, as does o p i n o z a , as the attempt t o d i s c o v e r 
how i t i s t h a t we know what we know, o r perhaps as does Hegel, 
as t h e a t t e m p t t o d i s c o v e r how t h o u g h t r e l a t e s t o i t s o b j e c t . 
Whichever way we see i t , i t i s s t i l l t h e same problem: are 
we r e a l l y a b l e t o a s p i r e t o o b j e c t i v e knowledge? I t was 
supposed i n t h i s e n q u i r y , and we can see t h i s most t y p i c a l l y 
m t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i e s o f Locke and Kant, f i r s t l y , t n a t we as 
t h i n k e r s s t o o d on t h e one s i d e s e p a r a t e d from the o b j e c t t o 
be known, and s e c o n d l y , t h a t t he o b j e c t was unique i n i t s e l f , 
and, t h i r d l y , t h a t knowledge was t h e meeting o f s u b j e c t and 
o b j e c t t h r o u g h the t h i n k e r becoming a c q u a i n t e d W L t h what t h e 
o b j e c t was m i t s e l f . However, i n Hegel's view, what t h e 
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c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s i g n o r e d m supposing a l l t h i s was 
t h a t wnat a t h i n g i s m i t s e l f can o n l y be a t h o u g h t - c o n s t r u c -
t i o n . T h e i r s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h , i n s t e a d o f b e i n g something 
m a t e r i a l 'out t h e r e ' , c o u l d o n l y be an i d e a . On p u r e l y e p i s t -
e m o l o g i c a l grounds Hegel appears t o be r i g h t i n c l a i m i n g t h i s , 
f o r w hatever we d e cide t o adopt as our s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h m 
an e n q u i r y we can o n l y adopt i t as an I d e a . Thus t h e comparison 
t h a t t a k e s p l a c e m t e s t i n g t h e t r u t h o f an e x p l a n a t i o n i s 
always one between one i d e a and a n o t h e r . So t h a t t o p o s t u l a t e 
a t h i n g m i t s e l f as t h e s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h , as d i d t h e c l a s s i c a l 
e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s , has t o be seen as j u s t t h a t : s e t t i n g up an 
i d e a , a l b e i t an i d e a o l t he o b j e c t i v i t y o f t h i n g s , as a s t a n d a r d 
o f t r u t h . T h i s means t h a t t h e r e i s a d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e view-
p o i n t o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o ] o g y because i t p o s t u l a t e s as i t s 
s t a n d a r d o f t r u t h t he o b j e c t i n i t s p r i s t i n e , u n t hought form: 
and t h i s i s p a t e n t l y i m p o s s i b l e . Now, Hegel's s u g g e s t i o n 
i s t h a t o n l y by r e g a r d i n g knowledge as an appearance m t h e 
consciousness o f our t i m e can t h i s d i f f i c u l t y be overcome. 
I t i s a s e n s i b l e enough s u g g e s t i o n s i n c e , as Hegel h i m s e l f 
p o i n t s out, we can o n l y know what r e a l i t y our knowledge has 
a f t e r i t has a r r i v e d on the scene. However Hegel goes on 
t o say t h a t s i n c e i t i s merely a phenomenon m our t i m e what 
t h a t r e a l i t y i s , i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r . For i t t o become 
c l e a r t o us we have t o overcome t h e phenomenality o f i t s 
e x i s t e n c e . The r e a l i t y of knowledge i s t h e r e f o r e t h e phenomen-
ol o g y o f t h e s p i r i t o f our t i m e . I t i s i n thi_s c o n t e x t t h a t 
t h e o r d i n a r y t e s t o f t r u t h - and i t i s Hegel's s u g g e s t i o n t h a t 
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t h i s JS a l l that t h e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m -
o l o g y amounts t o - comes i n t o i t s own f o r Hegel. The e x i s -
tence o f t h e t e s t i s a p o s i t i v e advantage f o r t he p h i l o s o p h e r 
who seeks t o l e a d t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness t o r e a l knowledge. 
For, i f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness t e s t s t h e t r u t h o f t h e 
phenomenology o f mind i n t h a t f a s h i o n i t w i l l , so Hegel c l a i m s , 
engender t h e d i a l e c t i c a l process w h i c h i s EXPERIENCE. Indeed 
i t i s t h a t process t h a t g i v e s movement t o t h e Phenomenology 
o f Mind. As we have seen, t h e o r d i n a r y t e s t o f t r u t h i n 
t h e Phenomenology o r i n g s about a change i n consciousness 
i t s e l f . Now t h i s accords w i t h t h e consummate s c e p t i c i s m o f 
t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness t n a t p r e s e n t s t h e phencmenol~ 
o g i c a l process because consciousness m t e s t i n g t h e t r u t h o f 
what t h e p h i l o s o p h e r has t o say o f i t c o n t i n u a l l y d i s c o v e r s 
t h a t i t s view o f i t s e l f i s u n t r u e . I n t h e course o f t h a t 
" e s t i n g c onsciousness, as we see, always changes i t s view o f 
i t s e l f and i t i s t h a t change t h a t Hegel c a l l s e x p e r i e n c e . 
One t h i n g i s c l e a r t h e n : t h i s i s n o t e x p e r i e n c e as t h e p a s s i v e 
s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n o f o b j e c t s . Indeed f a r from i t g i v i n g r i s e 
t o problems o f knowledge i t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, t h e p a t h 
t o t h e f u l l e s t c o n c r e t e knowledge. I t i s an e x p e r i e n c e i n 
w hich we p a r t i c i p a t e and m which, i f o n l y as t h i n k e r s , we 
are a c t i v e and m which, a g a i n i f o n l y i n t h e same l i m i t e d 
c a p a c i t y , we change and develop. 
There are two a s p e c t s , m Hegel's view, t o t h i s o ur p a r t i c -
i p a t i o n m e x p e r i e n c e . F i r s t t h e r e i s t h a t s i d e t o our p a r t i c i p -
a t i o n m e x p e r i e n c e whicti,Hegel says, engenders a new o b j e c t f o r 
us. V/hat nappens i s t h a t i n comparing t h e t h e o r y o f consciousness 
2^ 5-
w i t h t h e view t h a t we have o f our own consciousness o r , i f 
one wishes, m comparing t h a t t h e o r y w i t h o u r e x p e r i e n c e , our 
view o f our e x p e r i e n c e changes. I n Hegel's terms, i t becomes 
our new o b j e c t . Second, and i t i s t h i s a spect t h a t r e p e a t s 
what we have a l r e a d y had t o say o f Hegel's n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e 
i n t h e l a s t Chapter, t h e r e i s t h a t s i d e t o our e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h 
undermines consciousness' o b j e c t i v i t y . I n e x p e r i e n c i n g our-
s e l v e s m a new l i g h t , t h e p r e v i o u s o b j e c t - t h e i n i t i a l view 
we have o f o u r s e l v e s - i s suppressed. T h e r e f o r e , n o t o n l y 
do we have t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t a new o b j e c t i s g e n e r a t e d m 
the course o f our e x p e r i e n c e but t h a t t h e o l d o b j e c t becomes 
n o t h i n g f o r us. I t i s , as we would expect from our d i s c u s s -
i o n m th e l a s t Chapter, t h i s l a t t e r aspect o f Hegel's account 
o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t t r i u m p h s a t the end. I n A b s o l u t e Knowledge, 
t h e l a s t stage m the Phenomenology o f Mind, no new o b j e c t 
j s generated by t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f consciousness. I t i s t h e 
p o i n t a t w n i c h consciousness ' d i s c a r d s t h e appearance o f b e i r g 
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encumbered w i t h what i s a l i e n t o i t ' , and becomes s i m p l y 
the consciousness o f t h e s c i e n c e o f consciousness. 
^6. Hegel.Werke j5, p. 81. 
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SENSE-CERTAINTY AND PERCEPTION 
That t h e n i s how, i n my view, t h e problem o f knowledge 
o f Modern Ph i l o s o p h y i s s u e s i n t o Hegel's r a d i c a l l y m o d i f i e d 
account o f e x p e r i e n c e : The Phenomenology o f Mind. 
We must now examine some o f t h e d e t a i l s o f t h a t 
work m o r d e r t o s u b s t a n t i a t e oar v i e w . o f Hegel's 
account o f e x p e r i e n c e and indeed our g e n e r a l view o f h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y . Our view o f t h e for m e r s c a r c e l y r e q u i r e s r e -
p e a t i n g ; b u t , i t m i g h t be w e l l , i f o n l y t o r e f r e s h our memory, 
t o i n d i c a t e once a g a i n t h e most i m p o r t a n t o f our c o n c l u s i o n s 
about Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y m g e n e r a l . The most s i g n i f i c a n t 
o f o ur c o n c l u s i o n s was, I t h i n k , t h a t t h e view c e n t r a l t o 
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y i s t h a c a l l p h i l o s o p h y i s m a c r i t i c a l 
c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past p h i l o s o p h i e s . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t he 
t h i n k s o f p h i l o s o p h y as b e i n g f i r s t and foremost a s e t t l i n g 
o f accounts w i t h t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y . Doing p h i l o s o p h y , 
t h e n , has f o r him t h e l i t e r a l sense o f s t u d y i n g and c r i t i c a l l y 
a b s o r b i n g p a s t p h i l o s o p h y . So much as Hegel's answer t o t h e 
problem o f Knowledge i s , Yes. we have dependable knowledge, 
i t i s a phenomenon m each and everyone's e x p e r i e n c e , so a l s o 
i s h i s answer t o What i s p h i l o s o p h y ? m a t t e r o f f a c t . I t i s , 
be says " s i m p l y what has r e c e i v e d t h a t name m o u r c u l t u r e 
and what i s p r e s e r v e d f o r us i n the works o f past p h i l o s o p h e r s . 
The p a r a l l e l goes deeper t h a n t h a t though - and I t h i n k t h i s 
i s because t h e r e i s u l t i m a t e l y no d i f f e r e n c e i n Hegel's mind 
between t h e appearance o f knowledge and t n e course o f tne 
H i s t o r v o f p h i l o s o p h y - f o r j a s t as the r e a l problem o f 
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knowledge c o n s i s t s f o r him m t h e overcoming o f i t s 
a p p a r e n t l y c h a o t i c e x i s t e n c e m the c u l t u r e o f t h e ciir.e, so 
d o i n g p h i l o s o p h y c o n s i s t s , m h i s view, m t h e overcoming o f 
the a p p a r e n t l y hap-hazard appearance o f p h i l o s o p h y i n i t s 
h i s t o r y . The second most s i g n i f i c a n t o f our c o n c l u s i o n s 
was, 1 t h i n k , t h a t i f t h e r e i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n m Hegel's 
p h i l o s o p h y i t i s t h a t i t assumes as p a r t o f i t s approach t h a t 
t h e r e i s an a l i e n , m a t e r i a l e x t e r n a l w o r l d b u t , on t h e o t h e r 
hand, assumes t h a t t h e a l i e n w o r l d i s n o t . We concluded t h a t 
Hegel's assumption t h a t t h e r e was a w o r l d e x t e r n a l t o t h e 
mind i s g r a t u i t o u s . He appears o n l y t o assume i t m ord e r 
t h a t i t might be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o Mind. 
T h i s i s an a p p r o p r i a t e p o i n t a t w h i c h t o b c g j n our 
a n a l y s i s o f t h e f i r s t Chapters o f t h e Phenomenology s i n c e 
t h e y b e g i n p r e c i s e l y by assuming an e x t e r n a l w o r l d , t h a t i s , 
'the knowledge w h i c h i s f i r s t o r i m m e d i a t e l y our o b j e c t . . t h e 
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knowledge o f t h e immediate' o r t h a t which i s . What we 
are f i r s t p r e s e n t e d w i t h on l o o k i n g a t Mind o r S p i r i t as i t 
e x i s t s m consc i o u s n e s s , Hegel c l a i m s , i s t h e knowledge o f 
sense c e r t a i n t y ( s m n l i c h e G e w i s s h e i t ) . Hegel suggests t h a t 
i t "appears t o o f f e r t h e r i c h e s t k i n d o f knowledge t o c o n s c i o u s -
ness. I t o f f e r s t o consciousness a l l t h e r i c h d a t a o f t h e 
senses, t h e o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e unimpaired by any o b s t a c l e 
and t h e r e f o r e m t h e i r f u l l n e s s . From a l l we have s a i d about 
t h e r o l e o f oast p h i l o s o p h i e s i n Hegel's system i t i s c l e a r 
57. I b i d . , p. 82. 
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t h a t we can see t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the i n i t i a l e x p e r i e n c e 
o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness as b e i n g a l s o a d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . Among th e Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s , 
Hegel i s most l i k e l y t o have i n mind Locke and Hume s i n c e t h e y 
are t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s who s e t so much s t o r e by t h e knowledge 
i m p a r t e d by our sense-experience. L i k e t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u 
ness when i t b e g i n s e x p e r i e n c i n g , t h e y t a k e the knowledge o f 
t h e immediate t o be t h e r i c h e s t k i n d o f knowledge. L e t us 
see, t h e n , how Hegel t a c k l e s t h i s p o s i t i o n . 
He c h a r a c t e r i s e s i t as t h e view t h a t t r u t h i s t o be 
a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h our mere appre h e n s i o n ( A u f f a s s u n g ) of 
o b j e c t s and seeks, as a i d Hume, t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s apprehen-
s i o n o f o b j e c t s from t h e i r c o n c e p t u a l comprehension ( B e g r e i f e e 
The f o r m e r mode o f c o g n i t i o n b e i n g i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e t r u t h , 
the l a t t e r c o u l d o n l y be seen as b e i n g 3 ess t h a t adequate t o 
i t . We m i g h t a g a i n , as d i d Hume, see i t as c o n t a i n i n g i n f e r -
ences t h a t were o n i y ours and n o t h i n g t o do w i t h o b j e c t s them-
s e l v e s . Hegel i s p r e p a r e d t o admit t h a t t h e r e appears t o be 
something t o t h i s p o s i t i o n . What ou r senses l e t i n , he says, 
seems t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e p u r e s t and t r u e s t knowledge. The 
i m p r e s s i o n s t h e y i m p a r t appear t o be wha.t t h i n g s a r e . And 
t h a t i s what knowledge should be. But would we however be 
c o r r e c t t o m a i n t a i n t h i s p o s i t i o n ? Since, Hegel c o n t m u a s , 
' i t a s s e r t s o f what i t knows t h i s a l o n e : i t i s ; and i t s t r u t h 
Kg 
o n l y c o n t a i n s t h e b e i n g o f t h e t h i n g ' . ' ' " I s i t n o t , he says, 
on t h e c o n t r a r y t h e p o o r e s t k i n d o f t r u t h * 5 1, t h i s person, 
'am c e r t a i n of t m s t h i n g ' n o t because I have developed my 
i d e a s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i t o r because I have an a l y s e d i t from 
58. I o i d . 
249. 
t h e v i e w p o i n t s a f f o r d e d by : r s v a r i o u s p r o p e r t i e s - which 
o f course p l a c e i t m r e l a t i o n t o innumerable o t h e r t n i n g s -
b u t s i m p l y because i t i s . I t i s t h i s mere b e i n g t h a t i s most 
e s s e n t i a l t o sense-knowing o r , as Hegel says, ' t h i s pure 
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b e i n g o r s i m p l e immediacy c o n s t i t u t e s i t s t r u t h . We 
cannot r e s t a t t h i s , Hegel c l a i m s , s i n c e there i s a g r e a t 
d e a l more i m p l i e d m t h i s i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n o f consciousness 
t h a n i t cares t o a d m i t . N e i t h e r t h e I which i s supposed 
t o be c e r t a i n o f i t s o b j e c t p o r t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f are as 
d i r e c t l y p r e s e n t ( u n m i t t e l b a r ) as t h e e m p i r i c a l t h i n k e r 
s uggests. B o t h , a r e , as Hegel p u t s i t , mediated. T h i s , 
we s h a l l see, i s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y so, f o r , on t h e one hand, t h e 
s u b j e c t i s o n l y c e r t a i n o f t h e c b j e c r t h r o u g h i t s presence 
and, on the o t h e r hand, t h e o b j e c t only r e c e i v e s i t s s i g n i f -
i c a n c e as a d i r e c t l y p r e s e n t o b j e c t t h r o u g h t h e s u b j e c t . 
B o t h are dependent f o r t h e i r supposed immediacy on t h e o t h e r 
and a r e , t h e r e f o r e , mediated. Hegel, m b r i e f , i s o f t h e 
o p i n i o n t h a t t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness 
t h i n k s t o have found m t h e knowledge f u r n i s h e d by sense-exper-
i e n c e i s a m i s t a k e n c e r t a i n t y . I t i s a c e r t a i n t y t h a t i s 
based on t h e m i s g u i d e d n o t i o n t h a t , as we have a l r e a d y i n d i c a -
t e d , t h i n g s are r e v e a l e d t o us i n our s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s 
d i r e c t l y as t h e y a r e . The f a i t h o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousnes 
i s i n t h e d i -"ectness o f t h e r e l a t i o n . I n s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e , 
i t argues, I have n o t i n t e r f e r e d w i t h what i t i s I have t c 
know. Hegel's p o i n t i s , however, t h a t t h a t r e l a t i o n i s a l -
ready an i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h what i t i s I have t o know. Since 
i t i s a r e l a t i o n , no m a t t e r what, i t does n o t r e v e a l o b j e c t s 
59- xbid 
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t o us d i r e c t l y as t h e y a r e . They are as !_ s e n s e - p e r c e i v e 
them. E m p i r i c i s m t h e n , Hegel suggests, i s n o t o b j e c t i v e 
m t h e sense i t would l i k e t o be - u t t e r l y d e v o i d o f s u b j e c t i v e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I t does n o t e n j o y t h e p r i v i l e g e d immediate 
r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t s t h a t i t c o v e t s . I f i t d i d e n j o y t h a t 
r e l a t i o n , i t would, Hegel i m p l i e s , have a c h i e v e d t n e i m p o s s i b l e 
a r e l a t i o n w i t h o b j e c t s m which a l l n o t i o n o f r e l a t i o n d i s -
appears. Hegel seeks t o press home h i s p c m t w i t h a c o n s i d -
e r a t i o n o f t h e 'Here' and 'Now'. I n h i s view these are 
t h e two paramount n o t i o n s on w h i c h e m p i r i c i s t t h i n k i n g bases 
t h e c e r t a i n t y o f i t s knowledge: t h a t what i s crue i s here and 
now, o r s i m p l y immediate. But what i s here and now, Hegel 
shows, i s n o t h e i e and now. As soon as, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e 
s t a t e m e n t 'Now i s Midday' i s made i t i s no l o n g e r t h a t . As 
soon as we say Now t h a t now i s gone. The 'Here' i s e q u a l l y 
changeable; "what i s here depends on where I am. As soon as 
I change my p o s i t i o n o •> o t h e r w i s e a l ^ e r my f i e l d o f v i s i o n 
Here i s n o t h e r e . Indeed, Hegel adds, t h e f a c t t h a t these 
s o - c a l l e d t r u t h s o f common-sense t h i n k i n g can o n l y be expressed 
i n language means t h a t t h e y t r a n s c e n d bhe here and now: t h e y 
are n o t merely immediate. I f t h e y were, t h e y would be m u t t e r 
a b l e . As Hegel says, we c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y say a 'Here' and 
'Nov/' which was pure b e i n g . I n o t h e r words, we c o u l d n o t 
e v e r express t h i n g s i n a manner which would w h o l l y s a t i s f y 
t h e e m p i r i c i s t because any s a y i n g i n v o l v e s a r e t r a c t i o n o f 
t h a t d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o tine o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e which he 
c o v e t s . 
2 5 1 -
I n a t r a n s i t i o n o f the Phenomenology which o n l y t h e 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness observes, and n o t t h e e x p e r i e n c -
i n g consciousness, t h a t c e r t a i n t y which consciousness f i n d s 
i n s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y now comes t o be l o d g e d m t h e s u b j e c t 
a l o n e . For i f , as Hegel suggests, we t h e o b s e r v e r s l o o k 
a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n w hich consciousness stands as a r e s u l t 
o f d i s c o v e r i n g m th e d i a l e c t i c o f t h e here and now, t h a t i t 
cannot say what i t i n t e n d s t o say., we s h a l l see t h a t t he 
c e r t a i n t y which consciousness found i n sense-knowledge was 
a i l a l o n g one t h a t was f o r consciousness r a t h e r t h a n i n t h e 
o b j e c t s o f t h e senses. So we as p h i l o s o p h i c a l o b s e r v e r s 
p o i n t out t h a t t h e s t a r d a r d - o f t r u t h : immediate sense-know-
le d g e was one t h a t consciousness i t s e l f had e s t a b l i s h e d . 
The e x p e r i e n c i n g consciousness WD11,according t o Hegel, 
i n s i s t t h a t 'the power o f i t s t r u t h now l i e s m th e I ' . ^ 
I t a s s e r t s , m o t h e r words, t h a t what i s t r u e i s r r u e because 
i t s e n s e - p e r c e i v e s i t . Thus consciousness w i 1 ! i n s i s t , f o r 
i n s t a n c e , t h a t now i s day because I p e r c e i v e i t t o be so. 
We may r e c a l l t h a t i t was F i c h t e who, amongst t h e Modern 
P h i l o s o p h e r s , reduced the grounds f o r a l l c e r t a i n t y m Know -
ledge t o t h e I . I n h i s e s t i m a t i o n , even t a u t o l o g i c a l propos-
60. I b i d . p. 86. A l t h o u g h I have chosen t o show t h a t t h e f i r s t 
Chapters o f the Phenomenology p r e s e n t p o i n t s o f view t h a t 
p a r a l l e l many o f those t o be found m the h i s t o r y o f Modern 
P h i l o s o p h y t h i s does n o t mean t h a t such a p a r a l l e l must be 
c o n f i n e d t o t h a t . Hegel, as I have argued, e n t e r s i n t o a 
d i a l o g a e w i t h t h e whole h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y . Thus m 
t h i s i n s t a n c e we c o u l d j u s t as w e l l see him as o b j e c t i n g t o 
P r o t a g o r a s ' t h e o r y o f knowledge as t o t h a t o f F i c h t e . Hegel 
h i m s e l f n m t s as much i n h i s r e v i e w of P r o t a g o r a s ' p n i l o s o n h y 
m h i s L e c t v s o n c he H J. S t o r y o f P h 1 1 o s o oh y V o l . I . pp. '428 -
434 Werke TB. 
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l t i o n s were t r u e o n l y because o f t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t i n u i t y 
o f t h e I . So, as we would e x p e c t , t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t Hegel 
(qua p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) r a i s e s t o t h e s o l i p s i s m o f 
th e o r d i n a r y consciousness i s t h e same as t h e one he r a i s e s 
when d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h F i c h t e ' s s o l i p s i s m . I t 
i s t h a t when a l l b e i n g and knowledge i s reduced t o t h e I a l l 
t h a t we are l e f t w i t h as knowledge i s mere o p i n i o n . And, 
o f course, t h a t w i l l not do. I t means t h a t t h e a f f i r m a t i o n 
o f one i n d i v i d u a l 1 i s j u s t as good as any o t h e r . I n 
q u e s t i o n s o f t r u t h , t h e n , what I a f f i r m t o be t r u e w i l l be 
e q u a l l e d and indeed c a n c e l l e d out by whac a n o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l 
i n s i s t s i s t h e case. The n e x t stage i n t h e d i a l e c t i c o f 
s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y , however, removes t h i s cause f o r u n c e r t a i n t y , 
i t shows t h a t what t h e i n d i v i d u a l I means when i t says t h a t 
I am c e r t a i n o f t h i s , i s t h a t I as u n i v e r s a l am c e r t a i n o f 
t h i s , i n o t h e r words, i f you were i n my p o s i t i o n you would 
a f f i r m t h e same. So t h a t m s a y i n g ' I , t h x & i n d i v i d u a l I 1 
I am a c t u a l l y s a y i n g , Hegel c l a i m s , 'every I ; everyone i s t h a t 
what I say: I t h i s i n d i v i d u a l I ' . ^ There i s no s u o h t i l i n g 
as an i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l I : we are a l l i n d i v i d u a l s and sub-
j e c t s . Kegel t h e r e f o r e suggests t h a t t h e t a s k t h a t F i c h r e 
s e t h i m s e l f : t h e d e d u c t i o n o f t h e w o r l d from t h e I , was w h o l l y 
m i s c o n c e i v e d s i n c e as soon as what he deduces i s s a i d i t cease 
t o be merely a mine and i s an u n i v e r s a l . 
We have t h e r e f o r e g o t t o t h i s stage i n t h e d i a l e c t i c o f 
s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y : Consciousness, as Hegel c l a i m s , has j u s t 
6 1 . Hegel. Werke 3, p. 87. 
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t t h e essence o f sense-awareness i s t o he 
found n e i t h e r i n t h e o b j e c t n o r m th e s u b j e c t . As a 
r e s u l t o f t h i s d i s c o v e r y , consciousness, he suggests, comes 
t o see t h e t r u t h o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y as a whole. Thus i t 
seeks t o a t t r i b u t e c e r t a i n t y n e i t h e r t o t h e I n o r t o t h e 
o b j e c t i n s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y , but r a t h e r a t t r i b u t e s c e r t a i n t y 
t o a sense-experience which 'excludes from i t s e l f . . . a l l 
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o p p o s i t i o n ' . Consciousness r e a c t s , t h e n , t o t h e d i a l e c t i c 
o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y by a t t e m p t i n g t o a v o i d those- one-sided 
p o s i t i o n s t h a t had l e d t o t n e d i a l e c t i c i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . 
A c c o r d i n g t o ^ e g e l i t t r i e s t o p r e s e r v e t h e t r u t h o f sense-
c e r t a i n t y by p o s i t i n g a r e l a t i o n s h i p j n w hich t h e r e i s 'no 
d i s t i n c t i o n o f e s s e n t i a l i t y and i n e s s e n t i a l j t y between t h e 
I and the o b j e c t ' . J I n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e c e r t a i n t y 
o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g consciousness d e c i d e s t o 
remain i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e c l a i m s o f s u b j e c t r n d o b j e c t f o r 
precedence w i t h i n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p . From t h e way i n w hich 
Hegel d e p i c t s t h i s ruse o f t h e o r d i n a r y c onsciousness, i t 
ought t o be c l e a r t h a t i t i s i n t e n d e d t o i n d i c a t e n o t o n l y 
a r e a c t i o n o f consciousness t o t h e d i a l e c t i c o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y 
b u t a l s o a r e a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y t c t h e 
problem c r e a t e d by t h e s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y model o f knowledge. 
I t i s , o f course, S c h e l l m g wno a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel's account 
o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y i n t he L e c t u r e s on the H i s t o r y o f P n i l o s o p n y 
d e p i c t s t h e c o r r e c t view o f knowledge as the p o i n t of i n d i f f -
erence o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . I n S c h e l l i n g ' s o p i n i o n , as 
62. I b i d . 
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we have seen, s u b j e c t and o b j e c t "were t o be regarded as 
two e q u i v a l e n t poles which met I n Knowledge. They were 
a b s o l u t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o each o t h e r m knowledge s i n c e 
knowledge was an a b s o l u t e i d e n t i t y . T h i s i s as p l a i n an 
i n s t a n c e as any o f past p h i l o s o p h y e n t e r i n g i n t o Hegel's 
account o f t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e n a t u r a l consciousness. 
What I t t e l l s us about t h e r o l e o f past p h i l o s o p h i e s i n t h e 
Phenomenology i s , I t h i n k , t h a t t h e y do n o t p l a y a p a r t which 
would (somehow) be Jess t h e n p h i l o s o p h i c a l . As I s a i d ear-
l i e r , when Hegel i n i t i a l l y makes the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e c r i t -
i c i s m o f the o r d i n a r y consciousness w i l l a l s o b r i n g about an 
adequate c r i t i c i s m o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s we t e n d t o r e g a r d 
i t as an i m p l a u s i b l e s u g g e s t i o n . Nov/, however', aoubt i s cast-
on t h a t doubt s i n c e i t t u r n s out t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness 
i s no'man o f s t r a w ' . I t appears, a t l e a s t from t h e stages o f 
g e l ' s argument which we have analysed so f a r , t h a t t h e p a t h 
t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness t r a v e r s e s on i t s way t o s c i e n c e 
i s i t s e l f p h i l o s o p h i c a l . I t i s t h e r e f o r e s e t t l i n g a c c ounts 
n o t o n l y w i t h what we would t a k e t o be i t s own n a i v e view on 
knowledge but a l s o w i t h ^iews o f knowledge t h a t were and are 
p r e v a l e n t i n p h i l o s o p h y . I n o t h e r words,Hegel's s u g g e s t i o n 
t h a t t h e p a t h o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness t o s c i e n c e r e v i v e s 
p a s t p h i l o s o p h i e s m such a manner t h a t t h e i r most t e l l i n g 
arguments are met may n o t be e n t i r e l y i m p l a u s i b l e . We may, 
I b e l i e v e , judge c h i s f o r o u r s e l v e s s i n c e i n i t s c u l m m a c i n g 
st a g e s t h e d i a l e c t i c o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y i s d i r e c t e d towards 
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what i s p a t e n t l y a l s o a d i f f i c u l t y i n S c n e l l m g ' s p h i l o s o p h y . 
I t i s t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h a t had l e d S c h e l l i n g t o p r e d i c a t e 
t h e c e r t a i n t y o f immediate knowledge t o n e i t h e r s u b j e c t no/ 
o b j e c t b u t t o b o t h i n d i f f e r e n t l y . The e r r o r i n v o l v e d m 
t h a t p o s i t i o n , Hegel argues, i s t h a t i t appeals t o an 
immediacy w h i c h s i m p l y does n o t p e r t a i n t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t . Indeed he c l a i m s t h e r e i s no such 
t h i n g as an a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , o r 
t h a t t h e r e are such t h i n g s 'as a b s o l u t e l y p a r t i c u l a r , w h o l l y 
p e r s o n a l , i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s ' . ^ Each r e l a t i o n o f s u b j e c t 
and o b j e c t t r a n s c e n d s i t s p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t i v e o r o b j e c t i v e 
l o c a t i o n . I n each such r e l a t i o n , Hegel argues, b o t h s u b j e c t 
and o b j e c t are u n i v e r s a i s . Thus i t j s no use f o r S c h e l l i n g , 
t o c l a i m t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s are capable o f a p r i v i l e g e d 
i n t u i t i o n i n w h i c h t h e a b s t r a c t s u b j e c t and o b j e c t are a l r e a d y 
u n i t e d s i n c e t h e n o t i o n of such a r e l a t i o n i s a redundant 
one. The p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t lfe. supposes i s an u n r e a l 
o r a b s t r a c t one. There i s no such t h i n g as an i s o l a t e d , 
u n ique i n t u i t i n g c onsciousness - as soon as i t u t t e r s something 
i t acknowledges t h a t i t i s a t l e a s t , p a r t o f a l i n g u i s t i c 
community. S i m i l a r l y , t h e p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i t supposes i s 
an a b s t r a c t one. An o b j e c t , m Hegel's view, i s n o t something 
t h a t i s merely immediate o r i s o l a t e d . I t i s what i t i s o n l y 
i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r o b j e c t s . 
T h i s b r i n g s us t o p e r c e p t i o n . T h i s i s t h e second stage 
on c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' p a t n t o s c i e n c e . Hegel's view i s t h a t i t 
64. I b i d . , p. 9 1 . 
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i s o n l y p e r c e p t i o n t h a t can t a k e up t h e c o n c r e t e c o n t e n t c f 
sense-awareness because p e r c e p t i o n , u n l i k e sense-awareness, 
has u n i v e r s a l i t y as i t s p r i n c i p l e and t h e r e f o r e r e g a r d s i t s 
o b j e c t as an u n i v e r s a l . P e r c e p t i o n , m f a c t , i s t h e o u t -
come o f t h e d i a l e c t i c o f sense c e r t a i n t y w h i c h showed t h a t 
b o t h t h e s u b j e c t and o b j e c t o f sense-experience were mediated. 
T h i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Hegel, i s s u e s m p e r c e p t i o n , as 'the t h i n g 
65 
w i t h many p r o p e r t i e s ' . I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t t h e d i a l -
e c t i c o f p e r c e p t i o n b e g i n s . T h i s d i a l e c t i c i s p a r t i c u l a x ^ l y 
complex. We s h a l l f i n d , however, t h a t i n p a t t e r n i t f o l l o w s 
t h e d i a l e c t i c o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y . We found t h e r e t h a t t h e 
p o s i t i o n s w h i c h t he o r d i n a r y consciousness t r a v e r s e d were i n 
most r e s p e c t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s , and I i n d i c a t e d what 
some o f th o s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s were. The same, I 
b e l i e v e , m i g h t be s a i d o f Hegel's account o f p e r c e p t i o n . 
He suggests t h a t t h e process o f p e r c e p t i o n f i r s t apcears 
t o t h e n a t u r a l consciousness t o r e q u i r e t h a t i t make an 
a t t e m p t t o apprehend an o b j e c t as a 'pure o n e 1 . ^ What 
i t does i n making such an a t t e m p t i s t o l i s t t h e v a r i o u s 
p r o p e r t i e s o f the t h i n g ; i t says t he t h i n g i s b l a c k , round, 
b i t t e r t o t a s t e , e t c . However, m d o i n g t h i s t h e f o c u s o f 
a t t e n t i o n o f t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g consciousness s h i f t s . I t 
d i s c o v e r s , Hegel says, t h a t i t m i s c o n c e i v e s t he t h i n g by 
s i m p l y r e g a r d i n g i t as a One. I t f e e l s i t ought, s i n c e each 
65. 
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o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f the t h i n g i s an u n i v e r s a l , t o r e g a r d 
i t as a Many. I t must t h e r e f o r e , Hegel reasons, ' f o r t h e 
sake o f t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e p r o p e r t y t a k e t h e o b j e c t i v e 
essence as a community'. The p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t h i n g 
c o n s e q u e n t l y f i n d t h e i r p l a c e f o r consciousness m an 
a b s t r a c t u n i v e r s a l medium. T h i s i s because consciousness 
now views i t s o b j e c t n o t as a s i n g l e t h i n g but as t h m g h o o d 
68 
i n general. As i t s t a n d s , t h e r e i s l i t t l e t h a t we can 
make o f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f Hegel's. Phrases l i k e ' a b s t r a c t 
u n i v e r s a l medium' o r 'thmghood m g e n e r a l ' mean, a t f i r s t 
g l a n c e , n o t h i n g a t a l l t o us. But we can, I t h i n k , t h r o w 
some l i g h t on t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i f we recon n e c t i t w i t h what 
i s most l i k e l y t o be i t s o r i g i n , namely, Hegel's C r i t i q u e o f 
Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y m h i s r e v i e w o f t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s -
69 
ophy. We w i l l r e c a l l t h a t Spinoza espoused a n o t i o n o f 
what we might c a l l 'thmghood m g e n e r a l ' - Substance whi c h 
Hegel g r e a t l y admired . Indeed we have seen t h a t n o t i o n e n t e r 
i n t o t h e v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y . We w i l l a l s o 
remember t h a t i n t h a t a b s t r a c t u n i v e r s a l medium o f Spinoza's 
none o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s , i . e . t h e a t t r i b u t e s and modes, are 
d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o one a n o t h e r . T h e i r o n l y r e l a t i o n i s t n e i r 
community i n t h e One Substance. S i m i l a r l y , m t h i s s t age 
o f p e r c e p t i o n t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e t h i n g become sunk m 
t b m g h o o d i n g e n e r a l f o r t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g consciousness. 
I t seems as though those p r o p e r t i e s permeate t h a t medium 
67. I b i d . 68. I b i d . , p. 95. 
69. H y p p o l i t e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Cnapter on P e r c e p t i o n i n 
h i s Genese e t S t r u c t u r e de l a Pheriome'riologie de 1 ' E s p r i t l e n d s 
s u p p o r t t o t h i s view. ' 
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w i t h o u t i m p i n g i n g on each o t h e r a t a l l . But t h i s , Hege] 
argues, i s n o t t h e p r o p e r view o f those p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h 
p e r c e p t i o n d i s c o v e r s . As Hegel i n d i c a t e s a t t h e end o f 
h i s C r i t i q u e o f Spinoza's philosophy, we have t o t a k e account 
o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n m t h e t h i n g s o f p e r c e p t i o n . We cannot 
s i m p l y a l l o w t h e p r o p e r t i e s t o be r e f e r r e d back t o t h e One 
Substance o r t h i n g h o o d m g e n e r a l . We have r a t n e r t o 
acknowledge t h a t they r e a l l y are d e t e r m i n a t e . T h i s i s what 
the p e r c e i v i n g consciousness i s asked t o do i n the Phenomen-
o l o g y o f Mind: i t has t o i s o l a t e those p r o p e r t i e s as t h e y 
appear m t h e a b s t r a c t u n i v e r s a l medium. Those p r o p e r t i e s 
have t h e r e f o r e t o be seen as e x c l u d i n g ones. A c c o r d i n g t o 
Hegel m h i s L e c t u r e s on t h e H i s t o r y o f P h i l o s o p h y i t was 
Locke and L e i b n i z who had, i n t h i s way, compensated f o r t h e 
a b s t r a c t n e s s o f Spinoza's p h i l o s o p h y , L e i b n i z e s p e c i a l l y so 
t h r o u g h d e v e l o p i n g the p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n . The most 
s i g n i f i c a n t aspect o f t h i s p r i n c i p l e f o r Hegel u s , t h e n o t i o n 
°^ s e l f - d i f f e r e n t l a t i o n which i t i m p l i e d . I t i m p l i e d t h a t 
t h i n g s are n o t o n l y d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t f o r t h e p e r c e i v i n g 
s u b j e c t b u t t h a t t h e y are d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t i n t h e m s e l v e s . 
Thus m cons c i o u s n e s s ' e x p e r i e n c e o f p e r c e p t i o n , t h e f a c t t h a t 
i t comes t o see t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f an o b j e c t as a l l d i f f e r e n t 
i m p l i e s t h a t those p r o p e r t i e s have t o be viewed Dy Lt n o t o n l y 
as e x c l u d i n g one a n o t h e r but a l s o e x c l u d i n g themselves from 
each o t h e r . Since ' i f t h e many d e t e r m i n a t e p r o p e r t i e s 
were sim p l y i n d i f f e r e n t and were t h r o u g h o u t o n l y s e l f - r e l a t e d 
t h e y would n o t be d e t e r m i n a t e p r o p e r t i e s f o r t h e y o n l y are 
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t h i s i n so f a r as th e y d i f f e r e n t i a t e themselves.... 
T h i s wnole process, from t h m g h o o d m g e n e r a l t o t h e 
p r o p e r t y t h a t i s an e x c l u d i n g one, i s m Hegel's view how 
t h e ' t h i n g ' o f p e r c e p t i o n i s formed f o r t h e e x p e r i e n c i n g 
consciousness. I t i s each o f those moments combined i n t o 
a whole. I t i s t h e r e f o r e f i r s t l y , ' i n d i f f e r e n t p a s s i v e 
u n i v e r s a l i t y ' ; s econdly, 'the one, t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r 
i t i 7 1 
p r o p e r t i e s ; t h i r d l y , t h e many p r o p e r t i e s m themselves .' 
Thus, f o r Hegel t h e ' t h i n g ' o f p e r c e p t i o n i s t h e ' p o i n t o f 
i s o l a t i o n m t h e medium o f p e r s i s t e n c e emanating i n m u l t i p -
7 2 
l i c i t y . We can see what Hegel means by t h i s i f we keen 
i n mind what he has t o say o f p e r c e p t i o n m h i s C r i t i q u e o f 
Modern P h i l o s o p h y . But even so i t i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y 
complex way o f d e f i n i n g the o b j e c t o f p e r c e p t i o n e s p e c i a l l y 
as t h e d e f i n i t i o n i s i n t e n d e d t o f o r m u l a t e what goes on i n 
t h e n a t u r a l consciousness on i t s p a t h t o r e a l knowledge. 
We might be l e d t o conclude from t h i s t h a t Hegel m c o n s t r u c -
t i n g t h a t p a t h a t t e n d s n o t so much t o t h e problems c f n a t u r a l 
c onsciousness as t o the problems t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s have had 
i n d e f i n i n g r e a l knowledge. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n cannot l i g h t l y 
be brushed a s i d e s i n c e i t seems t o me t h a t i t i s o n l y p h i l o s -
o p h e r s t h a t can have o r would have i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e c o n t e n t 
o f p e r c e p t i o n i s merely a 'point o f i s o l a t i o n ' o r s i m p l y a 
70. H egel. Werke 3 > P- 95• 
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'medium o f p e r s i s t e n c e . ' A n a t u r a l consciousness o r what 
c o u l d be c a l l e d a n a i v e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o i n t o f view would 
n o t , s u r e l y , a r t i c u l a t e i t s e l f m t h a t way. The language 
i s t o o t e c h n i c a l . I f , however,we were t o g i v e Hegel t h e 
b e n e f i t o f t h e doubt t n e problem t h a t we are l e f t w i t h i s : 
how i s i t t h a t t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y n a i v e n a t u r a l c o n s c i o u s -
ness can e x p e r i e n c e p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t s o f v i e w 0 
For t h e moment we s h a l l postpone answering t h a t q u e s t i o n 
u n t i l we have examined more o f Hegel's a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n . 
H i s b e l i e f i s t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y c o n sciousness' e x p e r i e n c e o f 
p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t c o n f i n e d t o i t s d e f i n i t i o n . The i s o l a t i o n 
o f t h e ' t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n 1 l e a d s i t i n t o a f u r t h e r d i a l e c t i c 
i n w h i c h f i n a l l y t h e t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n d i s s o l v e s . T h i s 
development may appear s u r p r i s i n g m t h e c o n t e x t of Hegel's 
a n a l y s i s o f c o n sciousness' e x p e r i e n c e o f p e r c e p t i o n , b u t i t 
can h a r d l y appear s u r p r i s i n g i n t h e c o n t e x t o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y 
as a whole. Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t would on t h e c o n t r a r y 
suggest t h a t i t i s p a r t and p a r c e l o f i t s approach. What 
comes t o mind h e r e , i s o f c ourse, t h e p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s o f Hegel's 
p h i l o s o p h y : Substance i s S u b j e c t . T h i s i s Hegel's o b j e c t i v e 
i d e a l i s m . At one and t h e same t i m e , he suggests, we a r e t o 
assume t h a t t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y w hich i n v o l v e s genuine 
o p p o s i t i o n and that that externa], rea l i t y is not or, rather, shews I t s e l f essentially 
to be subject. Thus, as we have seen, we can assume with the Empiricists that there 
i s a thing of perception, but we can also show that we are misled i f we believe 
t h a t t h i s t h i n g ©3£ p e r s i s t s m th e f a c e of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
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73 a n a l y s i s o f p e r c e p t i o n . ^ 
We have d i s s e n t e d b e f o r e from Hegel's i d e a l i s t c o n c l u s -
i o n s , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e y are based on an argument w h i c h , 
i f n o t c o n t r a d i c t o r y , i s c e r t a i n l y c i r c u l a r . T h i s i d e a l i s m 
a s i d e , however, the way ±n which Hegel s e t s about showing 
t h a t t he t h i n g o f p e r c e p t i o n d i s s o l v e s has, I b e l i e v e , much 
t o recommend i t . A gain i t seems t o me t h a t he t a k e s up 
i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i o n s m th e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y and woiks 
them t h r o u g h . 
The stage we have now reached i n t h e d i a l e c t i c o f 
p e r c e p t i o n i s t h e stage a t w h i c h t n e o r d i n a r y consciousness 
has b e f o r e i t t h e t h i n g . T i n s t h i n g , Hegel c l a i m s , has been 
c r e a t e d f o r i t by i t s p a t h so f a r . The t a s k t h a t t h e p e r c e i v -
i n g c o nsciousness now s e t s i t s e l f i s t o apprehend t h e t r u t h 
o f t h a t t h i n g . T h e r e f o r e i t r e l a t e s l c s e l f p a s s i v e l y t o i t , 
h p p i n g t h a t what comes t o i t as a consequence i s t h e r e a l i t y 
o f t h e t h i n g . (As we have seen, m th e d i a l e c t i c o r sense-
73 • G.R.G Mure m The P h i l o s o p h y o f Kegel has t h i s t o say on t h e 
p o i n t : 'Hegel has no i n t e n t t o c r i t i c i s e t h i s a t t i t u d e ' t h a t 
t h e f i n i t e i s r e a l ' 'm t h e sense o f t e l l i n g the o r d i n a r y man 
o r t h e s c i e n t i s t how t o r u n t h e i r own b u s i n e s s , f o r t h e i r 
b u s i n e s s i s n o t p h i l o s o p h y . For Hegel t h e f i n i t e i s n o t 
u n r e a l o r i l l u s o r y ; i t i s as r e a l as i t must be t o be t h e 
c o r r e l a t e o f o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s . But when we view them 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , o r d i n a r y cuociousness and i t s world are a r e l a t i v e l y 
undeveloped phase m the s e l f - m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f S p i r i t . So 
seen t h e f i n i t e i s o n l y m a degree r e a l ' , ( p . 1 7 ) Mure i s 
c o r r e c t m h i s c o n c l u s i o n , but Hegel does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h t h e 
o r d i n a r y and p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness as r a d i c a l l y as Mare 
suggests. Hegei i s concerned t o make t h e o r d m a i y c o n s c i o u s -
ness p h i l o s o p h i c a l . 
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c e r t a i n t y consciousness s i m i l a r l y r e l a t e s i t s e l f p a s s i v e l y 
t o t h e o b j e c t . ) Now m p e r c e p t i o n , Hegel c l a i m s , a l t h o u g h 
we have t o do o n l y w i t h u n i v e r s a l s t h e r e l a t i o n o f e s s e n t i a l 
t o i n e s s e n t i a l p e r s i s t s . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , consciousness 
t a k e s the t h i n g t o be t h e e s s e n t i a l aspect and the s u b j e c t 
t h e i n e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t . T h e r e f o r e as consciousness t a k e s 
i t s e l f t o be t h e i n e s s e n t i a l aspect - t h e s i d e o f t h e percep-
t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t \fc i s now f i x e d and unchangeable - i t 
o c c u rs t o i t , Hegel suggests, t h a t what i t may apprehend m 
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t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p may m i s r e p r e s e n t t h e t h i n g . I t b e g i n s 
t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t may be d e c e i v e d by i t s p e r c e p t i o n . I n -
deed Hegel suggests t h a t i t comes t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e t h i n g 
as we p e r c e i v e i t i s n o t t h e t r u t h - -^ege! assumes t h ^ t t o 
overcome " i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s t h e n a t u r a l consciousness w i l l 
a dopt, as ' i t s c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h ' , 'self-sameness'.'^ Thus, 
when t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness observes a d i v e r g e n c e m what 
i t p e r c e i v e s , t h i s counts 'not as an u n t r u t h o f t h e o b j e c t 
f o r t h a t i s self-same but o f p e r c e p t i o n 1 J 1 0 T h e r e f o r e what 
i t seeks t o do t o get a t t h e t r u t h o f p e r c e p t i o n i s t o remove 
from what i t observes a l l t h a t i s n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e 
p e r s i s t e n c e o f t h e t h i n g . T h i s i s o f course a procedure 
t h a t D e s c a r t e s adopts i n h i s e p i s t e m o l o g y . He sought, l i k e 
t h e o r d i n a r y c onsciousness, t o reduce t o a minimum t h e chance 
7 4 . Hegel. Werke p. 99. 
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o f our b e i n g d e c e i v e d by what we p e r c e i v e . I t was as a 
consequence o f a d o p t i n g t h i s p r o c e d u r e , we r e c a l l , t h a t he 
was l e d t o conclude t h a t we c o u l d o n l y p r e d i c a t e e x t e n s i o n 
o f o b j e c t s . I n h i s view we c o u l d n o t be c e r t a i n t h a t any 
o t h e r o f t h e i r observed p r o p e r t i e s a c t u a l l y p e r t a i n e d t o them. 
A c c o r d i n g t o H egel, what t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness l e a r n s 
from a p p l y i n g t h i s c r i t e r i o n o f self-sameness t o t h e c o n t e n t 
o f i t e p e r c e p t i o n i s t h a t i t i t s e l f i s a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e d m 
p e r c e p t i o n . I t l e a r n s , Hegel c l a i m s , t h a t what i t t akes t o 
be pure p a s s i v i t y o r mere appr e h e n s i o n ( A u f f a s s u n g ) i s m 
f a c t i t s own a c t i v e m e d i a t i o n m perception.'''' P e r c e p t i o n , 
i t d i s c o v e r s , i s i t s own p e r c e p t i o n o f the o b j e c t and n o t 
pure o b j e c t - w h a tever t h a t might be. T h i s e x p e r i e n c e a g a i n 
i s s i m i l a r t o an e x p e r i e n c e t h a t consciousness has a t t h e 
s t age o f s e n s e - c e r t a i n t y . There i t had t o ' r e t u r n t o i t s e l f 1 
t o l e a r n t h a t i t was t h e consciousness t h a t d e c l a r e d sense-
awareness t o f u r n i s h i~he most c e r t a i n knowledge. I t concladed 
as a r e s u l t o f t h i s 'homecoming' t h a t t h e c e r t a i n t y o f sense-
c e r t a i n t y was d e r i v e d from t h e s u b j e c t . Here e q u a l l y t h e 
p e r c e i v i n g consciousness has ' r e t u r n e d t o i t s e l f ' t o l e a r n 
t h a t what i t t o o k t o be d e c e p t i o n ( i . e . a l a c k o f setfse-sameness 
i n t h e o b j e c t ) was merely an e r r o r m i t s p e r c e p t i o n . I t 
concludes t h a t any i n a c c u r a c i e s t h a t c r o p up m p e r c e p t i o n 
7 o 
are a r e s u l t o f i t s m i s c o n c e p t i o n . H a v i n g e x p e r i e n c e d t h i s 
±t now f e e l s a b l e t o remove t h e sources o f e r r o r m p e r c e p t i o n . 
T h e r e f o r e i t ' d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t s a p p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e t r u t h 
f r o m t h e u n t r u t h o f i t s p e r c e p t i o n , c o r r e c t s i t . . ^ So we 
77- I b i d . , p. 98. Kegel's s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t consciousness r e -
t u r n s t o i t s e l f (Puokehr i n s i c h s e l b s t ) a s a r e s u l t o f t h i s 
r e f l e c t i o n i n t o s e l f ( P e f l e x i o n i n s i c h ) . 
7 8 . I b i d . , p. 99. 79. I b i d . 
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may now see t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness as no l o n g e r merely 
p e r c e i v i n g h u t a l s o as b e i n g conscious o f t h e n a t u r e o f i t s 
p e r c e i v i n g . I t t h e r e f o r e now l o o k s upon p e r c e p t i o n as a fo r m 
o f t h i n k i n g . T h i s , o f course, b r i n g s us back t o Hegel's 
C r i t i q u e o f D e s c a r t e s . Because, i f we r e c a l l , one o f h i s 
p r i n c i p a l c r i t i c i s m s o f D e s c a r t e s was t h a t he d i d n o t count 
p e r c e p t i o n as a form o f t h o u g h t , I t i s p r e c i s e l y because 
D e s c a r t e s d i d n o t come t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t o which t h e n a t u r a l 
consciousness comes t h a t , j_n Hegel's e s t i m a t i o n , he has t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h t h o u g h t from e x t e n s i o n . 
I t was, m Hegel's view t he Lockean p h i l o s o p h y t h a t f i r s t 
r a i s e d Mind beyond t h i s impasse. Locke, we r e c a l l , came t o 
t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , i f we are t o p e r c e i v e w i t h o u t e x p o s i n g 
o u r s e l v e s t o d e c e p t i o n we have t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e what p e r t a i n s 
t o t h e t h i n g from what p e r t a i n s t o o u r p e r c e p t i o n o f i t . 
The o r d i n a r y c onsciousness, t h e r e f o r e , has t o d i s t i n g u i s h ( m 
Locke's t e r m i n o l o g y ) between t h e secondary and pri m a r y q u a l i t i e 
o f a t h i n g . The o r d i n a r y consciousness t h e r e f o r e suggests 
t h a t t h e t h i n g ' i s o n l y w h i t e t o o u r eyes, a l s o sharp t o our 
tongue, a l s o c u b i c t o our f e e l i n g ' . As we can see, i t now 
h o l d s t h a t i f ' i n t h e movement o f p e r c e p t i o n something o c c u r s 
t h a t i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h i s i s t o be r e c o g n i s e d as my r e f l e c t i o n ' 
The many and v a r i e d q u a l i t i t e s o f a t h i n g c o n t r a d i c t i t s s e l f -
sameness. By t a k i n g on t h e secondary q u a l i t i e s o f a t h i n g , 
t h e t h i n g p r e s e r v e s t h e form o f i t s b e i n g one f o r t h e o r d i n a r y 
c o nsciousness. Thus by a d o p t i n g a procedure from Locke's 
e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness p r e v e n t s t h e c r i t e r i o n 
o f self-sameness from ^ e d u c i n g t h e c o n t e n t o f s e n s a t i o n , as w i t 
80. I b i d . 
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Descartes, to a n u l l i t y . 
When we see t h a t the Phenomenology of Mind may be described 
i n these terms we are tempted t o suggest t h a t a l l the work 
amounts t o i s a r e p e t i t i o n of Hegel's account of the H i s t o r y 
of Philosophy. This suggestion i s p l a u s i b l e since, as we have 
sai d , the view t h a t l i e s at the heart of Hegel's philosophy i s 
t h a t a l l philosophy i s m a c r i t i c a l c o n t i n u i t y w i t h past p h i l -
osophy. But Hegel, as I have suggested p r e v i o u s l y , does not 
i n t e n d t h i s m the sense t h a t each philosophy merely works anew 
on the h i s t o r y of philosophy. There i s more t o h i s view than 
t h a t , as i s so m t h i s p a r t i c u l a r instance. What Hegel i s 
doing here i s g i v i n g an account of perception as one of the 
forms of consciousness which i s p r i o r t o p m l o s o p h i c a l reason-
i n g . I n Hegel's view t h i s e n t a i l s t h a t a Timber of o r d i n a r y 
conceptions about the nature of perception have to be shown 
t o be untrue. One of the conceptions he f e e l s he has tc rebut 
i n t h a t area i s t h a t knowledge i t s e l f has merely t o do w i t h the 
c o r r e c t perception of a t h i n g . As i t stands Hegel's account of 
the H i s t o r y of Philosophy has n o t h i n g t c do w i t h t h a t r e b u t t a l . 
I t enters i n t o the p i c t u r e ; and i t i s by p r o v i d i n g the arguments 
w i t h which the ordinary consciousness may defend its p o s i t i o n , 
t h a t the confusion a r i s e s . We can understand t h a t Hegel, m 
seeking t o e s t a b l i s h the t r u t h of h i s philosophy, w i l l contend 
w i t h previous and cor.temporaiy philosophers. I t i s the form 
m which he does so t h a t causes confusion. He t a c k l e s past 
philosophies, as forms of t h i n k i n g t h a t appear m the 
n a t u r a l consciousness of h i s time. The n a t u r a l conscious-
ness comes, so to speaK:, betvreen philosophy i t s e l f 
8 l 
and the account of i t s h i s t o r y . I f t h i s i s so, 
8 l . Werner Marx. Hegel_s__ Phfecienologie deb__Geis_tes (Klostenr.ar 
1971)PP« 21 - 22. 
266. 
might we not f a i r l y suggest t h a t the or d i n a r y or n a t u r a l 
consciousness of Hegel's philosophy has t o carry too much 
we i g h t 9 C l e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems and the experience 
of the ordinary consciousness are not the same. I t i s 
possible to imagine t h a t the common-sense t h i n k e r runs 
across some of the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s t h a t Hegel analyses m has 
account of perception,, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine t h a t 
i t can experience the whole d i a l e c t i c . Surely the only place 
t h a t the ordi n a r y consciousness w i l l experience t h a t d i a l e c t i c 
as a whole i s i n Hegel's Phenomenology o f Mind? I n other 
words, Hegel has constructed an account of the experience of 
the o r d i n a r y consciousness which does not correspond to the 
experience of any a c t u a l consciousness. Indeed a l l t h a t 
experience does correspond t o i s Hegel's view o f the path 
t h a t philosophy must take and l o g i c a l l y must have taken f o r 
i t t o a t t a i n t r u t h . This i s why Hegel's account of the path 
of the ordi n a r y consciousness' experience r e l i e s so h e a v i l y 
on the work of previous philsophers. The h i s t o r y of p h i l o s -
ophy must f o r him be the pre-experience of the experience 
of the ordinary consciousness and m t h a t capacity supply the 
raw m a t e r i a l f o r tne experience of the o r d i n a r y consciousness. 
I f t h i s i s a l l t h a t goes i n t o the making of the Hegelian 
n a t u r a l consciousness i t appears t h a t we have t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
between two t h i n g s w i t h i n the Phenomenology of Mind each of 
which may have been b e t t e r done i f i t had been tacl.led separ-
a t e l y : f i r s t , the attempt t o rec o n s t r u c t r a t i o n a l l y the h i s t o r y 
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of philosophy t o show the way t o genuine knowledge and second, 
the attempt t o induce the common-sense t h i n k e r t o t h i n k 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . I t I s the l a t t e r , of course, which most 
r e a d i l y comes t o mind when Hegel t a l k s of the Phenomenology 
as the path of the ordi n a r y consciousness to science but i t 
i s the former, i t seems, t h a t takes precedence i n h i s account 
of the experience of the ordi n a r y consciousness. 
With t h i s m mind we s h a l l r e t u r n t o our review of 
Hegel's a n a l y s i s of perception. I t w i l l give us an i n d i c a -
t i o n of some of the problems t h a t are caused by Hegel's 
f a i l u r e t o separate the two strands m the f i r s t p a rt of h i s 
system. We can, I b e l i e v e , agree w i t h Hegel on tne f i r s t 
p o i n t t o be considered, namely the common-sense t h i n k e r w i l l 
regard each and every object i t perceives as being a body 
e x t e r n a l to h: s consciousness. The man m the s t r e e t i s 
g e n e r a l l y a m a t e r i a l i s t of t h i s k i n d . But i t i s th±s con-
v i c t i o n of the o r d m a r j consciousness t h a t Hegel,, i s seeking 
t o undermine. I n defence of i t s p o s i t i o n the ordinary con-
sciousness w i l l adopt the view t h a t a l l the p r o p e r t i e s we 
perceive t o be pa r t of a t h i n g do i n f a c t belong t o i t . As 
Hegel says, i t w i l l suggest that ' i t i s the t h i n g i t s e l f 
82 
which i s white and also cubic, also sharp and so on 1. So 
f a r , so good. However, at i s not p l a u s i b l e t o suggest t h a t 
the common-sense t h i n k e r w a l l r e f l e c t on, or indeed see, the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s p o s i t i o n as Hegel describes them. I t 
w i l l not, I b e l i e v e , n o t i c e t h a t i n i t s i n s i s t i n g t h a t a t h i n g 
82. Hegel. Werke 5; p. 100. 
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i s w h ite, and also cubic, also sharp e t c . t h a t the also 
c o n t r a d i c t s the u n i t y of the t h i n g . We cannot, Hegel says, 
claim that a t h i n g i s both one and many and yet s t i l l p e r s i s t s . 
This subtelty w i l l c e r t a i n l y escape the o r d i n a r y consciousness 
qua man m the s t r e e t . Our man m the s t r e e t c l e a r l y 
would not acknowledge t h a t i t was h i s t h i n k i n g that; maintained 
t h a t u n i t y and then apportion the d i v e r s i t y t o the t h i n g . 
He w i l l not, as does Hegel's n a t u r a l consciousness, know or 
declare h i m s e l f t o be t h a t which brings u n i t y t o the objects 
of experience. This s o p h i s t i c a t i o n can, I t h i n k , most approp-
r i a t e l y be seen as belonging to Kant's theory of knowledge. 
I t i s he, r a t h e r than our man i n the street,who claims t h a t 
the ' u n i t y of apperception' which accompanies the ' I t h i n k ' 
gives the diverse matter of appearance i t s concrete s t r u c t u r e 
i n our experience. What he says i s t h a t m any given instance 
of perception the p r o p e r t i e s of the object such as white, cubic 
sharp e t c . , are supplied by our : n t u i t i o n , but m a t i t i s the 
understanding t h a t combines those various p r o p e r t i e s t o give 
us the o b j e c t . Thus what we perceive, m Kant's view, i s 
always made up of the diverse data t h a t we receive from t h i n g s 
and the u n i f y i n g manner m which our understanding deals w i t h 
t h a t data. Hegel i s r i g h t t o suggest, i n h i s a n a l y s i s of 
perception, t h a t the problem which a r i s e s i f we accept t h i s 
view i s t h a t since now 'the ccincidnece (inemseozen) of those 
p r o p e r t i e s ' we i n t u i t ' i s due t o consciousness only', : t 
must t h e r e f o r e prevent them from f a l l i n g i n t o one m the t n m g ' 
As we remember, Kant, m assenting t h a t our Understanding was 
83. I b i d ; p. 101. 
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able t o know objects was obliged t o add t h a t i t was not able 
to know th i n g s m themselves. N a t u r a l l y the Understanding 
could know phenomena because i t was the Understanding t h a t 
gave them t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , but i n Kant's view we had t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s perceptual knowledge from what the t h i n g 
might be outside our experience. We could not, i n h i s view, 
A 
claim t o know i t as a noumena/. What Hegel however wishes t o 
p o i n t out here i s t h a t Kant has to make t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
simply because the Understanding i s allowed t o take on the 
u n i t y of the t h i n g m experience. Tms i s a clear enough 
p o i n t against Kant since i f Kant wants t o a t t r i b u t e the u n i t y 
of the t h i n g of perception t o the Understanding i t i s apparent 
t h a t he has t o r e j e c t any suggestion t h a t the t h i n g i n i t s e l f 
i s as we perceive i t . However we are l e f t wondering j u s t 
what kind of p o i n t t h i s i s against the o r d i n a r y t h i n k e r . 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o imagine t h a t he w i l l ever have thought l i k e 
Kant. True enough, he w i l l have c e r t a i n views of perception 
but s u r e l y they w i l l stop at the suggestion t h a t began t h i s 
stage of the d i a l e c t i c , namely, the suggestion thac a l l the 
p r o p e r t i e s we perceive t o be an i n t e g r a l p art of a t h i n g are 
indeed so. 
As we have suggested then, the experience t h a t Hegel i s 
examining m the Phenornneology of Mitid i s p r i m a r i l y philosoph-
i c a l experience. I t i s t h e r e f o r e what I s h a l l c a l l an a b s t r a c t 
view of experience. For even when he r e f e r s us t o a non-
p h i l o s o p h i c a l experience, f o r instance the experience of need 
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or the experience of L i f e , he does so from a p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
p o i n t of view; j u s t as i t i s h i s h a b i t t o r e f e r to the 
g 
p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of animals merely to prove h i s idealism.' 
We have already remarked on t h i s d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y a b s t r a c t 
nature of Hegel's account of experience. We d i d so m our 
discussion i n the l a s t Chaptex1 of the Preface of the Phenomen -
ology. Indeed there tne abstractness was even more marked 
since i t f o llowed on a f a s c i n a t i n g account of the h i s t o r i c a l 
and s c i e n t i f i c nature of experience. I n our concluding 
remarks on the Phenomenology we w i l l attempt t o b r i n g out 
t h i s abstractness m Hegel's theory of experience. 
84. I b i d ; The argument i s t n a t animals do not t r e a t the o b j e c t s 
of t h e i r experience as maccessiole t h i n g s i n themselves. 
They q u i e t l y set t o and eat them.1 I n Hegel's view t h i s 
shows what the ' t r u t h of sensuous tntngs 1,:' t h e i r 
nothingness'. See Werke ~*>, v. 91. 
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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE 'THING' OF PERCEPTION 
To grasp the conclusion of the d i a l e c t i c of perception 
we have to d i s t i n g u i s h two aspects of Hegel's a n a l y s i s . 
These are, f i r s t l y , what I s h a l l c a l l the well-grounded c r i t 
ique of empiricism he deploys i n h i s a n a l y s i s and, secondly, 
the i d e a l i s m of h i s a n a l y s i s . This seems a strange d i s t i n c 
t i o n t o make since, s u r e l y , i t could be argued t h a t Hegel's 
c r i t i c i s m of empiricism i s h i s i d e a l ism. But t h i s i s not 
so, f o r i t i s possible to c r i t i c i s e empiricism without being 
an i d e a l i s t . The E m p i r i c i s t s ' theory of knowledge need not 
be the only one t h a t i s open to a m a t e r i a l i s t . This i s an 
important p o i n t , f o r when we come t o our a n a l y s i s of Marx 
we s h a l l f i n d t h a t i t i s the p o s i t i o n t h a t he adopts. Hegel 
i d e a l i s m then i s not e n t i r e l y t i e d t o h i s c r i t i q u e of e r r p i r i 
cism although i t plays a r o l e i n t h a t c r i t i q u e . I t i s f o r 
t . i l s reason t h a t i t becomes important t o d i s t i n g u i s h what i s 
well-founded m h i s c r i t i q u e and what i s merely i d e a l i s t . 
Marcuse i n h i s Reason and Revolution f a i l s t o make t h i s d i s -
t i n c t i o n . He brings out the element m Hegel's a n a l y s i s 
of perception which i s a well-founded c r i t i q u e of empiricism 
or what he c a l l s positivesm,witnout remarking on the other 
i d e a l i s t element m the a n a l y s i s . The r e s u l t i s , and t h i s 
may be said i n general of Marcuse's work, t h a t we get a p i c -
t u r e of Hegel preparing the ground f o r Marx i n what we might 
c a l l merely a l i n e a r sense. By t h i s I mean th a t Marcuse se 
Hegel's philosophy only m the l i g h t of i t s p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b 
u t i o n t o Marx's t h i n k i n g . No mention i s made of the d e b i t 
side of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , of which p l a i n l y Hegel's i d e a l i s m 
i s an important p a r t . 
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This said, l e t us now see what the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of 
the i d e a l i s m and well-founded c r i t i q u e of empiricism m 
Hegel's philosophy amounts t o . I n the f i r s t place I taKe 
Marcuse's point t h a t what we might c a l l the p o s i t i v e aspect 
of Hegel's d i a l e c t i c of perception i s i t s i m p l i e d c r i t i c i s m 
'of common-sense and t r a d i t i o n a l s c i e n t i f i c thought' which 
'takes the world as a t o t a l i t y of t h i n g s , more or less e x i s t -
i n g per se, and seensthe t r u t h m objects t h a t are independent 
0 ( -
of the knowing subjects'. The p o i n t being of course t h a t 
t h e r e are no f a c t s of experience which are not, m Hegel's 
terms, mediated by the knowing subject. I t i s p e r f e c t l y 
c l e a r t h a t one of Hegel's i n t e n t i o n s i n o u t l i n i n g the d n a l c c t i 
of perception i s t o show t h a t there i s no sucn absolute 
d i v i s i o n between ' e s s e n t i a l ' and ' i n e s s e n t i a l ' - the essentia 
o b j e c t and the i n e s s e n t i a l subject m t h i s instance - as the 
o r d i n a r y consciousness i s wont to assume. The r e l a t i o n of 
p e rception, as Hegel c l e a r l y proves, i s a d i a l c r t i e a J one. 
As a form of knowledge i t i s an a l t e r n a t i n g movement from 
subject t o object w i thout e i t h e r t a k i n g precedence. Any 
knowledge we may gam as a r e s u l t i s c e r t a i n l y f o r us but i t 
i s also a knowledge of what the object i s . This means t h a t 
p e r c e p t i o n does o f f e r us knowledge of t h i n g s as they are but 
does not o f f e r us superior-because direct-knowledge. We 
can not, as Hume bel i e v e s , by s t i c k i n g i n t h i s way t o the 
85. H.^-arcuse. Reason and Revolution, o p . c i t . p. 112. 
appearance of things ensure the c e r t a i n t y of our knowledge. 
Indeed i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t we s n a i l confuse ourselves as 
there are so many po i n t s of view from v;hich we can perceive 
a t h i n g . A l l t h i s , I t h i n k , we can regard as part of 
Hegel's well-grounded c r i t i c i s m of empiricism. However. 
Hegel goes on to say t h a t the viewpoint of perception as 
a whole i s f a l s e . I n h i s view i t can only e x i s t as a 
s u b s i d i a r y element m knowledge and then only when i t s 
premisses have been undermined. This i s where the a b s t r a c t 
conclusion t o the a n a l y s i s of perception comes i n . The 
premisses he wants removed are these which lead t o the d i a l e c t i c 
of perception: the two poles of p e r c e i v i n g subject and perceived 
o b j e c t . And, as we would expect, the outcome favours the 
s u b j e c t . Hegel t h e r e f o r e concentrates on showing t h a t the 
t h i n g goes t o ground or, since Zugrunde gehen also means demise 
i n German, t h a t i t p e r i s h e s . ^ The argument, though j d e a l i s t , 
has a c e r t a i n p l a u s i b i l i t y . I t goes as f o l l o w s . Hegel takes 
i t t o be the nature of a t h i n g t h a t i t preserves i t s i d e n t i t y 
through i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o other t h i n g s . I t i s e s s e n t i a l 
from the p o i n t of view of the t h i n g t h a t i t be independent 
of other t h i n g s and t h e r e f o r e opposed to them; This means, 
according t o Hegel, t h a t i t s existence i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 
Other t h i n g s are, he argues, both e s s e n t i a l and i n e s s e n t i a l 
t o i t . I t i s what i t :s only i n o p p o s i t i o n t o other t h i n g s 
but e q u a l l y washes to be r i d of those other t h i n g s . Thus 
86. Hegel. V/erke 3„ p. 103. 
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' d i r e c t l y through the absolute cnaracter and i t s o p p o s i t i o n 
i t r e l a t e s i t s e l f t o others and e s s e n t i a l l y i s only t h i s relating; 
r e l a t i o n however i s the negation of i t s independence and the 
t h i n g on the contrary perishes through i t s essentia.1 p r o p e r t y 1 . 
This c l e a r l y i s the i d e a l i s t aspect of Hegel's a n a l y s i s of 
perception. Though not separate m Hegel's mind from h i s 
c r i t i c i s m of empiricism i t can, as I have s a i d , be i s o l a t e d 
from what i s acceptable m h i s c r i t i q u e . I t i s of course 
t r u e t h a t t h i s account of the 'perishing of the t h i n g ' i s 
also aimed at empiricism. I t misses i t s mark however because 
the m a t e r i a l i s t p o s t u l a t e of empiricism i s one that concerns 
the existence of t h i n g s and not what the explanation or a 
t h i n g looks l i k e . I t _ i s s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t the r a t i o n a l 
unaerstandmg of a t h i n g i s not m a t e r i a l , i t i s n o t h i n g t h a t 
e x i s t s outside our minds. An explanation i s always m t h a t 
sonse i d e a l . I t does not, however, f o l l o w t h a t the ^hnrgs 
i t e xplains are. Hegel be l i e v e s uhat by showing t h a t a t h i n g 
i s an u n i t y of opposites: something t h a t can only preserve 
i t s i d e n t i t y by being both associated w i t h and disassociated 
from a l l other t h i n g s he has shown t h a t i t perishes. But, 
m f a c t , he has only succeeded m showing t h a t i f we are t o 
know what a t h i n g i s we have t o take a perspective t h a t i s 
not l i m i t e d t o the perception of the one t h i n g . Hegel has 
made t.~-e e r r o r of i d e n t i f v i n g the uiyierstanding of a t h i n g 
w i t h i t s existence. l c may w e l l be t h a t m understanding 
87 . I b i d . , p. I OP . 
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what an apple i s we do not t a l k about apples but more 
about f r u i t , t r e e s , and p l a n t l i f e i n general; but none 
of t h i s means t h a t the existence of our e m p i r i c a l apple 
i s impaired. Again, o f course, our a n a l y s i s would break 
down i f we r e l i e d e n t i r e l y on perception but t h i s does not 
mean t h a t our e m p i r i c a l apple w i l l have broken down. By 
concluding the opposite, however, Hegel i s able to conclude 
h i s a n a l y s i s of perception w i t h the announcement of the 
a b o l i t i o n of the t h i n g of perception. This conclusion 
(and the reader w i l l not be s u r p r i s e d by t h i s ) I c a l l abstrac 
This d i s t i n c t i o n I have made between the i d e a l i s t and 
well-founded aspect of Hegel's c r i t i q u e of idealis.n v i l l i , I 
t h i n k , serve us w e l l i n the b r i e f look we s h a l l now take at 
Hegel's account of tne Understanding I n the Phenomenology. 
I t i s the d i s s o l u t i o n of the t h i n g of perception that leads 
us i n t o the understanding The t h i n g of perception has 
now become what Hegel d 3 s c r i b e s as the 'unconditioned-
u n i v e r s a l ' . This f u r t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f as Force. 
The p l a u s i b i l i t y or otherwise of t h i s t r a n s i t i o n does not 
d i r e c t l y i n t e r e s t us here. What does i n t e r e s t us i s the 
d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Hegel makes between what he c a l l s the outer 
expression of force and i t s inner r e a l i t y . This inne r 
r e a l i t y f i r s t a r i s e s f o r consciousness, Hegel claims, w i t h 
the d i s s o l u t i o n of the t h i n g of perception. I n perception, 
i t t h i n k s i t has before i t a t h i n g whose r e a l i t y i s c e r t a i n . 
But i t s experience of the d i a l e c t i c of perception undermines 
87. I b i d . , p. 107. 
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t h i s c o n v i c t i o n and brings i t t o p o s t u l a t e , t h a t behind t h a t 
perception there must be some supersensible r e a l i t y . The 
n o t i o n of force f i t s t h i s experience because i t has, as I 
g 
have i n d i c a t e d , both an outer expression and an inner r e a l i t y . 
The outer expression accounts f o r t h i s changeable and unstable 
world of perception, the inner n o t i o n a l l y f o r the e x p l a n a t i o n 
of t h a t unstable world. 1 say ' n o t i o n a l l y 1 since according 
to Hegel when the o r d i n a r y consciousness f i r s t comes to deal 
w i t h t h i s p o s t u l a t e of an inne^ and outer c e r t a i n problems 
a r i s e . Although the experiencing consciousness has discovered 
t h a t what i t thought t o be p e r f e c t l y c e r t a i n and o b j e c t i v e , 
namely, the t h i n g o f perception, has shown i t s e l f to be the 
opposite, i t s t i l l c l i n g s to i t s n o t i o n of the c e r t a i n t y 
of the perceived world. Admittedly, i t no longer t h i n k s of 
t h a t world as s t a b l e or f i x e d . I t i s prepared t o grant t h a t 
n t i s the expression of another r e a l i t y , beyond appearance. 
But because i t f i n d s i t s c e r t a i n t y i n the world of appearance 
i t i s only prepared t o t h i n k of t n a t r e a l i t y as an unknowable 
beyond. Because, Hegel says, 'the i n n e r i s s t i l l pure beyond 
O Q 
f o r consciousness' ' i t dees not f i n d i t s e l f m i t y e t ' . ^ 
Therefore i t regards the i n n e r r e a l i t y of force as a mere 
beyond m comparison w i t h i t s concrete expression. The i n n e r 
r e a l i t y , Kegel says, merely expresses a void f o r i t . 
What the n a t u r a l consciousness has ignored, Hegel claims, 
m i n s i s t i n g on t h i s i s t h a t what i t c a l l s the supersensuous 
beyond has a r i s e n from experience i t s e l f . I t i s t h e r e f o r e 
88, I b i d . , p. 110. 
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mistaken, Hegel argues, to t h i n k of i t as something t h a t 
i s f o r e v e r beyond our ken. I t has only appeared as a 
r e s u l t of a development m our knowledge about the world. 
The development t o which he r e f e r s i s of course the one t h a t 
led t o the d i s s o l u t i o n of tne t h i n g of perception. I t i s 
t h i s whach provides the content f o r the supersensuous beyond. 
This i t does not as i t appears: as what Hegel c a l l s a mere 
90 
f l u x or a play of forces. A f t e r a l l , the mere d i s s o l u t i o n 
of the things of appearance i s no adequate content f o r exper-
ience. I t must give r i s e t o a new o b j e c t . We s h a l l have 
t h a t new object or content t o the supersensuous beyond, Heg^l 
claims, through regarding appearance as appeara.nce. I n 
other words, the world beyond perception w i l l only cease to 
be a mere void f o r us when we look on t h a t f l u x of appearance 
as the externa] appearance of a more profound and deeper r e a l -
i t y . Thus a l l we perceive has, according t o Hegel, not to 
be taken at face value; we have to see i t as evidence of a 
more permanent r e a l i t y . We ha.ve t o understand and not 
merely take note of t h a t evidence. I t i s at t h i s p o i n t 
91 
t h a t Hegel introduces the notaon of Law, f o r law i s the 
manner m which t h a t evidence can be understood or a.ppearance 
explained as appearance. Because law or the who]e system 
o f laws i s the permanent r e a l i t y beyond appearance, i t l a y s 
t o r e s t the play of forces f o r consciousness. Therefore 
'with t h i s the supersensuous w o r l d i s a serene kingdom of 
laws indeed beyond the perceived world, f o r t h i s onLy presents 
90. I b i d . , p. 119. I b i d . , p. 120. 
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the law through continuous change, however j u s t as much 
present m i t and i t s immediate peaceful image ( A b b i l d ) ' . 
Hegel's answer then t o those wno, l i k e Kant, claim t n a t there 
i s n o t h i n g knowable beyond appearance i s t h i s : We may know 
what noumena are p r e c i s e l y because we are able t o understand 
what phenomena are. That knowledge i s not t o be discovered 
m phenomena per se; i t only comes t o l i g h t when we seek t o 
i n t e r p r e t them as evidence of a noumenal r e a l i t y . 
Kant, as we know, r e j e c t s such a claim because he holds 
the E m p i r i c i s t s ' view t h a t knowledge of what t h i n g s are m 
themselves may only be derived from sense-perception. And 
t h a t , of course, i s n e i t h e r s u f f i c i e n t l y dependable nor 
s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m a t i v e t o provide us w i t h t h a t knowledge. 
Hegel's a n a l y s i s of the Understanding i s the.i i n one dimension 
d i r e c t e d at Kant's empiricism. There i s however, as T have 
suggested another, the i d e a l i s t dimension. We c?n see t h i s 
most p l a i n l y m the conclusion of the a n a l y s i s He concludes 
t h a t the supersensuoas r e a l i t y beyond appearance should be 
known as s e l f . Here again Hegel presents us w i t h a paradox. 
He provides us w i t h a more or less convincing account of one 
of the aspects of s c i e n t i f i c experience, but then he under-
mines what are p o s i t i v e conclusions by i d e n t i f y i n g t h a t exper-
ience w i t h self-consciousness. I t seems t o me t h a t , as 
Hegel suggests, the experience of science dees show t h a t 
what i s t r u e about nature i s not simply what we can perceive 
9^5 
of i t but what we know of i t m our s c i e n t i f i c laws. y We 
•9ST-~TbidT ~ 
9.P. This may not seem to be saying much. I f , however, we consider 
what flows from i t : t n e d i s t i n c t i o n between appearance and rea 
i c y , we can see the contrary i s the case. Gadatier presents an 
anal y s i s of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n or. r a t h e r , wnat i t supposes :n 
h i s essay on'Die Yerkehrte Welt' m Hegels D i a l e k t i k , pp/O -V,' • 
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have come across t h i s p o i n t of Hegel's before i n our review 
of h i s c r i t i q u e of Kant's philosophy. There he made the 
point t h a t our Understanding i s higher than our sense-percep-
t i o n because, and he c i t e s as an example our knowledge of the 
heavens, i t i s what furnishes us w i t h our knowledge of the 
world. The general claim t h a t Hege] i s making i s t h a t our 
knowledge of the world i s always conceptual m form. This 
claim i s undeniably t r u e and as u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l a c r i t i c i s m 
of Empiricism as one could have. The same cannot be daid 
f o r what Hegel goes on t o claim. He goes on to claim t h a t 
o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y i s t h e r e f o r e s e l f . This i s one claim we 
have t o examine an d e t a i l ' s i r c e i t i s what makes Hegel's 
account of experience a b s t r a c t . 
F i r s t we ought t o see how i t i s t h a t Hegel i n the 
anal y s i s of the Understanding comes t o make t h i s claim. 
Self-consciousness f i r s t comes on the scene, i t seems, w i t h 
the explanation of the Law. A l l the law provides i t s e l f , 
he claims, i s a s t a b l e p i c t u r e of the f l u x of appearance. 
I t i s , he suggests, an inner r e a l i t y only m co n t r a s t t o an 
e x t e r n a l appearance. What occurs through the law being 
explained i s t h a t the aspect of consciousness' view of the 
law i s revoked. As we see, the only i d e n t i t y i t has i n i t i a l l y 
i s t h a t i t i s opposed to the f l u x of appearance. What e x p l a i n -
ing i t does, according to Hegel, i s to show t h a i law i s the 
r e a l i t y of appearance. I n e x p l a i n i n g tne law, Hegel claims, 
9^ . Hegel. Werke 3 J p. 1^ 3> Also Gadamer, op. c i t . , p. ~j>0. 
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consciousness discovers that i t i s also a law fbf d i s t i n c t i o n s 
to come about m perception t h a t are not d i s t i n c t i o n s at a l l . 
Consciousness t h e r e f o r e comes t o the conclusion t h a t i t i s 
useless to f a l l back on perception t o e x p l a i n anything. 
What appears t o our senses i s merely c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Thus 
the experiencing consciousness cor.tes t o the conclusion t h a t 
knowledge i s not f u r n i s h e d by mere consciousness i . e . the 
mere perceptual awareness of the world outside ourselves, but 
by our r e f l e c t i o n on consciousness. And t h i s i s of course 
self-consciousness. But there i s more t o i t than t h a t , 
since r e f l e c t i o n on consciousness i n v o l v e s understanding i t 
i s also the r e f l e c t i o n on understanding i t s e l f . Thus s e l f -
consciousness makes i t s appearance m the Understanding not 
only throught i t s becoming the consciousness of consciousness 
but also through the Understanding's own r e f l e c t i o n on i t -
s e l f . The Understanding f i r s t comes t o see t h i s : t h a t the 
r e a l i t y of experience i s self-consciousness when i n the course 
of e x p l a i n i n g the law i t r e a l i s e s a u t h a t i t i s doing i s , 
i n Hegel's words, conversing w i t h i t s e l f . Then i t knows t h a t 
m che explanation of the Jaw i t 'only enjoys itseldP-', ^  and 
t h e r e f o r e r e a l i s e s t h a t the r e a l i t y of appearance i s not the 
'play of fo r c e s ' but i t s e l f . 
This conclusion i l l u s t r a t e s the s o l i p s i s m of Hegel's 
philosophy. This s o l i p s i s m i s also the core of i t s i d e a l i s t 
t h e s i s . The s t r e n g t h of Hegel's p o s i t i o n i s t h a t i t i s 
based on an an a l y s i s of the nature of s c i e n t i f i c e x p lanation. 
9b- Hegel, i b i d . , p. I'jh. 
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He concludes t h a t t h e r e a l i t y o f phenomenal ' r e a l i t y ' i s 
t h o u g h t o r s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s because, l i k e S c h e l l i n g , he 
i d e n t i f i e s s c i e n c e ' s m t e l l e c t u a l i s a t i o n o f n a t u r e w i t h t h e 
d i s s o l u t i o n and disappearance o f m a t e r i a l t h i n g s e x t e r n a l 
t o o u r s e l v e s . N a t u r a l Science f o r them b o t h i s i d e a l i s t . 
H egel, however, goes one s t e p f u r t h e r t h a n S c h e l l i n g w i t h 
h i s s o l i p s i s m . He c l a i m s , a t t h e end o f h i s account o f t h e 
U n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t ' i t becomes apparent t h a t b e h i n d t h e so-
c a l l e d c u r t a i n of- appearance which i s supposed t o c o n c e a l 
t h e i n n e r ( w o r l d ) t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o see u n l e s s we o u r s e l v e s 
go b e h i n d i t , j u s t as much t h a t we can see, as t h a t t h e r e be 
96 
something b e h i n d i t t h a t cam be seen H i s s u g g e s t i o n i s 
t h e n t h a t s c i e n c e n o t o n l y d i s c o v e r s t h e r e a l i t y o f t h i n g s 
b e h i n d appearance buc i n a sense pu t s i t t h e r e . Up t o a 
p o i n t Hegel seems t o be c o r r e c t . I t i s c l e a r t h a t , a s he 
m a i n t a i n s , we cannot see a n y t h i n g w i t h o u t p u t t i n g o u r s e l v e s 
i n a p o s i t i o n t o see i t The s c i e n t i s t , we might agree, 
can o n l y hope t o e x p l a i n n a t u r a l phenomena by r e g a r d i n g them 
as such, i . e . , as Hegel c l a i m s , by r e g a r d i n g them as evidence 
o f a deeper r e a l i t y . There would indeed be n o t h i n g t c see 
u n l e s s he went b e h i n d t h e c u r t a i n o f appearance. ks we are 
a l l aware t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f n a t u r a l phenomena i s t h e outcome 
o f t h e s c i e n t i s t ' s a c t i v i t y . Hegel, however, wishes t o 
c l a i m more t h a n t h i s . As we have seen, he suggests t h a t a l l 
t h a t t h e s c i e n t i s t knows w i t h t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n can a c c u r a t e l y 
96. I b i d . p. 135. 
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be c a l l e d s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Science, f o r him, t h e r e f o r e 
I s t h e overcoming o f a l l o t h e r n e s s . T h i s c l a i m would be 
most simple t o r e f u t e i f i t meant s i m p l y t h a t a l l t h a t s c i e n c e 
seeks t o e x p l a i n i s p er se s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . However, t h e 
c l a i m i s t h a t i t shows i t s e l f t o be s e l f . The a b s t r a c t -
ness o r s o l i p s i s m m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y i s , as I have t r i e d 
t o p o i n t cut, subtle. For K e g e l , as we have seen, o t h e r n e s s 
i s a f a c t . I n o t h e r words, a t t h e o u t s e t of h i s p h i l o s o p h y 
he i s prepared t o admit t h e m a t e r i a l i s t t h e s i s . But a t 
the same t i m e , he wishes t o c l a i m t h a t o t h e r n e s s i s s e l f -
c o nsciousness, a l b e i t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s m i t s a l i e n a t i o n . 
And t h i s i s a p parent m h i s account o f s c i e n c e . He ack-
nowledges i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e t h a t what i t has t o account 
f o r i s o u t s i d e consciousness. B u t , as I have p o i n t e d o u t , 
i t i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n m Hegel's whole p h i l o s o p h y t h a t he 
assumes t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y o n l y t o prove t h a t t h e r e 
i s no such t h i n g . I t w i l l n o t do t o m i n t a c o m s i m p l y t o 
w i t h d r a w i t from c i r c u l a t i o n . I f i t i s l e g a l t e n d e r i t has 
t o be a l l o w e d t o c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y . Hegel's assumption o f 
e x t e r n a l i t y o r o t h e r n e s s i s n o t genuine; o r e l s e i t would n o t 
f a l l out o f use. T h i s l e a d s t o a l l s o r t s o f c o n f u s i o n . 
I n t h e case we a r e c o n s i d e r i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , i t means t h a t 
he has t o c o n t r a d i c t h i s own c l a i m t h a t t h e s c i e n t i f i c law 
i s t h e knowledge o f appearance as appearance. He argues t h a t 
as a r e s u l t o f t h e s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n , we can d i s c a r d any 
28^. 
c o n c r e t e r e f e r e n t . But i f t h a t r e f e r e n t i s l e f t o u t , i n 
what sense are we t o r e g a r d t h e s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n as 
b e i n g an e x p l a n a t i o n o f a n y t h i n g 9 Hegel's d i s t i l l a t i o n 
o f e x p e r i e n c e i n t o t h e s e l f may work w e l l i n t h e f o r w a r d 
d i r e c t i o n . F o r i n s t a n c e , we might be l e d t o b e l i e v e now 
t h a t s c i e n c e m i t s r e s u l t , i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . But i t 
does n o t work a t a l l m t h e r e v e r s e d i r e c t i o n . I f we were 
t o work backward t h r o u g h e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h i s h y p o t h e s i s we 
would be faced w i t h c o n t r a d i c t i o n a t each t u r n . I f a l l i s 
s e l f , what i s i t t h a t s c i e n c e i s supposed t o have e x p l a i n e d ? 
Indeed i f a l l i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s what need i s t h e r e f o r 
science? There can be no phenomena. There seems no 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h e n t h a t we can r e t u r n from any o f the h i g h e r 
l e v e l s o f consciousness o f t h e Phenomenology t o any o f the 
l o w e r l e v e l s because t h e more advanced l e v e l s are c o n s t r u c t e d 
o;. t h e assumption t h a t t h e l o w e r l e v e l s no l o n g e r e x i s t . 
For example, we can ne v e r r e t u r n t o t h e assumption t h a t t h e r e 
i s a w o r l d o f sens e - i m p r e s s i o n s s i n c e i t has no r e a l e x i s t e n c e 
f o r us now. I t s r e a l e x i s t e n c e i s i t s r e s u l t - the u n c o n d i t i o 
ed u n i v e r s a l . T h i s i s t h e p i t - f a l l o f Hegel's i d e a l i s m t h a t 
he wants t h e r e t o be a w o r l d bat t h a t w o r l d has t o be s e l f -
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' a l o n e . He cannot have i t b o t h ways nowever. 
He cannot assume t h a t t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d and t h e n , 
when i t i s e x p l a i n e d , t h a t i t i s no l o n g e r t h e r e . 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY 
There i s , I have argued, a d i f f i c u l t y i n - H e g e l ' s 
p h i l o s o p h y . He p o s t u l a t e s t h a t t h e r e i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d 
o n l y t o show t h a t t h a t w o r l d i s Mind o r S p i r i t . Mind ( G e i s t ) , 
he c l a i m s , i s t h e process o f t h o u g h t e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f as 
th e o t h e r o f i t s e l f and the r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g o f i t s s e l f -
i d e n t i t y and freedom t h r o u g h t h e overcoming o f t h a t o t h e r -
ness. N a t u r e , t h e r e f o r e , i s 'Mmd t h a t has i t s e l f a l i e n a t e d 
i t s e l f ' and t h e ' t h i n k i n g way o f r e g a r d i n g ' i t i s t o 'watch 
how Na t u r e i n i t s e l f i s t h i s process o f overcoming i t s o t h e r -
ness t o become Mind'."'" Hegel, ±n o t h e r words, aas no sooner 
e s t a b l i s h e d a N a t u r e independent o f Mind th a n he r e t r a c t s i t s 
independence. I t s apparent e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e o u r s e l v e s , he 
c l a i m s , i s i t s e l f o n l y an appearance o f Mind. I t s r e a l i t y 
i=, t h e c o n t e n t o f Mind: s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. I t i s f o r 
t h i s reason t h a t I say t h a t h i s account o f experience i s 
a b s t r a c t . I t i s , as we have seen, an account o f e x p e r i e n c e 
which though c o n c r e t e m much o f i t s d e t a i l has o n l y one end: 
t o show t h a t a l l e x p e r i e n c e may be reduced t o knowledge o r 
'Absolute Knowledge', as Hegel c a l l s i t . Because he b e l i e v e s 
he has shown t h i s t o be so i n h i s Phenomenology he c l a i m s t h a t 
a l l e x p e r i e n c e can be s a i d t o be i d e a l . I n s h o r t , ne b e l i e v e s 
t h a t i t i s o n l y t h e thesus o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l i s m t h a t makes 
sense c f t h e w o r l d . 
] . Hegel. Werke 9> p. 25. 
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However t h e f a c t t h a t Hegel's account o f e x p e r i e n c e 
I n v o l v e s him m the d i f f i c u l t y I have mentioned does n o t 
mean t h a t he i s n o t a g r e a t t h i n K e r . We might indeed t a k e 
t h e view t h a t i t i s because o f h i s i d e a l i s m t h a t Hegel i s 
a g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r . For, i t may be c l a i m e d , i f we d e t a c h 
h i s i d e a l i s m from h i s p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e i s n o t h i n g p e c u l i a r l y 
H e g e l i a n about i t . As t h e M a r x i s t , H e n r i L e f e b v r e , says 
o f Hegel: ' h i s a m b i t i o n c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h a t o f p h i l o s o p h y , 
w i t h t h e most s e c r e t d e s i r e o f t h e l i f e o f mind, seen as 
expa n s i o n and do m i n i o n : t o exclu d e n o t h i n g , t o l e a v e n o t h i n g 
o u t s i d e i t s e l f , t o abandon and t r a n s c e n d every one-sided 
p o s i t i o n ' . H e g e l i a n i s m , he c o n t i n u e s , ' a s s e r t s i m p l i c i t l y 
t h a t a l l c o n f l i c t s can be r e s o l v e d , w i t h o u t m u t i l a t i o n o r 
r e n u n c i a t i o n . . ; i t a s s e r t s t h a t m t h e l i f e o f Mind t h e r e i s 
no need f o r o p t i o n s , a l t e r n a t i v e s o r s a c r i f i c e s . Innumer-
a b l e c o n f l i c t s are o b j e c t i v e l y e x p e r i e n c e d , b u t none o f them 
l a s t f o r e v e r . Every c o n t r a d i c t i o n can be tr a n s c e n d e d m a 
f o r w a r d l e a p o f Mind'. And a g a i n , he says, - and no g r e a t e r 
compliment can be p a i d Hegel t h a n t h i s 'Hegelianism r e p r e s e n t s 
a t y p e o f s p i r i t u a l l i f e t h a t i s s t i l l v a l i d . Not t o aim 
a t a c q u i e s c i n g t o o h a s t i l y t o o u r s e l v e s o r t o t h e w o r l d ; n o t 
t o h i d e from o u r s e l v e s t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d , i n 
man and m each i n d i v i d u a l , b a t , on the c o n t r a r y , t o a c c e n t u a t e 
them, however much we may s u f f e r , because i t i s f r u i t f u l t o 
be t o r n asunder and because,once the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s have become 
T e f e b v r e . D i a l e c t i c a l M a t e r i a l i sin, Jonathan Cape, p. -46. 
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u n b e a r a b l e , t h e need t o t r a n s c e n d them becomes s t r o n g e r t h a n 
any r e s i s t a n c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e elements t h a t are p a s s i n g 
away; such i s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a s p i r i t u a l l i f e b o t h sorrow-
f u l and j o y o u s , w h o l l y r a t i o n a l and unconfused'. Thus m 
L e f e b v r e ' s view i t s t i l l makes sense t o be a H e g e l i a n . The 
w o r l d m which we l i v e , he b e l i e v e s , i s n o t one where we are 
f r e e from moral compromise and, i n d e e d , c o n f u s i o n . The 
H e g e l i a n p o i n t o f view, he suggests, a l l o w s us t o a s s e r t an 
autonomy by r a i s i n g o u r s e l v e s m t h o u g h t above the c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n s o f our e x i s t e n c e . And t h i s t h o u g h t , L e f e b v r e argues, 
has not t o be t h i s o r t h a t t h o u g h t b u t t h e f a i t h f u l r e f l e c t i o n 
o f t h e dilemmas o f o u r e x i s t e n c e . I t has t o be t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f those c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . Thus, i t seems, we can have no need 
t o choose a l t e r n a t i v e o o r make s a c r i f i c e s . We can t a k e r e f u g e 
i n our knowledge o f t h e w o r l d . But i n t h a t knowledge, as 
L e f e b v r e p o i n t s o u t , we a r f 'not t o h i d e from o u r s e l v e s t h e 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o f t h e w ^ r l d ' . Indeed we are t o a c c e n t u a t e 
them u n t i l t h e y become almost u n b e a r a b l e . T h i s , o f c o a r s e , 
i s where t h e s t r e n g t h o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y l i e s . I t encour-
ages us t o be s e v e r e l y c r i t i c a l o f our e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , 
i n d e e d t o see a l l l i f e as e s s e n t i a l l y negative'. Hegel, t h e r e -
f o r e , i s p r e p a r e d t o accept t h e w o r s t o f t h e w o r l d . He i s 
t o t h i s e x t e n t a r e a l i s t . H i s P h i l o s o p h y o f R i g h t , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
i s no mere apology f o r Modern S o c i e t y . That much i s c l e a r 
3- I b i d . , p. 47. 
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from t h e most r e c e n t debates on the work. For r e a l i s m , 
Hegel b e l i e v e d , was n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s i d e a l i s m . 
Indeed, i n h i s Preface t o t h e Ph i l o s o p h y o f R i g h t , he t e l l s 
us t h a t t h e t a s k f o r p h i l o s o p h y i s t o 'grasp what i s ' , and, 
m h i s view 'what i s i s Reason'.^ 
W h i l s t a g r e e i n g t h a t Hegel i s a g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r I s h o u l d 
l i k e t o q u e s t i o n L e f e b v r e ' s c l a i m t h a t h i s p h i l o s o p h y i s r a t -
i o n a l and v a l i d . For i t i s t r u e t h a t H e g e l i a n i s m c o n t i n u e s 
t o e x e r c i s e a h o l d on many t h e o r i s t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a r a t i o n a l 
p h i l o s o p h y i s s u r e l y one t h a t i s f r e e o f a l l i l l u s i o n , one m 
whi c h t h e r e i s no evidence o f m y s t i c a l o r m a g i c a l i d e a s . B u t , 
as L e f e b v r e h i m s e l f p o i n t s o u t , ' H e g e l i a n s p e c u l a t i o n i s s t i l l 
steeped m 'magical' i d e a s . ^ By p o s i t i n g a m a g i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
4. The arguments, f o r and a g a i n s t , can be found m Hegel's P o l i t i c 
P h i l o s o p h y ( A t h e r t o n , 1970) e d i t e d bi W a l t e r Kaufmann. A v m e r i 
g i v e s a most s y m p a t h e t i c r e n d e r i n g o f Hegel's p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t 
m h i s Hegel's Theory o f t h e Modern S t a t e . Hans F r i e d r i c h F u l d a ' r 
Das Recht der P h i l o s o p h i e m Hegel^~s~Pnilosophie des Rechts 
( F r a n k f u r t , 1 9 6 8)contams the most" r i g o r o u s a n a l y s i s I have read 
on t h e t o p i c . 
5. Hegel. Werke 7, P- 26. 
6. R i c h a r d Kroner(Von Kant b i s H e g e l , P a r t T w o , o p . c i t . ) goes so f a r 
as t o say t h a t Hegel i s w i t h o u t doubt t h e g r e a t e s t i r r a t i o n a l i s t 
t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y has ever seen'.(p.2 7 1) T h i s a g a i n 
though does n o t l e a d Kroner t o d i s m i s s Hegel as a g r e a t t h i n k e r . 
He f i n d s h i m s e l f m t h e same paradox as L e f e b v r e t h a t i t i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s weak p o i n t m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y t h a t i s i t s 
s t r e n g t h . He says: 'Dieltjenigen, d i e m dem P a t i o n a l i s m u s des 
Systems e m lhrn e i g e n t u m l i c h e s Kennzeichen sehen, memen aber 
v i e l l e i c h t n i c h t so sehr seme methodische Form,sondern semen 
Anspruch,jedes Problem,das d i e P h i l o s o p h i c n u r immer a u f w e r f e n 
mag,auch p h i l o s o p h i c h e b e w a l t i g e n zu konnen,-sie memen d i e 
V e r z i c h t l o s i g k e i t des Hegelschen Denkens. . . ( p 2 6 8 ) Dies i s t es, 
was man m i t Fug Kegels R a t i o n a l i s m u s nennen d u r f t e . ...Aber d e r 
Name i s t l r r e f l i h r e n d . Denn f u r Hegel b e d e u t e t das Denken und der 
Peg r i f f n i c h t s , was s i c h m Gegensatz zu etwas Anderem b r m g e n 
l i e s s e , s o n d e r n etwas,was s i c h s e l b s t e ntgegensetzt,was s i c h s e l o 
zum Anderen s e i n e r s e l b s t w i r d und mi Anderen s i c h m i t w i e d e r 
zusammenschliesst. Der R a t i o n a l i s m u s des Hegelschen DenKen e n t h a l 
a l s o emen I r r a t i o n a l i s m u s an lhm s e i b s t : d e r B e g r i f f seci'c s i c h 
Grenzen und i s t eben n u r dadurch d er B e g r i f f , d a s s e r es i s t , d e r 
s i c h d i e Grenzen s e t z t und d i e g e s e t z t e Grenze a l s d i e von ihm 
an lhm g e s e t z t e aucn w i e d e r a u f h e b t . N u r ,ienn man d i e s b e r u c k s i c n 
t i g t , v e r s t e h t man Kegels Ford srung auf Uni versa l h e r r s c h a f t d es 
B e g r i f f s r i c h t i g , - d a n n aber w i r d mm n i o h t rnehr von R a t i o n a i i ; m u . 
reden.' (pp . 270 - 271) . 
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i n a b s o l u t e Being ( c o n c e i v e d o f as knowledge and r e a s o n ) , 
i t combines the m a g i c a l schema w i t h an a t t e m p t t o be more 
f u l l y r a t i o n a l ' . He h i m s e l f g i v e s t h e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r 
t h i s i r r a t i o n a l i s m m Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y when he says: 
'Hegel was n o t merely c o n t e n t t o deepen t h e c o n t e n t and make 
i t e x p l i c i t m o r d e r t o a t t a i n t h e form, he reduced i t t o 
g 
t h o u g h t , by c l a i m i n g t o grasp i t t o t a l l y and exhaust i t ' . 
H egel's p h i l o s o p h y does n o t t h e n r e p r e s e n t a w h o l l y r a t i o n a l 
p o i n t o f view because i t c o n j u r e s away t h e c o n t e n t o f our 
e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . Our e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e becomes an 
i r r e l e v a n c e f o r Hegel because h i s i s a system m which, as 
L e f e b v r e h i m s e l f p o i n t s o u t , ' t h o u g h t . . i s t h e s e c r e t source 
o f t h e c o n t e n t ' . For an H e g e l i a n t h e r e f o r e ' i t i s o n l y 
an i l l u s i o n t h a t Mind r e c e i v e s i t s c o n t e n t from o u t s i d e , i n 
accordance w i t h t h e u n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f obser-
i 9 
v a t i o n and e x p e r i e n c e . U l t i m a t e l y t h e n - and L e f e b v r e seems 
t o agree - Hegelianism i s an i n c o n s i s t e n t d o c t r i n e because i t 
reduces a l l e x p e r i e n c e t o the t h o u g h t o f e x p e r i e n c e . We may 
admire Hegel f o r s e e k i n g t o gr a s p t h e e n t i r e c o n t e n t o f 
e x p e r i e n c e m h i s system. Yet t h e r e must always be a p o i n t 
a t w h i c h we must curb our a d m i r a t i o n . For as L e f e b v r e says 
a g a i n , ' i t i s i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e l i m i t e d mind o f one 
i n d i v i d u a l , o f a p h i l o s o p h e r , s h o u l d be a b l e t o gr a s p t he 
e n t i r e c o n t e n t o f human e x p e n e n c e . 1 ^ There i s always 
7. L e f e b v r e . o p . c i t . p. 57. 
8. I b i d . , p. 51-
9- I b i d . , p. 52. 
10. I b i d . , p. 48. T h i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , i s what K r o n e r ha-., i n mm 
when he r e f e r s t o Hegel as an i r r a t i o n a l i s t : t h e c l a i m t h a t 
h i s Concept i s t h e r e a l i t y o f r e a l i t y . 
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something new t o be fou n d , t o be e x p l a i n e d . The forms o f 
human and n a t u r a l e x i s t e n c e are p o t e n t i a l l y l i m i t l e s s . 
P h i l o s o p h y and t h e s c i e n c e s may, as Hegel c l a i m s , m t e l l e c -
t u a l i z e human and n a t u r a l l i f e b u t b o t h , n a t u r e and Humanity, 
because t h e y are d e v e l o p i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r under-
s t a n d i n g remain u n l i m i t e d sources o f new knowledge. What 
Hegel i g n o r e s i s , as L e f e b v r e n o t e s , t h a t i t i s n o t o n l y 
t h o u g h t t h a t i s r e a l f o r us but a l s o p r a c t i c e . We are n o t 
o n l y t h i n k i n g b e i n g s b u t a l s o p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e b e i n g s . 
Thought cannot t h e r e f o r e e n c a p s u l a t e t h e whole o f our exper-
i e n c e , because t o do t h a t , n o t o n l y would i t have t o be t h e 
knowledge o f our consciousness b u t i t would a l s o have t o be 
what we do. And f o r t h o u g h t t o be a l l t h a t we do i s i m p o s s i b i 
As L e f e b v r e concludes, ' p r a c t i c e i s c r e a t i v e , i t cannot be 
deduced from the concept. I t has i t s erwn e x i g e n c i e s , i t s 
own d i s c i p l i n e - i t s own l o g i c p e r h a p s ' . 1 1 Thus i n h i s view, 
i t i s p r i m a r i l y t h e problem o f the r e l a t i o n o f p r a c t i c e t o 
p h i l o s o p h y t h a t Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y r a i s e s and l e a v e s unanswered 
I t i s , o f course, t o t h i s problem t h a t Marx - t o whom we now 
t u r n - f i r s t addresses h i m s e l f . 
1 1 . I b i d . , p. 50. 
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TWO'CONTRADICTIONS'IN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY 
We s h a l l b e g i n w i t h an a n a l y s i s o f Marx's ' C r i t i q u e 
o f t h e H e g e l i a n D i a l e c t i c and P h i l o s o p h y ' . T h i s essay 
forms p a r t o f t h e famous P a r i s M a n u s c r i p t s o f 1844. I t i s 
c e n t r a l t o our i n t e r e s t i n t h e end o f German C l a s s i c a l P h i l o s -
ophy because m the course o f h i s C r i t i q u e Marx makes p l a i n 
h i s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h H e g el. I n examining those d i f f e r e n c e s 
we can, I b e l i e v e , d i s c o v e r t h e reasons why Hegel's p h i l o s -
ophy f e l l i n t o d i s r e p u t e so r a p i d l y a f t e r h i s d e a t h and a t 
the same t i m e d i s c o v e r t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i t undergoes m 
Marx's hands. I t i s t h ese two 'ends' which m nry view 
German C l a s s i c a l p h i l o s o p h y has. There i s i n t h e f i r s t 
p l a c e t he end t o which Hegel b r i n g s i t m h i s p h i l o s o p h y 
and secondly t h e r e i s t h e end t o which Marx p u t s i t m h i s 
p h i l o s o p h y , and, as I say, an a n a l y s i s o f Marx's C r i t i q u e 
w i l l a c q u a i n t us w i t h b o t h . 
I n t h e C r i t i q u e Marx, as I have suggested, i n t e n d s 
t o s e t t l e h i s d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y . Now he 
sees h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Hegel as c o n t i n u i n g a t a s k t h a t Feuer-
bach had begun. There are t h r e e a s p ects o f what he t a k e s 
t o be Feuerbach's C r i t i q u e which he re g a r d s as p a r t i c u l a r l y 
12 
i m p o r t a n t . I n the f i r s t p l a c e he t a k e s Feuerbach's c r i t i q u e 
t o be i m p o r t a n t because i t proved t h a t Hegel 'proceeds from 
t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f Substance, t h e a b s o l u t e , f i x e d a b s t r a c t i o n ' . " ' " 
12. A.Schmidt i n h i s The Concept o f N a t u r e i n Marx (NLB) and 
Emanzipa r o n s c n e S m n l i c h k e i t (Reihe Hanser) has g i v e n a 
most comprehensive account o f t h i s Marx's debt t o Feuerbach 
13. Marx Marx-Engels Werke, Erganzungsband, E r s t e r T e i l , p. 5Y0 
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For t h e want o f a b e t t e r word, Marx c o n t i n u e s , we can 
c a l l t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n God. And t h i s , he c l a i m s , i s what 
Feuerbach showed: t h a t Hegel's s t a r t i n g - p o i n t was t h e o l o g i c a l . 
Feuerbach t h e n b u i l t on t h i s c r i t i c i s m , by showing t h a t Hegel's 
second move was t o p o s i t t h a t God was no more. I n o t h e r words, 
m t h e second stage o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y Hegel l a i d emphasis on 
t h e ' a c t u a l , sensuous, r e a l , f i n i t e and p a r t i c u l a r ' . 1 ^ Feuer-
bach completed t h i s i m p o r t a n t c r i t i c i s m , Marx suggests, by 
showing t h a t m t h e t h i r d aspect o f h i s p h i l o s o p h y Hegel 
' r e - e s t a b l i s h e s r e l i g i o n and t h e o l o g y ' by a b o l i s h i n g t h e 
15 
f i n i t e and t h e r e a l . I n sum t h e n , Marx suggests, Feuer-
bach had proven t h a t t h e r e was an a m b i g u i t y m Hcge]'s p h i l o s -
ophy. That a m b i g u i t y , i t seems, was t h a t Hegel was b o t h an 
u p h o l d e r and c r i t i c o f t h e o l o g i c a l n o t i o n s . I n s e c u l a r 
t e r m s , Marx c l a i m s , t h i s means t h a t he b o t h acknowledged t h e 
e x i s t e n c e o f a f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r w o r l d and d e n i e d t h e r e a l i t y 
o f i t s e x i s t e n c e . I n c l a i m i n g t h i s Marx seems t o have m 
mind what I have c a l l e d t h e p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s o f Hegel's 
p h i l o s o p h y : t h a t Substance i s S u b j e c t . The t h e s i s i s , as 
we have seen, t h a t r e a l i t y i s b o t h t h e a l l - e m b r a c i n g One 
Substance and i t s l i m i t a t i o n and p a r t i c u l a r i s a t i o n as S u b j e c t . 
I t i s a t h e s i s t h a t , as we have seen, r e p r e s e n t s t h e p o i n t 
o f view t h a t t h e r e i s a f i n i t e p a r t i c u l a r w o r l d o n l y t o 
show t h a t t h a t w o r l d i s o f i t s e l f i n f i n i t e o r d i v i n e . The 
i n f i n i t e , Hegel c l a i m s , has t o be shown t o emerge from t h e 
f i n i t e . Marx r e f e r s t o t h i s aspect o f Hegel's system as the 
16 
'Negation o f t h e N e g a t i o n ' . I t r e p r e s e n t s f o r him t h e 
' c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h i t s e l f ' . But what Marx 14. I b i d . 
16. I b i d . , p. 570. 
15. I b i d . 
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means by r e f e r r i n g t o i t m t h i s way i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y 
c l e a r . I t i s t h e r e f o r e f o r t u n a t e t h a t he t u r n s t o Hegel's 
Pheno nenology t o c l a r i f y h i s p o i n t . 
The Phenorneno 1 og/ now occupies h i s a t t e n t i o n because, 
I n h i s view, i t i s 'the t r u e b i r t h p l a c e and t h e s e c r e t o f 
th e H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y . Marx g i v e s l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n 
why he t h i n k s t h i s t o be so o t h e r t h a n t o say t h a t , i n h i s 
view, t he c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y appear most 
c l e a r l y m t h a t work. What the n are those c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 9 
l 8 
Marx c l a i m s t h a t t h e y are two i n number. I n the f i r s t 
p l a c e Hegel ( r i g h t l y i t seems) d e p i c t s t h e w o r l d o f t h e 
o r d i n a r y consciousness as an estrange d w o r l d b u t , Marx 
o b j e c t s , t h i s estrangement t a k e s p l a c e m t h e t h o u g h t - f o r m 
a l o n e . I n o t h e r words, Marx suggests, Hegel r e g a r d s a l i e n -
a t i o n o n l y as a menta l phenomenon. I n t h e second p l a c e , 
Hegel e r r o n e o u s l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e process o f t h e Phenomenology 
can overcome a l i e n a t i o n . I n Marx's view Hegel i s m i s t a k e n 
i n t h i s because no amount o f t h i n k i n g - w h i c h , a f t e r a l l , i s 
a l l t h a t t h e process o f t h e Phenomenology r e p r e s e n t s - can 
overcome a phenomenon t h a t i s r o o t e d i n man's s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e . 
So a l t h o u g h Marx agrees w i t h Hegel t h a t man i s an e s t r a n g e d 
b e i n g he b e l i e v e s t h a t what he c a l l s 'man's t r u e b e i n g ' cannot 
be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h t h o u g h t a l o n e . But t h i s , Marx c l a i m s , 
i s what happens w i t h Hegel ' the v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i v e 
w o r l d f o r man' i s merely an i n t e l l e c t u a l one. Because 'the 
es t r a n g e d o b j e c t . . i s . . . o n l y t he t h o u g h t o f a l i e n a t i o n , i t s 
a b s t r a c t and t h e r e f o r e empty and u n r e a l e x p r e s s i o n . . t h e over-
L 7 . I b i d . , p. 571 . 18. I b i d . , p. 572, 
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coming o f a l i e n a t i o n i s e q u a l l y n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n an 
119 
a b s t r a c t , empty overcoming o f t h a t empty a b s t r a c t i o n . 
The two o b j e c t i o n s t h a t Marx has t o Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y a r e , 
t h e n , m u t u a l l y complementary. We can r e a d i l y see t h a t i f , 
as Marx says, Hegel conceives o f a l i e n a t i o n as merely a 
mental phenomenon he w i l l c onceive o f i t s r e s o l u t i o n i n those 
terms as w e l l . E q u a l l y , i f we t a k e t h e view t h a t a l i e n a t i o n 
can be r e s o l v e d by t h o u g h t alone t h e r e i s e very reason f o r 
us t o b e l i e v e t n a t i t i s merely an i n t e l l e c t u a l phenomenon 
Marx o f course b e l i e v e s b o t h i d e a s t o be m i s t a k e n , 
The f i r s t , he suggests, i s wrong because Hegel i s m i s t a k e n 
m b e l i e v i n g t h a t a l i e n a t i o n i s o n l y a ment a l phenomenon. 
Marx argues t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t i t appears m t h e f i r s t p l a c e 
i s dependent on c e r t a i n economic c o n d i t i o n s , n o t a b l y t he 
pr e v a l e n c e o f commodity p r o d u c t i o n . I t s e x i s t e n c e i s a 
p r e r e q u i s i t e o f man's b e i n g a l i e n a t e d - as Marx conc e i v e s 
t h e n o t i o n . Thus t o suggest t h a t a l i e n a t i o n has appeared, 
as Hegel does, t h r o u g h t h e mere p o s i t i n g o f 'the o p p o s i t i o n 
o f an m i t s e l f (an s i c h ) and f o r i t s e l f , o f consciousness 
20 
and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o f o b j e c t and s u b j e c t 1 i s , m Marx' 
view, t h o r o u g h l y m i s l e a d i n g . The n o t i o n , Marx c o n t i n u e s , 
has t o do w i t h man's s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e and n o t , as a r e a d i n g 
o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y would suggest , w i t h 'the o p p o s i t i o n 
o f a b s t r a c t t h o u g h t and sensuous r e a l i t y o r r e a l sensuousness 
19- I b i d . , p. 585. 20. I b i d . , p. 572. 
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i n s i d e t h o u g h t i t s e l f ' . So, Marx c l a i m s , Hegel g i v e s 
the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a l l a l i e n a t i o n r e s u l t s from a t h e o r e t -
i c a l e r r o r on t h e p a r t o f t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s , 
Marx says, i s s u r e l y a b a s i c f a i l i n g i n h i s p h i l o s o p h y . 
Hegel, m h i s o p i n i o n , has w h o l l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d t h e problem. 
However, i t m ight be argued t h a t i t i s Marx, r a t h e r 
t h a n Hegel, who has mis u n d e r s t o o d t h e problem. For, i t 
c o u l d be s a i d , h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Hegel i s based on c o n s i d e r -
a t i o n s which, by any s t a n d a r d s , are e x t r a n e o u s t o p h i l o s o p h y . 
Prima f a c i e such an o b j e c t i o n would appear t o be c o r r e c t . 
Marx, i t seems, i s g u i l t y o f an i g n o r a t i o e l e n c h i m c l a i m i n g 
t h a t Hegel misunderstands t h e phenomenon o f a l i e n a t i o n . For 
even i f we suppose t h e phenomenon o f a l i e n a t i o n t o be t h e 
r e s u l t o f a c e r t a i n mode o f p r o d u c t i o n t h i s s t i l l need n o t 
mean t h a t Hegel's philosophy has f a i l e d m any r e s p e c t . A 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument, our c r i t i c would c l a i m , can o n l y be 
r e f u t e d by a p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument; and Marx's argument i s 
p l a i n l y an economic one. I would suggest, however, t h a t 
t h e r e has t o be an e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s r u l e ; and t h i s would be 
where t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument d e a l s w i t h a problem t h a t 
i s b e s t d e a l t w i t h w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a d i f f e r e n t o r , 
ind e e d , new d i s c i p l i n e . T h i s would appear t o be p a r t o f 
Marx's c l a i m h e r e . However, our c r i t i c i s u n l i k e l y t o l e t 
t h e m a t t e r d r o p a t t h a t . He w i l l c o n s i d e r t h a t i f a q u e s t i o n 
i s b e s t d e a l t w i t h o u t s i d e t he p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c i p l i n e t h e n 
2 1 . I b i d . 
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i t i s n o t , and can nev e r have been, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n . 
But are t h i n g s always as c l e a r c u t as t h i s 9 The b o u n d a r i e s 
o f p h i l o s o p h y are n o t f i x e d n o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r are th e y 
r e a d i l y d i s c e r n i b l e . T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y how p h i l o s o p h y has 
appeared m the p a s t . For i t i s a m a t t e r o f f a c t t h a t i t 
has a t c e r t a i n t i m e s b o t h been subsumed under and has sub-
sumed what are now r e c o g n i s e d t o be q u i t e s e p a r a t e d i s c i p l i n e s . 
One need o n l y l o o k a t what has been i t s r e l a t i o n t o t h e o l o g y 
and n a t u r a l s c i e n c e t o see t h i s . Indeed I b e l i e v e t h a t i t 
would be q u i t e wrong t o exclude from p h i l o s o p h y a l l arguments 
t h a t are drawn from o t h e r d i s c i p l i n e s s i m p l y because t h e y a r e 
t h a t . I t i s b e s t , I t h i n k , t o judge each p a r t i c u l a r argument, 
whether drawn from p h i l o s o p h y o r n o t , on i t s own m e r i t s . 
Judged m t h i s more g e n e r a l sense i t appears t o me t h a t 
Marx c r i t i c i s m o f Hegel has some m e r i t . C e r t a i n l y h i s c r i t -
i c i s m does n o t i n v o l v e him i n an i g n o r a t i o e l e n c h i . For i t 
i s Hegel h i m s e l f who h a i i d e n t i f i e d a p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem 
w i t h a s o c i a l problem. I t i s he, as we have seen, who c l a i m s 
t h a t t h e b i f u r c a t i o n t h a t i s i n h e r e n t m e x p e r i e n c e i s r e f l e c t e d 
i n p h i l o s o p h y . I t i s he, who as Marx says, reduces t h e problem 
o f a l i e n a t i o n t o t h e p h i l s o p h i c a l o r , more s p e c i f i c a l l y , epistem-
o l o g i c a l problem o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , 
t h e i n i t s e l f and t h e f o r i t s e l f , c onsciousness and s e l f - c o n -
s c i o u s n e s s . T h i s o p p o s i t i o n Hegel, as we have seen, c a l l s 
t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f mind o r the l o s s o f s e l f , and he f i r m l y 
a s s o c i a t e s i t w i t h t h e ' s h a t t e r e d harmony' o f man's day t o 
29 6. 
day e x i s t e n c e . T h i s was most e x p l i c i t m h i s e a r l y 
D i f f e r e n z s c h r - i f t b u t , as P l a n t and Rohrmoser have shown, i t 
i s a theme o f h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y . We o u r s e l v e s have found 
t h i s t o be t r u e o f t h e Phenomenology o f Mind. Hegel, I 
argued, i d e n t i f i e s t n e t h e s i s o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m 
22 
w i t h a l i e n a t i o n . He cannot t h e r e f o r e escape Marx's c r i t -
i c i s m by p l e a d i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l immunity. He h i m s e l f i n v i t e s 
t h e k i n d o f c r i t i c i s m Marx p u t s f o r w a r d . I t i s Hegel who 
suggests t h a t knowledge can overcome a l i e n a t i o n . And i t 
makes sense f o r Marx t o r e p l y t h a t t h i s i s nonsense. A l i e n -
a t i o n , he c l a i m s , i s much more t h a n a mere p o s t u l a t e o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . The mere i d e a o f t h e r e b e i n g an 
e x t e r n a l w o r l d can, m h i s view, a l i e n a t e no-one. What i s 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r what Hegel c a l l s t h e s e l f ' s l o s s o f i t s 
o b j e c t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o Marx, man's r e a l l o s s o f h i s o b j e c t 
lxi commodity p r o d u c t i o n . What, t h e r e f o r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i r r i t a t e s him m Hegel's account o f a l i e n a t i o n i s t h a t f o r 
Hegel i t i s 'not t h a t t h e human b e i n g o b j e c t i f i e s h i m s e l f 
inhumanly m o p p o s i t i o n t o h i m s e l f b u t t h a t he o b j e c t i f i e s 
h i m s e l f m d i s t i n c t i o n t o and m o p p o s i t i o n t o a b s t r a c t 
t h o u g h t w h i c h counts as t h e p o s i t e d essence o f a l i e n a t i o n and 
t h e essence which has t o be o v e r c o m e . A n d f a r from t h i s 
b e i n g a c r i t i c i s m which i n v o l v e s what some would c a l l a 
c a t e g o r y m i s t a k e , i t i s one t h a t g e t s a t t h e h e a r t o f Hegel's 
p h i l o s o p h y . 
22. See above. Chapter 3, P- 151 • 
23. Marx, i b i d j p. 572. 
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We can see t h i s more c l e a r l y , I b e l i e v e , when we have 
a more precise idea of the nature of Marx's c r i t i c i s m . 
This w i l l not be a simple task since Marx r e l i e s h e a v i l y 
on aphorism i n making h i s p o i n t s m the C r i t i q u e . We can 
however make a beginning by examining the grounds f o r Marx's 
second p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n t o Hegel's system. The second 
e r r o r he detects m Hegel's philosophy i s , as I have said, 
t h a t i t i s i t s e l f supposed to represent the overcoming of 
man's a l i e n a t i o n . Thus m Hegel's philosophy, Marx claims, 
'the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of the e s s e n t i a l powers of man which have 
become objects and a l i e n o bjects i s t o begin w i t h only an 
a p p r o p r i a t i o n which occurs i n consciousnes, m pure thought 
,24 
i . e . m a b s t r a c t i o n . So the claim t h a t h i s philosophy 
has, or can, overcome a l i e n a t i o n m Marx's view represents 
an e r r o r on Hegel's p a r t because i t i s too ambitious. I n 
i t , Marx claims, thought i s over-reaching i t s e l f . Marx, 
then, wants t o demarcate thought and p r a c t i c e m such a way 
t h a t i t would preclude the claim t h a t thought by i t s e l f can 
a l t e r s o c i a l phenomena. Hegel however, Marx i m p l i e s , allows 
no such d i s t i n c t i o n . Indeed, he claims, Hegel's view i s 
t h a t the thought of a t h i n g or an a c t i v i t y i s the essence of 
t h a t t h i n g or a c t i v i t y . Marx appears t o be c o r r e c t m 
a s s e r t i n g t h a t Hegel takes t h i s view. We r e c a l l , f o r example 
t h a t Hegel regards the h i s t o r y of philosophy as the essence 
of world h i s t o r y . He claims, as we have seen, t h a t 'the 
2h. I b i d . p. 573. 
25. I b i d , pp 580 - 1. I n saying t h i s Marx i s quoting Feuerbach. 
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h i s t o r y of philosophy i s the innermost ( s o u l ) of world 
h i s t o r y - t h i s work of the mind of man m h i s inner thought 
26 
i s p a r a l l e l w i t h a l l the stages of r e a l i t y . ' I n short., 
he i m p l i e s , as Marx claims, t h a t our r e f l e c t i o n on our a c t i v i t y , 
or more p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of the philosopher, i s the essence 
of our a c t i v i t y . Equally, we might r e c a l l an aspect of 
Hegel's general view of philosophy. Philosophy, we have 
seen Hegel claim, i s t h a t process which while l o o k i n g on at 
t h a t a c t i v i t y which appears t o be going on e x t e r n a l t o Mind 
(G e i s t ) shows t h a t the a c t i v i t y of i t s e l f becomes Mind. Or, 
Hegel claims, we may simply see the process as 'pure s e l f -
r e c o g n i t i o n i n absolute otherbemg' . But m 'pure s e l f -
r e c o g n i t i o n ' there can, as Marx claims, be no room f o r any 
d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made between thought and a c t i v i t y . Such 
a philosophy has to reduce p r a c t i c e t o the thought of i t . 
Thus f o r instance the Hegelian philosophy can only contemplate 
'sensuousness, r e l i g i o n , state-power', Marx suggests, as 
28 
' i n t e l l e c t u a l essences'. 
Marx, then, stresses the abstractness of Hegel's p h i l o s -
ophy. I have already drawn a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s f a cet of Hegel's 
system. I have suggested t h a t i t i s evidence of a fundamental 
d i f f i c u l t y , namely, t h a t he supposes t h a t there i s an e x t e r n a l 
world only t o undermine t h a t s u p p o s i t i o n . I suggested t h a t 




See above. Chapter pJ-^5-
Hegel. Werke 3, P- 29. 
Marx, i b i d . , p. 573. 
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c i r c u l a t i o n . Now, Marx I bel i e v e i n t h i s C r i t i q u e of Hegel's 
D i a l e c t i c has m mind the same facet of Hegel's philosophy. 
He i s , so t o speak, i n t e r e s t e d m a l l o w i n g t h i s Hegelian com 
of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n (the p o s i t i n g of an e x t e r n a l world) t o 
c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y . To be sure, he has not m mind p r e c i s e l y 
the same n o t i o n of the a b s t r a c t i o n m Hegel's as we; h i s 
n o t i o n i s c l e a r l y more comprehensive than ours. I was 
concerned w i t h a t h e o r e t i c a l inconsistency m Hegel's system 
he w i t h what appears to be an o n t o l o g i c a l inadequacy. We 
s h a l l f i n d , however, t h a t our less ambitious n o t i o n w i l l serve 
us w e l l m the e f f o r t t o understand Marx's o n t o l o g i c a l c r i t i c -
ism of H e g e i , For, as we s h a l l see, Marx begins from the 
less comprehensive view of Hegel's abstractness i n makang 
those c r i t i c i s m s . 
I have suggested t h a t Marx m h i s enquiry wishes t o 
discover the consequence of mai n t a i n i n g c o n s i s t e n t l y the 
Hegelian view t h a t the subject f i n d s i t s e l f o b j e c t i f i e d 
i n the e x t e r n a l world. As we have seen, Marx t h i n k s t h a t 
Feuerbach has shown t h a t t h i s was the second aspect of Hegel's 
system, namely, t h a t he 'abolishes the I n f i n i t e , p o s i t s the 
,29 
a c t u a l , sensuous, r e a l , f i n i t e , p a r t i c u l a r . But i n 
Hegel's philosophy, t h i s aspect i s superceded (as Marx again 
believes Feuerbach to have shown) by the r e s t o r a t i o n of the 
I n f i n i t e , the t h i r d aspect of Hegel's philosophy. I n other 
words, we can see Marx's i n t e r e s t as being m the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of d i s c a r d i n g t h i s t h i r d aspect of Hegel's philosophy. For 
he s t r o n g l y believes t h a t the second aspect of Hegel's system 
i s h i s most l a s t i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the development of what. 
29- Marx, i b i d . , p. 570. 
300. 
Marx c a l l s man's self-knowledge. Indeed he i s prepared 
to go so f a r as t o say t h a t i t i s 'the greatest t h i n g 
• 30 
about the Hegelian Phenomenology.'^ 
We can best understand why Marx wishes t o claim t h i s i f 
we keep m mind the view of man t h a t l i e s at the back of 
many of Marx's c r i t i c i s m of Hegel. Man f o r Marx 1 i s p a r t 
of nature'. And what he means by t h i s i s complex. Nature 
i s , he suggests, 'the inorganic body of man, namely, nature 
m so f a r as i t i s not i t s e l f human body. Man l i v e s from 
nature means: Nature i s h i s body w i t h which he must remain 
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m constant process m order t h a t he not d i e ' . I n other 
words, he suggests, man's productive a c t i v i t y i s h i s l i f e 
a c t i v i t y . I t i s h i s l i f e a c t i v i t y not only as a means t o 
s a t i s f y h i s needs but also as the p r i n c i p a l way he expresses 
hi m s e l f . So, Marx argues, a man i s what he does. And not 
only t h a t , the whole of humanity or what Marx c a l l s man's 
species l i f e (Gattungsleben), i s t o be cha r a c t e r i s e d by 
i t s t y p i c a l a c t i v i t y which i s , according t o Marx, conscious 
productive a c t i v i t y . 'Free conscious a c t i v i t y ' , he claims, 
' i s the species character of man'.^ What d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i s 
productive a c t i v i t y from t h a t of an animal i s t h a t h i s i n t e r -
course w i t h nature i s governed by h i s w i l l . As a r e s u l t , Marx 
33 
b e l i e v e s , 'nature appears as h i s work and h i s r e a l i t y ' . J 
Man then i s a n a t u r a l being m a p r i v i l e g e d sense f o r Marx. 
Because he i s not only able t o secure from nature h i s means 30. I b i d . p. 57^. 
32. I b i d . 
31. I b i d . , p. 516. 
33. I b i d . 
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of subsistence but i s also able t o c o n t r o l i t t o meet w i t h 
h i s requirements h i s 'naturalness' i s one t h a t i s not only 
m nature but above i t as w e l l . 
Now, Marx, i t seems, associates the second stage of 
Hegel's philosophy, of the I n f i n i t e being abolished and the 
f i n i t e and p a r t i c u l a r being a f f i r m e d , w i t h t h i s view of man. 
To discover why he does so i s , of course, of some importance 
to us. I n t h i s instance he r e f e r s t o the second stage of 
Hegel's philosophy as the d i a l e c t i c of n e g a t i v i t y . What 
he has m mind m using the term i s the m a t e r i a l i s t , concrete 
aspect of the phenomenological process; the aspect of Hegel's 
approach which leads t o the p o s i t i n g of an e x t e r n a l world 
whjch i s genuinely opposed t o ourselves. Hegel him s e l f 
r e f e r s t o t h i s m a famous passage m the Preface t o the 
Phenomenology as the aspect of the l i f e of Mind which does 
not 'shy away from death' but r a t h e r 'puts up w i t h i t and 
.34 
preserves i t s e l f m i t . ^ I n h i s view, l i v i n g w i t h the 
negative was an e s s e n t i a l aspect of the l i f e of Mind ( G e i s t ) . 
Now Marx believes t h a t as a r e s u l t of t h i s , what he c a l l s 
the d i a l e c t i c of n e g a t i v i t y , ' H e g e l comprehends the s e l f -
formation (Selbsterzeugung) of man as a process, o b j e c t i f i c -
a t i o n as oppostion, as e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n and as overcoming t h i s 
35 
e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n ' . I t appears t h a t i n saying t h i s Marx has 
3^. Hegel. Werke 3* p. 36. 
35- Marx, i b i d . , p. 57^. This i s what leads Marx to say t h a t 
Hegel's standpoint i s the standpoint of modern P o l i t i c a l 
Economy. As I v m e r i says,(The SociaJ and P o l i t i c a l Thought 
K a r l Ma rx)Marx points out t h a t what the c l a s s i c a l economTs 
expressed i n terms of economic a c t i v i t y Hegel has already 
formulated p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ' . But, as A v m e n adds, m Mao 
view 'Hegel saw only labour's c r e a t i v e nature and d i d >iot 
perceive the a l i e n a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s accompanying i t m pres 
s o c i e t y ' . p. 78. 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y m mind the se c t i o n of the Phenomenology 
which deals w i t h the r e l a t i o n of 'Master and Slave'. As 
t h i s w i l l b r i n g us t o a p o i n t which i s of some importance 
t o Marx's view of experience i t i s worth our while examining, 
i f only m b r i e f , the s t r u c t u r e of t h a t d i a l e c t i c . 
The whole d i a l e c t i c , i t appears, revolves around the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of both the master and the slave to what Hegel 
c a l l s the obje c t of d e s i r e . At the outset the master, not 
s u r p r i s i n g l y , appears to be m the dominant p o s i t i o n . He 
i s able to c a l l on the slave to s a t i s f y h i s every need by 
f u r n i s h i n g him w i t h the object of h i s d e s i r e . He i s , Hegel 
36 
claims, t h e r e f o r e the consciousness t h a t i s f o r i t s e l f . 
At the end of the d i a l e c t i c , however, the p o s i t i o n of master 
and slave are apparently reversed. There 'the t r u t h of the 
independent consciousness..is the s e r v i l e (knechtische) 
37 
consciousness' . The d i a l e c t i c has t h i s outcome, I thmK., 
because of the way m -".lich Hegel i n t e r p r e t s the process of 
negation. Negation f o r Hegel i s the process of what Marx 
c a l l s man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . As Marx i n d i c a t e s , f o r Hegel 
the completion of the process e n t a i l s t n a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
consciousness ( m t h i s instance t h a t of the slave) must f e e l 
genuine o p p o s i t i o n . And by t h i s Hegel means not merely t h a t 
consciousness should have f e l t t h i s or t h a t discontent 
but t h a t i t s whole being should have been placed m jeopardy. 
Thus he says of the slave's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of h i m s e l f : ' t h e r e i n 
36. Hegel. Werke j; p. 150, 
37. I b i d . , p. 152. 
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he i s inwardly d i s s o l v e d , has trembled t o the core, and 
38 
e v e r y t h i n g f i x e d m h i s existence has been shaken'. The 
otherness which he experiences has t o be genuine or else i t 
i s not o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n t h a t he experiences. Hegel i n s i s t s 
on t h i s p o i n t . He argues t h a t the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of sub-
j e c t t h a t takes place m h i s philosophy i s no mere i l l u s i o n . 
And m so f a r as t h i s i s t r u e of h i s philosophy, Marx would 
suggest, i t i s i t s s t r e n g t h . Through presenting man's 
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as 9 process he had, Marx claims, come close 
to g i v i n g an u n d i s t o r t e d view of man's nature. I t i s man's 
nature to be a l i m i t e d , f i n i t e and indeed, s u f f e r i n g being 
who has t o remain m coastant i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h nature to 
secure h i s l i f e . Equally i t i s h i s nature, Marx claims, t c 
seek t o overcome h i s l i m i t a t i o n s t o seek t o dimmish h i s 
s u f f e r i n g . This Marx regards as the p o s i t i v e aspect of 
man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . This aspect of o b j e c t : f i c e t i o n , he 
claims, d i d not escape Hegel's n o t i c e e i t h e r . We can see 
this f o r ourselves m t h i s instance. Because i t i s through 
t h i s very aspect of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n according t o Hegel t h a t 
the r o l e s of master and slave are reversed. For the slave, 
he argues, overcomes h i s dependent and estranged c o n d i t i o n 
through h i s s t r u g g l e w i t h nature. By seeking to d i m m i s h 
'through labour' the o p p o s i t i o n he f e e l s between him s e l f and h i s 
surroundings the slave. Hegel claims,'comes to hi m s e l f ' . ^ 9-
38. I b i d . , p. 153. 
39. I b i d p o r a comprehensive, i f obscure, account of the n o t i o n o f 
labour in"Hegel's Phenomenology see Sok-Zm Lim, Per B e g r i f f 
der A r b e i t be: Hegel (Bonn 19t>3) A c l e a r e r view of Hegel Is 
n o t i o n of p r a c t i c e i s given by Re: de l m h i s The o n e und 
Praxis im Denken Hegels. 
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He i s no longer estranged. This change m the slave's Status 
i s symbolised f o r him m a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n m the object of 
d e s i r e . The object of desire i s no longer something which 
he fears as the t h i n g f o r which he was enslaved, i t i s now 
h i s own o b j e c t . He comes to see i t m t h i s way because i t 
i s he t h a t produces i t . He discovers through h i s own objec-
t i f i c a t i o n or negation, t h a t i t i s h i s own labour which i s 
embodied m the o b j e c t . I t would, I t h i n k , be t r u e t o say 
t h a t i t i s t h i s aspect of the d i a l e c t i c t h a t appeals most 
t o Marx. For i t appears t o be what Marx has i n mind when 
he says m the C r i t i q u e t h a t Hegel 'comprehends the essence 
of labour' and f o r t h i s reason grasps 'ob j e c t i v e man, t r u e 
because r e a l man as a r e s u l t of h i s own labour'.^^ For m 
h i s own labour the slave, as we can see, comes to see h i s 
c o n d i t i o n as the r e s u l t of h i s a c t i v i t y ; and t h i s , Marx c l a i n s , 
i s so not only f o r Hegel's account of the slave but f o r h i s 
whole philosophy. This assessment i s , of course, i n f l u e n c e d 
by Marx's own view of man but i t i s not only he and h i s f o l l -
owers who have pointed out t h i s aspect of Hegel's n o t i o n of 
labour. What Mure m h i s e x c e l l e n t The Philosophy of Hegel 
has t o say on Hegel's account of the Master and Slave echoes 
Marx's p o i n t . Although, Mure says, the slave m h i s work 
'serves under the compulsion of an u t t e r f e a r which d i s s o l v e s 
h i s whole being, y e t as he labours he l e a r n s . He learns t o 
r e f a s h i o n h i s d i s s o l v e d and shattered consciousness t o a new 
self-consciousness by f a s h i o n i n g e x t e r n a l t h i n g s before which 
he does not tremble..his labour changes the world permanently, 
40. Marx, i b i d . , p. 574. 
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as h i s master's t r a n s i t o r y s a t i s f a c t i o n s do not. His 
products accordingly m a measure r e f l e c t h i mself, and i n 
t h a t measure give him a fr e e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . ' ^ 
We can now assess the v a l i d i t y of Marx's suggestion 
t h a t m Hegel's philosophy man overcomes h i s estrangement m 
consciousness alone. I t i s v a l i d I would argue because -
even i n t h i s notable instance - Hegel's assumption of other-
ness i s not, as he l i k e s t o claim, wholly genuine. I n other 
words, there i s an e r r o r m h i s account of negation. For 
what u l t i m a t e l y concerns Hegel m the d i a l e c t i c of the master 
and slave i s not the p r i v a t i o n t h a t the slave s u f f e r s as a 
man through being a slave but the p r i v a t i o n that he has to 
put up w i t h as self-consciousness. Man f o r Hegel counts 
only as a t h i n k i n g being or, as Marx suggests, man f o r Hegel 
42 
i s only self-consciousness. I t i s t h e r e f o r e s u f f i c i e n t 
t h a t the slave, as Mure puts i t , 're-fashion h i s d i s s o l v e d 
and shattered self-consciousness' f o r h i s p r i v a t i o n t o be 
turned i n t o a p o s i t i v e bounty. He i s able t o recover h i s 
loss of s e l f through the mere i n s i g h t i n t o the master's 
r e c i p r o c a l dependence on him. Indeed Hegel claims t h a t , 
through h i s labour the slave comes to view the 'independent 
being as him s e l f . ^  But t h i s , surely, cannot be so. For 
even i f , as Mure says, the slave gams a measure of freedom 
m labour he him s e l f does not, through t h a t labour, come t o 
possess h i s product or, f o r t h a t matter, himself. He i s 
c l e a r l y s t i l l not f r e e . To be sure, he may come t o see the 
41. G.R.G. Mure. The Philosophy of Hegel, pp.76 - 77. 
42. Marx, i b i d . , p. 575-
43. Hegel. Werke 3, p- 154. 
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world m a more u n i v e r s a l , and i f we are t o bel i e v e Hegel, 
more human way as a r e s u l t of r e f l e c t i n g on h i s work; but he 
has m no way recovered the a c t u a l loss of s e l f t h a t slavery 
i m p l i e s . He cannot, as Hegel suggests, t h i n k h i s chains away. 
This of course brings us t o the heart of Marx's case against 
Hegel. 
For Marx, as I have sa i d , wants t o demarcate thought and 
p r a c t i c e m such a way t h a t i t would preclude the claim t h a t 
thought by i t s e l f can a l t e r s o c i a l phenomena. But t h i s i s 
p r e c i s e l y what Hegel suggests, t h a t the slave can overcome 
h i s actual dependence on h i s master by comprehending h i s 
s i t u a t i o n . This c l e a r l y i s an instance of, as Marx would 
say, thought over-reaching i t s e l f . For what Hegel does i s 
t o equate the slave's comprehension of h i s circumstances w i t h 
those circumstances. Now Marx's po i n t i s t h a t no matter 
how w e l l the slave comprehends h i s circumstances t h a t i t s e l f 
would cause no o b j e c t i v e change t o come about i n them. The 
slave might, f o r instance, come t o understand the laws t h a t 
governed a sl a v e - s o c i e t y l i k e h i s own. As a r e s u l t he may 
understand t h a t i t i s the Master's r i g h t t o put t o death a 
runaway slave. So f o r t h a t slave the pu b l i c use of force 
i n h i s s o c i e t y might cease t o appear e n t i r e l y a r b i t a r y . And 
indeed he may gam some s u b j e c t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n from t h i s 
i n s i g h t . However none of t h i s would a l t e r the f a c t t h a t 
should he hims e l f t r y t o escape he hims e l f would be subject 
t o the same law and l i a b l e t o be punished s i m i l a r l y . He 
w i l l be no more free f o r knowing how i t i s t h a t he can be 
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punished - as h i s a c t u a l execution w i l l show. So, Marx 
would conclude, h i s s e r v i t u d e i s an o b j e c t i v e s e r v i t u d e which 
can only be overcome by o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l change. And Hegel 
i s being thoroughly misleading m suggesting t h a t the opposite 
i s the case. 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s i t seems paradoxical t h a t Marx 
i n s i s t s as s t r o n g l y as he does t h a t the ' d i a l e c t i c of n e g a t i v -
i t y ' i s the greatest t h i n g about the Phenomenology of Mind. 
Surely i f , as i t now seems, i t i s a prime example of the 
abstractness of Hegel's account of experience i t can have 
not h i n g p o s i t i v e m i t f o r Marx. This i s a paradox t h a t 
Marx resolves by r e f e r r i n g us back again t o Hege 1's p h i l o s -
ophy. I n h i s view the paradox belongs t o Hegel's system. 
For we can see, Marx says, t h a t many of the sections of the 
Phenomenology of which the d i a l e c t i c of the Master and Slave 
1;- one, 'contain the c r i t i c a l elements..of whole spheres, 
such as r e l i g i o n , the State, of bourgeois l i f e ' . Because, 
t h e r e f o r e , Hegel regards man's existence as a negative one 
he i s , Marx continues, able t o present an account of experience 
which throws i n t o question the e x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s . 
He i s , f o r instance, able to p o i n t t o the dissemblance of the 
moral consciousness, to c r i t i c i s e the n a i v e l y r e l i g i o u s person 
and, m the Philosophy of Right, almost prophetically,to +he chaos 
44. Indeed as Mclennan (Marx before Marxism, Penguin.) points OUT; 
'Marx makes the a s t o n i s h i n g claim f o r the Phenomenology t h a t 
' A l l the elements of c r i t i c i s m are i m p l i c i t m i t , already 
prepared and elaborated m a manner f a r surpassing the Hegelian 
standpoint', (p.252) I f i n d i t less a s t o n i s h i n g thai Mclennan 
says. C e r t a i n l y i t appears to flow from what Marx says about 
the p o s i t i v e aspect ol the work. 
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of c a p i t a l i s t production. Yet because he t h i n k s of the 
negative aspects of experience as a mere d e n i a l of the 
freedom of self-consciousness, Hegel, Marx suggests, i s able 
to shrug o f f the r e a l d e n i a l t h a t takes place m man's 
experience m modern s o c i e t y . Thus the paradox m Hegel's 
philosophy i s t h a t under h i s c r i t i c a l eye, the e x i s t i n g s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s i s f i r s t d i s s o l v e d and then, i n a most m a t e r i a l 
45 
way i t i s r e i n s t a t e d . I t i s d i s s o l v e d , Marx suggests, when 
Hegel abolishes the I n f i n i t e and es t a b l i s h e s the r e a l , f i n i t e 
and p a r t i c u l a r but i t i s r e i n s t a t e d when, and at the same 
time as, the I n f i n i t e i s r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . And, according 
to Marx, t h i s I n f i n i t e or I d e a l Hegel r e - e s t a b l i s h e s m 
Absolute Knowledge. I t i s the d i v i n e d i a l e c t i c ; the most 
complete knowledge of man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . 
i\^ >. Marx. VJerke, Erganzungsband E r s t e r T o i l , p. 573-
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MARX'S NOTION OF OBJECTIVITY. 
There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s conclusion of Marx's i s 
obscure. I said t h a t h i s c r i t i c i s m of Hegel gets at the 
heart of Hegel's philosophy and I added t h a t t h i s would become 
c l e a r when we had a more precise view of the nature of h i s 
c r i t i c i s m . At present we seem to be a long way from a t t a i n -
i n g t h i s o b j e c t i v e . However, from behind the w e l t e r of 
Hegelian terminology there i s one view of Marx's t h a t clearly emerges. 
This i s h i s view of o b j e c t i v i t y . And t h i s view he c o n s t r u c t s 
by persevering w i t h t h i s second aspect of Hegel's philosophy: 
the d i a l e c t i c of n e g a t i v i t y . For, i n h i s view, t h a t 'estab-
l i s h i n g of the f i n i t e , sensuous, r e a l and p a r t i c u l a r ' holds 
the clue to a c o r r e c t view of man. Marx comes to t h i s aspect 
of h i s a n a l y s i s i n h i s discussion of the l a s t Chapter of Hegel's 
Phenomenology. 
I n t h a t chapter,he believes, we can discover the e s s e n t i a l s 
of Hegel's p o s i t i o n . Through c r i t i c i s i n g i t , t h e r e f o r e , he 
t h i n k s t h a t he can demonstrate m f u l l the one-sideness of 
Hegel's system. This one-sideness Marx n a t u r a l l y a t t r i b u t e s 
to Hegel's f a i l u r e t o understand completely the nature of 
o b j e c t i v i t y . Therefore h i s philosophy i s , Marx suggests, 
a b s t r a c t . This abstrantness, Marx continues, extends to i t s 
very f i r s t assumption. Now, what concerns Marx most about 
philosophy i s i t s view of man. I n h i s o p i n i o n no philosophy 
can f a i l t o advance a view of man. Indeed he suggests t h a t 
t h i s i s the p r i n c i p a l way i n which a philosophy can be judged. 
310'. 
The l o g i c a l s t a r t i n g - p o i n t of a philosophy f o r hirn then i s 
where i t p o s i t s man. This f o r him has to be i t s very f i r s t 
assumption. The very f i r s t assumption of Hegel's philosophy 
i s t h e r e f o r e shot through w i t h a b s t r a c t i o n because i n i t man 
i s p o s ited as self-consciousness. Thus the n o t i o n of o b j e c t -
* l v i t y t h a t Hegel puts forward i s one which i s merely 'object-
46 
i f i e d self-consciousness not r e a l o b j e c t i v i t y . I t i s not 
r e a l o b j e c t i v i t y because Hegel conceives of man only as a 
t h i n k i n g being. Because Hegel only p o s i t s man as s e l f -
consciousness, Marx says, he only conceives of h i s object as 
o b j e c t s of thought or thought o b j e c t s . Indeed, he argues, 
f o r Hegel 'the o b j e c t of consciousness i s n o t h i n g other than 
, 47 
self-consciousness . ' 
At i t s base then, Marx concludes, Hegel's n o t i o n of 
o b j e c t i v i t y i s not concrete. This brings him back t o the 
suoject of a l i e n a t i o n . I t i s now more than evident, he claims, 
t h a t Hegel has misunderstood the phenomenon. For i t i s t h i s 
i n i t i a l p o s i t i n g of o b j e c t i v i t y , Marx declares, t h a t Hegel counts 
as the establishment of a l i e n a t i o n . Thus not only does Hegel 
t h i n k of a l i e n a t i o n as merely the o p p o s i t i o n of subject and 
object but he also supposes t h a t i t i s the p o s i t i n g of t h a t 
o p p o s i t i o n which i s t o blame f o r i t . Or as Marx says here, 
for Hegel i t i s ' o b j e c t i v i t y as such ( t h a t ) counts as an a l i e n -
ated r e l a t i o n , one which does not correspond t o the human 
48 
nature, to the self-consciousness of man.' Hegel's t a r g e t 
46. I b i d . , p. 575-
48. I b i d . p. 575. 
47. I b i d . 
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i s , as we have said, p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e not s u r p r i s i n g the r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of man's o b j e c t -
i v e being' should have not only 'the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the 
i 49 
overcoming of a l i e n a t i o n but the overcoming of o b j e c t i v i t y . ^  
Marx's view i s of course t h a t the r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of man's 
o b j e c t i v e being would i n v o l v e no such t h i n g . A l i e n a t i o n i s 
not f o r him a mere t h e s i s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . I t 
i s f i r s t and foremost a s o c i a l phenomenon; one t h a t i s c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d to the productive r e l a t i o n s of a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . 
I n h i s view, then, the r e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of man's o b j e c t i v e nature 
would r e q u i r e a s o c i a l and not a merely p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a n s -
formation. And although such a s o c i a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n might 
overcome a l i e n a t i o n , i t would not m the l e a s t a l t e r the 
nature of o b j e c t i v i t y . There would, i n h i s vierf, s t i l l 
be objects e x t e r n a l t o mind when a l i e n a t i o n i s overcome. 
But as I have sa i d , Hegel believes t h a t we a l i e n a t e ourselves 
as soon as we e s t a b l i s h t h a t there i s an ob j e c t outside our 
consciousness, and m the Phenomenology he bends a l l h i s 
energies toward 'the conquest (Uberwmdung) of the object of 
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consciousness . 
I n Marx's view, t h e r e f o r e , one of the p r i n c i p a l aims of 
the Phenomenology i s t o deny that there is from the philosophical point of 
49- I b i d . 
50. I b i d . As Meszaros says m one of the more l u c i d passages m 
h i s Marx's Theory of A l i e n a t i o n : 'Thus Hegel, m the end, ass-
igns the sane c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of untranscendable absoluteness 
and u n i v e r s a l i t y to the al i e n a t e d form of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as 
to a c t i v i t y i t s e l f and t h e r e f o r e he conceptually n u l l i f i e s the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of an a c t u a l supercession of a l i e n a t i o n , ( i t goes 
without saying t h a t a form, or some form of e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n -
o b j e c t i f 1 c a t i o n i t s e l f - i s as absolute a c o n d i t i o n of develop 
ment as a c t i v i t y I t s e l f : a non-externalised, n o n - o b j e c t L f i e d 
a c t i v i t y ^ 'Jpp. 90 - 91). 
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view such a t h i n g as o b j e c t i v i t y . Marx's c r i t i c i s m of t h i s 
aim i s , i n one way at l e a s t , p e c u l i a r . For he i s con-
cerned not only to show t h a t the aim suggests confused t h i n k i n g 
on Hegel's p a r t , but also why Hegel should come to t h i n k i n 
such an apparently confused way. The explanation he o f f e r s 
i s p l a i n enough. He believes t h a t Hegel came to t h i n k m 
such a confused fashion because he was too much of a p h i l o s -
opher. This w i l l seem a strange claim t o those of us who 
associate philosophy w i t h c l e a r t h i n k i n g . But what Marx 
suggest here i s t h a t Hegel i s too much of a philosopher m 
t h a t he tends to see human problems only as p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
problems and, c o n t r a r i w i s e , he tends t o see p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
problems as i n c o r p o r a t i n g a l l human problems. Indeed i t seerns 
t h a t Marx takes Lefebvre's view t h a t , f o r Hegel, philosopny 
pro p e r l y taught can exclude m us the need f o r t a k i n g any 
options or making any s a c r i f i c e s . For Marx, t h i s i s a con-
f u s i o n m Hegel's think. 1 ng because i t i n v o l v e s u n j u s t i f i e d 
a b s t r a c t i o n . I n the f i r s t place, he argues, why i s i t t h a t 
Hegel f i n d s i t necessary t o p o s i t o b j e c t i v i t y at a l l ? From 
Marx's po i n t of view there i s l i t t l e sense i n s e t t i n g out t o 
to e s t a b l i s h t h a t human consciousness has obje c t s f o r i t s 
o b j e c t For, as f a r as he can see, ' i t i s wholly n a t u r a l 
t h a t a l i v i n g n a t u r a l being equipped and endowed w i t h o b j e c t -
ive i . e . m a t e r i a l e s s e n t i a l powers (Wesenskrafte) has also 
both r e a l n a t u r a l objects of i t s essence and t h a t i t s s e l f -
e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n i s the p o s i t i n g of a r e a l . . o b j e c t i v e world'. 
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'indeed'j he continues, ' i t i s the opposite t h a t would be 
p u z z l i n g ' . ^ 1 Surely, he says, we would f i n d i t most odd i f 
we had no objects f o r our consciousness. Why then go t o lengths 
of p o s i t i n g them? The kind of beings we are makes i t i n e v i t a b l e 
t h a t we have objects outside ourselves. This brings us t o the 
second reason why Marx believes Hegel's t h i n k i n g to be u n j u s t -
i f i a b l y a b s t r a c t . For Hegel does not see man as a being who 
must have obj e c t s outside h i m s e l f . Man f o r him, may h a p p i l y 
be subsumed under the n o t i o n of self-consciousness. So j u s t 
as i t i s c l e a r t o Marx t h a t 'real man' should have r e a l n a t u r a l 
o b j e c t s f o r h i s o b j e c t so also i s i t p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t o him 
'that a self-consciousness through i t s e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n can 
only p o s i t thmghood, t h a t i s , only p o s i t i t s e l f as an a b s t r a c t 
t h i n g , a t h i n g of a b s t r a c t i o n and not a r e a l t h i n g ' . " " For 
Marx i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t i f Hegel has at the basis of h i s 
philosophy a view of man as t h i n k e r or, indeed, philosopher 
only the o b j e c t s w i t h which he deals w i l l only be thought or 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l o b j e c t s . Furthermore, Marx says, i t i s evident 
t h a t such 'thmghood w i l l not be independent m the l e a s t , J J 
By which Marx means t h a t i t w i l l be a thmghood t h a t i s 'a 
mere c r e a t i o n (Gesch6pf)' one t h a t i s as we have said merely 
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posited by self-consciousness. I t i s t h i s then t h a t happens, 
51 . Marx, i b i d . , p. 577- 52. I b i d . 
53- I b i d . We would do w e l l to r e c a l l here Hegel's p o s i t i n g of t h i n g -
hood m the Phenomenology• 
54. I b i d . Marcuse puts i t w e l l when he says i n h i s essay on 'The 
Foundations of P h i l o s o p h i c a l M a t e r i a l i s m ' ( S t u d i e s m C r i t i c a l 
Ph 1 1 osoohy;NLB) 'The object m Hegel i s only an o b j l i c t t o r con-
sciousness m the very strong sense t h a t consciousness 1s the 
t r u t h " 1 - o"f the object and t h a t the l a t t e r i s only the negative 
side of consciousness:having been'posited'(created,engendered)by 
consciousness as i t s a l i e n a t i o n and estrangement, i t must also 
be transcended by consciousness again, or 'taken back' i n t o 
consciousness. The object i s thus, by the nature of i t s existenc 
a purely negative t h i n g , a n u l l i t y - i t i s merely an object of abs 
t r a c t thought, f o r Hegel reduces self-consciousness t o a b s t r a c t 
thought.' (pp. 42 - 41.). 
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Marx claims, when Hegel broaches o b j e c t i v i t y i n h i s 
philosophy. He p o s i t s i t and i t i s a p o s i t i n g which 'instead 
of c o n f i r m i n g i t s e l f , i s only a c o n f i r m a t i o n of the act of 
p o s i t i n g which f o r one moment f i x e s i t s energy as the product 
and gives t o i t pro forma the r o l e - but only f o r a moment 
- of an independent, r e a l being . ^ The o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t 
Hegel e s t a b l i s h e s m h i s philosophy, Marx a l l e g e s , i s a 
formal one merely. The object t h a t Hegel conjures up i s 
only r e a l f o r t h a t moment. I t s r e a l i t y t h e r e f o r e Hegel 
a t t r i b u t e s t o mind s o l e l y . Thus Hegel appears to assume 
t h a t there i s an o b j e c t i v e , f i n i t e world e x t e r n a l to mind 
only to show t h a t i t i s not t h a t . Marx, as vie d i d , f i n d s 
t h i s to be an untenable view. 
He t h i n k s so because he believes t h a t i t r e s t s on a 
mistaken view of man's nature. I have already said t h a t 
what appears to concern Maix most about philosophy i s i t s 
view of man. His suggestion i s t h a t no philosophy can f a i l 
t o advance a n o t i o n of man. We s h a l l see now how Marx c a m e 
out t h i s suggestion m assessing Hegel's philosophy. Being 
able t o assess a philosophy m such a fashion does of course 
m the f i r s t place depend on our having our own n o t i o n of man, 
and Marx,as I have already pointed out, has one such n o t i o n 
of man. His view of man, as we have seen, i s t h a t of man 
as a n a t u r a l being. This, of course, he means m a s o p h i s t i c 
cated sense. By t h i s , he does not mean t h a t man i s simply an 
55- Marx. i b i d . 
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animal l i k e any other. Rather he means t h a t t o be man man 
has not only t o survive but more i m p o r t a n t l y has t o 
survive as a productive being. For him then man's species-
l i f e i s an unique one because man appropriates nature consciously. 
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I t i s tempting t o regard t h i s as Marx's ontology. This 
we might do f o r two reasons. I n the f i r s t place we might 
argue t h a t since i t i s w i t h t h i s n o t i o n of man th a t Marx 
assesses Hegel's philosophy, which boasts an ontology, Marx's 
n o t i o n of man has also to be or t o imply an ontology. The 
po i n t being t h a t Hegel's philosophy can be ta c k l e d only on 
o n t o l o g i c a l grounds. Secondly, we might claim t h a t because 
Marx's n o t i o n of man p l a i n l y determines how he understands 
experience m general. I f Marx were obliged t o say where we 
should begin our r e f l e c t i o n s on the world he would say: w i t h 
man's r e l a t i o n s h i p to nature. The only d i f f i c u l t y w i t h 
regarding t h i s as an ontology, however, i s t h a t i t a t t r i b u t e s 
a g r e a t e r systemisation ;o Marx 1 p h i l o s o p h i c a l speculations 
than they perhaps possess. Be t h a t as i t may, we can see 
t h a t Marx's view of man has profound i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
n o t i o n of experience. I t must also have an impact on the 
theory of knowledge which, as we have seen, depends on a view 
of experience. How, then, does Marx assess Hegel's philosophy 
w i t h t h i s view of experience? Unlike Hegel he wishes t o t a l k 
of experience m terms of man's n a t u r a l being and not m terms 
of consciousness and s e l f - consciousness. What does t h i s imply? 
56. As do Lukacs, Mezaros and Lefebvre. Lefebvre says t h i s m h 
Socio] ogy of ivarx: '1 "an ' s fundamental r e l a t i o n to nature may 
l e g i t i m a t e l y be c a l l e d ' o n t o l o g i c a l ' . ( p 4 0 ) . 
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I t i m p l i e s t h a t whereas Hegel sees man's e s t a b l i s h i n g him-
s e l f as a process of the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of self-consciousness, 
Marx sees i t simply as the c o n f i r m a t i o n of man's o b j e c t i v e , 
n a t u r a l being. Thus whereas Hegel regards the appearance 
of o b j e c t i v i t y t o man as a r e s u l t of h i s own act of thought 
Marx takes the view t h a t man 'produces, p o s i t s objects only 
because he i s posited by ob j e c t s , because at bottom he i s 
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nature' . So, Marx claims, m suggesting o b j e c t i v i t y i t 
i s wrong to conceive of the p o s i t i n g as subject; m other 
words, as though the o b j e c t i v i t y o r i g i n a t e s m the suggestion 
i t s e l f . Rather we have t o see the suggestion as an expression 
of our own o b j e c t i v i t y . We ourselves, Marx says, are o b j e c t s . 
We cannot be otherwise as we are n a t u r a l beings. The obj e c t s 
t h a t we i n t u i t ourselves cannot t h e r e f o r e be mere c o n s t r u c t i o n s 
(-o 
of mind, as 'man i s immediately a n a t u r a l b e i n g 1 . Thus 
h i s very f i r s t s u b j e c t i v e act has t o be an expression of a 
n a t u r a l , o b j e c t i v e power. Immediacy t o Marx suggests man's 
immediate dependence on nature u n l i k e Hegel to whom, as we 
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have found, i t suggests merely thought as sensation. 
C l e a r l y t h i s view of Marx's depends f o r i t s f orce on h i s 
n o t i o n of man as a n a t u r a l being. And 'as a n a t u r a l being', 
Marx continues, man ' i s , m p a r t , equipped w i t h n a t u r a l powers, 
w i t h powers of l i f e . . . . : these powers e x i s t m him as tendencies 
and c a p a b i l i t i e s , as d r i v e s : and as a n a t u r a l , c orporeal, sensuous, 
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l i m i t e d being, as i s also the animal and the p l a n t , t h a t 
i s , the objects of h i s d r i v e s e x i s t outside him, as objects 
independent of him; but these objects are the objects of h i s 
needs, e s s e n t i a l o b j e c t s and indispensable t o the a c t i v a t i o n 
and c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s e s s e n t i a l powers', ( l b . ) So we 
cannot regard what i s Immediate m experience as an expression 
of merely s u b j e c t i v e powers. Indeed i t makes no sense t o 
Marx to t a l k , as does F i c h t e , of the immediate objects of 
experience as expressions of the p o s i t i n g a c t i v i t y of the I . 
For when we look at our s u b j e c t i v e powers as a whole, our 
d r i v e s , as Marx c a l l s them, we discover t h a t they are not 
simply independent expressions of our being but t h a t they 
are also an expression of our l i m i t a t x o n s as n a t u r a l beings. 
Therefore, m Fichte's terms, we are j u s t as much posited by 
nature as we p o s i t i t . For our d r i v e s correspond to l i m i t -
a.< ions, l i m i t a t i o n s which would not e x i s t m us unless they, 
m t u r n , d i d not correspond t o objects outside us. So t h i s , 
Marx suggests, i s how objects f i r s t appear t o us m our e x p e r i -
ence: as the obj e c t s of our conditioned, l i m i t e d nature, m 
sho r t , as the objects of our needs. 
I n c r i t i c i s i n g Hegel's n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y Marx, as 
I have suggested, does not intend t o di s c a r d completely the 
t h e s i s t h a t l i e s behind i t . He would not, f o r instance, 
wish t o q u a r r e l w i t h the n o t i o n t h a t man has t o o b j e c t i f y 
h i m s e l f . What he does f i n d inadequate though i s the way 
m which Hegel presents t h i s process. He f i n d s i t both p a r t i a l 
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and t r a n s i e n t . I t i s p a r t i a l , Marx claims, because Hegel 
conceives of i t only as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t , and i t i s t r a n s -
c i e n t m t h a t he t h i n k s of i t as something t h a t ought not to 
be. This must be f o r Marx where the Hegelian point of view 
breaks down. For i f , as Hegel acknowledges m the e a r l i e r 
stages of h i s system, 'man i s a corporeal, l i v i n g , r e a l , 
sensuous o b j e c t i v e being' t h i s means f o r Marx t h a t man has 
always and i n e v i t a b l y ' r e a l , sensuous obj e c t s as objects of 
h i s being' and t h i s f o r the very simple reason t h a t he can 
only 'express (aussern) h i s l i f e m r e a l , sensuous ob j e c t s . 
A l i f e w ithout r e a l , sensuous objects f o r i t s o b jects i s f o r 
Marx no l i f e at a l l . 
This, then, i s what Marx means by o b j e c t i v i t y . I f l i k e 
Hegel we assume t h a t man, even as consciousness alone, has 
objects f o r h i s o b j e c t we must acknowledge what flows from 
t h a t assumption, namely, t n a t not only has consciousness an 
obj e c t but i f t h a t i s t ~ be a r e a l object consciousness must 
be an object f o r i t . I t w i l l not do f o r Hegel, as he does 
i n h i s account of perception, to p o s i t a t h i n g outside conscious 
ness only f o r consciousness. I f i t i s r e a l l y t o be a t h i n g , 
and not d i s s o l v e , consciousness has to be a t h i r d f o r i t . 
We can see more c l e a r l y what i s Marx's view from an example 
t h a t he gives. The example i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p of hunger. 
I n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p , he argues, the ob j e c t of our conscious-
ness i s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y o b j e c t i v e to us. I t i s not adequate 
60. Marx, i b i d . , p. 578. 
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t h a t i t merely be an object f o r us one, say, t h a t I have 
i n t u i t e d . I t w i l l not do to say t h a t i t exists merely f o r 
my consciousness}it has t o be one t h a t i s outside myself f o r 
i t t o s a t i s f y my need.^ 1 Andfor i t t o be an object t h a t i s 
outside myself i t has t o be one t h a t I not only l i m i t but 
l i m i t s me. Indeed unless i t l i m i t s me i t w i l l not be an 
o b j e c t of hunger. An o b j e c t of hunger l i m i t s me simply 
because without e a t i n g i t I w i l l remain hungry. As hunger, 
Marx says, ' i s a n a t u r a l need, i t r e q uires t h e r e f o r e a nature 
outside i t s e l f , an object outside i t s e l f t o s a t i s f y i t s e l f , 
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i n order t o s t i l l i t s e l f ' . This r e l a t i o n s h i p i s most 
t y p i c a l of o b j e c t i v i t y f o r Marx because i t i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of need. For t h a t , he argues, i s the way i n which objects 
do confront man. Not as mere expressions of a s u b j e c t i v e 
c a p a b i l i t y ( t o p o s i t , i n t u i t or whatever) but as an expression 
of our a c t u a l dependence on o b j e c t s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
need i s t h e r e f o r e not one we e s t a b l i s h i t i s one m .vhich we 
f i n d ourselves. I t i s such r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e 
our o b j e c t i v i t y f o r Marx. 
That i s how Marx p o s i t i v e l y explains o b j e c t i v i t y . I t 
i s not a p a r t i c u l a r l y l u c i d e x planation, but what he means 
comes out more c l e a r l y when he r e t u r n s t o h i s c r i t i c i s m of 
Hegel. What occurs t o him here i s the question, what would 
i t be i f we were to take a view which was opposite t c h i s own 
61. Marx brings up the same example when d e a l i n g w i t h the a t o m i s t i c 
view of man m the Holy Family. 'The e g o i s t i c i n d i v i d u a l of 
bourgeois s o c i e t y ' , he says, 1may i n f l a t e h imself i n h i s unsens-
uous imagination and u n l i v e l y a b s t r a c t i o n i n t o an atom , t h a t i s 
i n t o a r e i a t i o n l e s s , s e l f - s a t i s f y m g , need] ess, a b s o l u t e l y complete, 
b l i s s f u l being'. However'wretched sensuous r e a l i t y shows no con-
cern f o r h i s lmag m a t i o n , each of h i s senses forces him to believe 
m the existence of the world and the i n d i v i d u a l s outside him, 
and even h i s profane stomach remands him d a i l y t h a t the world 
outside him i s not empty but i s a c t u a l l y what f i l l s ' . Marx-Pa<-<-e"i s 
Werke 2, p. 127. 
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and 'posit a being, which i s i t s e l f n e i t h e r an object nor 
has an o b j e c t 9 ' J Marx has m mind, of course, Hegel's 
n o t i o n of Geist. Surely, he continues, 'such a being 
would m the f i r s t place be the only being, there would 
e x i s t no being except f o r i t , i t would e x i s t s o l i t a r y and 
alone'. I t would be then the unique being. This e v i d e n t l y , 
Marx says, i s an unreal being. C e r t a i n l y i t i s not o b j e c t i v e 
f o r 'an unobjective being', he says, ' i s an unbeing'. 'For 
as soon as there are objects outside me, as soon as I am not 
alone', he adds, ' I am an other, an other r e a l i t y than the 
o b j e c t outside me'.^ This, c l e a r l y , givesa more cogent 
n o t i o n of what Marx means by o b j e c t i v i t y . I t e v i d e n t l y 
precludes an o b j e c t i v i t y such as t h a t which Hegel suggests: 
f o r Mind alone. I t i s a n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y which, I t h i n k , 
f o l l o w s out c o n s i s t e n t l y the consequences of our ' p o s i t i n g ' 
o b j e c t s - which, a f t e r a l l , i s an Hegelian idea. Marx, u n l i k e 
Hegel, p o i n t s out three r e l a t i o n s h i p s which n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e 
from i t . Hegel would, I b e l i e v e , confine h i s account t o the 
f i r s t two of these r e l a t i o n s . F i r s t l y we can see t h a t i f 
we have an object f o r our object i t i s f o r us. Secondly, 
f o r us t o have an o b j e c t i t has t o be an m i t s e l f . Now, 
even t h i s second r e l a t i o n does not take us beyond the subject 
f o r Marx and acquaint us w i t h t r u e o b j e c t i v i t y because the 
object i s m i t s e l f simply f o r us. True o b j e c t i v i t y i s only 
63. I b i d . 
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e s t a b l i s h e d when the object ceases to be merely f o r us. For 
t h a t t o be so we have to concede a t h i r d r e l a t i o n s h i p . We 
ourselves have t o be an object f o r t h a t o b j e c t or, m other 
words, as Marx says, I have t o be 'an other r e a l i t y than the 
o b j e c t ' . This, I b e l i e v e , Marx takes t o be no more than a 
consequence of our p o s i t i n g an object m the f i r s t place. 
Once we have posited an object we cannot but admit as Marx 
has said t h a t ' f o r t h i s t h i r d o bject I am another r e a l i t y 
than i t , i . e . i t s o b j e c t ' . Indeed, he adds, 'a being which 
i s not the object of another being' which denies t h e r e f o r e 
t h i s t h i r d r e l a t i o n s h i p 'presupposes..that no o b j e c t i v e being 
e x i s t s ' . For, Marx concludes - s t r e s s i n g h i s p ^ i n t again -
'as soon as I have an object t h i s o b j e c t has me f o r an o b j e c t . 
However an ufoobjective being i s an u n r e a l , unsensuous, only 
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thought i . e . merely imagined being, a being of a b s t r a c t i o n ' . 
That i s the k i n d of being t h a t Hegel's n o t i o n of Geist 
conjures up f o r Marx. I t i s what ne c a l l s an unbemg (Unweseri) 
His n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y i s m d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to i t . Marx 
suggests t h i s example. Mind ( G e i s t ) , Hegel is prepared to 
venture, o b j e c t i f i e s i t s e l f as sensuousness. I t i s t h i s 
process t h a t gives us the stage of sense-certainty m the 
Phenomenology. But what Hegel does not take i n t o account 
i s t h a t f o r Mind genuinely to o b j e c t i f y i t s e l f as sensuousness 
64. I b i d . 
65. I b i d . , pp. 578 - 579-
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i t has not only, as he says, t o receive sense-data from 
o b j e c t s outside i t s e l f but also be the kind of being which 
i s capable of doing t h a t . Hegel claims i t i s . He says 
t h a t Mind as consciousness r e l a t e s i t s e l f passively t o the 
world. What i t then experiences, he claims, i s the appar-
e n t l y r i c h content of sense-certainty. This p a s s i v i t y of 
Mind Marx, however, regards as a mock p a s s i v i t y . I t i s a 
p a s s i v i t y , which again, i s merely p o s i t e d . I t i s posited 
simply m order t h a t Mind can transcend i t . Genuine pass-
i v i t y , Marx b e l i e v e s , p e r t a i n s only t o a being t h a t i s cap-
able of s u f f e r i n g . Because f o r Marx 'to be sensuous i s t o 
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be s u f f e r i n g ' . And man i s such a being. He i s a n a t u r a l , 
t h e r e f o r e , l i m i t e d being. Thus he has sensuous objects f o r 
h i s object which he not only determines but determine him. 
There i s something odd m t h i s argument of Marx. I t 
appears t h a t he wants us t o concur w i t h h i s argument not only -
and m some instances, i t seems, - not p r i m a r i l y , because i t 
i s l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t but because i t accounts most r e a d i l y 
f o r our experience. I t seems t h a t i t i s almost beside the 
po i n t f o r Marx t h a t he e s t a b l i s h l o g i c a l l y , step by step, t h a t 
m our sense-experience we are passive and t h e r e f o r e s u f f e r . 
This i s odd because t o do t h i s he need only have repeated h i s 
argument about Geist. Just as Geist, he could have sa i d , 
would be not h i n g at a l l without being an object f o r another 
66. I b . , p. 579- S u f f e r i n g i s a rendering of Leiden. I t i s tnc 
best t h a t i s possible but does not q u i t e convey Marx's mean-
ing . S u f f e r i n g , i f anything, i s a b i t strong. Leiden Marx 
means i n the sense of an openess t o being e x t e r n a l l y deterrnn 
Thus the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of sensuousness he wishes~to b r i n g o^ 
i s t h a t aspect of i t i n which we are subject to th? t h i n g <x 
sense. 
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so we cannot sense-experience w i t h o u t being genuinely 
passive i . e . without s u f f e r i n g . However, he p r e f e r s to 
r e s t h i s case on what he t h i n k s to be a s e l f - e v i d e n t f a c t 
of our experience, namely, t h a t we are l i m i t e d , s u f f e r i n g 
beings. Now the question t h i s r a i s e s i s : t o what n o t i o n of 
t r u t h does Marx subs c r i b e 9 I s i t one which r e l i e s on mere 
formal consistency 9 Or has he m mind another ki n d of 
consistency altogether? The answer t h a t he gives to these 
problems, we s h a l l f i n d , hang together w i t h h i s view of ob-
j e c t i v i t y . We s h a l l see how they do so i n the next Chapter. 
32 4. 
PHILOSOPHY AND RESIGNATION 
For the present we s h a l l continue w i t h our review of the 
C r i t i q u e of Hegel's Phenomenology. There are some problems 
of d e t a i l t h a t we have t o s e t t l e . Marx's p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s 
i n the essay i s , as we have seen, t h a t Hegel has misunderstood 
the nature of the a l i e n a t i o n of modern man. He argues t h a t 
the overcoming of a l i e n a t i o n 'has f o r Hegel..the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
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of the overcoming of o b j e c t i v i t y . ' I n t h i s connection 
' he r e s t s h i s .case on what Hegel has t o say m the 
beginning of the l a s t Chapter of the Phenomenology. Here, 
according t o Marx, Hegel argues t h a t i t ' i s not the p a r t i c u l a r 
character of the object but i t s o b j e c t i v e cnaracter which f o r 
self-consciousness i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e and the a l i e n a t i o n ' . ^ 
I t i s f o r t h i s reason, Marx argues, t h a t Hegel describes the 
objec t or o b j e c t i v i t y i n general as the Negative. Hegel, 
i d e n t i f i e s the idea of an e x t e r n a l world w i t h negation, and 
Marx's suggestion i s t h a t Hegel does t h i s because he confuses 
the n e g a t i v i t y or the inhumanity of man's existence w i t h e x i s -
tence per se. This, i f we remember, i s what our reading of 
Hegel's D i f f e r e n z s c h r i f t suggested: t h a t he thought t h a t 
dissonance or b i f u r c a t i o n i s i nherent i n experience as 
such. 
This i n d i c a t e s t o Marx t h a t the r e s i g n a t i o n t h a t Hegel 
shows before the f a c t s of experience, i s one t h a t permeates 
h i s whole philosophy, and t h e r e f o r e , t h a t there 'can be no 
more t a l k of Hegel's accommodation w i t h r e l i g i o n , s t a t e , e tc. 
67. I b i d . , p. 580. 
68. 11-id. 
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because t h i s l i e i s the l i e of h i s p r i n c i p l e ' . ^ This i s 
why the claim at the end of the Phenomenology p a r t i c u l a r l y 
catches Marx's eye: 'Consciousness, s e l f consciousness i s 
at home w i t h i t s e l f m i t s other-being as s u c h ' . ^ As 
Marx i s e v i d e n t l y aware t h i s argument has a r e l i g i o u s dimen-
s i o n . God m the or d i n a r y r e l i g i o u s consciousness i s an 
o b j e c t i v e being, i f one wishes, an other t o man. The term 
t h a t Hegel uses f o r such an idea i s , V o r s t e l l u n g . God app-
ears to the ordinary r e l i g i o u s consciousness as something 
p o s i t i o n e d before i t . Now, what m Hegel's view the Pheno-
menology does i s , to d i s s o l v e such Vorstellungen. I t i s 
intended t o break them aown i n t o ideas which are c l e a r l y the 
property of the s e l f . Thus, Hegel would claim, consciousness 
need no longer f e e l estranged m i t s r e l i g i o u s being. I t 
can now, he argues, know other-being as i t s own e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n . 
For the r e l i g i o u s person of course, such a n o t i o n would be 
an abomination, f o r i t seems t h a t i t i s tantamount t o denying 
the existence of God. But, Marx says, t h i n g s are not as 
shocking as they seem. Hegel i s , a f t e r a l l , prepared t o 
recognise m r e l i g i o n a r e l a t i v e t r u t h . The Vor s t e l l u n g e n 
of the r e l i g i o u s person are, as the idiom has i t , a cut above 
the r e s t . They are the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l equivalent of Absol-
71 
ute Knowledge. R e l i g i o n f o r Hegel, i s the way m which 
69- I b i d . , p. 581. I t i s a p i t y t h a t very l i t t l e n o t i c e has 
been taken of t h i s important view of Marx's m the discussion 
of Hegel's p o l i t i c a l philosophy. For, as Marx i s c l e a r l y 
aware, the ambivalence m Hegel's p o l i t i c a l philosopny which 
has led to so mucn controversy i s one th a t as rooted i n h i s 
system as a whole. 
70. Hegel. Werke 3. p. 575-
7 1 . I b i d . 
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Mind or S p i r i t i s revealed t o the ord i n a r y consciousness. 
A l l t h a t i t lacks m comparison w i t h Absolute Knowledge i s 
t h a t m i t Mind appears m the form of mere o b j e c t i v i t y . 
Thus although r e l i g i o n i s recognised as an a l i e n a t i o n of 
s e l f I t 'nevertheless f i n d s i t s e l f a f f i r m e d m r e l i g i o n as 
72 
r e l i g i o n ' . ' I n i t self-consciousness, j u s t as i t I s I n the 
other modes of consciousness, i s able to be at home w i t h 
i t s e l f m i t s other-being as such. 
This f o r Marx i s 'the root of the f a l s e p o s i t i v i s m of 
7 3 
Hegel or h i s merely seeming c r i t i c i s m . For the i n s i g h t 
i t provides i n t o man's a l i e n a t i o n m contemporary s o c i e t y i s 
one t h a t i s shot through w i t h r e s i g n a t i o n . A l l t h a t Hegel 
promises, as he says i n the Preface to the Phenomenology i s 
'pure s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n m absolute otherness, t h i s e ther as 
74 
such.. He i s indeed aware of what Marx c a l l s man's inhuman 
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n m contemporary s o c i e t y , but a l l he has t o o f f e r 
i s the knowledge t h a t we ourselves are the authors of t h a t 
c o n d i t i o n . This u n c r i t i c a l p o s i t i v i s m Marx t h i n k s i s c l e a r e s t 
m Hegel's l a t e r work The Philosophy of Right. There, Hegel 
sets h i m s e l f the task of d e p i c t i n g the State as i t i s . And 
indeed Marx seems to t h i n k t h a t he does t h i s w i t h some success. 
For m h i s notes f o r a C r i t i q u e of Hegel's Philosophy of Fight 
he argues t h a t Hegel 'portrays the essence of the Modern State'. 
72. Marx, o p . c i t . , p. 5 8 l . 
73- I b i d . , p. 581. 74. Hegel, l b . , p. 29-
75. Marx-Engels Werke I , p. 266. 
327. 
I n Marx's view t h e r e f o r e the ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ' w i t h which Hegel 
deals I n the work m i r r o r e x a c t l y the ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ' m 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s m the Modern World. But 
none of t h i s i s to say t h a t Hegel comes up w i t h c r i t i c a l 
conclusions, because (and t h i s i s the view t h a t Marx appears 
to take m the C r i t i q u e of Hegel's Phenomenology) the knowledge 
of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n as a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r Hegel. 
A symptom of t h i s i s t h a t Hegel f i n d s complete f u l f i l m e n t m 
knowledge or Absolute Knowledge. Knowledge i s u l t i m a t e l y 
a l l there i s to experience f o r Hegel. That i s the p o i n t at 
which the Phenomenology ends. At i t s end there appears, 
as Lefebvre suggests, to be no room m experience f o r making 
s a c r i f i c e s or t a k i n g any d i f f i c u l t options. Indeed a l l such 
p r a c t i c a l problems become non-problems because they are not 
p a r t of the r e a l i t y of experience. The only r e a l i t y t h a t 
experience has i s , Hegel suggests, what we know about i t . 
Thus, f o r him, to know a ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n ' i s to experience a l l 
t h a t i s r e a l about i t . Our o b j e c t i v e experience of a 'con-
t r a d i c t i o n ' as what Marx c a l l s l i m i t e d , s u f f e r i n g beings i s 
not according t o Hegel our t r u e experience of i t . We exper-
ience i t t r u l y , he claims, when t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y i s r e t r a c t e d . 
Hegel t h e r e f o r e pays no heed t o the s u f f e r i n g caused by the 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of Modern Society because he takes the view 
t h a t t h a t o b j e c t i v e experience of them i s overcome m know-
ledge. Reason i s then the rose m the cross of the present 
because only i t , u l t i m a t e l y , i s r e a l . I t knows the contra-
d i c t i o n s of our experience as c o n t r a d i c t i o n s but, Marx suggests, 
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the Hegelian Reason i s unperturbed by them because i t i s only 
knowing t h a t counts f o r i t . I n t h a t knowing the Hegel-
ian i s at home w i t h h i m s e l f . I t i s t h i s r e s i g n a t i o n t h a t 
Marx cannot countenance because i t i m p l i e s f o r him t h a t 
76 
'Reason i s a t home w i t h i t s e l f m unreason as unreason'. 
This i s a f a l s e p o s i t i v i s m and merely seeming c r i t i c i s m of 
Hegel's system. The c r i t i c a l element m i t i s not sustained, 
Marx suggests, because Hegel believes t h a t our t r u e existence 
i s not t o be a f f i r m e d p o s i t i v e l y m our e m p i r i c a l l i f e but m 
our knowledge of i t . Thus i t i s a matter of i n d i f f e r e n c e 
to the Hegelian whether our practical l i f e i s a r a t i o n a l one. 
I f i t i s an i r r a t i o n a l one, h i s only concern Marx argues, i s 
t h a t he should know i t as such. He f u l f i l s h i m s e l f m the 
' s c i e n t i f i c ' knowledge of the world. And 'science' f o r the 
Hegelian i s philosophy. Thus f o r the Hegelian, Marx says, 
'my t r u e r e l i g i o u s being i s ' , f o r instance, 'my being m the 
philosophy of r e l i g i o n ' and, s i m i l a r l y , 'my t r u e p o l i t i c a l 
being i s my being m th<=> philosophy of r i g h t , my t r u e a r t i s t i c 
being m the philosophy of a r t j ' f i n a l l y i t i s c l e a r , Marx 
says, t h a t f o r the Hegelian 'my t r u e human being i s my p h i l -
77 
osophical being'. 
I t i s t o t h i s t h a t Marx a t t r i b u t e s the abstractness of 
Hegel's t h i n k i n g . Hegel i s an ab s t r a c t t h i n k e r because he 
reduces a l l our experience t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l experience. This 
we s h a l l now see, i s a more comprehensive claim than ours, 
because we a t t r i b u t e d Hegel's abstractness p r i m a r i l y t o h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l ism. This, I t h i n k , i s probably the 
76. Erganzungsband a s t e r T e i l , p. 58] . 
77- Marx, i b i d . , p. 582. 
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sounder course t o adopt, f o r Marx's c l a i m here, t h a t a l l 
p h i l o s o p h y i s n e c e s s a r i l y a b s t r a c t , i s t o o sweeping. Not 
a l l p h i l o s o p h e r s have t r i e d t o reduce e x p e r i e n c e t o t h e i r 
t h o u g h t o f i t . I t i s o n l y some; and as Marx suggests 
Hegel i s c e r t a i n l y one o f them. Be t h a t as i t may, Marx 
t a k e s 'feer -fee t h e i l l u s i o n t o be one i n h e r e n t i n a l l p h i l o s o p h -
i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n . The i l l u s i o n a r i s e s , he suggests, because 
o f t h e exaggerated v a l u e t h a t i s p l a c e d on knowledge. I n 
s a y i n g t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s p l a c e an exaggerated v a l u e on know-
ledge he does n o t o f course mean t h a t t h e y exaggerate t h e 
i m p o r t a n c e o f t r u t h . Presumably i f t h e y d i d so t h e y would 
n o t be s u b j e c t t o i l l u s i o n s . R ather, Marx's p o i n t appears 
t o be t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s t e n d t o see knowledge as t h e essence 
o f t h i n g s . I n one sense, o f c o u r s e , t h i s i s p e r f e c t l y t r u e . 
For i f I know what a t h i n g i s I am o b v i o u s l y a c q u a i n t e d w i t h 
i t s 'essence'. But p h i l o s o p h e r s , Marx t h i n k s , tend t o s t r e s s 
a n o t h e r aspect o f t h i s c l a i m . They t e n d t o s t r e s s t h a t our 
knowledge i s what t h e t h i n g i s m i t s e l f , and t h i s i s where 
t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e . For t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , i f Marx under-
stands him c o r r e c t l y , goes on t o argue t h a t our knowledge i s 
a l l t h a t i s o b j e c t i v e about t h e t h i n g . Our knowledge o f i t 
e x h austs i t f o r him. T h i s , as I have s a i d , Marx b e l i e v e s 
t o be t h e e s s e n t i a l weakness o f p h i l o s o p h y , and f o r him i t 
makes any p h i l o s o p h i c a l view o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d an a b s t r a c t 
one. I t does n o t t h e r e f o r e know ' r e a l man'. A l l i t knows 
7 o 
i s man as an ' a b s t r a c t t h i n k i n g b e i n g ' . But f o r Marx, as 
78. I b i d . , p. 584. 
we have seen, man i s a n a t u r a l b e i n g who t h e r e f o r e always 
has o b j e c t s f o r h i s o b j e c t . They are t h e o b j e c t s o f h i s 
need. They are n e c e s s a r i l y t h e n o b j e c t s which are n o t 
merely t h o u g h t o b j e c t s . They must be t a n g i b l e c o n c r e t e 
o b j e c t s . I n h i s view I t i s an i l l u s i o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t 
t h e o b j e c t s t h a t i m m e d i a t e l y c o n f r o n t man are o f any o t h e r 
k i n d . T h a t , he c l a i m s , i s t h e i l l u s i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y . 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE THESES ON FEUERBACH 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE ( 1 1 ) 
E x p e r i e n c e and e p i s t e m o l o g y are terms t h a t are n o t o f t e n 
j u x t a p o s e d . I have d e l i b e r a t e l y s e t them s i d e by s i d e f o r 
two reasons. I n the f i r s t p l a c e I have done so, as we r e -
c a l l , t o c h a l l e n g e a t h e s i s o f Jurgen Habermas, namely, t h a t 
Marx and Hegel's e x t i r p a t i o n o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o i o g y was 
w i t h o u t p o s i t i v e outcome. T h i s t h e s i s i s wrong, I have s a i d , 
because, on t h e r u m s o f t h e o l d t h e o r y o f knowledge Hegel 
and Marx b u i l t t h e o r i e s o f e x p e r i e n c e which are m many r e s -
p e c t s c o n v i n c i n g . I have a l r e a d y examined t h e p o s i t i v e 
a s p e c t s o f Hegel's c r i t i q u e o f " t h e problem o f knowledge" 
w h i c h was, o f course, t he c e n t r a l problem o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t -
ernology. I come now t o Marx's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the d e v e l o p -
ment o f a new i d e a o f e x p e r i e n c e . I n the second p l a c e we 
have, c l e a r l y , n o t pursued t h i s aim m an e n t i r e l y detached 
way. For, I s h o u l d a l s o l i k e t o see i f a n y t h i n g can be made 
o f t h i s j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f e p i s t e m o l o g y and e x p e r i e n c e t h a t 
Hegel and Marx evi n c e m t h e i r w r i t i n g s . Prima f a c i e such 
a j u x t a p o s i t i o n would suggest t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n t u s i o n m 
t h e i r t h i n k i n g ; e s p e c i a l l y so i f we bear m mind t h e 
o r d i n a r y usage o f t h e word " e x p e r i e n c e " . When we t a l k o f 
"our e x p e r i e n c e " we g e n e r a l l y mean a ] 1 t h a t m th e course o f 
our e x i s t e n c e we have come a c r o s s and i n which we have i n v o l -
ved o u r s e l v e s p a r t i c u l a r l y , i n a s o c i a l and p r a c t i c a l way. 
Ep i s t e m o l o g y on the o t h e r h a n d , i s a merely t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
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w i t h l i t t l e o r no p r a c t i c a l o r s o c i a l i m p l i c a t e o n s , and we 
would c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h i t from any n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e . 
But are we c o r r e c t m d o i n g t h i s 9 I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e i s 
room f o r t h e view t h a t e x p e r i e n c e , regarded as our p r a c t i c a l 
I n v o l v e m e n t m s o c i e t y , has a g r e a t d e a l t o do w i t h knowledge. 
T h i s , as we have seen>is t h e view t h a t Hegel t a k e s . He 
t a k e s s t e p s t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r our o r d i n a r y view o f e x p e r i e n c e 
and t h e account o f t h e o r i g i n s o f knowledge. Marx, as we 
s h a l l now see, c o n t i n u e s t h i s t a s k , and he does so w i t h 
f e w e r r e s e r v a t i o n s . He i s f i r m l y c onvinced t h a t t h e t h e o r y 
o f knowledge has t o be a p a r t o f a more g e n e r a l , p r a c t i c a l 
t h e o r y o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t i s t h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t more t h a n 
a n y t h i n g e l s e b r i n g s t o an end German C l a s s i c a l P h i l o s o p h y . 
The c o n c l u s i o n o f Marx's C r i t i q u e o f t h e Phenomenology 
was, as we have seen, t h a t man has t o be regarded as a 
n a t u r a l b e i n g who 'produces, p o s i t s o b j e c t s o n l y because he 
i s p o s i t e d by o b j e c t s , because he i s a t b ottom n a t u r e ' . 1 
To be s u r e , Marx says, i f we see man as does Hegel, o n l y 
a b s t r a c t l y and t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h e o p p o s i t e w i l l appear t o be 
t h e case. I t w i l l seem t h a t man s i m p l y p o s i t s o b j e c t s . 
I n o t h e r words man has o b j e c t s because, j u s t f o r a moment, 
he supposes he does. T h i s , Marx says, w i l l n o t do. I t i s 
f a r more s e n s i b l e t o suggest t h a t o b j e c t s p o s i t man. They 
are n o t t h e r e - p r e s e n t o u t s i d e him - because he d e s i r e s i t 
b u t r a t h e r because t h a t i s s i m p l y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p m wh i c h 
man f i n d s h i m s e l f because he i s a n a t u r a l b e i n g . As p a r t 
1. Marx. Marx-Enge1s Werke , Erganzungsband E r s t e r T e i l , p.577 
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o f n a t u r e , Marx suggests, man must n e c e s s a r i l y have o b j e c t s 
o u t s i d e him. They are t h e o b j e c t s o f h i s needs. They are 
indeed " h i s " m so f a r as t h e y correspond t o h i s r e q u i r e m e n t s 
but i n t h a t t h e y are e x t e r n a l t o him, t h e y are n o t " h i s " . 
The p r o o f o f t h a t i s t h a t he has t o a p p r o p r i a t e them. Marx's 
c l a i m t h e n i s t h a t objects do n o t p r i m a r i l y appear t o us as 
o b j e c t s o f our I n t u i t i o n b u t as o b j e c t s o f our n a t u r e . 
T h i s b r i n g s us t o Marx's f i r s t t h e s i s on Feuerbach. 
I n my view, the Theses as a whole summarise Marx's i d e a o f 
e x p e r i e n c e . I need h a r d l y say t h a t he a r r i v e s a t t h a t i d e a 
t h r o u g h a c r i t i c i s m o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l view o f our r e l a t i o n -
s h i p t o o b j e c t s . He t a k e s Hegel and Feuerbach t o be r e p r e -
s e n t a t i v e o f t h a t view, and he t h i n k s t h a t i t s p r i n c i p a l 
d e f e c t i s i t s c o n t e m p l a t i v e approach t o e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s , 
n a t u r a l l y , says l i t t l e . I t depends on what Marx means by 
c o n t e m p l a t i o n ; and one of the aims o f t h i s Chapter w i l l be t o 
e l u c i d a t e h i s meaning. However one t h i n g t h a t we can say 
m advance i s t h a t Marx does not, a p p o r t i o n t h e blame f o r t h i s 
d e f e c t o f p h i l o s o p h y e v e n l y . I n making h i s c r i t i c i s m he 
d i v i d e s t h e Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s i n t o two g r e a t camps: t h e 
I d e a l i s t s and t h e M a t e r i a l i s t s . I t i s , 1 t h i n k , h i s sympathy 
f o r Hegel's i d e a o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t l e a d s him t o do t h i s . 
For i t seems t o him t h a t m h i s Phenomenology o f Mind Hegel 
r e c o g n i s e s some o f t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f the c o n t e m p l a t i v e app-
ro a c h . But w i t h o u t s u p e r c e d i n g i t . Had he superceded i t , 
he would, Marx suggests, have ceased t o t h i n k o f man mer e l y 
as an a b s t r a c t t h i n k i n g b e i n g . Hegel, t h e n , i s a m b i v a l e n t 
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on a p o i n t which i s o f v i t a l i mportance t o Marx. He b o t h 
r e j e c t s and p r e s e r v e s t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e approach. We can, 
I t h i n k , g i v e an example o f what Marx has m mind h e r e . I n 
th e o pening c h a p t e r s o f t h e Phenomenology Hege] comes t o 
d i s c u s s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f d e s i r e ( B e g i e r d e ) . T h i s , we 
would be i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k , i s an i n t r i g u i n g d e p a r t u r e m a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l work. Indeed i t suggests t h a t Hegel t a k e s 
something l i k e Marx's view o f man's o b j e c t i v i t y , f o r i t 
s u ggests t h a t Hegel i s e x a m i ning t he most c o n c r e t e a s p e c t s 
o f o ur l i f e m a c c o u n t i n g f o r o ur e x p e r i e n c e . And so, m 
a sense, he i s . As Mure says: 'At f i r s t d e s i r e ' , as Hegel 
a n a l y s e s i t , ' i s ( s e l f i s h ) a p p e t i t i o n , i m p u l s e t o s a t i s f y a 
f e l t want ( o f l i f e ) by a b s o r b i n g i n t o o n e s e l f an o t h e r 
w h i c h as sttch i s t h e r e b y merely c a n c e l l e d and d e s t r o y e d ( f o o d 
-7. 
f o r e x a m p l e ) . ' ^ But Hegel's t r u e i n t e r e s t m t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
c-n be seen m what f o l l o w s . ' I n t h i s p r a c t i c a l s a t i s f a c t i o n 1 , 
Mare says, 'the s u b j e c t e n j o y s a c e r t a i n t y which i s t r u t h , 
b u t such s a t i s f a c t i o n i s t r a n s i t o r y ; want and i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
a l t e r n a t e and r e c u r e n d l e s s l y . True s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s :s 
o n l y reached when the r e l a t i o n o f s e l f and o t h e r develops i n t o 
t h e r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n o f two s e l f - c c n s c i o u s i n d i v i d u a l s ' . ( l b . ) 
I n o t h e r words, Hegel's t r u e i n t e r e s t i s m t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s 
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r knowledge o r ' t r u e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' 
as Mure p u t s i t . The i n t e r e s t i n a c o n c r e t e aspect o f our 
2. Hegel. Werke 3, p. 139. 
3- G.R.G.Mure. H^ he P h i l o s o p h y o f Hegel, p. 74. 
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e x p e r i e n c e i s merely p a r t i a l . Hegel, merely p o s i t s d e s i r e 
i n o r d e r t o supercede i t . To t h a t e x t e n t , Marx would sug-
g e s t , h i s approach i s s t i l l a c o n t e m p l a t i v e one. 
When I say ' c o n t e m p l a t i v e ' I have m mind t h e K a n t i a n 
t e r m Anschauung. T h i s i s t h e term t h a t Marx uses m h i s 
famous f i r s t t h e s i s on Feuerbach. A g r e a t d e a l h i n g e s on 
the meaning t h a t we acco r d t o t h i s t e r m , f o r on i t Marx 
b u i l d s h i s view o f e x p e r i e n c e . For Kant t h e term s i g n i f i e d 
t h e s y n t h e s i s o f app r e h e n s i o n t h a t t a k e s p l a c e m t h e mind 
o f each i n d i v i d u a l when c o n f r o n t e d by t h e e m p i r i c a l m a n i f o l d 
o f e x p e r i e n c e . For t h a t reason i t i s n o r m a l l y t r a n s l a t e d 
as i n t u i t i o n . For i n Kant's view an Anschauung c o n t a i n s b o t h 
the c h a o t i c data 0 f sense-experience and, i m p l i c i t l y , i t s 
s y n t h e s i s i n t o a V o r s t e l l u n g . A V o r s t e l l u n g , as we have seen, 
i s an image t h a t we have o f an aspect o f our e x p e r i e n c e o r a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . So an i n t u i t i o n , i s m Kant's view, what 
goes t o make up a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . An Anschauung,is a r e s u l t 
o f merely ' l o o k i n g on a t ' t h e w o r l d . That i s i t s l i t e r a l 
sense. Kant's use o f t h e term E , as we have seen, c l o s e l y con-
n e c t e d w i t h h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e empir-
i c i s t s . He h e l d i t t o d e s c r i b e a c c u r a t e l y what t h e y meant 
by e x p e r i e n c e : our l o o k i n g on a t t h e w o r l d o r our o b s e r v a t i o n 
o f i t . There i s , however, an i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t he 
wanted t o b r i n g o u t , namely, t h a t no m a t t e r what Hurne o r Locke 
may suggest our ' l e t t i n g m r e a l i t y ' t h r o u g h t h e senses i t s e l f 
i n v o l v e d a s y n t h e s i s . Hume and Locke, j n s i & t t h a t sense-
4. I . K a n t . K r i t i k d e r Remen V e r n u n f t , p p . 162 - l6j5. 
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e x p e r i e n c e i s 'pure'. I n o t h e r words, i t i s t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n 
t h a t i t a c q u a i n t s us d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f o b j e c t s . 
There i s no i n t e r v e n t i o n on our p a r t . But Kant's view i s 
t h a t even our s e n s e - o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d i n v o l v e s a 
c e r t a i n amount o f s e l e c t i o n and o r d e r i n g on our p a r t . H i s 
o b j e c t m p r o v i n g t h i s was t o demonstrate t h a t t h e g o a l o f 
metaphysics was m i s c o n c e i v e d . I n h i s view, because o f t h i s 
s y n t h e s i s t h a t always t a k e s p l a c e m our e x p e r i e n c e , we are 
never a b l e t o know t h i n g s m themselves o r noumenally. 
We can know them o n l y as appearances o r phenomena. I t 
f o l l o w s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Anschauung has two prime s i g n i f i c a t i o n s 
f o r Kant. F i r s t l y , i t r e p r e s e n t s h i s assessment o f t h e view 
o f e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s Locke and Hume and, s e c o n d l y , 
i t r e p r e s e n t s h i s c r i t i c i s m o f t h a t view. i f we t r a n s l a t e 
t h i s i n t o more r e a d i l y u n d e r s t o o d terms we can see t h e c l o s e 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h our o r i g i n a l n o t i o n o f t h e t e r m . ^ o r i t i s , 
on t h e one hand, our a p p r e h e n s i o n o f the w o r l d m our sense-
e x p e r i e n c e and, on t h e o t h e r , t h e f a s h i o n m wh i c h we s y n t h e s i s e 
t h a t e x p e r i e n c e m our minds. I n t u i t i o n (Anschauung) f o r 
Kant i s t h e r e f o r e b o t h a manner o f " l o o k i n g on a t " e x p e r i e n c e 
and o f knowing i t . 
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MARX AMD TRADITIONAL MATERIALISM 
Marx, as I have a l r e a d y s a i d , r e g a r d s man as an o b j e c t -
i v e , sensuous and n a t u r a l b e i n g . I t i s t h e r e f o r e c e n t r a l 
t o h i s t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be o b j e c t s o u t s i d e t h e mind. 
I n t h e p l a i n e s t terms, he must show t h a t the o b j e c t s we sense 
are " t h e r e " . T h i s , by Marx's own r e c k o n i n g , must put him 
m th e m a t e r i a l i s t camp m p h i l o s o p h y ; b u t i t would be mis"' 
l e a d i n g t o conclude t h a t he i s t h e r e f o r e an e m p i r i c i s t . For, 
as we s h a l l see, he p l a c e s f a r g r e a t e r emphasis on the o b j e c t -
i v i t y o f our knowledge th a n t h e c l a s s i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s d i d . 
One c o u l d say t h a t he r ehearses t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s ' p o s i t i o n 
n o t from t h e i r p o i n t o f view but from t h e p o i n t o f view o f 
Kant's C r i t i q u e . 'The mam d e f e c t o f a l l p r e v i o u s m a t e r i a l -
Ism', he says, (and t h a t f o r him i n c l u d e s t h a t of Feuerbach) 
' i s t h a t o b j e c t , r e a l i t y , sensuousness i s o n l y grasped under 
t h e form o f o b j e c t o r o f i n t u i t i o n (Anschauung); n o t as sens-
uous human a c t i v i t y , p r a c t i c e ; n o t s u b j e c t i v e l y . T h e r e f o r e , 
t h e a c t i v e s i d e was developed a b s t r a c t l y by i d e a l i s m m opp-
o s i t i o n t o m a t e r i a l i s m - i d e a l i s m - w h i c h n a t u r a l l y does n o t 
know r e a l , sensuous a c t i v i t y as such'."* Marx's o b j e c t i o n 
moves m two d i r e c t i o n s . F i r s t he c r i t i c i z e s what I have 
c a l l e d Lockean m a t e r i a l i s m and t h e n , s u r p r i s i n g l y , suggests 
an o b j e c t i o n t o h i s c r i t i c i s m a p p a r e n t l y t o l e a v e us m no 
doubt t h a t he i s n o t h i m s e l f an i d e a l i s t . Because Marx has 
m rrnnd t h e K a n t i a n term t h e r e i s a marked s i m i l a r i t y between 
h i s c r i t i c i s m s and those o f Kant. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e he p o i n t s 
o u t , as does Kant, t h a t t h e Lockean account o f e x p e r i e n c e i g -
n ores our i n t e r v e n t i o n m the a p p r e h e n s i o n o f r e a l i t y . Our 
5- Marx. 'Theses on Feuerbach',Harx-Engels Werke 3, p. 5- I t i s 
t r u e t h a t Marx's r e f e r e n c e t o l d e a L i s m p o i n t s t o Hege 1 r a t h e r 
t h a n Kant, b u t i t seems t o me t h a i , because o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f t h e K a n t i a n n o t i o n o f Anschauung m Marx's o b j e c t i o n s t o 
t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i s m , K a n t J S t h e more i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e m t h i 
i n s t a n c e . 
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minds are not s i m p l y b l a n k when we sense-experience. We are 
c l e a r l y i n v o l v e d m our apprehension o f an o b j e c t . I n t h e 
second p l a c e he p o i n t s o u t , l i k e Kant, t h a t , from t h e f i r s t , 
o ur r e l a t i o n t o an o b j e c t i s an a c t i v e one. Marx o f course 
means t h i s m a much more comprehensive sense t h a n Kant. 
He i s n o t o n l y r e f e r r i n g t o a t h e o r e t i c a l s y n t h e s i s m t h e 
form o f i n t u i t i o n but t o 'sensuous human a c t i v i t y , p r a c t i c e ' . 
I t i s i n t h i s comprehensiveness o f o u r a c t i v e i n v o l v e m e n t t h a t 
Marx d i f f e r s from t h e I d e a l i s t s . They, he c l a i m s , and here 
he echoes what he has t o say o f Hegel m h i s C r i t i q u e o f t h e 
Phenomenology, do n o t know ' r e a l sensuous a c t i v i t y as such'. 
L e t us now t a k e a ~ l o s e r l o o k a t t h e two as p e c t s o f Marx's 
c r i t i c i s m o f t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i s m . T r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i s m 
had, he suggests, o n l y t a k e n h o l d o f r e a l i t y 'under t h e form 
o f o b j e c t o r o f i n t u i t i o n ' , n o t under t h e form 'of sensuous 
human p r a c t i c e ' . I t i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y c l e a r what t h i s means. 
Indeed on t h e face o f i t t h e r e i s something q u i t e c o n f u s i n g 
m s a y i n g t h a t an " o b j e c t i v e " view o f r e a l i t y i s one t h a t 
r e g a r d s i t " s u b j e c t i v e l y " as 'sensuous human p r a c t i c e ' . But 
we may perhaps c l a r i f y Marx's p o i n t w i t h an example. The 
k i n d o f example t h a t we r e q u i r e would i n v o l v e a comparison 
o f Marx's view o f ' o b j e c t , r e a l i t y ' and t h a t o f p r e v i o u s 
m a t e r i a l i s m . For Marx's view we need go no f u r t h e r t h a n 
h i s C r i t i q u e o f Hegel's Phenomenology; and f o r t h e e m p i r i c i s t 
view, Locke's accounc o f t h e sun w i l l serve. The idea o f t h e sun 
i s f o r Locke 'but an aggregate o f those s e v e r a l s i m p l e i d e a s , 
b r i g h t , h o t , r o u n d i s h , h a v i n g a c o n s t a n t r e g u l a r m o t i o n , a t 
a c e r t a i n d i s t a n c e from us, and perhaps some o t h e r : as he who 
t h i n k s and d i s c o u r s e s o f t h e sun has be en more o r l e s s a c c u r a t e 
m o b s e r v i n g those s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s , i d e a s , o r p r o p e r t i e s , 
which are m t h a t t h i n g he c a l l s t he sun'. What Marx would 
say o f t h i s i d e a o f the sun i s t h a t i t i s c l e a r l y a contemp-
l a t i v e one. Locke i s concerned w i t h t h e o r i g i n o f our 
'Complex I d e a s o f Substances'. He b e l i e v e s t h e y a r i s e from 
our o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e substance m q u e s t i o n , m t h i s case 
t h e sun. Through o b s e r v i n g t h e sun we r e c e i v e sense-impre-
s s i o n s o f i t o r what Locke c a l l s , s i m p l e i d e a s , and o u r 
complex Jdea o f t h e sun i s n o t h i n g 'but ( t h e ) aggregate o f 
those s e v e r a l s i m p l e i d e a s ' . Now, i t would be t o misunder-
sta n d Marx t o say t h a t h i s q u a r r e l was p r i m a r i l y w i t h t h i s 
account o f t h e o r i g i n o f our complex i d e a s . H i s q u a r r e l i s 
w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p t n a t Locke i n v o k e s between o u r s e l v e s 
and t h e w o r l d ( o r o b j e c t ) m g i v i n g t h a t account. The 
o b j e c t , t h e sun, i s merely a n m t u i t e d one. The o o j e c t , 
Marx would argue, i s n o t seen as i t a c t u a l l y c o n f r o n t s men 
as a n a t u r a l b e i n g . Indeed m Locke's terms, t h e ideas o f 
t h a t o b j e c t a r e t h e i d e a s o f a b e i n g who ' t h i n k s and d i s c o u r s e 
o f t h e sun'. T h i s , we know, i s Locke's view o f e x p e r i e n c e : 
i t i s t h e f i l l i n g t h a t i s g i v e n t o our minds t h r o u g h our 
s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n , o f and r e f l e c t i o n , on t h e w o r l d . But t h a t 
i s n o t Marx's view o f e x p e r i e n c e . For him e x p e r i e n c e i s , 
i n d eed, sensuous and o f o b j e c t s ; b u t i t i s n o t merely p a s s i v e 
and c o n t e m p l a t i v e . As he p u t s i t ( m t h e Economic and P h i l -
o s o p h i c a l M a n u s c r i p t s ) : 'The sun i s t h e o b j e c t o f t h e p l a n t 
an i n d i s p e n s a b l e o b j e c t t o i t , c o n f i r m i n g i t s l i f e - j u s t as 
6. J.Locke. Essay Concerning t h e Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , o p . c i 
p. 177-
7« I b i d . Locke heads t h e Chapter m t h a t way. 
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the p l a n t i s an o b j e c t of the sun, b e i n g an e x p r e s s i o n o f 
th e l i f e - a w a k e n i n g power o f t h e sun, o f t h e o b j e c t i v e 
g 
e s s e n t i a l powers o f the sun'. E x p e r i e n c e , he suggests, i s 
n o t s i m p l y p a s s i v e and c o n t e m p l a t i v e , because our immediate 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h o b j e c t s i s one o f n a t u r a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e , most s e n s i b l e he c l a i m s t o see our g e n e r a l 
r e l a t i o n t o r e a l i t y m the terms t h a t t h i s i n s i g h t demands: 
as sensuous human p r a c t i c e . 
T h i s view o f e x p e r i e n c e has, I b e l i e v e , v e r y i m p o r t a n t 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r e p i s t e m o l o g y . Our immediate r e a c t i o n t o 
Marx's c l a i m would, I thank, be t o j o i n Habermas i n a c c u s i n g 
Marx o f o v e r t h r o w i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y t o l i t t l e good e f f e c t . 
Locke, we would say, may have miscon c e i v e d t h e n a t u r e o f 
e x p e r i e n c e b u t he does a t l e a s t have t h e m e r i t o f p u r s u i n g 
h i s e n q u i r y i n t o t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f our knowledge. There 
i s , however, more t o Marx's view t h a n meets t h e eye. H i s 
s u g g e s t i o n i s , as we have seen, t h a t o b j e c t s im i r ,3diat.ely 
c o n f r o n t man as o b j e c t s o f h i s n a t u r e . T h i s f o r him i s 
what i t means t o be o b j e c t i v e . For us t o be o b j e c t i v e im-
p l i e s f o r him t h a t we have n o t merely i n t u i t e d an o b j e c t o r t h a t 
we are s i m p l y o b s e r v i n g i t ^ R a ther he would say t h a t t h e 
o b j e c t o f o u r Anschauung ( i n t u i t i o n , p e r c e p t i o n ) has t o be 
seen as p a r t o f a n o t h e r more s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n o f man t o 
h i s o b j e c t s . O b j e c t s , he says, are as th e y f i r s t appear t o 
us mediated by our n a t u r e o r n a t u r e i t s e l f . And our n a t u r e 
8. Marx. Werke, Erganzundsband, o p . c i t . , p. 578. 
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f o r Marx i s , as we have seen, w i t h o u t doubt t o be sensuously 
humanly a c t i v e , i n o t h e r words t o produce: t o t r a n s f o r m our 
environment m accordance w i t h o u r needs. T h i s , we would 
say, i s where Marx's view i s t h o r o u g h l y s u b j e c t i v e . How, 
we w i l l ask,can our knowledge o f t h e w o r l d p o s s i b l y be 
o b j e c t i v e i f o u r o v e r r i d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i t i s a p r a c t i c a l 
one? The answer i s t h a t f o r Marx t h i s i n e v i t a b l e s u b j e c t i -
v i t y o f our e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t a one-sided one. H i s c l a i m 
i s t h a t o u r s u b j e c t i v i t y , o r i f one wishes, our n a t u r e , i s 
t h e n a t u r e o f t h e w o r l d . Our d r i v e s , he argues, do n o t 
d e r i v e from mere one-sided wishes b u t from our n a t u r a l 
l i m i t a t i o n s . Our d e s i r e s m g e n e r a l e x i s t n o t s i m p l y be-
cause we are s e l f i s h c r e a t u r e s but because w i t h o u t t h e i r 
c o n t i n u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n we would n o t s u r v i v e . They are n o t 
t h e r e f o r e , Marx would argue, mere e x p r e s s i o n s o f our n a t u r e , 
t h e y are a l s o how the o b j e c t i v e w o r l d impinges on us. So 
he would suggest t h a t t h e c l a s s i c a l e m p i r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s 
had made an e r r o r m t i y m g t o e x c l u d e from our' knowledge o f 
o b j e c t s what was t h e r e s u l t o f t h e i r impact on our merely 
s u b j e c t i v e f a c u l t i e s . Because, i n Marx's view, we have no 
merely s u b j e c t i v e f a c u l t i e s . To t a k e up a g a i n Marx's d i s -
c u s s i o n o f t h e sun: 'the sun i s t h e o b j e c t o f t h e p l a n t ' as 
'an e x p r e s s i o n o f the l i f e - a w a k e n m g powers o f t h e sun, o f 
the sun's o b j e c t i v e e s s e n t i a ] powers'. Tnus, j u s t as t h e 
p l a n t as a n a t u r a l o b j e c t e x p e r i e n c e s i t s o b j e c t , t h e sun, 
as i t r e a l l y i s , we as n a t u r a l o b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c e t h r o u g h 
our ( a p p a r e n t l y merely s u b j e c t i v e ) f a c u l t i e s o b j e c t s as 
t h e y are i n themselves. What he i m p l i e s t h e r e f o r e i s t h a t 
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our p r a c t i c a l human sensuous r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t , r e a l i t y , 
as he says m t h e f i r s t t h e s i s , i s a t one and t h e same t i m e 
an e x p r e s s i o n o f the o b j e c t i v e n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y . 
T h i s , o f course, w i l l n o t do t o e s t a b l i s h Marx's 
p o s i t i o n as a s e r i o u s c r i t i c o f c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g y . 
We can perhaps see i t as a p l a u s i b l e account o f t h e s u b j e c t -
o b j e c t r e l a t i o n b u t i t s p r e c i s e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r e p i s t e m o l o g y 
a r e , as y e t , u n c l e a r . A s l i g h t d i g r e s s i o n on Hegel w i l l , 
I t h i n k , h e l p us h e r e . As we have seen i t i s a l s o Hegel's 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d i s n o t , s i m p l y 
because i t i s o u r s , u n o b j e c t i v e . The manner^he s u b s t a n t i a t e s 
t h i s i s , however, a l t o g e t h e r d i f f e r e n t from t h a t o f Marx. 
He does so, we r e c a l l , t h r o u g h an a n a l y s i s o f s c i e n c e . For 
him, t h e human b e i n g qua s c i e n t i s t p u t s h i m s e l f r i g h t i n t o 
h i s o b j e c t m t h i s way, he says, n e g a t i n g i t s ' s e l f - s u b s i s t e n c e ' 
Thus the o b j e c t as s c i e n t i f i c a l l y known i s f o r Hegel b o t h 
s u b j e c t i v e l y h i s and o b j e c t i v e l y as i t i s . T h i s f o r him i s 
how s u b j e c t and o b j e c t c o i n c i d e . The s u b j e c t subsumes the 
o b j e c t m s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. T h i s i s t h e r o l e o f t h e 
s c i e n t i f i c law. The s c i e n t i f i c law, Hegel suggests, encap-
s u l a t e s r e a l i t y ( t h e m i t s e l f ) f o r us. Now Marx would 
o b j e c t t o Hegel's account o f t h e c o i n c i d e n c e o f s u b j e c t and 
o b j e c t on t h e grounds t h a t i t d i s r e g a r d s man's n a t u r a l o b j e c -
t i v i t y . Man, we have seen Marx say, i s n o t merely an a b s t r a c t 
t h i n k i n g b e i n g . So even h i s b e i n g qua s c i e n t i s t i s b u t p a r t 
o f a n a t u r a l b e i n g . But s i n c e I d e a l i s m , and Hegel's i d e a l i s m 
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m p a r t i c u l a r , 'does n o t know r e a l , sensuous a c t i v i t y as such', 
Hegel reduces man t o s c i e n t i f i c man o r , more p r e c i s e l y , know-
le d g e . The c o i n c i d e n c e o f o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y m 
man's e x p e r i e n c e i s , Marx b e l i e v e s , more b a s i c t h a n t h a t which 
t a k e s p l a c e m knowledge. 
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f Marx has a l l t o do w i t h t h e way m v/hich 
he c o n c e i v e s o b j e c t i v i t y and, above a l l , man's o b j e c t i v i t y . 
He says, a g a i n m the C r i t i q u e o f Hegel's Phenomenology, 'to 
be o b j e c t i v e , n a t u r a l , sensuous and b o t h t o have o u t s i d e one-
s e l f , o b j e c t , n a t u r e , sense o r t o be o n e s e l f o b j e c t , n a t u r e , 
9 
sense f o r a t h i r d i s i d e n t i c a l . ' So, m Marx's view, t h e r e 
i s t h i s t h i r d aspect t o b e i n g o b j e c t i v e , and, i t i s t h i s 
t h i r d aspect t h a t ensures t h a t o ur s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e o b j e c t i s one t h a t corresponds t o i t s o b j e c t i v e 
n a t u r e . T h i s t h i r d aspect i s t h a t we are an o b j e c t f o r 
i t . Now, what Marx claims i s t h i s : i f we are an o b j e c t f o r 
i t i t must be an o b j e c t f o r us as i t o b j e c t i v e l y i s . Indeed 
i t i s h i s view t h a t t h e r e i s no o t h e r way t h a t i t can be an 
o b j e c t f o r us o t h e r t h a n as i t o b j e c t i v e l y i s . As i t s t a n d s , 
t h i s i s n o t h i n g b u t a c l a i m f o r Marx. But a g a i n t h e analogy 
w i t h t h e sun w i l l serve t o e s t a b l i s h h i s p o i n t . The 'sun 
i s t h e o b j e c t o f t h e p l a n t ' , he says, as 'the p l a n t i s t h e 
o b j e c t o f t h e sun'. We must be c a r e f u l t o t a k e t h i s sentence 
l i t e r a l l y . Marx i s c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e way m which t h e p l a n t 
r e l a t e s t o t h e sun m i r r o r s p r e c i s e l y t h e way i n which t he sun 
r e l a t e s t o t h e p l a n t . The p l a n t i s t o t h e sun m t h e i r n a t u r a l 
( b i o l o g i c a l ) r e l a t i o n what the sun i s t o i t . What t h e sun 
9- I b i d . 
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i s t o i t i n t h a t r e l a t i o n i s what i t o b j e c t i v e l y i s . I n 
o t h e r words, Marx i s c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e sun seen from t h e p l a n t ' s 
p o i n t o f view appears j u s t as i t i s m i t s e l f . The n a t u r a l 
r e l a t i o n does n o t d i s t o r t f o r t h e p l a n t what t h e sun i s m 
i t s e l f . F or the sun's p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i v e q u a l i t y i s , Marx 
would argue, t he energy i t t r a n s m i t s . T h i s i s t h e sun as 
i t i s i n i t s e l f . B ut, and t h i s i s Marx's p o i n t , t h e p l a n t 
i s a l s o m i t s e l f an e x p r e s s i o n o f t h a t energy o f , as he says, 
'the l i f e - a w a k e n i n g powers o f t h e sun'. Man's o b j e c t i v i t y , 
Marx argues, i s o f t h i s k i n d . T h i s i s because o b j e c t s a r e 
always o b j e c t s o f our n a t u r e . O b j e c t s are t o us as n a t u r a l 
b e i n g s what we are t o taem, we are t h e i r o b j e c t j u s t as th e y 
are o ur o b j e c t s . I n o t h e r words, I r e l a t e t o i t j u s t as i t 
o b j e c t i v e l y i s . For, f o r t h e y t o be our o b j e c t s i s t h e same 
as f o r us t o be t h e i r o b j e c t s . We can see now where c l a s s -
i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m breaks down f o r Marx. I t c o n f r o n t s i t s 
o b j e c t s as we have seen as o b j e c t s o f Anschauung ( i n t u i t i o n , 
p e r c e p t j o n ) . T h i s r e l a t i o n cannot be adequate t o o b j e c t i v i t y 
( w h i c h i s o f course t h e c e n t r a l m a t e r i a l i s t s t h e s i s ) as Marx 
u n d e r s t a n d s i t . For i f I i n t u i t an o b j e c t I c o n f r o n t i t -
i f o n l y m e n t a l l y . Now, f o r me t o c o n f r o n t i t p r o p e r l y as 
an o b j e c t , Marx suggests, i t has t o be t o me what I am t o i t . 
But what am I t o i t : a merely p a s s i v e i n t u i t i n g being? C l e a r l y 
t h i s i s n o t so. But t h i s i s what t h e c l a s s i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t 
s u g g e s t s : t h a t I e x p e r i e n c e i t m erely by ' l o o k i n g on a t ' i t . 
I f I am t o c o n f r o n t t h e o b j e c t p r o p e r l y i n my mind I have, 
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Marx suggests, t o t a k e i n t o account what I am f o r i t . And 
what I am f o r a n o t h e r o b j e c t , Marx says, i s p l a i n l y and 
c l e a r l y an a c t i v e , sensuous, human b e i n g . That I am c o n s c i o u s 
o f t h i s , Marx suggests, i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r my coming i n t o 
an o b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e o b j e c t s o u t s i d e m y s e l f . There-
f o r e t h a t I see m y s e l f m such a way i s n o t m t h e l e a s t b i t 
I n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h my knowing t h e o b j e c t s o f my e x p e r i e n c e as 
t h e y o b j e c t i v e l y a r e . 
T h i s b r i n g s us t o t h e second aspect o f Marx's c r i t i c i s m 
o f p r e v i o u s m a t e r i a l i s m . Because p r e v i o u s m a t e r i a l i s m con-
c e i v e d e x p e r i e n c e as Anschauung i t had not, a c c o r d i n g t o Marx, 
viewed r e a l i t y as sensuous .human a c t i v i t y , P r a x i s . The 
development o f t h i s s i d e o f our r e l a t i o n s h i p ^o o b j e c t s had 
t h e r e f o r e f a l l e n t o i d e a l i s m . Indeed, as we have seen, Marx 
c l a i m s t h a t Hegel had, l i k e him, seen t h a t o ur s u b j e c t i v e r e l -
a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d was a l s o an o b j e c t i v e one. He has t o add 
however t h a t t h e H e g e l i a n view o f our a c t i v e r e l a t i o n t o r e a l i t y 
was n o t p r o p e r l y founded. Because i t d eveloped m o p p o s i t i o n 
t o t h e p a s s i v e m a t e r i a l i s t view o f e x p e r i e n c e , i t was necess-
a r i l y a b s t r a c t . To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t we may t a k e a n o t h e r 
l o o k a t t h e process o f Hegel's Phenomenology. I have t r i e d 
t o show t h a t , m t h a t work, Hegel s e t s out t o overcome (Aufheben) 
what he c a l l s t h e m a t e r i a ] i s t s ' ' o p p o s i t i o n o f cons c i o u s n e s s ' . 
So, m one sense, h i s aim i s t h e same as t h a t o f Marx: he 
wished t o r e f u t e t h e view t h a t e x p e r i e n c e i s s i m p l y t o be 
seen as p a s s i v e sense-experience. I n d o i n g t h i s , as I have 
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a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , Hegel i n t r o d u c e s concepts from our 
p r a c t i c a l arid s o c i a l l i f e i n t o t he t h e o r y o f knowledge. 
(One such concept i s , as we have seen, t h e concept o f D e s i r e 
( B e g i e r d e ) . ) But i n so d o i n g , he f a i l s t o g e t beyond what 
Marx c a l l s an a b s t r a c t approach t o e x p e r i e n c e . Hegel's 
f a i l u r e l i e s I n t h e manner i n which he i n t r o d u c e s p r a c t i c a l 
concepts t o e p i s t e m o l o g y . Rather t h a n s e e k i n g t o g i v e 
e p i s t e m o l o g y a p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e he seeks t o g i v e t h e 
p r a c t i c a l concepts an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . D e s i r e , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , he p r e s e n t s n o t as one o f o u r mundane p r a c t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o o b j e c t s b u t 'as the movement w h e r e i n t h i s 
o p p o s i t i o n i s overcome and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s becomes t o 
i t s e l f i t s e q u a l i t y w i t h i t s e l f ' . 1 ^ * I n o t h e r words, Hegel 
p r e s e n t s t h e concept o f d e s i r e as the p o i n t a t which s e l f -
c onsciousness i s i t s e l f assured o f t h e u n t r u t h o f t h e m a t e r i a l 
i s t s ' t h e s i s . The aim o f t h e process o f t h e Phenomenology i s 
t h e n , indeed t o show that e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t p r o p e r l y c o n c e i v e d 
when conceived as Anschauung; and m p u r s u i n g t h i s aim i t 
d e v e l ops the p r a c t i c a l s i d e o f our r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o b j e c t s . 
But i t does not. as Marx p o i n t s o u t , make p r a c t i c e t h e p r i m a r y 
aspect o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s i s because i t s aim i s t o oppose 
m a t e r i a l i s m , t o show t h a t t h e r e are no r e a l , sensuous o b j e c t s 
but r a t h e r t h a t a l l are merely t h o u g h t o b j e c t s . I f a l l i d e a ] 
ism has b e f o r e i t are t h o u g h t o b j e c t s i t must f o l l o w , Marx 
sug g e s t s , t h a t i t s view o f p r a c t i c e i s an a b s t r a c t one. 
10. Hegel. Werke 3, p. 139. 
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Marx's a t t i t u d e t o i d e a l i s m i s u n d e n i a b l y a m b i v a l e n t . 
On t h e one hand he c l a i m s t h a t i d e a l i s m c o n t r i b u t e s t o our 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f o b j e c t i v i t y and, on t h e o t h e r , t h a t i t 
h i n d e r s our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t . Moreover, he p r a i s e s 
i d e a l i s m f o r s e e i n g t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f p r a c t i c e m our 
r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t s y e t c r i t i c i s e s i t f o r n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
t h a t s i g n i f i c a n c e . P a r t o f the reason f o r t h i s I s t h a t , 
common t o t h e German I d e a l i s t s , t h e r e i s what I s h a l l c a l l 
a convergence o f t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ( e p i s t e m o l o g y ) w i t h 
p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ( e t h i c s ) . T h i s , a d m i t t e d l y , t a k e s on 
d i f f e r e n t forms. W i t h Kant and P i c h t e , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y are d i s t i n c t y e t m t e r -
r e a l t e d . W i t h Hegel, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e r e i s from t h e 
b e g i n n i n g no d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e two. The p a t t e r n w i t h 
Kant and F i c h t e i s t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y comes 
f i r s t m o r d e r t h a t t h e y may e s t a b l i s h what we can r e a s o n a b l y 
hope t o know; and t h a t o e t s t n e scene f o r the p r a c t i c a l p h i l -
osophy. For i n s t a n c e , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t Kant makes between 
pehnomenon and noumenon i n t h e C r i t i q u e o f Pure Reason i s 
c a r r i e d i n t o h i s moral and p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i e s . Indeed, 
i t i s o f major s i g n i f i c a n c e m h i s p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y , f o r h i s 
whole n o t i o n o f p r o p e r t y depends on i t . I n Hegel's p h i l -
osophy, however, e p i s t e m o l o g y and e t h i c s converge c o m p l e t e l y . 
I n f a c t , h i s Phenomenology o f Mind i s b o t h an e t h i c and a 
t h e o r y o f knowledge. Now Marx a l s o wants t o put f o r w a r d an 
account o f e x p e r i e n c e m wh i c h , e p i s t e m o l o g y and e t h i c s are 
seen t o converge. However, he wants t o d i s t i n g u i s h h i s 
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account from t h a t o f h i s i d e a l i s t f o r e r u n n e r s . I t i s t h i s 
t h a t e x p l a i n s h i s ambiguous a t t i t u d e t o them. He approves 
o f t h e c o n f l a t i o n o f t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge and e t h i c s m 
t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i e s y e t d i s a p p r o v e s o f t h e way m which i t i s 
done. T h i s i s because he t h i n k s , t h a t w i t h t h e I d e a l i s t s , 
t h e o r y o r , more g e n e r a l l y , t h o u g h t has t h e upper hand over 
p r a c t i c e . 
A g r e a t d e a l t u r n s on what we t a k e Marx t o mean by t h i s . 
There i s v e r y l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n ±n t h e 'Theses on Feuerbach' 
themselves o f why Marx t h o u g h t t h a t t h e I d e a l i s t s had d e v e l -
oped the a c t i v e s i d e o f our r e l a t i o n t o r e a l i t y m an incom-
p l e t e way. We can, however, shed l i g h t on t h e m a t t e r by 
l o o k i n g a t t h e o b j e c t i o n s he r a i s e s t o H e g e l ' J view o f p r a c -
t i c e m the C r i t i q u e o f Hegel's Phenomenology. We w i l l 
r e c a l l t h a t Marx d i s c u s s e s Hegel's n o t i o n o f a c t i v i t y w n i l s t 
p r a i s i n g Hegel f o r h i s i n s i g h t i n t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f l a b o u r 
f o r t h e ' s e l f - d e v e l o p m e n t o f man'. For, i n Marx's view, 
Hegel had shown t h a t t h e essence o f man was e v i n c e d m h i s 
p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , however, Hegel o n l y 
u n d e r s t a n d s i t as t h e essence o f man t h o u g h t . I n o t h e r words, 
Marx s u g g e s t s , i t i s , f o r Hegel, no more t h a n a t h e o r e t i c a l 
i n s i g h t . For i f t h e t r u t h be known, Marx c o n t i n u e s , 'the 
o n l y l a b o u r which Hegel knows and acknowledges i s t h e a b s t r a c t 
i n t e l l e c t u a l ' . 1 1 T h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f Marx's need h a r d l y 
s u r p r i s e us. We have a l r e a d y seen him c l a i m t h a t Hegel r e d -
11. Marx. Erganaungsband, o p . c i t . , p. 57^-
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uces a l l a s p e c t s o f oar l i f e , r e l i g i o n and a r t f o r i n s t a n c e , 
t o t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f those v a r i o u s a s p e c t s . Hegel does t h i s , 
Marx suggests, because he sees the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n t h a t t a k e s 
p l a c e m our e x p e r i e n c e merely as an e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n o f s e l f -
consciousness. Thus t h e a c t i v e s i d e o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e t h a t 
Hegel develops i s o n l y 'an a c t i v e s i d e t h o u g h t ' . So he 
o n l y t a k e s n o t e o f l a b o u r as t h e t h o u g h t o f i t , o r as i t 
a f f e c t s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Indeed, Marx c l a i m s , t h e r e i s 
n o t h i n g e l s e l e f t m e x p e r i e n c e o f w h i c h t o t a k e n o t e as Hegel 
conceives i t : as t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f consciousness. Because, 
Marx says, 'the way m w h i c h ( t h e H e g e l i a n - H.W.) consciousness 
i s and m which something i s f o r i t , i s knovjledge. Knowledge 
i s i t s s o l e a c t . Something i s t h e r e f o r e f o r consciousness 
m so f a r as as i t knows t h i s something. Knowledge i s i t s 
12 
s o l e o b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n ' . T h i s i s what Marx means when 
he says Hegel o f f e r s a merely t h e o r e t i c a l i n s i g h t : n t o our 
a c t i v e r e l a t i o n t o r e a l i t y : t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s r e c o g n i s e s o n l y 
one k i n d o f o b j e c t , and t h a t i s knowledge. As we have seen, 
n o t h i n g e l s e i s r e a l f o r Hegel o t h e r t h a n the r a t i o n a l . And 
what he means by t h e r a t i o n a l , i s t h e p r e c i s e s c i e n t i f i c know-
ledge o f t h e p r e s e n t . Thus what Marx c a l l s sensuous, human 
p r a c t i c e i s , t o t h a t e x t e n t , u n r e a l f o r him. Wha.t i s r e a l 
about p r a c t i c e i s f o r Hegel the t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t . 
So m t h a t sense,then, t h e o r y subsumes p r a c t i c e . Hegel, 
as Marx says, does n o t know r e a l o b j e c t s , j u s t t h o u g h t o b j e c t s . 
12. I b i d . p. 58G. 
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I t was Feuerbach's g r e a t m e r i t , Marx argues, t h a t he had 
s t r e s s e d t he r e a l i t y and m a t e r i a l i t y o f t h e o b j e c t s o f our 
senses. Indeed, Marx d e s c r i b e s Feuerbach as t h e t r u e conqueror 
13* 
o f t h e H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h e r . To ac h i e v e h i s conquest he 
had t o b r i n g down the H e g e l i a n n o t i o n o f G e i s t , and he d i d so 
by i n t r o d u c i n g t o p h i l o s o p h y a view o f n a t u r e , and o f man's 
n a t u r e , h o s t i l e t o the p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s o f i d e a l i s m . He 
b e l i e v e d t h a t much o f the appeal o f i d e a l i s m r e s t e d on a 
d e f a m a t i o n o f n a t u r e . I d e a l i s m m h i s view had seen n a t u r e , 
t h e w o r l d e x t e r n a l t o mind, s i m p l y as t h e n e g a t i o n o f man's 
freedom. N e g a t i o n i s o f course an a p p r o p r i a t e term f o r Feuer-
bach t o use because, as we have seen, t h e whole c f r e a l i t y e x t e r n a l 
t o mind i s f o r Hegel t he n e g a t i v e . B u t , Feuerbach argues, t h u s i s 
t o s l a n d e r n a t u r e . N a t u r e , he p o i n t s o u t , has n o t o n l y t o be seen 
as f u r n i s h i n g us w i t h t h e 'common workshop o f t h e stomach' b u t a l s o 
1 14* 
t h e temple o f t h e b r a i n . N a t u r e , he argues, has t o be seen 
as t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f our humanity, and t h e r e t u r n t o n a t u r e 
as t h e p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n o f our freedom. For t h i s reason, 
Feuerbach, as Marx says, 'wants sensuous human o b j e c t s ' . ^ * 
But t h e r e i s , Marx b e l i e v e s , something odd m the way m 
which Feuerbach appeals t o sensuous o b j e c t i v i t y . He s t r e s s e s 
t h e impact t h a t o b j e c t s have on a l l o ur f i v e senses w i t h o u t , 
Marx c l a i m s , comprehending that'human a c t i v i t y 1 i s i t s e l f 
, 1 16* 
o b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y . T h i s i s odd, Marx t h i n k s , because 
i n s t r e s s i n g t h e sensuous aspect o f our e x p e r i e n c e Feuerbach 
a l l b u t a t t a i n s a p r o p e r view o f o b j e c t i v i t y . As we have 
See o v e r f o r r e f e r e n c e s . 
351. 
13- I b i d . 
1L\. Feuerbach. 'Zur K r i t i k d e r Hegelschen P h i l o s o p h i e 1, 
S a m t l i c h e Werke11, p. 20^. 
15- Marx. MEW ~3> P- 5- Feuerbach says m h i s ' P r e l i m i n a r y 
Theses Towards the Reform o f P h i l o s o p h y ' t h a t 'the e s s e n t i a l 
implements, organs o f p h i l o s o p h y are t h e head, t h e source o f 
a c t i v i t y and freedom, o f m e t a p h y s i c a l i n f m i t e n e s s , o f i d e a l -
ism, and t h e h e a r t , the f o u n t a i n head o f s u f f e r i n g , o f f i n i t e -
ness, o f needs, o f s e n s u a l i s m - t h e o r e t i c a l l y expressed; 
t h o u g h t and sense p e r c e p t i o n . For t h o u g h t i s t h e need o f 
the head; p e r c e i v i n g , s e n s i n g , t h e need o f t h e h e a r t . 
Thought i s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t h e School, o f the system; 
sense p e r c e p t i o n i s t he p r i n c i p l e o f l i f e . I n sense-
p e r c e p t i o n I am d e t e r m i n e d by the o b j e c t , m t h o u g h t I 
d e t e r m i n e t h e o b j e c t , m t h o u g h t I am I , i n sense p e r c e p t i o n 
not - I . Only t h r o u g h t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h o u g h t , t h r o u g h 
b e i n g determined by the o b j e c t , from p a s s i o n , t h e f o u n t a i n -
head o f a l l p l e a s u r e and need i s b r o u g h t f o r t h t r u e , 
o b j e c t i v e t h o u g h t , the t r u e o b j e c t i v e p h i l o s o p h y . Sense 
p e r c e p t i o n g i v e s t h a t which i s immediate and i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h i t s e x i s t e n c e , t h o u g h t essence which mediated t h r o u g h 
s e p a r a t i o n , a b s t r a c t i o n from e x i s t e n c e . I t i s o n l y 
t h e r e , t h e r e f o r e , where essence i s u n i t e d w i t h e x i s t e n c e , 
t h o u g h t w i t h sense p e r c e p t i o n , a c t i v i t y w i t h p a s s i v i t y , 
th e s c h o l a s t i c phlegm o f German metaphysics w i t h t h e 
a n t i - s c h o l a s t i c , sanguine p r i n c i p l e o f French s e n s u a l i s m 
and m a t e r i a l i s m , o n l y t h e r e w i l l you have l i f e and t r u t h ' . 
S a m t l i c h e Werke, Fds. B o l i n & J o d l , p. 2^5. A p a r t from 
i l l u s t r a t i n g Marx s pffeint t h i s T h e s i s g i v e s a s p l e n d i d 
i n d i c a t i o n o f the mam themes o f Feuerbach's p h i l o s o p h y : 
s e n s u a l i s m and a n t i - s c h o l a s t i c i s m . 
16. Marx. i b i d . 
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seen, a p r o p e r view o f o b j e c t i v i t y f o r Marx i s one where i t 
i s acknowledged t h a t an o b j e c t i s n o t o n l y t h e r e m i t s e l f 
and f o r us b u t a l s o t h a t we are t h e r e f o r i t . The way 
t h a t we can c o n f i r m t h i s view o f o b j e c t i v i t y , Marx s u g g e s t s , 
i s t h r o u g h p a y i n g heed t o our se n s e - e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s , o f 
course, i s what Feuerbach does. As I have s a i d , he s t r e s s e s 
our sensuousness. We become c e r t a i n t h a t we have t h e c o r r e c t 
view o f o b j e c t i v i t y m our sense-experience, Marx s u g g e s t s , 
because sense-experience i s i t s e l f an example o f t h e t h i r d , 
most n e g l e c t e d , aspect o f o b j e c t i v i t y . C l e a r l y we o n l y 
sense-experience because we are t h e o b j e c t o f a n o t h e r o b j e c t . 
For w i t h o u t an e x t e r n a l s t i m u l u s t h e r e can be no s e n s a t i o n . 
Somehow, Marx s u g g e s t 0 , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s aspect o f 
sense-experience escapes Feuerbach. He sees c l e a r l y , Marx 
says, t h a t f o r us t o e x p e r i e n c e o b j e c t s they have t o be more 
t h a n t h o u g h t o b j e c t s f o r us. But he f a i l s t o grasp t h a t m 
a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r b e i n g o b j e c t s f o r us, we have t o be o b j e c t s 
f o r them. Only t h e n do we see t h a t sensuous human a c t i v i t y 
i s i t s e l f o b j e c t i v e . 
I t i s n o t easy t o see how t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s t h i r d 
a spect o f o b j e c t i v i t y l e a d s Marx i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f p r a c t i c e . 
But i t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e m a t t e r because i t 
i s h ere t h a t we have t h e t r a n s i t i o n f rom e p i s t e m o l o g y t o e t h i c s 
o r what I have c a l l e d t h e t r a n s i t i o n f rom an a b s t r a c t e p i s t e m -
o l o g i c a l view o f e x p e r i e n c e t o a c o n c r e t e , p r a c t i c a l n o t i o n 
o f i t . From t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h i s s t u d y t h e n i t r e p r e s e n t s 
353; 
th e end o f C l a s s i c a l German P h i l o s o p h y . Now Marx's p o i n t 
i s t h a t when we come t o see our r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t s as one 
m which we b o t h have o b j e c t s m themselves and f o r us, and 
we are t h e i r o b j e c t , we s h a l l see how o b j e c t s c o n f r o n t us m 
our p r a c t i c e . T h i s i s n o t an obvious p o i n t . Our p r a c t i c e , 
we might argue, does n o t s i m p l y c o n s i s t o f h a v i n g o b j e c t s f o r 
our o b j e c t n o r indeed b e i n g t h e i r o b j e c t . We would say t h a t 
i t c o n s i s t s o f our i n t e n t i o n a l l y t r a n s f o r m i n g an o b j e c t o r 
o b j e c t s , and n o t h i n g i s t r a n s f o r m e d , we would argue, t h r o u g h 
our mere c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h an o b j e c t . But i t i s a x i o m a t i c 
w i t h Marx t h a t t he r e l a t i o n s h i p i s a p r a c t i c a l one. P r a c t i c e 
does n o t e n t e r i n t o our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h o b j e c t s from o u t s i d e 
f o r Marx. I t i n h e r e s m t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f o b j e c t i v i t y i t -
s e l f . I t does so, i t seems, because he views t h e r e l a t i o n -
s h i p s between o u r s e l v e s and objects as determining ones . I have an object 
f r my o b j e c t , reads f o r him as: I d e t e r m i n e i t . C o n t r a r i w i s e , 
I am t h e o b j e c t o f a n o t h e r o b j e c t , reads f o r him: i t d e t e r m i n e s 
me. Thus, f o r Marx, f o r me t o c o n f r o n t an o b j e c t i s f o r me 
t o d e t e r m i n e i t and i t t o d e t e r m i n e me. What more i s t h e r e 
t o p r a c t i c e t h a n t h i s ? i t seems t h a t he would say. There 
i s f o r him no r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t s t h a t i s n o t u l t i m a t e l y a 
p r a c t i c a l one. 
T h i s view i s a x i o m a t i c t o Marx because o f h i s view o f 
man. As I have s a i d , he r e g a r d s man as a n a t u r a l b e i n g who 
t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r i l y has o b j e c t s f o r h i s o b j e c t . For Marx 
i t i s n o t a mere c o n t i n g e n c y t h a t l e a d s as t o be c o n f r o n t e d 
w i t h o b j e c t s m our e x p e r i e n c e . They are the c o u n t e r p a r t s 
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o f o ur n a t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s . As n a t u r a l b e i n g s we r e q u i r e 
o t h e r o b j e c t s m o r d e r t h a t we might s u r v i v e . We have t o 
l i v e o f f them. So t h a t o b j e c t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y c o n f r o n t 
us as o b j e c t s o f our needs. And our needs we can o n l y q u e l l 
t h r o u g h a p p r o p r i a t i n g t hose o b j e c t s . So t h e way m which 
we as n a t u r a l b eings r e l a t e t o t h e o b j e c t s t h a t c o n f r o n t us 
I s p r a c t i c a l l y . We c o n f r o n t them as be i n g s ' e n e r g e t i c a l l y 
b e n t ' on s a t i s f y i n g o ur needs. That i s why m Marx's view 
i t i s t h e p r i n c i p a l d e f e c t o f p r e v i o u s m a t e r i a l i s m , i n c l u d i n g 
t h a t o f Feuerbach, t h a t i t f a i l s t o grasp t h e o b j e c t , r e a l i t y , 
sensuousness as sensuous human a c t i v i t y . I t s f a i l u r e was 
I t s f a i l u r e t o see t h a t o ur immediate r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e 
o b j e c t s o f our sense-experience was one o f need. T h i s i s 
n o t t o say t h a t Marx t h i n k s t h a t t h e way m which we immed-
i a t e l y c o n f r o n t o b j e c t s o r are i m m e d i a t e l y c o n f r o n t e d by them 
i s merely a n i m a l . H i s i s a complex n o t i o n o f need, as 1 have 
a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d . I t has t o be so t o be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h 
h i s view o f man's n a t u r e . For i f , as he says, man i s e s s e n t -
i a l l y a s o c i a l and p r o d u c t i v e b e i n g i t i s s c a r c e l y p o s s i b l e 
f o r man's needs t o be merely a n i m a l . O b j e c t s i m m e d i a t e l y 
c o n f r o n t us t h e n , Marx su g g e s t s , as o b j e c t s o f our human needs. 
And what t h e y are i s what man's development has made them. 
Human needs themselves, Marx says, are t h e r e s u l t s o f h i s t o r y . 
They are l i v i n g embodiments o f a l o n g process o f c i v i l i s a t i o n . 
They are n a t u r a l needs which have been c i v i l i z e d . We must, 
t h e r e f o r e , add a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n t o our account o f 
Marx's t h e o r y o f e x p e r i e n c e . For he views man's immediate 
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r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t s n o t o n l y as a n a t u r a l p r a c t i c a l and s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n b u t a l s o as a h i s t o r i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d r e l a t i o n . As 
we s h a l l see, t h i s l a s t aspect o f Marx's view o f e x p e r i e n c e 
©mes t o t h e f o r e m t h e German I d e o l o g y , which I w i l l d i s c u s s 
m t h e n e x t c h a p t e r . 
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MARX AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 
For t h e p r e s e n t , however, I shou l d l i k e t o c o n c e n t r a t e 
on t h e n a r r o w e r e p i s t e r n o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Marx's view 
o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s , a f t e r a l l , i s t h e p r i n c i p a l concern 
o f t h e 'Theses on Feuerbach.' I n those 'Theses' Marx b r i e f l y 
wishes t o g i v e h i s grounds f o r d i s m i s s i n g t h e problem o f know-
l e d g e . I t i s h i s view as i t was Hegel's t h a t i t i s f r u i t l e s s 
t o pursue t h e problem c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e a l i t y o f our knowledge. 
The q u e s t i o n : How i s i t t h a t we know what we know? i s w i t h o u t 
i n t e r e s t f o r him. The same goes f o r a l l q u e s t i o n s about t h e 
c e r t a i n t y o f our knowledge. They are f o r him, as t h e y were 
f o r Hegel, q u e r i e s t h a t arouse an unecessary d i s t r u s t i n o ur 
knowledge. But because he develops t h i s view as a c r i t i c i s m 
o f Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y h i s grounds f o r d i s m i s s i n g t h e problem 
have t o be r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those o f Hegel. Hegel, 
we have seen, d i s m i s s e d t h e problem o f knowledge w i t h t h e 
assurance t h a t knowledge o r s c i e n c e had appeared. He r e s t e d 
h i s case on the f a c t o f knowledge. T h i s i s , o f course h a r d l y 
p r o o f t h a t t he Modern P h i l o s o p h e r s had been w a s t i n g t h e i r 
t i m e m t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c e r t a i n t y o f our knowledge. 
We s h a l l r e q u i r e more t h a n a mere assurance i f we are t o 
b e l i e v e t h a t a n y t h i n g can come o f r e j e c t i n g a t r a d i t i o n a l con-
c e r n o f p h i l o s o p h y . Marx, however, i s more c o n v i n c i n g on 
th e m a t t e r . Once a g a i n , h i s a t t i t u d e t o the problem i s 
d e t e r m i n e d by h i s view o f o b j e c t i v i t y . T h i s i s t h e most 
p e n e t r a t i n g and l a s t i n g m s i g n t o f h i s e a r l y work. At t h e 
r i s k o f e x c e s s i v e r e p e t i t i o n , l e t us remind o u r s e l v e s o f th e 
t h r e e a s p e c t s o f Marx's view o f o b j e c t i v i t y . 'To be o b j e c t i v e , 
n a t u r a l , sensuous', he says, 'and b o t h t o have o u t s i d e o n e s e l f 
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o b j e c t , n a t u r e , sense o r t o be oneself o b j e c t , n a t u r e , 
17 
sense f o r a t h i r d i s i d e n t i c a l ' . 'For', he adds, 'as 
soon as t h e r e are o b j e c t s o u t s i d e me, as soon as I am n o t 
a l o n e , I am an o t h e r , a n o t h e r r e a l i t y , t h a n t h e o b j e c t o u t s i d e 
me. F o r t h i s t h i r d o b j e c t I am t h u s an o t h e r r e a l i t y t h a n 
I t s e l f , t h a t i s , I am i t s o b j e c t . Thus t o suppose a b e i n g 
w h i c h i s n o t t h e o b j e c t o f a n o t h e r b e i n g i s t o presuppose t h a t 
no o b j e c t i v e b e i n g e x i s t s . As soon as I have an o b j e c t , t h i s 
18 
o b j e c t has me f o r an o b j e c t ' . I t i s t h i s t h i r d a spect o f 
h i s n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t governs Marx 1s response t o t h e 
problem o f knowledge. T h i s t h i r d a s p e c t , i s t h a t as w e l l 
as our h a v i n g an o b j e c t t h a t o b j e c t has us f o r an o b j e c t ; and 
e v i d e n t l y t h a t o b j e c t has us f o r an o b j e c t as i t i s m i t s e l f . 
We t h e n have i t f o r an o b j e c t as i t m i t s e l f has us f o r 
an o b j e c t . I n o t h e r words, i t i s o ur o b j e c t as i t o b j e c t i v e l y 
i s . The f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f our t h o u g h t 
are, a c c o r d i n g t o Marx> s» t i s f l e d by t h i s r e l a t i o n , f o r m i t 
t h e r e i s a congruence between what t h e o b j e c t i s f o r me and 
what i t i s f o r i t s e l f . Marx however does n o t want t o see 
i t as a merely f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . The reason, t h e ground 
f o r t h e f o r m a l congruence i s , m h i s view, t h a t our r e l a t i o n 
t o an o b j e c t i s a n a t u r a l one. N a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s , he argues, 
ar e d e t e r m i n i n g ones. I n a n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n an o b j e c t impinges 
on a n o t h e r . The o n l y way i t can impinge on a n o t h e r i s as 
i t o b j e c t i v e l y i s . I t would make l i t t l e sense t o suggest, 17. Marx. Erganzungsband, o p . c i t . , p. 578. 
18. I b i d . 
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or i n d e e d i t would be nonsense t o suggest, t h a t an o b j e c t m 
n a t u r e has an o b s e r v a b l e impact on a n o t h e r t h r o u g h a merely 
s u b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t y . I f t h a t were the case t h e r e would o f 
course be no o b s e r v a b l e i m p a c t . E q u a l l y i t would be nonsense 
t o suggest, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t t h e r a i n wet us n o t because 
t h e r a i n i s wet, but simply because of a propensity on our p a r t t o 
get wet. We do indeed g e t wet because we are t h e k i n d s o f 
be i n g s t h a t are p o t e n t i a l l y s u b j e c t t o t h a t d i s c o m f o r t u r e , 
b u t we a l s o g e t wet because one o f t h e o b j e c t i v e , n a t u r a l 
p r o p e r t i e s o f r a m i s wetness. So f o r Marx t h e r e i s i n our 
n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s a congruence between what t h i n g s s u b j e c t i -
v e l y a re f o r us and what t h e y o b j e c t i v e l y a re m themselves. 
For him what n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s a r e a l l about i s t h e correspond-
ence o f t h e m i t s e l f and t h e f o r i t s e l f . 
I t i s o n l y w i t h some d i f f i c u l t y t h a t we _can e x t r i c a t e 
a view o f knowledge from t h i s account o f o b j e c t i v i t y , o r 
n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . We should l i k e t o d i s c o v e r from a l l t h i s 
what i s Marx's n o t i o n o f t r u t h , and we can b e s t s e t about i t 
by a process o f e l i m i n a t i o n . We know a l r e a d y t h a t , f o r 
Marx, f o r m a l c r i t e r i a are n o t m themselves s u f f i c i e n t . I t 
would n o t do f o r i n s t a n c e t h a t an account o f an aspect o f our 
experience s i m p l y correspond t o t h e f a c t s o f t h e m a t t e r . Nor, 
on t h e o t h e r hand, would i t do t o put' f o r w a r d what i s a merely 
coherent account o f our e x p e r i e n c e . I n some r e s p e c t s , f o r 
example, t h e p o l i t i c a l economists p r e s e n t an a n a l y s i s o f 
contemporary s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e t h a t c o r r e s pond t o t h e f a c t s 
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o f t h e m a t t e r . Yet Marx c r i t i c i s e s them. E q u a l l y we 
cannot f a u l t Hegel f o r h i s l a c k o f coherence i n a c c o u n t i n g 
f o r e x p e r i e n c e m h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l system. H i s system i s , 
i t c o u l d be argued, f u l l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r n a l l y . Yet Marx 
v o i c e s h i s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h a t system. I t i s e x t r e m e l y 
d i f f i c u l t t o say what, m b o t h i n s t a n c e s , are h i s grounds f o r 
d o i n g so. But i t i s o n l y by p u r s u i n g Marx's account o f 
o b j e c t i v i t y o r n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t we s h a l l succeed, s i n c e 
i t i s because o f h i s view o f o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t he f i n d s 
f o r m a l c r i t e r i a o f t r u t h i n a d e q u a t e . For, as we have seen, 
i t i s Marx's o p i n i o n t h a t t h i n g s o b j e c t i v e l y are as we s u b j e c t -
i v e l y f i n d them, m o t h e r words, as we as n a t u r a l b e i n g s exper-
i e n c e them. T h i s view o f t r u t h d i f f e r s from the c o r r e s p o n d -
ence n o t i o n o f t r u t h a c c o r d i n g t o which we e s t a b l i s h what 
t h i n g s o b j e c t i v e l y are by d i s c o u n t i n g what t h e y are t o us. 
Locke, f o r i n s t a n c e , sought t o e l i m i n a t e t he secondary q u a l i t -
i e s o f t h i n g s which f o r him were 'm t r u t h n o t h x n g m t h e objec 
themselves, but powers t o produce v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s m us'. ^ 
T h i s Marx cannot countenance. And n e i t h e r can he countenance 
a coherence account o f t r u t h . F o r such an account, i f Hegel's 
p h i l o s o p h y i s a n y t h i n g t o go by, does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e r e 
be any o b j e c t s t o know. A l l t h a t i t r e q u i r e s us t o d e a l w i t h 
are t h o u g h t o b j e c t s . B u t , Marx c l a i m s , we must d e a l w i t h 
t h e c o n c r e t e , sensed o b j e c t s o f our e x p e r i e n c e . T r u t h con-
cerns our r e l a t i o n s h i p t o them. T h i s does n o t , however, b r i n g 
us back t o an e m p i r i c i s t n o t i o n of t r u t h . Because Marx i s 
19- John Locke. Essay Concerning the Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , p.85 
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n o t concerned w i t h o b j e c t s as t h e y might appear m t h e i r 
p r i s t i n e c o n d i t i o n o u t s i d e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o us. He 
i s concerned w i t h them as t h e y r e l a t e t o us s u b j e c t i v e l y and, 
c o n v e r s e l y , we as we r e l a t e t o them o b j e c t i v e l y o r p r a c t i c a l l y . 
T r u t h , t h e n , f o r Marx concerns o b j e c t s as we p r a c t i c a l l y f i n d 
them and o u r s e l v e s as we a r e n a t u r a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by o b j e c t s . 
T h i s i s why he responds t o t h e problem o f knowledge m t h i s 
way: 'The q u e s t i o n whether human t h o u g h t w i l l a t t a i n o b j e c t i v e 
t r u t h - i s n o t a q u e s t i o n o f t h e o r y , but a p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n . 
I n ( t h e ) p r a c t i c e man must prove the t r u t h i . e . t h e r e a l i t y 
and power, th e t h i s - s i d e n e s s ( D i e s s e i t i g k e i t ) o f h i s t h o u g h t . 
The d i s p u t e about the r e a l i t y o r u n r e a l i t y o f t h o u g h t - which 
20 
i s i s o l a t e d from p r a c t i c e i s a p u r e l y s c h o l a s t i c q u e s t i o n ' . 
These, b a l d l y s t a t e d , are t h e grounds f o r Marx's r e j e c t i o n 
o f t h e problem o f knowledge. I t i s h i s view, as I have s a i d , 
t h a t a l l our s u b j e c t i v e r e ' a t i o n s , ( i n c l u d i n g , i t goes w i t h o u t 
s a y i n g , o u r knowledge) are p r e c i s e e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h e o b j e c t i v e 
n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y . The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t each and e very 
one o f our t h o u g h t s , p a s t o r p r e s e n t , are t r u e - and t h a t m 
t h e f o r m a l sense o f t r u t h . The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f our t h o u g h t 
t o i t s o b j e c t , l i k e a l l n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s , i s one t h a t coher-
e n t l y r e f l e c t s t h e correspondence o f what t h e o b j e c t i s m 
i t s e l f w i t h what i t i s f o r us. Our i d e a s , i f we are t o t a ke 
Marx s e r i o u s l y , are always o b j e c t i v e i d e a s . T h i s would appear 
t o l a n d Marx m the most i n t r a c t a b l e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problems. 
For, we might ask, what about t h e t h o u g h t s o f t h e madman? 
20. Marx. MEW 3, p. 5. 
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Are they also o b j e c t i v e 9 Marx's answer would have t o be: 
Yes. But t h i s would place l i t t l e s t r a i n on h i s argument. 
Because what he says i s t h a t what things n a t u r a l l y are to us 
( m t h i s instance the madman's thoughts) i s what t h i n g s 
n a t u r a l l y are m themselves. What th i n g s are m the madman's 
thoughts ase i s , of course, confused but i f we look at h i s 
n a t u r a l and s o c i a l environment, we f i n d t h a t i t also i s con-
fused. Thus m the formal sense the madman's thoughts are 
t r u e . Marx's argument does not of course depend on t h i s example. 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s of i t i s , however, t h a t he must deal w i t h 
each and every idea or a l l thought as evidence f o r , or more 
s t r o n g l y , as an accurate r e f l e c t i o n of some o b j e c t i v e circum-
stance or other. I t f o l l o w s , as I have said, t h a t f o r him 
t h a t a l l t h e o r i e s , judged on formal grounds alone, must be 
t r u e . This would appear t o leave Marx w i t h a b s o l u t e l y no 
c r i t e r i a on which to judge a theory. I f he t h i n k s t h a t a l l 
t h e o r i e s r e f l e c t the f a c t s or t h a t a l l t h e o r i e s are coherent 
then i t appears t h a t there are none t h a t he can r e a d i l y r e j e c t . 
But there i s of course many an instance of h i s doing p r e c i s e l y 
t h a t m h i s works. His r e j e c t i o n of many of the views of 
p o l i t i c a l economists are cases m p o i n t . Ijdeed, C a p i t a l i s 
a ' C r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l Economy'. What we must e x p l a i n at 
t h i s point, t h e r e f o r e , i s how Marx wi t h o u t adhering t o formal 
c r i t e r i a of t r u t h , can nevertheless d i s c a r d the t h e o r i e s of 
others. 
Marx sketches h i s p o s i t i o n on the issue i n the second 
Thesis on Feuerbach. Since i t i s only a sketch, we s h a l l 
have t o do some of the reasoning f o r him m answering our 
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question. What Marx does m th a t Thesis i s , as I have 
already suggested, t o r e j e c t the problem of knowledge as 
i t was formulated by the c l a s s i c a l e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s . He 
r e j e c t s the manner m which they pose i t because i t i s 
posed as a merely t h e o r e t i c a l question. I n Marx's view i t 
can have no s a t i s f a c t o r y t h e o r e t i c a l answer. I have sugge-
sted t h a t Marx holds t h i s view because of h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t , 
judged on formal grounds alone, a l l t h e o r i e s would be t r u e . 
With h i s view of o b j e c t i v i t y he i m p l i e s t h a t a l l t h e o r i e s are, 
I n one way or another, coherent and correspond w i t h the f a c t s . 
Now, our problem i s : given t h i s view of Marx, how i s i t poss-
i b l e f o r him t o suggest t h a t one view of the world, namely, 
h i s own, i s the c o r r e c t one 9 The answer t o t h i s i s not one 
t h a t can be r e a d i l y deduced. But i t seems t h a t i t i s at t h i s 
p o i n t t h a t p r a c t i c e plays an important r o l e f o r Marx. One 
t h i n g t h a t we can be sure of, I t h i n k , i s t h a t i t does not 
play t h a t r o l e m the same way t h a t i t does f o r the prag'iiatist. 
Marx w i l l not allow e x i s t i n g p r a c t i c e t o decide f o r him what 
i s t r u e . Indeed, n o t h i n g would be f u r t h e r from h i s mind than 
to suggest t h a t t h e o r i e s and ideas should be judged upon t h e i r 
usefulness i n overcoming p r a c t i c a l problems. What he does 
wish t o suggest, however, i s something f a r more r a d i c a l than 
t h a t . He wants t o suggest t o us t h a t the whole problem of 
knowledge i s a p r a c t i c a l one. 'The question whether human 
thought w i l l a t t a i n o b j e c t i v e t r u t h ' , he says, ' i s not a 
question of theory, but a p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n . 1 This i s , 
c l e a r l y , d i s t i n c t from what the pragmasist has t o say because 
the pragmatist o f f e r s h i s n o t i o n of t r u t h as a way of side-
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stepping or avo i d i n g the problem concerning the o b j e c t i v i t y 
of our thought. The pragmatist's n o t i o n of t r u t h i s a f l a t 
r e j e c t i o n of the problem of knowledge along the l i n e s t h a t 
Habermas has m mind. Marx, as I i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , o f f e r s 
as a more c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m . He does not r e j e c t the 
whole question of the o b j e c t i v i t y of our thought out of 
hand. Indeed he suggests t h a t , m a c e r t a i n context, i t i s 
a sensible question t o ask. Marx, then, does not want us t o 
be l i e v e , as does the pragmatist, t h a t there are as many t r u t h s 
as there are t e c h n i c a l problems t o be solved. For him, it 
seems, as f o r the c l a s s i c a l philosophers, there i s one over-
r i d i n g t r u t h about the world. And t h a t t r u t h , ne argues, 
concerns our p r a c t i c e . This i s where Marx believes t h a t ne 
departs from philosophy. The philosophers, Marx t h i n k s , 
b elieved t h a t the question of t r u t h was a purely t h e o r e t i c a l 
caestion. Those who had f i r s t posed the problem of know-
ledge, he suggests, had thought t h a t theory of i t s e l f could 
decide the issue. But m Marx's view whether or not my 
thought i s o b j e c t i v e does not l e t i t s e l f be decided by thought 
alone. Rather i t i s p r a c t i c e t h a t holds the key to the issue. 
This, however, i s not t o say t h a t the c r i t e r i o n f o r the 
t r u t h of an idea or theory i s i t s p r a c t i c a l e f f i c a c y . The 
c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h , f o r Marx, i s o b j e c t i v i t y . Marx, l i k e 
a l l t h e o r i s t s worthy of t h a t name, r e j e c t s or accepts views 
about r e a l i t y on the basis of t h e i r o b j e c t i v i t y . The p o i n t 
is, however, t h a t w i t h him o b j e c t i v i t y i s a p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t -
i v i t y . As I have pointed out Marx's n o t i o n of t r u t h does not 
r e l y on formal c r i t e r i a alone. I t depends also on h i s view 
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of man or, more p r e c i s e l y , of man's o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n . His 
n o t i o n of t r u t h i s t h e r e f o r e at i t s base both formal and e t h i c a l . 
I t i s now t h a t we see the point of my o f t repeated a n a l y s i s 
of Marx's n o t i o n of o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n or o b j e c t i v i t y . Objec-
t i v i t y f o r him, as we have seen, tu r n s out t o be a t h r e e f o l d 
determining r e l a t i o n s h i p between man and h i s o b j e c t s . I t 
i s f o r t h a t reason a p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n m Marx's view. I t 
i s a p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n because o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s a n a t u r a l 
r e l a t i o n . I t i s the r e l a t i o n t h a t we as n a t u r a l beings have 
w i t h the objects t h a t confront us m our experience. The 
objects of our experience, Marx says, confront us as ob j e c t s 
of our needs. I f , t h e n , we are t o d e p i c t r e a l i t y o b j e c t i v e l y , 
we have t o d e p i c t i t m t h i s way. We must confront the ob j e c t s 
we analyse as obje c t s of need. We must see them t h e r e f o r e 
as l i m i t i n g ourselves as n a t u r a l beings and ourselves as 
n a t u r a l beings e n e r g e t i c a l ] y bent on a l l e v i a t i n g t h i s depend-
ency. That, f o r Marx, i s what i t i s t o be o b j e c t i v e m our 
t h i n k i n g . Objective t h i n k i n g i s p r a c t i c a l t h i n k i n g . I t i s 
p r a c t i c a l or e t h i c a l t h i n k i n g f o r him because, as we can see, 
i t c a r r i e s w i t h i n i t s e l f a p r e s c r i p t i o n . Objective t h i n k i n g , 
he claims, through viewing man as a n a t u r a l being s t r u g g l i n g 
t o overcome h i s dependence on objects contains w i t h i n i t s e l f 
the value and motive t h a t t h a t s t r u g g l e be waged i n the most 
r a t i o n a l and e f f e c t i v e possible way. Now, i t i s m t h i s 
f a shion, I suggest, t h a t e t h i c s and epistemology converge and 
coincide m Marx's theory. This i s the much vaunted u n i t y 
of theory and p r a c t i c e t h a t Marx proposes. By i t , I take 
him t o mean t h a t an o b j e c t i v e view of r e a l i t y i s a p r a c t i c a l 
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or r e v o l u t i o n a r y one. This, p o s s i b l y , i s the most 
d i f f i c u l t p o i n t m h i s t h i n k i n g f o r us t o understand. Yet 
he himself sees no problem m i t at a l l . Theory and prac-
t i c e are as i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d m h i s mind as are bread and 
b u t t e r . We can see t h i s most c l e a r l y when he comes t o 
discuss the r e l a t i o n of h i s views to those of the French 
M a t e r i a l i s t s m the Holy Family. 'No great acumen i s 
required', he says, 1 to see the necessary connection between 
the t h e o r i e s of the m a t e r i a l i s t s of the o r i g i n a l goodness and 
equal i n t e l l e c t u a l endowment of men, the omnipotence of exp-
erience, h a b i t , education, h a b i t , the i n f l u e n c e of e x t e r n a l 
circumstances of man, of the great s i g n i f i c a n c e of i n d u s t r y , 
21. Those who are f a m i l i a r w i t h the work of Xolakowski w i l l , 
I am sure, have already noted the s i m i l a r i t y between h i s 
a n a l y s i s of Marx's n o t i o n of c o g n i t i o n m h i s essay on 
'Karl Marx and the C l a s s i c a l D e f i n i t i o n of T r u t h 1 ( m 
Marxism and Beyond, Paladin) and my own. I n p a r t i c u l a r , I 
have concurred w i t h Kolakcwski on these p o i n t s . 'The basic 
point of departure of Marx's e p i s t e m o l o g i c ^ I thought i s ' , he 
says, 'the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the r e l a t i o n s between man and h i s 
environment are r e l a t i o n s between the species and the objects 
of i t s need, i t also concerns the c o g n i t i v e contact w i t h 
t h i n g s . Marx's t h i n k i n g can be summarised m the f o l l o w i n g 
observations: I . The world of t h i n g s e x i s t f o r man only as 
a t o t a l i t y of possible s a t i s f a c t i o n s of h i s needs. 2. 'And 
nature, conceived a b s t r a c t l y , nn and of i t s e l f , perpetuated i n 
i t s separation from man i s n o t h i n g t o him'. I f various 
o b j e c t s , l i k e the objects of science or a r t , are only p a r t 
of h i s consciousness, then m p r a c t i c e they are only a p a r t 
of h i s l i f e and a c t i v i t y . Nature c o n s t i t u t e s man's inorga n i c 
f l e s h ' , ( o p . c i t . pp 64 - 6 3 ) Also Kolakowski says, (and t h i s 
i s of most s i g n i f i c a n c e here) f o r Marx 'to ask how the world 
would be seen to an observer whose essence was pure t h i n k i n g 
and whose consciousness was defined e x c l u s i v e l y by a d i s -
i n t e r e s t e d c o g n i t i v e e f f o r t , i s t o ask a barren question, f o r 
a l l consciousness i s a c t u a l l y born of p r a c t i c a l needs, and 
the act of c o g n i t i o n i t s e l f i s a t o o l designed to s a t i s f y 
these needs. ...Mature appears as the o p p o s i t i o n encountered 
by human d r i v e s , and a i l possible c o g n i t i o n i s man's r e a l i s -
a t i o n of the contact between conscious man and the e x t e r n a l 
resistence he experiences', ( i b i d . p. 64 - 6 5 . ) . 
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the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of enjoyment and communism and s o c i a l i s m . 
I f man forms a l l knowledge and f e e l i n g from the world of sense 
and from experience m the world of sense what t h e r e f o r e 
matters i s t h a t the e m p i r i c a l world be so ordered t h a t he 
experiences m i t (and becomes accustomed t o ) what i s t r u l y 
22 
human, t h a t he experiences himself as a man'. The t h e o r i e s 
of the m a t e r i a l i s t s c o ntain, m h i s view, the elements of an 
o b j e c t i v e understanding of experience. For, he argues, 
simply to see (as they d i d ) t h a t education, f o r instance, was 
of such v i t a l importance m the forming of a man's character 
put them on the t h r e s h o l d of a s o c i a l i s t view of experience, 
because f o r Marx t h a t view i m p l i e s both t h a t education should 
form an important aspect of a youth's l i f e and t h a t t h a t 
education be as human as po s s i b l e . And, he argues m the 
same vei n , t o know, as the French M a t e r i a l i s t s appeared to 
do, t h a t I d e r i v e a l l my f e e l i n g s and sensations from my 
experience m the sensor us world means t h a t I must advocate 
a c t i o n t h a t w i l l ensure t h a t I experience only t h a t which i s 
human i n the sensuous world. As we can see, then, p r e s c r i p t i o n 
f o l l o w s from d e s c r i p t i o n f o r Marx. So, f o r instance, he would 
claim t h a t i f I know t h a t a disease i s d e s t r u c t i v e of l i f e 
i t i s necessary t h a t I take steps t o c o n t r o l i t should i t take 
hold m my d i s t r i c t . C l e a r l y , there would be no l o g i c a l 
necessity i n v olved m t h i s . From the p o i n t of view of l o g i c a l 
t h i n k i n g or reasoning as such i t makes no sense to say t h a t 
i t would be f a l s e to a b s t a i n from a c t i n g . However, from 
22. Marx. MEW 2, p. 138. 
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Marx's p o i n t of view we would be making an e r r o r should 
we not act on the d e s c r i p t i o n . This i s because, as I have 
already pointed out, Marx's n o t i o n of t r u t h transcends a l l 
formal c r i t e r i a of t r u t h . The o b j e c t i v e , t r u e way of 
seeing a dangerous disease would f o r him m i t s very concep-
t i o n be a p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e one. Object, r e a l i t y has, he 
suggests m the f i r s t t h e s i s , t o be grasped as Praxis. 
Thus an o b j e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of r e a l i t y , m t h i s instance 
of the disease, i s f o r him conditioned by an i n t e r e s t . That 
i n t e r e s t i s the n a t u r a l , human one t h a t s u f f e r i n g be avoided. 
There i s a nece s s i t y then t h a t we act on the d e s c r i p t i o n 
because, Marx argues, t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n must i t s e l f be occas-
ioned by a p r a c t i c a l concern. So, not t o act on the obser-
c a t i o n would c o n t r a d i c t the i n i t i a l reason f o r making i t . 
This i s an important p o i n t . Marx's view i s t h a t there 
are no d e s c r i p t i o n s which are not m some sense p r e s c r i p t i o n s . 
There i s no doubt that at a l o g i c a l l e v e l t h i s cannot be so. 
I f I describe the weather as bad I have i n no way suggested 
t h a t we do anything. To make t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n i n t o a pres-
c r i p t i o n I would have to add some e x h o r t a t i o n , o r other such 
as: the weather's bad, let's not go out today. But, as I 
have suggested, Marx i s not making h i s point at t h i s l e v e l . 
He i s concerned w i t h the context w i t h i n which we use language. 
He argues t h a t i t i s always employed m some p r a c t i c a l context 
or other. No-one, he suggests, simply observes t h a t , f o r 
instance, the weather i s bad. There i s c l e a r l y some motive 
f o r the observation. Maybe the observer had intended t o go 
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out f o r a s t r o l l some time i n the day and the bad weather 
prevents him. Whatever the motive the observer must act on 
h i s observation. The p r e s c r i p t i o n f o l l o w s from the d e s c r i p -
t i o n because the d e s c r i p t i o n takes place m a p r e s c r i p t i v e 
context, m other words, because the d e s c r i p t i o n i s made by 
a p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e human being. 
Marx's n o t i o n of t r u t h i s then, I suggest, of t h i s k i n d . 
Tneory, he b e l i e v e s , always r e f l e c t s and i s given r i s e t o by 
our p r a c t i c a l experience. We t u r n t o i t , he claims, because 
we have a p r a c t i c a l problem. Or, more s t r o n g l y , Marx's view 
i s t h a t our whole experience, i n c l u d i n g our t h i n k i n g , i s a 
n a t u r a l , p r a c t i c a l one. Theory, he argues, i s always caught 
i n t h i s nexus. Whether i t i s t r u e or one-sided, as he puts 
i t , cannot t h e r e f o r e be decided w i t h reference t o theory alone. 
This, Marx suggests, i s simply because any theory has i t s 
o r i g i n s m an o b j e c t i v e set of circumstances. For Marx there 
i s no i d l e t h e o r i s t . Each and every t h e o r i s t , m h i s view, 
d e p i c t s some r e a l i t y or other, and each t h i n k e r , he b e l i e v e s , 
i s i n a measure c o r r e c t . I t appears to him t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
by i t s nature no merely t h e o r e t i c a l dispute can be resolved, 
because the merely t h e o r e t i c a l or contemplative a t t i t u d e i s 
not i t s e l f o b j e c t i v e . The a t t i t u d e t h a t Marx sees as prom-
o t i n g truth i s the theoretical a t t i t u d e t h a t has man at i t s centre 
and concerns i t s e l f w i t h objects as he experiences them as a 
s u f f e r i n g , l i m i t e d being. I t i s only t h i s a t t i t u d e , he i m p l i e s 
t h a t can give an unambiguous content t o t r u t h . Because t h e o n e 
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t h a t are put forward from t h i s p o i n t of view can show 
themselves t o be t r u e m the course of man's p r a c t i c a l 
experience. Trie converse can of course be shown to be t r u e i f 
the theory i s a mistaken one. Thus, Marx might say, I suggest a 
theory t h a t i s p a t e n t l y wrong, such as t h i s : man i s an i n a n i -
mate o b j e c t . We know t h a t t h i s i s p a t e n t l y wrong, and t h i s 
i s the burden of Marx's argument, because we know t h a t m 
p r a c t i c e we cannot get f a r by espousing such a theory. 
This i s not t o say t h a t , f o r Marx, p r a c t i c e proves i t t o be 
wrong. According t o him i t simply shows us t h a t the view 
i s an i n c o r r e c t one. He does not suggest t h a t we take prac-
t i c e as our c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h . Rather, what he suggests i s 
t h a t we derive our c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h from the observation 
of p r a c t i c e . I t i s not t h e r e f o r e my p r a c t i c e t h a t t e l l s me 
2^ 
a theory i s i n c o r r e c t but my r e f l e c t i o n on p r a c t i c e . ^ I 
can see t h a t i t i s wrong. I t i s here t h a t formal c r i t e r i a 
of t r u t h such as correspondence and coherence s t i l l have a 
r o l e to play f o r Marx. They are not discarded by him because 
h i s claim i s , I repeat, not t h a t p r a c t i c e be the c r i t e r i o n 
of t r u t h but t h a t a l l t r u t h concerns our p r a c t i c e . I t i s 
only I n the context of p r a c t i c e t h a t the question of t r u t h 
makes sense f o r him. Once we acknowledge t h i s , however, we 
have t o acknowledge t h a t the o b j e c t i v i t y of our thought does 
not depend e n t i r e l y on formal c r i t e r i a . P r a ctice also imposes 
i t s own c r i t e r i a . Foremost amongst those, Marx suggests, i s 
t h a t we e s t a b l i s h m p r a c t i c e the appropriateness of our ideas. 
We have to r e a l i s e t h a t i t i s not enough to argue our theory. 
2T~Marx.MEW ~5~, P7) says as much m Thesis '6'. ' A l l mysteries' , he 
says,'which occasion theory to mysticism f i n d t h e i r r a t i o n a l 
s o l u t i o n m human p r a c t i c e c.nd m the comprehension of t h i s 
p r a c t i c e ' . For a l l mysteries would f o r nun have t h e i r s o l u t i o n 
i n p r a c t i c e i f our r e f l e c t i o n on i t d i d not play the r o l e I 
suggest m h i s theory. 
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We have t o act on i t . Only then w i l l we have the 
op p o r t u n i t y t o prove, by the c r i t e r i a t h a t p r a c t i c e i t s e l f 
imposes, th a t our theory i s o b j e c t i v e . Thus m e s t a b l i s h -
i n g the o b j e c t i v i t y of a theory formal c r i t e r i a do indeed 
count f o r Marx but, because he sees t r u t h as being concerned 
w i t h p r a c t i c e , what counts, m h i s eyes, i s t h a t i t be proved 
to hold t r u e m our a c t i v e experience. Then, Marx claims, 
we are assured of the o b j e c t i v i t y of our theory. So,_ as I 
have already suggested, a theory t h a t i s t r u e i n a l l i t s 
formal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s only p a r t i a l l y t r u e f o r Marx. A 
t r u e theory i s one which, superadded t o t h a t , has success-
f u l l y a l t e r e d the world. This i s what leads him to lament, 
m the l a s t t h e s i s of a l l , t h a t 'the philosophers have only 
v a r i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d the world, what matter^ i s , i s t o change 
, 24 
i t . For i f we t h i n k , as does Marx, t h a t t r u t h concerns 
our a c t i v e experience we must conclude t n a t i t i s n o t s u f f i c -
i e n t t o expound a theory we t h i n k t o be t r u e . We must, above 
a l l , act on i t , and philosophers he blames f o r not having done 
t h i s . 
Marx's a n a l y s i s of the problem of knowledge bri n g s him 
t h e r e f o r e to the theoiy of experience and p r a c t i c e . The question 
as t o whether my knowledge i s o b j e c t i v e i s , he claims, a 
p r a c t i c a l one. Marx, I have argued, does not mean p r a c t i c e 
merely m i t s narrow technical sense. As w i t h h i s I d e a l i s t 
forerunners, i t also s i g n i f i e s f o r him e t h i c a l a c t i o n . The 
question concerning the o b j e c t i v i t y of our knowledge i s , m 
.Marx. i b i d . 
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other words, an e t h i c a l question. What i s r e a l or ob-
j e c t i v e f o r Marx i s not, as i t i s w i t h the merely t h e o r e t i c a l 
t h i n k e r , a r a t i o n a l explanation of a t h i n g or event, but our 
r e l a t i o n as n a t u r a l beings to the world outside ourselves. 
So, m h i s view, thought w i l l not be o b j e c t i v e or have a t t a i n e d 
r e a l i t y where i t simply explains what i s going on i n the world. 
To t h i n k t h a t i t w i l l i s the e r r o r of philosophy. R e a l i t y , 
f o r Marx, i s our p r a c t i c a l productive r e l a t i o n t o the world. 
Marx t h e r e f o r e wants to t h i n k about t r u t h m those terms. 
True thought i s thought t h a t comprehends the p r a c t i c a l (objec-
t i v e ) circumstances of man and m comprehending them i n d i c a t e s 
how they might be changed f o r the b e t t e r . This, of course, 
appears to be an odd k i n d of t r u t h at which t o aim. Marx's 
n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y , i t seems, takes no account of genuine 
t h e o r e t i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y which we normally take t o i n v o l v e an 
element of detachment from p r a c t i c a l concerns. We would be 
wrong t o t h i n k t h i s however. Marx does have a place f o r 
t h e o r e t i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y m h i s system. But, m h i s view, 
i t a l l depends on what i s meant by 'detachment'. I f a l l t h a t 
i s meant by detachment i s t h a t t o give an o b j e c t i v e account 
of an aspect of our experience we must a b s t r a c t from t h i s or 
t h a t p r a c t i c a l concern, he would agree. For i t stands to 
reason t h a t we cannot give an o b j e c t i v e account i f we allow 
ourselves t o be d i s t r a c t e d by our day t o day a f f a i r s . But 
t h i s does not mean t h a t t o take an o b j e c t i v e view we have t o 
a b s t r a c t from human p r a c t i c a l concerns m general. That, 
i n Marx's view, would be the detachment of the philosopher, 
who p r e f e r s t o contemplate experience r a t h e r than know i t . 
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This kind of detachment leads to no t r u t h at a l l . Because 
experience i s e s s e n t i a l l y p r a c t i c a l , t r u t h , Marx b e l i e v e s , 
must also concern p r a c t i c e . I n other words, he sees no 
reason why h i s view of o b j e c t i v i t y should be incompatible 
w i t h genuine t h e o r e t i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y . 
I t i s only w i t h some unease, however, t h a t we should 
accept Marx's view of the t r u t h . For as i t stands i t i s 
the merest sketch of an epi s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n which though 
both serious and ch a l l e n g i n g ra i s e s d i f f i c u l t and as yet un-
answered p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems. I t i s of course beyond the 
scope of t h i s work to attempt t o answer a l l those problems. 
But we have attempted to r a i s e those amongst them which are 
most pressing m t h e i r claims t o be answered* and at the same 
time t o c l e a r away some of the more obvious misconceptions 
surrounding Marx's views. Since the p r i n c i p a l d i f f i c u l t y 
we have encountered w i t h t h a t view of t r u t h concerns Marx's 
n o t i o n of the u n i t y of theory and p r a c t i c e we might do w e l l 
now t o close t h i s Chapter w i t h some r e f l e c t i o n s on those Theses 
on Feuerbach /here t h a t n o t i o n comes p a r t i c u l a r l y to the f o r e . 
I t does so where Marx i n Thesis 3 and 4 gives two examples 
of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . He says m Thesis 3: 'The m a t e r i a l i s t d o c t r i n 
of the a l t e r a t i o n of circumstances and education ignores t h a t 
circumstances must be transformed by men and the educator must 
hi m s e l f be educated. I t must t h e r e f o r e separate s o c i e t y i n t o 
two parts one of which i s superior to the other.' 
'The coincidence of the a l t e r a t i o n of circumstances and 
human a c t i v i t y of s e l f - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n can only be grasped and 
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r a t i o n a l l y understood as r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r a c t i c e . ' And 
m Thesis 4: 'Feuerbach proceeds from the f a c t of r e l i g i o u s 
s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n , the d u p l i c a t i o n of the world i n t o a r e l i g i o u s 
and secular one. His work consists of t h i s , t h a t he d i s s o l v e s 
the r e l i g i o u s world i n t o i t s secular base. However t h a t the 
secular base l i f t s o f f from i t s e l f and f i x e s i t s e l f an indep-
endent kingdom m the clouds i s only t o be explained from 
the s e l f - d i s r u p t i o n and s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n of t h i s secular 
base. This i t s e l f must t h e r e f o r e both be understood m i t s 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n and be p r a c t i c a l l y r e v o l u t i o n i s e d . Thus, f o r 
instance, a f t e r the e a r t h l y f a m i l y i s discovered to be the 
secret of the Holy Farm l y the f i r s t must now i t s e l f be theor-
25 
e t i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y destroyed.' ~ Marx's claim i s , as 
I have said, t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y i s not of i t s e l f 
s u f f i c i e n t . I n h i s view, as we can see, there i s more t o 
t r u t h than t h a t . For him for a theory t o be t r u l y r e e l i t has 
to show i t s e l f t o be so m p r a c t i c e . This i s .he po i n t of 
these two Theses. Both argue t h a t o b j e c t i v e theory must 
issue i n p r a c t i c e . E a r l i e r , I brought out the connection 
t h a t Marx saw between h i s views and those of French M a t e r i a l -
i s t s . I t need har d l y be said t h a t he drew conclusions from 
those m a t e r i a l i s t t h e o r i e s which were not the conclusions of 
t h e i r authors. I n Thesis 3 he gives us an i n d i c a t i o n why 
he d i d so. I t hinges of course, on h i s view of the u n i t y of 
theory and p r a c t i c e . He acknowledges t h a t the m a t e r i a l i s t s , 
25- I b i d . p. 6. 
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l i k e h i m s e l f , prescribe on the basis of t h e i r m a t e r i a l i s t 
d e s c r i p t i o n of experience. They had not, however, seen t h a t 
p r e s c r i p t i o n i s i t s e l f p a rt of a p r a c t i c a l understanding 
of experience. They had, he suggests - u n w i t t i n g l y or no -
drawn a d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l understanding 
and t h e i r p r a c t i c a l p r e s c r i p t i o n s . Their materialsism, Marx 
argues, i s only a contemplative m a t e r i a l i s m (anschauende Mater 
l a l i s m u s ) . Theory and p r a c t i c e remain unconnected. On the 
basis of t h e i r understanding the m a t e r i a l i s t s had, indeed, 
advocated t h a t men should be educated d i f f e r e n t l y , be brought 
up under d i f f e r e n t circumstances, and g e n e r a l l y be made more 
conversant w i t h what i s t r u l y human. But t h i s , f o r Marx, f a l l 
short of being an o b j e c t i v e view of experience because a theor 
t h a t separates p r e s c r i p t i o n and d e s c r i p t i o n _i.s not a f a i t h f u l 
r e f l e c t i o n of our circumstances. I n p a r t i c u l a r , Marx says, 
i t f a i l s t o b r i n g out the connection between transTormation 
of the world and s e l f - t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . Amongst other t h i n g s 
t h i s connection i m p l i e s , f o r Marx, t h a t my o b j e c t i v e knowing 
of the world can only be seen as a process o f s e l f - t r a n s f o r m -
ation brought about through my being a c t i v e l y i n v o l ved m the 
world. Had t h e r e f o r e the m a t e r i a l i s t seen t h e i r knowledge 
i n t h i s way, Marx continues, they would not have believed t h a t 
the world can be changed simply through the b e t t e r education 
of people„ For, Marx concludes, proper education goes hand 
i n hand w i t h the a l t e r a t i o n of our circumstances. We can 
understand and transform society along human l i n e s only when 
we see t h i s coincidence of theory and p r a c t i c e . We must, 
t h e r e f o r e , f i r s t be r e v o l u t i o n s r i l y a c t i v e t o be potent theor-
i s t s . 
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This, i n d i s p u t a b l y , i s a c o n t r o v e r s i a l view of knowledge. 
One t h i n g i t does not mean, however, i s t h a t Marx wishes t o 
discard theory m favour of p r a c t i c e . However much i t seems 
so at f i r s t , he does not wish t o replace the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
search f o r t r u t h w i t h the view t h a t the exigencies of p r a c t -
i c a l l i f e may press on us. Theory and t r u t h , as I have argued, 
have an important place m h i s system. A l l t h a t Marx claims 
i s t h a t knowledge and t r u t h must, i f they concern anything 
at a l l , concern our p r a c t i c a l l i f e . Theory can, Marx suggests, 
f u r n i s h us w i t h the o b j e c t i v e knowledge of r e a l i t y . Feuer-
bach, f o r instance, shows us c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t the secret of 
the Holy Family i s the e a r t h l y f a m i l y . But t h i s of i t s e l f , 
does not f u r n i s h us w i t h t r u t h . For i t i s our p r a c t i c e t h a t 
places before us the objects of our knowledge and only prac-
t i c e , Marx claims, can give a content t o t r u t h . The know-
ledge of r e l i g i o u s s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n i s not, t h e r e f o r e , the 
t r u t h of Feuerbach's philosophy of r e l i g i o n . For Marx, as 
we know, o b j e c t i v i t y i s not of t h a t k i n d . T r u t h f o r Marx, 
i s both the accurate knowledge of the world and the c o n v i c t i o n 
t h a t t h a t world be ordered m the most human way po s s i b l e . 
So he says of Feuerbach's philosophy of r e l i g i o n ' a f t e r the 
e a r t h l y f a m i l y i s discovered to be tne secret of the Holy Family, 
the f i r s t must now i t s e l f be t h e o r e t i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y 
destroyed.' The o b j e c t i v e knowledge of circumstances has to 
be the spur t o a c t i o n or else, Marx suggests, we do not have 
an accurate view of experience. Here, most c l e a r l y , we can 
see how the theory of knowledge and e t h i c a l theory coincide 
i n Marx's t h i n k i n g . Knowledge and t r u t h Marx views - t r u e 
t o h i s n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y m the Paris Manuscripts - as 
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i n t e g r a l p a r t s of a general theory of a c t i o n . This, of course, 
brings us t o h i s theory of ideology. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 
I n h i s S o c i o l o g y o f Marx, H e n r i L e f e b v r e makes what i s 
an i n t e r e s t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n on Marx's t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y . He 
t e l l s us ' t h a t t h e term " i d e o l o g y " o r i g i n a t e d w i t h a p h i l o s -
o p h i c a l s c h o o l ( e m p i r i c i s t and s e n s a t i o n a l i s t , w i t h a tendency 
t o m a t e r i a l i s m ) which enjoyed c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e m France 
a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h and t h e b e g i n n i n g o f the n i n e -
t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s o f t h i s s c h o o l 
( D e s t u t t de Tracy i s t h e best known), t h e r e i s a sc i e n c e o f 
i d e a s , i . e . o f a b s t r a c t concepts, w h i c h s t u d i e s t h e i r g e n e s i s 
and can r e c o n s t r u c t i t m f u l l s t a r t i n g f rom s e n s a t i o n s (a 
c o n c e p t i o n t h a t goes back t o C o n d i l l a c ) . T h i s s c i e n c e was 
c a l l e d " i d e o l o g y " and t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s who p r a c t i s e d i t c a l l e d 
themselves " i d e o l o g i s t s " . ' 1 He adds t h a t , m the German 
I d e o l o g y , 'the o r i g i n a l meaning was n o t e n t i r e l y ] o s t s i g h t 
o f : Marx aimed a t f o r m u l a t i n g a t h e o r y o f g e n e r a l , i . e . s o c i a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s : he d e f i n e d t h e elements o f an e x p l a n a t o r y 
genesis o f " i d e o l o g i e s " and r e l a t e d t h e l a t t e r t o t h e i r h i s -
t o r i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s " . T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n i s 
one t h a t i s d o u b l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r us. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , 
i t s e t s m t h e r i g h t k i n d o f c o n t e x t Marx's view on i d e o l o g y . 
We, as ought by now t o be c l e a r , a re concerned w i t h t h a t t h e o r y 
o f i d e o l o g y as an account o f e x p e r i e n c e and, m p a r t i c u l a r , 
we are concerned w i t h i t as an account o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t 
1. H.Lefebvre. The S o c i o l o g y o f Marx, Penguin U n i v e r s i t y Books, 
1972, pp.59 - 00. 
2. I b i d . , p. 60. 
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c o n t r a s t s s h a r p l y w i t h t h a t o f t h e E m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s . 
What L e f e b v r e ' s remark does i s t o suggest t h a t we are n o t 
e n t i r e l y a lone o r mi s t a k e n m p e r s i s t i n g m t h i s view. I n 
t h e second p l a c e , h i s o b s e r v a t i o n i s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e t o us 
because we a l s o argue t h a t Marx, i n c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s account 
o f e x p e r i e n c e , does n o t l o s e s i g h t o f those problems o r i g i n -
a l l y posed by t h e E m p i r i c i s t s . I ndeed, I have suggested t h a t 
such t r a d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problems are m t h e f o r e f r o n t 
o f Marx's rnind when he comes t o p r e s e n t h i s t h e o r y o f a c t i o n 
m t h e German I d e o l o g y . But m d o i n g t h i s I have always 
h e l d m mind a view t h a t i s w i d e l y accepted, and one t h a t 
Marx h i m s e l f d i d much t o f o s t e r , namely t n a t Marx breaks v e r y 
e a r l y w i t h p h i l o s o p h y and i s t h e r e f o r e , m t h e mam, n o t a 
p h i l o s o p h e r . What t h e n , above a l l e l s e , i s ^ n t r i g u m g about 
L e f e b v r e ' s o b s e r v a t i o n i s t h a t i i / suggests t h a t Marx's more 
mature work, seen even on a s u p e r f i c i a l l e v e l , has _,ts p o i n t 
o f d e p a r t u r e m e p i s t e m o l o g y . Marx i s l i k e t h e E m p i r i c i s t 
p h i l o s o p h e r s t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n t he o r i g i n o f our i d e a s i n h i s 
t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y . He i s r e v i v i n g t h e approach o f t h i n k e r s 
l i k e C o n d i l l a c and D e s t u t t de Tracy m a n o v e l c o n t e x t . T h i s 
i s , o f cou r s e , t h e Lockean approach t o t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge. 
We r e c a l l t h a t Locke m h i s Essay Concerning Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g 
a t t e m p t s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t o ur i d e a s have t h e i r o r i g i n m our 
e x p e r i e n c e , and t h a t he d i d so a f t e r f i r s t r e j e c t i n g t h e n o t i o n 
o f i n n a t e o r i n b o r n i d e a s . But we found a t the time - and 
here we agreed w i t h Hegel - t h a t h i s n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e was 
too narrow t o account f o r t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f our knowledge. 
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He f a i l e d t o convince us t h e r e f o r e t h a t i d e a s do have t h e i r 
o r i g i n m e x p e r i e n c e . I t i s o f some i n t e r e s t t o us now, 
t h e r e f o r e , whether Marx has any g r e a t e r success m such an 
e n t e r p r i s e . 
Though t h e r e may be an i m p o r t a n t s i m i l a r i t y between Marx's 
t h e o r y o f I d e o l o g y and Locke's e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h e r e can be 
l i t t l e doubt t h a t Marx's c o n c l u s i o n s w i l l be r a d i c a l l y d i f f -
e r e n t from those found m t h e Essay Concerning Human Understand-
i n g . Much o f t h i s s i m p l y f o l l o w s from Marx's t h e o r y o f ideology 
b e i n g , as I have s a i d , a t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . Locke argues i n 
h i s Essay a g a i n s t t h e n o t i o n o f a c t i o n b e i n g i n c l u d e d m an 
account o f e x p e r i e n c e . As we have seen, he conc e i v e s o f 
our e x p e r i e n c e as 'our o b s e r v a t i o n employed e i t h e r , about 
e x t e r n a l s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s , o r about t h e i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s 
o f o u r minds..'^ And i t i s h e r e , he argues, t h a t a l l i d e a s 
have t h e i r o r i g i n . We can h a r d l y expect t h a t Marx w i l l h o l d 
t o t h i s view, e s p e c i a l l y so now t h a t we have e s c a d l i s h e d from 
t h e 'Theses on Feuerbach' t h a t Marx a c c e p t s t h e i d e a l i s t 
c r i t i q u e o f t h e Lockean p o s i t i o n . E q u a l l y we cannot now 
expect t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f knowledge w i l l p l a y t h e same r o l e 
f o r Marx as i t does f o r Locke. For we have a l s o l e a r n e d from 
t h e 'Theses' t h a t what f o r Locke i s a major problem, t h e problem 
c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e a l i t y o f our knowledge, i s no problem a t a l l 
f o r Marx. Indeed Marx sees i t as a d i f f e r e n t problem a l t o -
g e t h e r . Locke t h i n k s i t t o be a t h e o r e t i c a l q u e s t i o n , b u t , 
3- J.Locke. Essay Concerning Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g , o p . c i t . p.6l 
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f o r Marx, i t i s one t h a t concerns p r a c t i c e . Real knowledge, 
he argues, w i l l be shown t o be r e a l by o u r p r a c t i c e . Thus, 
I n so f a r as Marx has an answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n posed by 
Locke i t i s one t h a t i s i n c o n c l u s i v e . A l l knowledge, he 
argues, i s o b j e c t i v e a c c o r d i n g t o Locke's c r i t e r i o n , f o r a l l 
t h i n k i n g corresponds t o some aspect o f r e a l i t y . So, Marx 
suggests, we have t o t u r n t o a p r a c t i c a l t h e o r y o f knowledge 
t o i n d i c a t e knowledge whi c h w i l l be c o n c l u s i v e l y r e a l . I t 
i s t h i s view, I suggest, t h a t u n d e r l i e s h i s d e c i s i o n t o 
compose, w i t h E n gels, t h e t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y . 
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THE PREMISSES OF THE THEORY: REAL INDIVIDUALS 
The o c c a s i o n f o r w r i t i n g t h e German I d e o l o g y was t h e 
c r i s i s o f the Young H e g e l i a n movement m t h e i r homeland. The 
movement was r a p i d l y d i s i n t e g r a t i n g under t h e we i g h t o f b o t h 
P r u s s i a n c e n s o r s h i p and c r i t i c i s m from w i t h o u t and w i t h i n . 
Marx and Engels had themselves been p a r t o f t h a t movement, 
however t h e i r i n t e n t i o n i n i n t e r v e n i n g was n o t t o save t h e 
movement b u t t o d e l i v e r t h e coup de grace. Whether t h e y would 
have succeeded we s h a l l n ever know, f o r , m t h e event, t h e 
German I d e o l o g y was n o t p u b l i s h e d u n t i l l o n g a f t e r t h e o c c a s i o n 
had passed and b o t h t h e a u t h o r s had d i e d . I t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s 
i m p o r t a n t t o remember m d i s c u s s i n g t h e i r i d e a s on i d e o l o g y , 
t h a t t h e Young H e g e l i a n s are t h e i d e o l o g i s t s t h e y have p r i n -
c i p a l l y m mind. Marx and Engels f i n d one major d e f e c t m 
th e t h i n k i n g o f t h e movement, o f which they f i n d evidence m 
th e w r i t i n g s o f even Itz most advanced r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Ludwig 
Feuerbach. The Young H e g e l i a n s , t h e y argue, share t h e i l l -
u s i o n o f t h e i r past mentor and t e a c h e r , Hegel, t h a t i d e a s o r 
t h e o r i e s can o f themselves t r a n s f o r m t h e w o r l d . They t h e r e -
f o r e r e b e l n o t so much a g a i n s t e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s b u t ' a g a i n s t 
t h e t y r a n n y o f i d e a s ' , ^ f o r they t a k e m i s t a k e n i d e a s and 
t h e o r i e s t o be t h e source o f a l l t h e m i s e r i e s o f mankind. 
Men9 t h e y suggest, have o r g a n i s e d t h e i r a f f a i r s a c c o r d i n g t o 
these m i s c o n c e p t i o n s . S o ( a c c o r d m g t o Marx and En g e l s ) t h e y 
r e g a r d r e b e l l i n g a g a i n s t t h e t y r a n n y o f i d e a s as r e b e l l i n g 
4. K.Marx and F.Engels. Die Deutsche I d e o l o g u e , Marx-Engels 
Werke, V o l . 3, p. 15-
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a g a i n s t e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s : 'teach men, says one, t o exchange 
these i m a g i n i n g s w i t h t h o u g h t s t h a t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e essence 
o f man, t e a c h them t o r e l a t e c r i t i c a l l y t o themselves, says 
t h e o t h e r , t e a c h them t o put t~?~< out o f t h e i r rnmds, says a t h i r d 
and - e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y w i l l c o l l a p s e ' . ^ 
L a t e r on m t h e i r l i v e s Marx and Engels were t o say t h a t 
t h e i r i n t e n t i o n i n w r i t i n g t h e German I d e o l o g y was t o s e t t l e 
a c counts f o r once and f o r a l l w i t h t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l consc-
i e n c e s . They b e l i e v e d t h e r e ! o r e t h a t t h e book had served 
i t s purpose even though i t had n o t been p u b l i s h e d . C l e a r l y 
t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l h e r i t a g e , l i k e t h a t o f t h e i r opponents, 
was t h e H e g e l i a n system; so, m a sense, i t i s t r u e t o say 
t h a t t h e book i s more about Hegel t h a n t h e Young H e g e l i a n s . 
A l t h o u g h Marx and Engels make r e f e r e n c e most o f t e n t o t h e works 
o f t h e Young H e g e l i a n s (and, m S t i r n e r ' s case, c o p i o u s l y so) 
tr.e p r i n c i p a l i s s u e s t h e y r a i s e , I s h a l l argue, are those t o 
w h i c h Hegel's system g i v e s r i s e . C e r t a i n l y , t h e anecdote 
w i t h w h i c h they conclude t h e i r Preface r e f e r s j u s t as much 
t o Hegel as t o t h e Young H e g e l i a n s . For i t concerns a 'worthy 
man' who p l a c e d t o o h i g h a v a l u e on t h o u g h t . That w o r t h y 
man , Marx and Engels t e l l as, was obsessed by the i d e a t h a t 
men drowned because t h e y were possessed by t h e i d e a o f w e i g h t . 
Now, i t was h i s f i r m c o n v i c t i o n t h a t i f o n l y men c o u l d d i s m i s s 
f r o m t h e i r minds t h i s i d e a t h e y would be r i d o f a l l danger 
5. I b i d . 
383 
o f d r o w n i n g . Thus ' h i s whole l i f e l o n g ' t h e w o r t h y man 
'fought t he i l l u s i o n o f w e i g h t o f whose d e l a t e m o u s e f f e c t s 
each s t a t i s t i c gave him new and abundant p r o o f ' o n l y a t t h e 
end t o meet w i t h f r u s t r a t i o n and d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . ^ H e g e l i a n -
lsm, Marx and Engels suggest, g i v e s r i s e t o l i t e r a r y heroes 
o f t h e k i n d t h a t b e l i e v e t h e y have o n l y t o announce a new 
i d e a m one o f t h e i r j o u r n a l s and t h e w o r l d w i l l be t r a n s f o r -
med. I n t h i s t h e Young H e g e l i a n s are o n l y t h e o l d Hegel m 
a new garb. 
Marx and Engels say t h e r e f o r e t h a t 'the l a t e s t o f them 
have found t h e r i g h t e x p r e s s i o n f o r t h e i r a c t i v i t y when t h e y 
m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e y are o n l y f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t "phrases". A l l 
t h e y f o r g e t i s t h a t they a l s o oppose those phrases w i t h n o t h i n g 
but phrases and t h a t t h e y are m no way f i g h t i n g t h e r e a l , 
e x i s t i n g w o r l d when t h e y f i g h t t h e w o r l d w i t h those phrases'. 
The Young H e g e l i a n s may d i f f e r from t h e o l d Hegel m t h a t t h e y 
address themselves more r e a d i l y t o s o c i a l problems. But m 
th e manner m wh i c h t h e y do so th e y show t h a t they d i f f e r n o t 
one w h i t from t h e master m t h e i r approach t o t h e w o r l d . 
For m a d d r e s s i n g themselves t o s o c i a l problems, Marx and Engels 
argue, t h e Young H e g e l i a n s do n o t l e a v e t h e ground o f p h i l o s -
ophy. What Marx and Engels mean by p h i l o s o p h y i s , I b e l i e v e , 
what Marx e a r l i e r c a l l s a b s t r a c t t h i n k i n g . T h i s , as we have 
seen, i s t h i n k i n g which he b e l i e v e s has o n l y i t s e l f i . e . t h o u g h t 
f o r i t s o b j e c t . So t h e Young H e g e l i a n s , a c c o r d i n g t o Marx 
6. 
7-
I b i d . , p p 15 - 14. 
I b i d . , p. 20. 
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and Engels, b e l i e v e t h a t t o t a c k l e s o c i a l problems 
a t t h e i r r o o t what t h e y have t o t a c k l e are i d e a s . As t h e y 
put i t m t h e Holy F a m i l y ( w r i t t e n about t h e same t i m e ) , t h e 
Young H e g e l i a n s have ' l e a r n t from t h e H e g e l i a n Phenomenology 
t h e a r t o f t r a n s f o r m i n g r e a l , o b j e c t i v e c h a i n s e x i s t i n g o u t -
s i d e m y s e l f i n t o merely i d e a l , merely s u b j e c t i v e c h a i n s s i m p l y 
e x i s t i n g m me and t h e r e f o r e t h e a r t o f t r a n s f o r m i n g a l l ex-
g 
t e r n a l , sensuous c o n f l i c t s i n t o pure t h o u g h t c o n f l i c t s ' . 
The o b j e c t o f Marx and Engel's c r i t i c i s m m t h e German 
I d e o l o g y i s , a s i t i s m t h e H o l y F a m i l y , Hegel's I d e a l i s m . 
What t h e y p a r t i c u l a r l y w i s h t o deny t h e r e f o r e i s t h a t ' a i l 
r e a l i t y i s t h o u g h t ' . W i t h t h a t , o f course, t h e y have t o 
argue a n o t h e r view o f r e a l i t y : one w h i c h cannot be c o m p l e t e l y 
subsumed under t h o u g h t . I n o t h e r words, t h e y have t o argue 
a view o f e x p e r i e n c e m which t h o u g h t i s i t s e l f seen as p a r t 
o f a l a r g e r whole. I t i s t h i s view, I suggest, t h a t we have 
a l r e a d y found m embryonic form m Marx's C r i t i q u e o f t h e 
Phenomenology and t h e 'Theses on Feuerbach'. There i s l i t t l e 
need f o r me t o r e p e a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f the l a s t two Chapters 
h e r e . A l l I need remind the r e a d e r i s t h a t we d e a l t w i t h 
Marx's nascent view o f e x p e r i e n c e under t h e h e a d i n g o f h i s 
n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y . I n t h e German I d e o l o g y Marx and Engels 
come t o f i l l o ut t h a t n o t i o n . They expand i t i n t o a complete 
view o f e x p e r i e n c e and, as I have suggested, t he background 
a g a i n s t w h i c h they do so i s a g a i n t h e H e g e l i a n system and, 
i n p a r t i c u l a r i t s n o t i o n o f r e a l i t y . 
8. Die H e ' l i g e F a m i l i e , Marx-Engeis Werke,Vol. 2, p. 87. 
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We can see now why Marx and Engels p l a c e such emphasis 
on premisses and assumptions m b e g i n n i n g t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n 
o f i d e o l o g y . They are p u t t i n g f o r w a r d a view o f r e a l i t y w hich 
i s i n t e n d e d t o c o n t r a s t s h a r p l y w i t h t h e H e g e l i a n one. I t 
i s Hegel's proud boast t h a t h i s system has n e i t h e r b e g i n n i n g 
n o r end. I t i s , he c l a i m s , a c i r c l e o r , more p r e c i s e l y , a 
c i r c l e o f c i r c l e s . The b e g i n n i n g , he says, presupposes t h e 
Q 
end as, e q u a l l y , t h e end presupposes t h e b e g i n n i n g . We w i l l 
r e c a l l t h a t h i s account o f e x p e r i e n c e m th e Phenomenology 
of Mind f o l l o w s such a p l a n . G e i s t , Hegel argues, a t t h e 
b e g i n n i n g e x t e r n a l i s e s i t s e l f t o g i v e us the sensuous w o r l d 
o f t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness, b u t because i t i s G e i s t i t 
presupposes t h a t m t h e end t h i s e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n w i l l be 
r e t r a c t e d and i t w i l l be r e s t o r e d t o i t s i n i t i a l u n i t y w i t h 
i t s e l f . So t h e premiss o f t h e account c o n t a i n s the outcome 
of t h e account, o r , more p r e c i s e l y , t h e outcome i s t h e p r e m i s s . 
Now, Marx and Engels are o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t German p h i l o s o p h y 
i s s t i l l m the g r i p o f t h a t H e g e l i a n view o f e x p e r i e n c e . 
I t s p remisses, t h e y t h e r e f o r e suggest, are s t i l l u n r e a l ones, 
They t h e r e f o r e i n t e n d t o b e g i n w i t h r e a l premisses from which, 
t h e y say, 'we can o n l y a b s t r a c t m our i m a g i n a t i o n ' . These 
premisses a r e , t h e y c o n t i n u e , ' r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s , t h e i r a c t i o n s 
and t h e i r m a t e r i a l l i f e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , b o t h those w h i c h are 
a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d and those produced by t h e i r own a c t i v i t y ' . 1 0 
9. Hegel. Werke ( o p . c i t . ) V o l . 6, pp. 570 - 571• 
10. Marx-Engels Werke, V o l . 3, p. 20. 
386. . 
These premisses, they f e e l , i n no way presuppose t h e i r end. 
The e x p e r i e n c e o f r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s i s n o t c i r c u m s c r i b e d by 
t h e i r p o s i t i n g . 
However t h e r e i s a r e a l d i f f i c u l t y r a i s e d by t h i s view, a 
d i f f i c u l t y which i s n o t touched on by Marx and Engels. T h i s 
i s t h a t , no m a t t e r how much t h e y s t r a i n language, t h e y can 
n e v e r c l a i m t o have s e t down on paper c o n c r e t e , p h y s i c a l i n -
d i v i d u a l s . What t h e y have s e t down has t o be t h e t h o u g h t o f 
those ' r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s ' , j u s t as t h e y have o n l y p r e s e n t e d 
us w i t h t h e i d e a o f ' t h e i r m a t e r i a l l i f e ' . T h e i r premisses 
can, a t b e s t , be c o n c r e t e o r r e a l i d e a s . Marx and Engels 
must know t h i s t o be so, but t h e y do n o t d e a l wii,h t he problems 
i t r a i s e s . Be t h a t as i t may, Marx and Engels go on t o t e l l 
us what these r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t they b r i n g t o our a t t e n t i o n 
l o o k l i k e . N a t u r a l l y , t h e y say, they are human i n d i v i d u a l s , 
and human i n d i v i d u a l s 'one can d i s t i n g u i s h from a n i m a l s t h r o u g h 
consciousness, t h r o u g h r e l i g i o n , t h r o u g h whatever e l s e one w i l l s . 
They themselves b e g i n t o d i s t i n g u i s h themselves from a n i m a l s 
as soon as t h e y b e g i n t o produce t h e i r means o f s u b s i s t e n c e , 
a s t e p w h i c h i s d e t e r m i n e d by t h e i r p h y s i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n ' . 1 1 
These a r e , we might n o t e , t h e r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t Marx has 
m mind when o u t l i n i n g h i s n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y m t h e P a r i s 
M a n u s c r i p t s . They are i n d i v i d u a l s who n e c e s s a r i l y have o b j e c t s 
e x t e r n a l t o themselves because t h e y are n a t u r a l , l i m i t e d c r e a t u r e s . 
They are n a t u r a l b e i n g s though , as I have suggested b e f o r e , 
m a p r i v i l e g e d sense. T h i s i s because men a p p r o p r i a t e n a t u r e 
11. I b i d . , p. 21. 
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c o n s c i o u s l y . T h i s i s a p o i n t t h a t Marx b r i n g s out a g a i n 
m C a p i t a l . For, he says m d i s c u s s i n g t h e human l a b o u r 
p rocess, i t i s indeed t r u e t h a t 'a s p i d e r conducts o p e r a t i o n s 
t h a t resemble those o f t h e weaver, and a bee p u t s t o shame 
many an a r c h i t e c t m the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f h e r w a x - c e l l s . But 
what from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e w o r s t a r c h i t e c t 
from t h e b e s t o f bees i s t h a t t h e a r c h i t e c t has c o n s t r u c t e d 
h i s model i n h i s i m a g i n a t i o n b e f o r e he c o n s t r u c t s i t m wax'. 
T h e r e f o r e what d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e human l a b o u r process from 
the s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s o f a n i m a l s i s t h a t a t ' i t s end we have 
a r e s u l t w h i c h a l r e a d y e x i s t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g m th e lmagm-
12 
a t i o n o f t h e worker, t h e r e f o r e e x i s t e d a l r e a d y i d e a l l y ' . 
T h i s view, I suggest, Marx sees as fundamental t o an i d e a 
o f r e a l i t y . I t i s t n i s , added t o t h e n o t i o n t h a t o b j e c t s 
always c o n f r o n t us as o b j e c t s o f our needs, t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s 
t h e s u b j e c t i v e aspect o f e x p e r i e n c e . We now have a c l e a r e r 
view o f Marx's f i r s t t h e s i s on Feuerbach. For m o u t l i n i n g 
m t h a t t h e s i s h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e e s s e n t i a l s u b j e c t i v i t y 
o f e x p e r i e n c e he goes o n l y so f a r as t o say t h a t r e a l i t y i s 
always a sensuously (human) p r a c t i c a l one. The way m wh i c h 
he u n d e r s t a n d s i t t o be a sensuously p r a c t i c a l one i s , we are 
now a b l e t o see, as t h e o b j e c t o f our c o n s c i o u s l y u n d e r t a k e n 
l a b o u r . T h i s comes out m what he and Engels have t o say 
n e x t m t h e German I d e o l o g y . They say t h a t 'men by p r o d u c i n g 
t h e i r means o f s u b s i s t e n c e i n d i r e c t l y produce t h e i r m a t e r i a l 
12. K.Marx. Das K a p i t a l V o l 1, Marx-Engels Werke Vol 2^, p . l 
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13 l i f e i t s e l f ' . J I n o t h e r words, t h e y suggest t h a t men i n 
t h e i r c o n s c i o u s l y u n d e r t a k e n l a b o u r c r e a t e r e a l i t y . By t h i s 
o f course t h e y do n o t mean t h a t we, m our l a b o u r , c r e a t e t h e 
sun, t he moon, t h e s t a r s e t c . f o r t h e r e has always t o be a 
n a t u r a l m a t e r i a l s u b s t r a t u m t o form t h e raw m a t e r i a l o f o u r 
p r o d u c t i o n ; r a t h e r t h e y mean t h a t we, i n our l a b o u r , c r e a t e 
the o b j e c t s o f our e x p e r i e n c e . Even t h e heavenly b o d i e s , 
t h e n , are our o b j e c t s m t h i s way. For, Marx would argue, 
how we r e l a t e t o them a t any one t i m e i t s e l f depends on t h e 
l e v e l o f development o f p r o d u c t i o n and i n d u s t r y . To t h e 
p r i m i t i v e man, f o r i n s t a n c e , they are d i v i n e o b j e c t s ; where-
as t o modern man, h i m s e l f a p r o d u c t o f i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t 
s o c i e t y , t h e y are o b j e c t s o f s c i e n c e . We have t o u n d e r s t a n d , 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t our p r o d u c t i o n i s n o t merely an aspect o f our 
e x p e r i e n c e . I t i s , Marx suggests, what c o n s t i t u t e s o u r ex-
p e r i e n c e . The w o r l d t h a t i s g i v e n t o us m our e x p e r i e n c e 
i s one, he i s c o n v i n c e d , t h a t human l a b o u r has r t s e l f c r e a t e d . 
But, s e l f - e v i d e n t l y , i t i s n o t one t h a t we have e n t i r e l y 
chosen t o c r e a t e . Since we are r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s , we do n o t 
c o n s t i t u t e our e x p e r i e n c e m an a r b i t a r y f a s h i o n . We are 
no t s o l i t a r y F i c h t e a n Egos who by our mere t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
b r i n g t h e w o r l d i n t o b e i n g . For, Marx and Engels argue, t h e 
way m which ' r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s ' produce ' t h e i r means o f sub-
s i s t e n c e ' depends m t u r n 'on the s t a t e o f the g i v e n (and 
t o be reprodu c e d ) means o f s u b s i s t e n c e ' . " ^ A c c o r d i n g t o 
Marx, t h e r e f o r e , we j u s t as much form o ur e x p e r i e n c e by o u r 
l a b o u r as we are formed by i t . What we are depends on t h e 
13- Marx-Engels V/erke V o l . 3, p. 2 1 . 
14. I b i d . , p. 2 1 . 
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m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s under which we produce j u s t as what t h e y 
are depends on how we have p r e v i o u s l y o r g a n i s e d and c o n t i n u e 
t o o r g a n i s e our p r o d u c t i o n . We d e t e r m i n e them j u s t as t h e y 
d e t e r m i n e us. T h i s , o f course, b r i n g s us back t o Marx's 
n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y . For, as we can see, t h e f o r m a l 
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p m which ' r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s ' 
i m m e d i a t e l y f i n d themselves m i s o b j e c t i v e i n h i s sense. 
For 'these i n d i v i d u a l s ' are h i s and E n g e l s ' premisses 'not 
as t h e y may appear m t h e i r own o r o t h e r s ' i m a g i n a t i o n , b u t 
as t h e y r e a l l y a r e , t h a t means, as they work, m a t e r i a l l y p r o -
duce. Thus as t h e y - under d e f i n i t e m a t e r i a l l i m i t a t i o n s , 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and c o n d i t i o n s a l l independent o f t h e i r w i l l -
15 
are a c t i v e ' . The i n d i v i d u a l s t h e y have m mind t h e r e f o r e 
are a c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l s who, l i k e F i c h t e ' s Ego^ p o s i t t h e w o r l d 
f o r themselves m p r o d u c t i o n but are themselves, u n l i k e F i c h t e ' s 
Ego, p o s i t e d and l i m i t e d by t h a t m a t e r i a l w o r l d . They are 
indeed c o n s c i o u s l y a c t i v e i n d i v i d u a l s b u t a c t i v e under c o n d i t -
i o n s t h a t are n o t dependent on t h e i r w i l l . 
A l t h o u g h we can now see what Marx and Engels have m mind 
when t h e y propose we l o o k a t ' r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s ' , t h e r e are s t i l l 
some d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e i r view. A major d i f f i c u l t y i s 
r a i s e d by t h e q u e s t i o n : Why s h o u l d we accept t h e i r view o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s r a t h e r t h a n any o t h e r ? Here t h e y seem t o b r u s h 
t h e q u e s t i o n a s i d e by s a y i n g t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s who are t h e i r 
premisses 'are n o t as t h e y may appear m t h e i r own o r o t h e r s ' 
i m a g i n a t i o n ' . They a r e , supposedly, i n d i v i d u a l s as t h e y ' r e a l l y 
15. I b i d . , p. 25. 
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a r e . B u t , i t seems t o me, we are a l l m a p o s i t i o n t o say 
t h a t we o n l y see i n d i v i d u a l s as t h e y r e a l l y a r e . Need we 
a ccept t h a t Marx and E n g e l s ' v i s i o n i s c l e a r e r t h a n o u r s 9 
C l e a r l y , t h e r e f o r e , Marx and Engels have t o do more t o e s t a b -
l i s h t h e i r view. T h i s t h e y seek t o do, I b e l i e v e , w i t h one 
o f t h e p r i n c i p a l t h eses o f t h e i r t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y , namely, 
t h e t h e s i s i n which t h e y suggest t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e has 
t o be seen as p a r t and p a r c e l o f man's n a t u r a l p r o d u c t i v e 
a c t i v i t y . I d e a s and t h e o r i e s , t h e y argue, are themselves 
p r o d u c t s . Indeed, m t h e i r view, i t makes sense t o t a l k o f 
i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o d u c t i o n and, a l s o , t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f c o n s c i o u -
ness. I need h a r d l y say t h a t t h i s goes a g a i n s t what i s s t i l l 
a w i d e l y accepted view t h e t t h i n k i n g and t h e o r i s i n g i s n o t 
and s h o u l d n o t be enmeshed i n p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Marx 
suggests as much as t h i s m h i s 'Theses on Feuerbach' but h i s 
reasons f o r h o l d i n g t h i s view a g a i n stem, I b e l i e v e , from 
h i s C r i t i q u e o f t h e Phenomenology. There he c o n s i d e r s t h e 
t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c a l problem o f what comes f i r s t m ex-
p e r i e n c e . H i s response, as we have seen, i s t o suggest t h a t 
o b j e c t s always c o n f r o n t us as o b j e c t s o f our n a t u r e . So 
n o t o n l y does he suggest t h a t t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t h e f i r s t 
we e x p e r i e n c e but t h a t i t b ears on a l l our e x p e r i e n c e . I t 
has a b e a r i n g , t h e r e f o r e , on our t h i n k i n g e x p e r i e n c e . For 
he argues t h a t o u r t h e o r i s i n g about t h e o b j e c t s o f o u r exper-
i e n c e i s always o v e r l a i d by t h i s n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n . We can, 
he s u g gests, and indeed must, o n l y t h i n k o f t h i n g s w h i c h are 
our o b j e c t s as needy, l i m i t e d human b e i n g s . We are t h e r e f o r e 
always, even i n our t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y , enmeshed - m a p r a c -
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t i c a l l y a c t i v e r e l a t i o n . So, Marx argues, even qua p h i l o s -
ophers we cannot b u t c o n f r o n t o b j e c t s m t h i s way. Indeed 
he argued t h a t a l l o t h e r n o t i o n s , such as the c o n t e m p l a t i v e 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l one, o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f man t o h i s o b j e c t s were 
a b s t r a c t o r mere i m a g i n i n g s . T h i s argument i s s u s t a i n e d m 
the German I d e o l o g y and, on i t , i s b u i l t Marx and Engel's con-
f i d e n c e m t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h e i r view. For t h e y are i n 
no doubt as t o t h e f a c t t h a t 'men are t h e produ c e r s o f t h e i r 
c o n c e p t i o n s , i d e a s ' b u t t h a t as ' r e a l a c t i v e men, as t h e y are 
de t e r m i n e d by a d e f i n i t e development o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e powers'. 
Far consciousness, t h e y argue, 'can n e v e r be a n y t h i n g o t h e r 
t h a n c o n s c i o u s b e i n g , and t h e b e i n g o f men i s t h e i r l i f e p r o -
cess'. By man's l i f e process Marx and Engels mean t h e i r 
p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e i r means o f s u b s i s t e n c e and, as th e y p u t i t , 
t h e mode o f i n t e r c o u r s e ( V e r k e h r s f o r m ) t h a t goes hand i n hand 
w i t h i t . So i t i s t h i s , t h e y suggest, w h i c h i s t h e c o n t e x t 
i n w hich men always t h i n k . Theory i s t h e p r o d u c t o f c o n s c i o u s -
ness. And consciousness i s t h e p r o d u c t o f l i f e . F or, Marx 
and Engels c o n c l u d e , i t i s 'not consciousness t h a t d e t e r m i n e s 
17 
l i f e b u t l i f e d e t e r m i n e s consciousness'. 
Taken on i t s own t h i s may appear t o be a ve r y common-
pl a c e s u g g e s t i o n . However, I s h o u l d l i k e t o make t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
p o i n t t h a t what i s o b v i o u s t o us need n o t have been so t o t h e 
co n t e m p o r a r i e s o f Marx. Marx and Engels s t r e s s t h a t c o n s c i o u -
ness i s the consciousness o f e x i s t i n g l i f e because t h e y are 
16. I b i d . , p. 26. 
17- I b i d . , p. 27. 
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d e a l i n g w i t h an i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n m which t h e o p p o s i t e 
view has a p o w e r f u l h o l d . As we have seen, Hegel argues, 
m t h e Phenomenology o f Mind, t h a t consciousness f i r s t d e v e l o p s 
i t s e l f i n t o s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h r o u g h s c i e n t i f i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
and, s u b s e q u e n t l y , t h r o u g h t r a v e r s i n g t h e whole appearance o f 
Mind, i n t o t h e consciousness t h a t i s A b s o l u t e Knowledge. Now 
the consciousness t h a t i s A b s o l u t e Knowledge, Hegel argues, 
knows i t s e l f as t h e s o l e c o n t e n t o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t knows 
b e i n g , t h e r e f o r e , n o t as t h e b e i n g o f w h i c h i t i s t h e con-
s c i o u s n e s s but as t h e b e i n g w h i c h i s t h e o t h e r o f i t s e l f . 
Consciousness t h e n , he suggests, i s n o t t h e consciousness 
o f l i f e because a l l l i f e i s c onsciousness. The M a r x i a n 
view o f consciousness would, m Hegel's view, be a mere express-
i o n o f t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f Mind. For Hegel, consciousness knows 
no bounds. I t i s s i m p l y a l l t h e r e i s . As i t changes, t h e n , 
so does r e a l i t y . Mind ( G e i s t ) w h i c h i s t he consciousness 
o f c onsciousness i s t h e s p r i n g o f a l l l i f e . Hegel's t h e s i s 
i s , i n s h o r t , t h e r e v e r s e o f t h a t o f Marx and Engels who c l a i m 
t h a t i n t h e German I d e o l o g y ' q u i t e t h e c o n t r a r y t o German p h i l -
osophy which descends from heaven t o e a r t h , here we ascend 
l 8 
from e a r t h t o heaven'. For t h e i r hope i s t o e x p l a i n con-
s c i o u s n e s s o r mind from e a r t h l y , mundane, p r a c t i c a l l i f e and 
n o t p r a c t i c a l l i f e from consciousness. 
I t i s t h e n a p r i n c i p a l t h e s i s o f Marx's t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y 
t h a t what we t h i n k a t any one t i m e may be e x p l a i n e d as t h e 
outcome o f t h e p r a c t i c a l m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s o f which we are 
i n e v i t a b l y p a r t . Marx can see no o t h e r way m which t o deal 
w i t h c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I n h i s view Mind has no independent b e i n g . 
'Pure c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' t h e r e f o r e i s a term which makes no sense 
18. I b i d . 
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t o him. For 'from the b e g i n n i n g ' , he and Engels argue m 
th e German I d e o l o g y , '"Mind" has t h e curse on i t s e l f t o be 
" a f f l i c t e d w i t h " m a t t e r which appears here m the form o f 
a g i t a t e d l a y e r s o f a i r , sound, i n s h o r t , language. Language 
i s as o l d as consciousness - language _is t h e p r a c t i c a l conscious-
ness, r e a l consciousness which e x i s t s f o r o t h e r men as w e l l , 
r e a l consciousness t h e r e f o r e w h i c h a l s o e x i s t s f o r t h e f i r s t 
t i m e f o r m y s e l f . And language f i r s t a r i s e s , l i k e c onsciousness 
i 19 
from t h e need, t h e n e c e s s i t y , o f i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o t h e r men . 
Consciousness, whose p r o d u c t i s t h o u g h t , i s , t h e y argue, i n t e r -
t w i n e d f r o m t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g w i t h our p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 
I t i s o n l y made p o s s i b l e , Marx and Engels suggest, by i t s 
m a t e r i a l , p e r c e p t i b l e e x p r e s s i o n i n language. And language 
i s a means which does n o t have i t s o r i g i n and s p r i n g i n Mind 
i t s e l f . I t i s r a t h e r t h e o u t g r o w t h o f our m a t e r i a l , produc-
t i v e a c t i v i t y and o f t h e consequent n e c e s s i t y f o r s o c i e t y and 
i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o t h e r ^en. Those t h e r e f o r e who, l i k e t h e 
H e g e l i a n s , suggest t h a t consciousness o r Mind i s autonomous 
are making an u n r e a l i s t i c s u g g e s t i o n . They are i n e f f e c t 
c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e i s , somehow, a p r i v a t e w o r l d . They c l a i m -
r i g h t l y - t h a t consciousness ' i s rny r e l a t i o n s h i p t o my s u r r -
oundings', b u t t h e n t h e y argue t h a t t h o s e s u r r o u n d i n g s a r e 
themselves t h e p r o d u c t o f consciousness. B u t , Marx and Engels 
suggest, m c l a i m i n g t h a t consciousness i s always t h e c o n s c i o u s -
ness o f some r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e H e g e l i a n s a l r e a d y admit t h a t 
i t i s a p u b l i c w o r l d , a r e l a t i o n s h i p only e x i s t s f o r me because 
19. I b i d . , p. 30. 
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consciousness i s a s o c i a l p r o d u c t . T h i s i s a remarkable 
argument and n o t one t h a t i s s i m p l e t o f o l l o w : 'Where a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s ' , t h e y say, ' t h e r e i t e x i s t s f o r me, t h e 
an i m a l " r e l a t e s " t o n o t h i n g and n o t a t a l l . For t h e a n i m a l , 
i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r s does n o t e x i s t as a r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
From t h e o u t s e t t h e r e f o r e consciousness i s a s o c i a l p r o d u c t 
20 
and remains so as long as men e x i s t a t a l l ' . A t f i r s t s i g h t 
i t appears t h a t Marx and E n g e l s ' have drawn a c o n c l u s -
i o n t h e i r premisses can n o t bear. A l l t h e y appear t o have 
e s t a b l i s h e d i s t h a t a n i m a l s have no n o t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
and t h a t we do. The c o n c l u s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t c o n s c i o u s -
ness i s always a s o c i a l p r o d u c t i s somewhat unexpected. We 
have t o bear m mmd a t t h i s p o i n t , however, t h e i r s u g g e s t i o n 
t h a t language i s consciousness w h i c h e x i s t s f o r me and o t n e r 
men. So, i n t h e i r view, t h e use o f a language can ne v e r be 
an e x c l u s i v e l y p r i v a t e a f f a i r . B u t , as th e y suggest, what 
makes a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t f o r me i s t h e n o t i o n o f a r e l a t i o n -
s h i p . I o n l y have t h a t n o t i o n a t my d i s p o s a l , however, because 
I am a u s e r o f language; because t h e r e f o r e , m Marx and Engel's 
terms, I possess t h a t ' p r a c t i c a l c o n sciousness' w h i c h i_s con-
s c i o u s n e s s as i t comes i n t o b e i n g f o r me, and t h a t because 
i t e x i s t s f o r o t h e r s . I would n o t be cons c i o u s c o u l d I n o t 
use a language and m u s i n g t h a t language I become p a r t o f a s o c i a l 
w o r l d . Consciousness t h e r e f o r e i s always a s o c i a l p r o d u c t because 
t h e v e r y medium which makes i t p o s s i b l e i s i t s e l f a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n . 
Nowadays t m s would be regarded as an u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
view. W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s views on language i m p l y as much, f o r 
20. I b i d . , p. 30. 
395. 
i n s t a n c e . Not so, however, Marx's r e s u l t a n t views on 
i d e o l o g y . Marx and Engels l i n k t h e i r concept o f i d e o l o g y 
w i t h t h e i r views on t h e s o c i a l n a t u r e o f language because 
t h e y b e l i e v e contemporary men t o be more p r i s o n e r s t h a n 
masters o f t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e . Language, t h e y argue, a r i s e s 
f rom man's s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e . The words t h a t make up our language 
have t h e i r o r i g i n m some p r a c t i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e o r o t h e r . 
So our i d e a s , m t h e i r view, always r e f l e c t what i s g o i n g on 
m t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r l d . B u t , contemporary men, Marx and 
Engels argue, f a i l t o r e a l i s e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e i r con-
s c i o u s n e s s and, most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l , f a i l t o see t h i s 
c o n n e c t i o n between t h e i r consciousness and t h e p r a c t i c a l 
m a t e r i a l l i v e s t h e y l e a d , and p h i l o s o p h e r s , i n t h e i r view, 
are more g u i l t y t h a n most o f t h i s f a i l i n g . T h e i r systems^ 
Marx and Engel argue, s u f f e r from a b a s i c d e f e c t o f a l l i d e o l o g y , 
namely, t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e t h i n k i n g t h a t they e v i n c e con-
s i s t s o f t i m e l e s s and u n i v e r s a l t r u t h s . For i t i s a b a s i c 
t r a i t o f t h e i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k e r t o imagine t h a t h i s t h i n k i n g 
i s n o t anchored t o any p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l and m a t e r i a l c i r c u m -
21 
s t a n c e s . Through b e l i e v i n g themselves t o be immune fr o m 
any p a r t i c u l a r m a t e r i a l and s o c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , p h i l o s o p h e r s 
l a y themselves open t o p r e c i s e l y those e m p i r i c a l i n f l u e n c e s 
t h e y b e l i e v e t o a v o i d . T h i s , Marx b e l i e v e s , i s how the Young 
H e g e l i a n s had seen t h e i r i d e as and d o c t r i n e s : as t h e autonomous 
c r e a t i o n s o f t h e i r minds. For t h a t reason, he and Engels 
21. I b i d . , p. 27-
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suggest, t h e y had n o t t h o u g h t t o examine t h e r e l a t i o n between 
those i d e a s and d o c t r i n e s and t h e a c t u a l s t a t e o f a f f a i r s m 
22 
Germany. Had they done so, t h e y might have seen the c l o s e 
c o n n e c t i o n t h a t e x i s t e d between t h e backwardness o f t h e i r 
i d e a s and d o c t r i n e s and t h e underdeveloped n a t u r e o f s o c i a l 
and economic r e l a t i o n s in Germany. 
However we s t i l l do n o t know what i t i s t o be an i d e o l -
o g i c a l t h i n k e r . A l l t h m K i n g , Marx and Engels argue, i s 
s o c i a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d t h i n k i n g , r e f l e c t i n g r e a l m a t e r i a l c i r -
cumstances. And i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g , i t appears, i s t h i n k m 
wh i c h b e l i e v e s i t s e l f t o be above r e f l e c t i n g r e a l m a t e r i a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s b u t which a t t h e same ti m e cannot be: i n t h a t 
measure t h e n , t h e y suggest, t h a t i t seeks t o be above r e a l i t y , 
y e t i s p a r t o f i t , does i t p r e s e n t a d i s t o r t e d p i c t u r e o f t h i n 
But i s n o t t h i s i n t u r n t o o s i m p l e a view o f t h e m a t t e r 9 
What m p a r t i c u l a r appears t o be l a c k i n g i s some m c e p r e c i s e 
y a r d s t i c k o f i d e o l o g i c a l i l l u s i o n o r d i s t o r t i o n . I n o t h e r 
words, what has t o ce f i l l e d out are t h e terms 'above r e a l i t y ' 
and ' p a r t o f i t ' . We s h o u l d know t h e n what c o n s t i t u t e s a 
r e a l account o f e x p e r i e n c e f o r Marx and Engels. T h i s , I 
suggest, i s where f o r them h i s t o r y comes in, f o r t h e y argue, 
i n e f f e c t , t h a t by s e e i n g t h e p r e s e n t as h i s t o r y we s h a l l 
have our measure o f i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n . 
22. I b i d . , p. 20. 
397 
HISTORY AS A MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY. 
There are many o b j e c t i o n s t h a t can be made t o t h i s 
use o f H i s t o r y b u t t h e most s e r i o u s concerns t h e k i n d o f 
c o n t e x t m which i t makes sense t o expound a p h i l o s o p h y o f 
h i s t o r y . Marx and Engels o f course i n t e n d t h a t t h e i r t h e o r y 
o f i d e o l o g y be an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f h i s t o r y . And i t would seem t h a t events have proved them 
t o be c o r r e c t : t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , as i t i s now 
c a l l e d , has had an i m p o r t a n t impact b o t h on t h e i d e a o f 
H i s t o r y i t s e l f and indeed on t h e w r i t i n g o f h i s t o r y . But 
s t i l l t h e o b j e c t i o n may be r a i s e d t h a t Marx and Engels are 
h o p i n g t o use a view o f h i s t o r y t o e x p l a i n what can n o t be 
e x p l a i n e d i n such a way. What they are h o p i n g t o e x p l a i n 
i s n o t s i m p l y t h e past but our t h i n k i n g i t s e l f , and we can-
n o t a t one and t h e same t i m e t h e o r i s e a d e q u a t e l y about b o t h 
h i s t o r y and our t h o u g h t . ^ T h i n k i n g i s always a p r e s e n t 
a c t i v i t y . There i s no past t h i n k i n g t h a t i s a c t u a l l y t a k i n g 
p l a c e . H i s t o r y , on t h e o t h e r hand, i s always concerned w i t h 
2^. I n a p e c u l i a r way Marx r e c e i v e s some s u p p o r t on t h i s p o i n t 
from modern I d e a l i s t s . C o l l m g w o o d , m p a r t i c u l a r , t a k e s 
t h e view t h a t ' H i s t o r i c a l knowledge..has f o r i t s p r o p e r 
o b j e c t t h o u g h t : n o t t h i n g s t h o u g h t about, but t h e a c t o f 
t h i n k i n g i t s e l f . ' (R.G.Collmgwood. The I d e a o f H i s t o r y , 
p. 305 O x f o r d Paperbacks, 1966 - my emphasis) But C o l l m g -
wood argues t h i s because he b e l i e v e s t h a t a l l h i s t o r y 
i s t h e h i s t o r y o f t h o u g h t . So i n one sense he suggests 
t h a t h i s t o r y i s t h e p r o d u c t o f t h o u g h t . Marx, o f course, 
wants t o argue t h e o p p o s i t e : t h a t o ur t h i n k i n g i s a p r o d u c t 
o f h i s t o r y . F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f some o f t h e problems 
t h a t C o l l m g w o o d ' s ' i d e a ' o f H i s t o r y r a i s e s see W.H. Walsh. 
An i n t r o d u c t i o n t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f H i s t o r y ( H u t c h m s o n s , 
1951) PP. b^' - 59. 
398 
past e v e n t s . So i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how 
a h i s t o r i a n , o r a p h i l o s o p h e r o f h i s t o r y , can have a n y t h i n g 
t o say about our t h i n k i n g . There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t Marx 
and Engels would have t o accept t h a t H i s t o r y a t t e m p t s t o 
e x p l a i n p a s t events and t h a t t h i n k i n g i s a p r e s e n t a c t i v i t y ; 
b u t t h e y would n o t , f o r t h a t reason, see them as b e i n g unconn-
e c t e d , f o r they suggest t h a t t h i n k i n g i s an a c t i v i t y whose 
c o n t e n t o r m a t t e r i s f u r n i s h e d by H i s t o r y . As we have seen, 
i t i s t h e i r view t h a t o u r r e a l m a t e r i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e t e r m i n e 
our consciousness and n o t t h e r e v e r s e . They f u r t h e r argue 
t h a t what these c i r c u m s t a n c e s are and t h e r e f o r e what k i n d o f 
l i v e s we l e a d depend on h i s t o r i c a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d c o n d i t i o n s 
and i t i s t h e t a s k o f t h e h i s t o r i a n t o e x p l a i n these c o n d i t -
i o n s . The h i s t o r i a n w i l l t h e r e f o r e be a b l e t o t e l l how we 
are most l i k e l y t o t h i n k . For he w i l l have e x p l a i n e d p r e c i s e l y 
t h ^ s e c o n d i t i o n s which g i v e r i s e t o our t h i n k i n g about t h e 
w o r l d . 
T h i s may be an o v e r a m b i t i o u s c l a i m b u t i t i s h a r d l y one, 
I suggest, t h a t r e p r e s e n t s an abuse o f H i s t o r y . We s h a l l 
g r a n t f o r t h e p r e s e n t , t h e n , t h a t 'the p r e s e n t as h i s t o r y ' may 
be an a p p r o p r i a t e measure o f i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n . I t i s , 
o f c o urse, Marx and Engel's m a t e r i a l i s t n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e 
t h a t suggests t o them t h i s view o f H i s t o r y . But even w i t h -
out t h a t s t i m u l u s t h e i d e a o f the 'present as h i s t o r y ' would 
make immediate sense t o them because o f t h e i r H e g e l i a n back-
ground . I n t h e Preface t o t h e Phenomenology, Hegel argues 
t h a t H i s t o r y f i n d s a p l a c e f o r i t s e l f m the o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s -
ness o f t h e t i m e t h r o u g h t h e s p i r i t o f t h e e p o c h , f o r t h e 
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s p i r i t o f t h e epoch embodies, i n a hap-hazard way, t h e r e s u l t s 
o f p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h y . Indeed I t i s a k i n d o f v u l g a r c u s t -
o d i a n o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y . Hegel sees i t as h i s 
t a s k m t h e Phenomenology t o u n r a v e l those r e s u l t s o f p r e v i o u s 
p h i l o s o p h y 'embedded' m t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness and p r e s e n t 
them m a s y s t e m a t i c form. T h i s mig h t l o o k , now, v e r y much 
l i k e a t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y . He suggests, as do Marx and E n g e l s , 
t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y person's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d i s l e s s 
t h a n adequate t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , i t d i s t o r t s t h e r e a l w o r l d m 
some measure. He a l s o c l a i m s t h a t he has t h e key t o under-
s t a n d i n g t h i s phenomenon. The o r d i n a r y consciousness, he 
argues, i s c o n t e n t w i t h uhe mere appearance o f Mind ( G e i s t ) , 
whereas t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l consciousness has a t t a i n e d t h e 
r e a l i t y o f Mind. Not c o n t e n t w i t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y d e t e r -
mined, t h e r e f o r e r e l a t i v e , p o s i t i o n o f t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s -
ness i t c l a i m s A b s o l u t e Knowledge as t h e consciousness o f 
c onsciousness. 
I t would however be a m i s t a k e t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s 
i s t h e g o a l o f Marx and Engels m The German I d e o l o g y . They 
w i s h t o see t h e p r e s e n t as h i s t o r y , n o t t o r a i s e themselves 
above i t , b u t t o g a i n a g r e a t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i m p l i c -
a t i o n s o f such a view. I n d o i n g so, t h e y are s t i l l respond-
i n g t o problems t h a t Hege] poses and t h e r e f o r e are n o t p r e p a r e d 
t o d i s p e n se e n t i r e l y w i t h h i s views. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , 
t h e y f i n d h i s s u g g e s t i o n t h a t consciousness i s i t s e l f a his1> 
o r i c a l phenomenon t o be sound. Consciousness, as I have p o i n t e d 
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o u t , t h e y see as t h e p r o d u c t o f innumerable g e n e r a t i o n s ' 
p r o d u c t i o n and s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e . E q u a l l y t h e y d e a l w i t h 
t h a t c o nsciousness, as does Hegel, as a phenomenon. I n 
o t h e r words, t h e y d e a l w i t h i t as t h e appearance o f a deeper 
r e a l i t y . T h e i r aim, t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t w h o l l y d i s s i m i l a r 
t o t h a t o f Hegel m t h e Phenomenology: t h e y i n t e n d t o i n d i c -
a t e t o us t h e r e a l i t y o f Mind. But t h e d i f f e r e n c e l i e s m 
th e manner m which t h e y c a r r y o u t t h i s aim. For what, t h e y 
argue, l i e s b e h i n d t h i s appearance o f consciousness i s man's 
n a t u r a l p r o d u c t i v e l i f e and n o t Mind, n o t even m i t s more 
s y s t e m a t i c H e g e l i a n form. The H e g e l i a n " G e i s t " i s n o t t h e 
r e a l i t y o f consciousness a t each stage i n our development. 
But r a t h e r , Marx and Engels argue, a t each stage m our d e v e l -
opment, ' t h e r e i s t o be found a m a t e r i a l r e s u l t , a sum o f 
p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s , a h i s t o r i c a l l y c r e a t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p t o 
n a t u r e and o f i n d i v i d u a l s tr each o t h e r which i s i n h e r i t e d by each 
succeeding g e n e r a t i o n f r c m i t s p r e d e c e s s o r , a mass o f p r o d u c t -
i v e f o r c e s , c a p i t a l s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s which i s indeed on t h e 
one hand m o d i f i e d by t h e new g e n e r a t i o n b u t , on t h e o t h e r , 
a l s o p r e s c r i b e s i t s own l i f e c o n d i t i o n s and g i v e s i t a s p e c i f i c 
development, a p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r . . . T h i s sum o f p r o d u c t i v e 
f o r c e s , c a p i t a l s and modes o f s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e each i n d i v i d u a l 
and each g e n e r a t i o n f i n d s b e f o r e i t as something g i v e n i s t h e 
r e a l ground o f what t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s have conceived t o them-
s e l v e s as "Substance" and " t h e essence o f man", o f what t h e y 
have a p o t h e o s i z e d and f o u g h t , a r e a l ground w h i c h w i l l n o t be 
d i s t u r b e d m t h e l e a s t on its e f f e c t s and i n f l u e n c e s on t h e dev-
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elopment o f men by these p h i l o s o p h e r s r e b e l l i n g a g a i n s t 
24 
I t as " S e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s " and t h e "Unique". The 
h i s t o r y t h a t l i e s b e h i n d consciousness t h e r e f o r e has, as 
we can see, l i t t l e m common f o r Marx and Engels w i t h t h e 
e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y o f Hegel's system. They are n o t t a l k i n g 
about t h e h i s t o r y o f Mind b u t r e a l , m a t e r i a l h i s t o r y , o r what 
Marx c a l l s e x o t e r i c h i s t o r y . T h i s , t h e y argue, i s t h e r e a l 
PR 
ground f o r a l l s o c i a l l i f e . I t makes no sense f o r them 
t o see p h i l o s o p h y as i t s essence. Rather i t , l i k e a l l con-
s c i o u s n e s s , has t o be viewed as an o u t - g r o w t h o f e x o t e r i c 
developments. There i s no q u e s t i o n m t h e i r minds t h e n t h a t 
t h e o r d i n a r y consciousness i s n o t a phenomenal consciousness 
s i m p l y because i t has f a i l e d t o r a i s e i t s e l f t o p h i l o s o p h y . 
I t i s i n d e e d , as Hegel s u g g e s t s , a consciousness t n a t i s con-
fu s e d m i t s b e a r i n g s about t h e w o r l d . But i t i s so because 
e x o t e r i c h i s t o r i c a l developments make i t so. I t i s t r i t e 
t o suggest, as do t h e H e g e l i a n s , t h a t o r d i n a r y people are 
confused m t h e i r t h i n k i n g about t h e w o r l d because t h e y are 
bad p h i l o s o p h e r s . They do n o t g e t h o l d o f t h e wrong end o f 
the s t i c k f o r t h a t reason b u t because t h e i r r e a l l i f e e i r c u m -
24. Marx-Engeis Werke, V o l . 3, p. 38. 
25- Marx-Engels Werke, V o l 2, pp. 89."" 90. I n Marx and E n g e l s ' 
view rHegel's c o n c e p t i o n o f h i s t o r y presupposes an a b s t r a c t 
o r a b s o l u t e s p i r i t w hich develops i t s e l f m such a way 
t h a t mankind i s o n l y a mass which c o n s c i o u s l y o r u n c o n s c i o u 
c a r r i e s i t a l o n g . W i t h i n t h e e m p i r i c a l e x o t e r i c h i s t o r y 
he has t h e r e f o r e t a k e p l a c e a s p e c u l a t i v e , e s o t e r i c h i s t o r y 
The h i s t o r y o f mankind t r a n s f o r m s i t s e l f i n t o t h e h i s t o r y 
o f t h e a b s t r a c t - what t h e r e f o r e i s t o t h e r e a l man - o t h e r -
w o r l d l y s p i r i t o f mankind', ( i b i d . ) . 
26. Marx-Engels Werke, V o l 23, p. 87. 
27. I b i d . , p. 86. 28. I b i d . , p. 87 29- I b i d . 
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stances w i l l n o t a l l o w them t o see t h e w o r l d o t h e r t h a n m 
a confused way. 
T h i s p o i n t comes out most c l e a r l y i n Marx's d i s c u s s i o n 
o f ' F e t i s h i s m ' m C a p i t a l . Here Marx makes th e d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the appearance and r e a l i t y o f economic r e l a t i o n s m 
a c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . The purpose o f making t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s t o show t h a t the confused i d e a s o f o r d i n a r y men m contemp-
o r a r y s o c i e t y are n o t mere i l l u s i o n s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , he 
wants t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e confused, almost m y s t i c a l appear-
ance o f t h e commodity i s a p r o d u c t o f t h e commodity-form 
i t s e l f . T h i s i s t he argument he en.ploys. ' I n g e n e r a l ' , 
he says, ' o b j e c t s o f use o n l y become commodities because 
t h e y are t h e p r o d u c t o f p r i v a t e a c t s o f l a b o u r ( P r i v a t a r b e i t e n ) 
pursued i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f each o t h e r . The complex o f these 
p r i v a t e a c t s o f l a b o u r forms t h e c o l l e c t i v e l a b o u r o f s o c i e t y . 
Since t h e p r o d u c e r s f i r s t come i n t o s o c i a l c o n t a c t t h r o u g h 
t h e exchange o f these p r o d u c t s o f t h e i r l a b o u r the s p e c i f i c 
s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i r l a b o u r a l s o appears f o r t h e f i r s t 
t i m e w i t h i n t h i s exchange. Or, m f a c t , t h e p r i v a t e a c t s 
o f l a b o u r f i r s t p a r t i c i p a t e m t h e c o l l e c t i v e s o c i a l l a b o u r 
t h r o u g h those r e l a t i o n s m which exchange t r a n s f e r s t h e 
p r o d u c t s o f l a b o u r . . ' . ^ So t h e m ystery o f t h e commodity -
form ' c o n s i s t s m t h i s , t h a t i t r e f l e c t s back t o men, as 
t h e o b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f the p r o d u c t o f l a b o u r i t s e l f , as 
s o c i a l n a t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f these t h i n g s , t h e s o c i a l charac-
t e r o f t h e i r own l a b o u r . Thus a l s o i t r e f l e c t s , as a s o c i a l 
26. Marx-Engels Werke, V o l . 23, p. 87. 
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r e l a t i o n o f t h i n g s e x i s t i n g o u t s i d e them, t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s 
27 
o f t h e pr o d u c e r s t o the c o l l e c t i v e l a b o u r . ' ' Hence i t 
would make l i t t l e sense t o suggest t h a t t h e o r d i n a r y i n d i v i d u a l 
f e t i s h i s e s commodities because o f a t h e o r e t i c a l o v e r s i g h t on 
h i s p a r t . The p r o d u c e r s , Marx suggests, do n o t have a con-
fus e d o r d i s t o r t e d view o f t h e i r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s because 
t h e y are muddled t h i n k e r s . 'Rather', he adds, ' t h i s f e t i s h 
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e w o r l d o f commodities a r i s e s from t h e a c t u a l 
28 
s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r "of t h e l a b o u r which produces' t h e commodities'. 
To t h e p r o d u c e r s 'the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s o f t h e i r p r i v a t e a c t s 
o f l a b o u r appear as what t h e y a r e , i . e . , n o t as immediate 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s o f t h e persons m t h e i r l a b o u r b u t r a t h e r 
as t h i n g - l i k e r e l a t i o n s o f t h e persons and as s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s 
o f t h i n g s . ^ The m a t e r i a l p o i n t f o r us i s , o f course, t h a t 
t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s w h i c h g i v e r i s e t o f e t i s h i s m indeed 
appear as what t h e y a r e . So, m Marx's view, t h e o r d i n a r y 
i n d i v i d u a l has a d i s t o r t e d view o f t h i n g s because h i s r e a l 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s obscure the o b j e c t i v e n a t u r e o f t h e w o r l d . 
T h i s , as we can see, goes j u s t as much f o r t h e p h i l o s o p h e r 
as f o r t h e o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o s n e s s . The confused i d e a s o f 
p h i l o s o p h e r s , Marx and Engels suggest, a l s o have t h e i r o r i g i n 
i n confused h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Where t h e y 
are wrong i n t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n - as are a l l p h i l o s o p h e r s 




I b i d . , p. 86 
I b i d . , p. 87. 
I b i d . 
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c i r c u m s t a n c e o r o t h e r . However, a l t h o u g h p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
t h o u g h t f a i l s t o achieve what i t i n t e n d s , i t does, a c c o r d -
i n g t o Marx and Engels, h i n t a t t h e r e a l ground o f h i s t o r y 
w i t h such n o t i o n s as "Substance" and "the essence o f man". 
I t d i s t o r t s t h e t r u t h , b u t i t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e t r u t h 
t h a t i t d i s t o r t s . To c l a r i f y t h i s s u g g e s t i o n we must 
r e t u r n t o Marx's view o f our n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s and powers 
i n t h e P a r i s M a n u s c r i p t s . Our n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s and 
powers when expressed, Marx argues, are themselves e x p r e s s -
i o n s o f o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . We may t a k e as an example 
th e n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e o f s i g h t . W i t h our eyes, Marx 
would argue, we see t h e w o r l d n o t o n l y as i t s u b j e c t i v e l y 
impinges on us i . e . , as an image a t t h e back o f the eye, 
bu t a l s o as i t o b j e c t i v e l y i s , m o t h e r words, t he image 
a t t h e back o f t h e eye i s an image^of t h e o b j e c t s t h a t 
come i n t o o ur view. When we see, we see those o b j e c t s 
t h a t s u r r o u n d us. Any o t h e r v i s i o n i s , a t b e s t , c mirage, 
a t w o r s t , an h a l l u c i a t i o n . What we see, t h e r e f o r e , c o r r e s -
ponds w i t h t h a t t h e r e i s t o be seen m t n e w o r l d , m o t h e r 
words, our s i g h t g i v e s us a c o h e r e n t image o f t h e r e a l w o r l d . 
Indeed any o t h e r view o f our n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e o f s i g h t would 
f a i l t o make sense. T h i s view o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f our 
a t t r i b u t e s and powers Marx extends t o our t h i n k i n g . He 
argues t h a t a l l t h i n k i n g r e f l e c t s some r e a l i t y because i t 
i s t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f one o f our powers as n a t u r a l l i m i t e d 
b e i n g s . So when people express themselves m t h o u g h t 
we can see a t work some o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l s t i m u l u s . And 
i t i s o f course t h i s k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g t h a t l i e s b e h i n d 
h i s and Engel's s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s d i d n o t 
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e n t i r e l y miss the mark w i t h t h e i r systems. Indeed, a c c o r d -
i n g t o Marx's view o f t h i n k i n g , t h e y c o u l d n o t . There-
f o r e Hegel, f o r one, may be seen t o have e r r e d m th e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f h i s system b u t s t i l l t o have h i t on i m p o r t a n t 
i d e a s c o n c e r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e . The i n s t a n c e t h a t Marx p i c k s 
out m t h e German I d e o l o g y i s Hegel's use o f t h e term "Subs-
ta n c e " . Hegel had used the term m t h e Phenomenology m 
d i s c u s s i n g how c u l t u r e was handed down withou.t i n t e r r u p t i o n 
from one g e n e r a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r . We r e c a l l t h a t he i s vagae 
m h i s use o f t h i s t e r m , seemingly n o t p o i n t i n g t o a n y t h i n g 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , b u t emphasising i t n e v e r t h e l e s s as b e i n g o f 
prime s i g n i f i c a n c e m p r e s e r v i n g h i s t o r i c a l c o n t i n u i t y . Now, 
what Marx t h i n k s Hegel r e a l l y had m mind i n u s i n g t h e t e r m 
was the n o t i o n o f p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s . For t h e y , the c a p i t a l s 
and accumulated s k i l l s t h a t one g e n e r a t i o n hands over t o t h e 
o t h e r , a r e , he supposes, t h e r e a l , p a l p a b l e source o f t h e con-
t i n u i t y o f a c u l t u r e . Hegel, however, because he was i d e o l -
o g i c a l i n h i s t h i n k i n g no more t h a n h i n t e d a t t h i s . 
We may w e l l agree t h a t , on some p o i n t s , Hegel's r e a s o n i n g 
shows s i g n s o f c o n f u s i o n but we are u n l i k e l y t o t h i n k o f him 
as an i d e o l o g i s t . Marx and Engels, however, do; f o r t h e y 
argue t h a t an i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k e r i s one who f a i l s t o see 
t h e c o n n e c t i o n between h i s t h i n k i n g and h i s h i s t o r i c a l l y 
d e t e r m i n e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . And Hegel, t h e y suggest, i s one 
such t h i n k e r . For, a l t h o u g h he r e a l i s e s t h a t consciousness 
i n h i s t i m e i s a mere appearance, he f a i l s t o grasp the con-
n e c t i o n between the phenomenon and t h e r e a l ground o f h i s t o r y . 
406 . 
Thus he f a i l s t o see h i s own consciousness as a h i s t o r i c a l l y 
l i m i t e d one. He does indeed see the consciousness o f 
o t h e r s as l i m i t e d and i n f i n i t e , but t o h i s own, t h e c o n s c i o u s -
ness o f a p h i l o s o p h e r , he accords a g r e a t e r w o r t h . The 
p h i l o s o p h e r , t h r o u g h h i s s c i e n t i f i c e f f o r t s , i s a b l e t o p a r t -
i c i p a t e m G e i s t . Mind o r s p i r i t i s a f o r c e above H i s t o r y 
o r , r a t h e r , i t i s t he moving f o r c e o f h i s t o r y . The p h i l o s -
opher t h e r e f o r e need not see h i s consciousness as a l i m i t e d , 
f i n i t e one; i t i s , Hegel suggests, an i n f i n i t e one o r A b s o l u t e . 
For Marx and E n g e l s , t h i s i s no more t h a n a f a n t a s y . They 
ar e , o f c o u r s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y opposed t o Hegel's p o s i t i o n 
because i t s l u r s over what t h e y take t o be t h e r e a l cause o f 
t h e p h e n o m e n a l i t y d consciousness. I n t h e i r view, ' i f m 
a l l i d e o l o g y men and t h e i r c i r c u m s t a n c e s appear as though 
i n a Camera obscura st o o d on t h e i r head t h i s phenomenon s p r i n g s 
j u s t as much out o f t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l l i f e process as does t h e 
i n v e r s i o n o f o b j e c t s m th e r e t i n a f rom t h e i r immediate p h y s i c a l 
l i f e p r o c e s s ' . Consciousness i s t he mere i n v e r t e d appearance 
o f r e a l i t y f o r them because r e a l i t y i s c o n s t i t u e d m such 
a way as t o g i v e r i s e t o t h a t appearance. There i s l i t t l e 
s u g g e s t i o n o f t h i s m Hegel's view o f t h i n g s . For him i t 
i s s i m p l y t h e case t h a t Mind appears as i t does i n t h e o r d i n -
a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s . But f o r Marx and Engels, t h e r e i s no 
q u e s t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e h a l f - t r u t h s , t h e c o n f u s i o n and 
indeed, by Kegels own r e c k o n i n g , the d i s t o r t i o n o f t h e 
c u l t u r e o f the t i m e s i m p l y as m i s t a k e n t h i n k i n g t o be cured 
30. Marx-Engels Werke 3> P- 26. 
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by p h i l o s o p h i c a l reason. For, as Marx argues m th e P o v e r t y 
o f P h i l o s o p h y , 'the same men who e s t a b l i s h t h e i r s o c i a l r e l -
a t i o n s m c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e i r m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i v e n e s s produce 
a l s o t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s , i d e a s and c a t e g o r i e s m c o n f o r m i t y 
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w i t h t h e i r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ' , - so t h a t i f t hose p r i n c i p l e s 
and i d e a s are confused i t stands t o reason t h a t those s o c i a l 
and m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s t o w h i c h t h e y conform are t h e cause. 
I t a l s o f o l l o w s t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g on i t s own i s no 
cure f o r t h a t d i s t o r t i o n o f r e a l i t y . I d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g 
w i l l cease t o have a h o l d , Marx and Engels argue, o n l y where 
those m a t e r i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s g i v i n g r i s e t o i t are removed. 
Marx and Engels a t t r i b u t e t h e p o w e r f u l h o l d t h a t i d e o l -
ogy has i n t h e i r s o c i e t y t o t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r . I ndeed, 
m t h e i r view, t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r g i v e s r i s e t o what we 
might c a l l t h e ' o r i g i n a l . ' i n 1 o f i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k e r s : t h e 
p r e t e n c e t h a t t h i n k i n g i s something more t h a n t h e consciousnes 
o f e x i s t i n g p r a c t i c e . For, t h e y say, 'the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r 
f i r s t o f a l l becomes r e a l d i v i s i o n from t h a t moment on where 
we have a d i v i s i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l and m a t e r i a l l a b o u r ' and 
'from t h i s moment', t h e y c o n t i n u e , 'consciousness can imagine 
i t s e l f o r something o t h e r t h a n t h e consciousness o f e x i s t i n g 
p r a c t i c e , r e a l l y conceive something, w i t h o u t c o n c e i v i n g any-
t h i n g r e a l from t h i s moment on consciousness i s m t h e pos-
32 
i t i o n t o emancipate i t s e l f from t h e w o r l d . . But t h e y 
31. Marx-Engels Werke 4, p. 130. 
32. Marx-Engels Werke 3, p. 31. 
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suggest t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r n o t o n l y makes i d e o l o g i c a l 
d i s t o r t i o n p o s s i b l e . I t i s a l s o the d i r e c t cause o f t h e 
c o n f u s i o n t h a t r e i g n s m men's minds about t h e i r r e a l c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s . They argue t h a t , up u n t i l t he p r e s e n t , t h e d i v i s i o n 
o f l a b o u r has i t s e l f d e t e r m i n e d p r o d u c t i o n and n o t p r o d u c t i o n 
t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r , i n s t e a d o f the p r o d u c e r s themselves 
c o n t r o l l i n g p r o d u c t i o n , t h e course o f p r o d u c t i o n has c o n t r o l l e d 
t h e p r o d u c e r s . As Marx says m C a p i t a l 'the d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r 
i s a system o f p r o d u c t i o n whose t h r e a d s were weaved b e h i n d 
t h e backs o f t h e producers o f commodities and c o n t i n u e s t o 
be so'. J So, they suggest, i t i s o n l y n a t u r a l t h a t t h e 
c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t men c r e a t e 1 m c o n f o r m i t y 1 w i t h these r e l a t -
i o n s themselves bear w i t n e s s t o t h i s c o n f u s i o n and i n d e e d , a t 
most t i m e s , f o s t e r i t . I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t , as we s h a l l see 
l a t e r , t h a t Marx i n t r o d u c e s t h e n o t i o n s o f c l a s s and r e v o l -
u t i o n i n t o h i s t h e o r y o f i d e o l o g y . 
33- Werke 23, p. 121. 
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THE CHARACTER OF MARX'S THEORY 
Before we corne to that p o i n t , however, there i s s t i l l 
some important ground we have t o cover m our discussion of 
the measure of I d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n t h a t Marx and Engels 
propose. We may agree t h a t Marx's n o t i o n of h i s t o r y makes 
some s o r t of sense as a measure of i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n ; 
but we must also acknowledge t h a t Marx does not h i n g t o estab-
l i s h the e m p i r i c a l v a l i d i t y of h i s claim. Indeed he gives 
the impression t h a t i t would be beside the po i n t f o r him t o 
do so. But t h i s i s not because, as Acton claims, 'Marxists 
tend t o regard the theory as one t h a t any candid person i s 
bound t o accept as soon as he understands i t , or one t h a t the 
whole c r e a t i o n conspires t o proclaim.. . I t i s because, 
q u i t e simply, Marx's theory of ideology i s not an e m p i r i c a l 
theory. An e m p i r i c a l theory (and I f o l l o w Popper here) i s 
one t h a t can give r i s e to second order t e s t a b l e hypotheses. 
These i f proved t o be t r u e can corroborate the theory f o r us. 
They must themselves pass a s t r i n g e n t t e s t , however, i f they 
are t o be regarded as t e s t a b l e hypotheses. They (again f o l l -
owing Popper) have always t o be open t o f a l s i f i c a t i o n or, 
m the p o s i t i v i s t s ' own jargon, they have t o be such t h a t the 
category of p o s s i b i l e f a l s i f i e r s remains open. And these 
f a l s i f i e r s must always c o n s i s t of e m p i r i c a l l y observable f a c t s 
or events. No great i n s i g h t i s r e q u i r e d to see, however, 
t h a t no such t e s t a b l e hypotheses can be derived from Marx and 
Engels' theory of ideology. From the Popperian p o i n t of view 
34. H.B.Acton. The I l l u s i o n of the Epoch, pp 141 - 142. 
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the category of possible f a l s i f i e r s of t h e i r theory always 
remains closed. Indeed Marx and Engels are not m the l e a s t 
concerned t o p r e d i c t what any one i n d i v i d u a l w i l l be observed 
t o t h i n k at any one time or t o e s t a b l i s h what m p a r t i c u l a r 
caused t h a t t r a m of thought. They are r a t h e r concerned t o 
e s t a b l i s h the parameters w i t h i n which we t h i n k . Such para-
meters are, of course not the kinds o f t h i n g t h a t can be 
e m p i r i c a l l y observed nor, even less so, are hypotheses about 
them open t o e m p i r i c a l f a l s i f i c a t i o n . Marx and Engels t h e r e -
f o r e would not wish t h a t t h e i r theory be te s t e d m t h a t sense. 
They do indeed suggest, as do the E m p i r i c i s t s , t h a t we r e f e r 
t o our experience to v e r i f y t h e i r theory. But they do not 
in t e n d experience m the Popperian sense. When Popper t a l k s 
of experience he means s c i e n t i f i c experiment and observation. 
Marx and Engels, however, have m mind something f a r broader 
when they appeal t o experience. They have i n rnnd our a c t i v e 
productive experience ard what we might c a l l the c o l l e c t i v e 
wisdom t o which i t has given r i s e . Whatever else t h i s mighc 
make t h e i r theory of ideology to be, i t does not make i t an 
e m p i r i c a l theory i n the accepted s c i e n t i f i c sense. 
This i s of course a conclusion t h a t we have been l e d t o 
expect. I have argued t h a t what bri n g s Marx t o compose h i s 
theory of ideology i s h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a l l t r u t h concerns 
our practical a c t i v i t y . He i s convinced of t h i s because he 
considers t h a t the only r e a l o r i e n t a t i o n m experience i s the 
p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e one. Accordingly, h i s prime i n t e r e s t i s 
i n why, how and under what c o n d i t i o n s we a c t ; and, as we have 
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seen., h i s view i s t h a t we act as n a t u r a l but consciously 
productive beings under h i s t o r i c a l l y determined c o n d i t i o n s . 
At the same time, - and t h i s i s what excludes a p o s i t i v i s t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r views - he and Engels are concerned 
t o p o i n t out how we should act. This conclusion i s a b i t 
s u r p r i s i n g , f o r Marx and Engels assure us t h a t t h e i r s i s not 
a m o r a l i s t i c standpoint. I t i s , indeed, t r u e t h a t they are 
not m o r a l i s t s i n the accepted sense, i . e . m o r a l i s t s above 
ev e r y t h i n g else; but i t does not mean t h a t they dispense 
a l t o g e t h e r w i t h the moral view. For what they seek t o do 
i s t o i n t e g r a t e a morally c o r r e c t view of experience w i t h an 
o b j e c t i v e view of i t . They see themselves t h e r e f o r e as 
d e r i v i n g t h e i r moral imperatives from men's a c t u a l s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s . This we saw c l e a r l y i n Marx's C r i t i q u e of the 
Phenomenology. For no sooner does he argue a view of man 
then he i s suggesting t h a t the world be organised m such a 
way as t o accord w i t h t h a t view. I t remains f o r us t o estab-
l i s h t h a t t h a t view s t i l l p r e v a i l s m the German Ideology. 
There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t i t does and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , 
the one consequence of the view of a c t i v i t y t h a t Marx and 
Engels propose m the German Ideology i s i t s e l f a p r e s c r i p t i o n 
f o r a c t i o n . Indeed t h i s i s an aspect of t h e i r view of exper-
ience t h a t Marx and Engels themselves s t r e s s . They p a r t i c u l -
a r l y wish t o s t r e s s i t m the German Ideology m order t o d i s -
t i n g u i s h t h e i r views from those of Ludwng Feuerbach. Feuer-
bach h i m s e l f had suggested at one p o i n t t h a t 'the h i t h e r t o 
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e x i s t i n g development of s p e c u l a t i v e philosophy from the 
a b s t r a c t t o the concrete, from the i d e a l t o the r e a l i s 
muddled' and, t h e r e f o r e , 'the t r a n s i t i o n from the i d e a l t o 
35 
the r e a l has i t s place only m p r a c t i c a l philosophy . He 
had also suggested - and may even have s t i m u l a t e d Marx and 
. Engels t o t h i n k i n the same way - t h a t an adequate account 
of r e a l i t y I s one t h a t i s already p r a c t i c a l . But they claim, 
m the German Ideology, t h a t Feuerbach does no more than put 
forward t h i s suggestion. I t i s not one t h a t i s s u c c e s s f u l l y 
c a r r i e d out m h i s philosophy. We can see t h i s , they suggest 
m the a t t i t u d e t h a t Feuerbach takes t o Communism and S o c i a l -
Ism, ' i t can be seen how much Feuerbach deceives h i m s e l f ' , 
they argue, 'when he declares h i m s e l f , courtesy of the q u a l i f -
i c a t i o n "common man" t o be a Communist. He t h e r e f o r e t r a n s -
forms the word Communist i n t o a predicate "of the" man, the 
wo^d which m the e x i s t i n g world denotes a p a r t i c u l a r r e v o l -
u t i o n a r y party he believes to be able to transform again i n t o 
t 36 
a category. This p a r t i c u l a r weakness i n Feuerbach's reason 
i n g , they suggest, r e s t s on the general weakness t h a t m h i s 
philosophy Feuerbach reduces each and every a c t i v i t y t o the 
thought of i t . By t h i s Marx and Engels mean t h a t a l l Feuer-
bach contemplates when he contemplates the world are our 
thoughts about i t and not its n a t u r a l sensuous impact on our-
35* Ludwig Feuerbach. P r e l i m i n a r y Theses Toward the Reform 
of Philosophy, V o l . 2, SaTnlTche Werke, p. 231. 
36. Marx-Engels Werke 3, p. 4 l . 
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selves. Therefore, i t appears t o Marx and Engels t h a t , 
when Feuerbach i s engaged i n advocating, f o r instance, Commun-
ism he has m mind not t h a t the Communists should make r e a l 
p o l i t i c a l advances but the Communist t h e o r i e s should take a 
hold on E t h i c s . For they argue t h a t Feuerbach shares 
the i l l u s i o n o f the whole Hegelian t r a d i t i o n , namely, t h a t 
a change m our consciousness of the world transforms the 
world. I t i s t h e r e f o r e not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Marx and Engels 
go on t o claim t h a t 'Feuerbach's whole deduction bearing on 
the r e l a t i o n of men t o one another only goes so f a r as t o 
prove t h a t men have need o f each other and always have done. 
He wishes t o e s t a b l i s h a consciousness of t h i s f a c t , wishes 
t h e r e f o r e j u s t l i k e the other t h e o r e t i c i a n s o^ly t o b r i n g 
about a c o r r e c t consciousness concerning an e x i s t i n g f a c t , 
w h i l s t what matters f o r the r e a l communist i s t o overthrow 
the e x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s . For the r e s t , we completely 
acknowledge t h a t Feuerbach m s t r i v i n g t o produce the conscious 
ness of t h i s f a c t goes as f a r as a t h e o r e t i c i a n can p o s s i b l y 
go w i t h o u t ceasing t o be a t h e o r e t i c i a n and philosopher'. 
They f i n d t h a t Feuerbach sets as h i s aim the proper under-
standing of our r e l a t i o n s h i p to one another because he t h i n k s 
t h a t s u f f i c i e n t to b r i n g about a s i t u a t i o n where we do m f a c t 
p r o p e r l y r e l a t e to one another. 
For Marx the drawback of Feuerbach's p o s i t i o n i s t h e r e -
f o r e c l e a r . As w i t h Hegel, Feuerbach wishes men both t o have 
37- I b i d . , p. K2. 
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an awareness of the r e a l i t i e s of man's c o n d i t i o n and yet 
not t o act on t h a t where i t c o n t r a d i c t s a humanist view of 
man. As an example of t h i s 'simultaneous r e c o g n i t i o n and 
f a i l u r e t o appreciate (verkennen) the e x i s t i n g s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s ' , he says m the German Ideology, ' l e t us r e c a l l the 
po i n t i n the 'Philosophy of the Future' where he " e l u c i d a t e s " 
t h a t the being of a t h i n g or man i s at the same time h i s 
essence, t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s of existence, mode 
o f l i f e and a c t i v i t y of an animal or human i n d i v i d u a l i s t h a t 
wherein i t f i n d s i t s "essence" s a t i s f i e d . Here each exception 
i s expressly understood as an unlucky accident, as an abnor-
m a l i t y which i s not t o be changed .^  This represents a lack 
of understanding of the present s t a t e of a f f a i r s f o r Marx and 
Engels because i t i s not an a c t i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y view of t h i n g s . 
The proper way to comprehend man i s not simply p a s s i v e l y , as 
does Feuerbach. We ought, i f we see man's essence as depend-
i n g on the p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s of h i s existence, t o recommend 
t h a t those c o n d i t i o n s of existence r e f l e c t what i s t r u l y human. 
This, Marx and Engels suggest, ought t o be pa r t of our o b j e c t i v e 
understanding of t h i n g s . So we are not, f o r instance, l i k e 
the s h o r t - s i g h t e d person who observes t h a t the whole mass of 
the working class i s discontented w i t h i t s circumstance and 
yet concludes t h a t i t should do not h i n g about those circumstance; 
For Marx and Engels there i s no step at a l l between d e s c r i p t i o n 
and p r e s c r i p t i o n m an o b j e c t i v e understanding of the world. 
To know how, why and under what c o n d i t i o n s we act i s , f o r 
38. I b i d . 
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them, at the same time t o know how we should a c t . 
So here again, m the German Ideology, we f i n d t h a t 
Marx argues t h a t an o b j e c t i v e account of the world i s a 
p r a c t i c a l , r e v o l u t i o n a r y one. For t h i s also i s p a r t of h i s 
measure of an ideology. I d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g , i s t h i n k i n g 
39 
t h a t i s not premissed on p r a c t i c a l , r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y . ^ 
This of course would make vast categories of thought t o be 
i d e o l o g i c a l . Indeed the suggestion i s t h a t a l l t h i n k e r s 
who do not t h i n k l i k e Marx and Engels are i d e o l o g i s t s . Now, 
although t h i s i s an ambitious claim, we would be wrong t o 
condemn i t as mere arrogance on t h e i r p a r t . As I have t r i e d 
t o show, Marx does not a r r i v e at h i s views w i t h o u t having 
f i r s t r e f l e c t e d s e r i o u s l y on t r a d i t i o n a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l pro-
blems. He does so i n the f i r s t instance by c o n f r o n t i n g h i s 
views w i t h those of Hegel and,> subsequently, by c o n f r o n t i n g 
them w i t h those of Feuerbach. And now again m the German 
Ideology he comes back to the views of Feuerbach. He r e t u r n s , 
i n f a c t , t o the p o i n t t h a t he made m the f i r s t 'Thesis on 
Feuerbach'. Namely, t h a t Feuerbach l i k e a l l other m a t e r i a l -
i s t s conceived r e a l i t y only as Anschauung or the o b j e c t of 
i n t u i t i o n . 'Feuerbach's "conception" of the sensuous world', 
he says 'confines 11se 1 f on the one hand t o the mere apprehension 
of the same and, on the other, t o mere f e e l i n g , . . ' ^ At no 
time, t h e r e f o r e , ne suggests does Feuerbach r a i s e h i m s e l f above 
39- 'A second important f e a t u r e of the Marxist theory i s t h a t the 
" i d e o l o g i c a l " t h i n k e r i s held to be not only t h e o r e t i c a l l y , but 
also p r a c t i c a l l y , misleading and misled.' H.B.Acton, o p . c i t . p i 2 
40. Marx-Engels Werke 3, p. 42. 
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the p o s i t i o n of a mere i n t e r p r e t e r of the world. Indeed 
he cannot do so simply because what the world i s f o r him i s 
what impresses i t s e l f on the senses, and t h a t sensuous world 
i s ( f o r Feuerbach) both what i s r e a l and morally d e s i r a b l e . 
But he soon f i n d s , Marx suggests, t h a t t h i s w i l l not do, f o r 
' m the f i r s t place m the apprehension o f the world he necess-
a r i l y comes across t h i n g s which c o n t r a d i c t h i s consciousness 
and h i s f e e l i n g , which d i s t u r b what he assumes to be the har-
mony of a l l p a r t s of the sensuous world and m p a r t i c u l a r of 
man w i t h n a t u r e ' . ^ What he f a i l s t o see i s 'how the sensuous 
world surrounding him i s not an immediate, something given 
from a l l e t e r n i t y , a t h i n g t h a t i s c o n s t a n t l y self-same, but 
the product of i n d u s t r y and the s t a t e of s o c i e t y , and indeed 
i n the sense t h a t i t i s a h i s t o r i c a l product, the r e s u l t of 
the a c t i v i t y of a whole s e r i e s of generations each of which 
h?s stood on the shoulder o f the other, has developed f u r t n e r 
i t s i n d u s t r y and commerce and has modified i t s s o c i a l order 
42 
according t o changed needs'. What i s missing m Feuerbach's 
account of experience, i s a view of the ob j e c t s of our exper-
ience not as i s o l a t e d , self-same o b j e c t s , given somehow from 
a l l e t e r n i t y , but as h i s t o r i c a l products. For, as Marx says, 
'the o b jects of the most simple "sense-certainty" are given 
to him only through s o c i a l development, i n d u s t r y and commercial 
i n t e r c o u r s e . The cherry t r e e , l i k e a l l f r u i t t r e e s was, as 
i s w e l l known, only transplanted t o our zone a few hundred years 
41. I o i d . 
42. I b i d . , p. 43. 
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ago by trade and was t h e r e f o r e f i r s t only by t h i s a c t i o n 
of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y at a c e r t a i n time given t o "the sense-
c e r t a i n t y " of Feuerbach'. J 
I t i s most important t h a t we look at t h i s remark m the 
r i g h t context. This context i s c l e a r l y t h a t of t h i s study 
as a whole. I n t h i s study, I have shown how the n o t i o n of 
epistemology and experience are connected m the t h i n k i n g 
of Marx and Hegel. I n p a r t i c u l a r I have i l l u s t r a t e d how 
they transform a narrow, merely e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l n o t i o n of 
experience i n t o a wider s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l n o t i o n . This 
view t h a t Marx expresses about the o b j e c t s of sense-certainty 
represents the c u l m i n a t i o n of t h a t development. Indeed, i t 
b r i n g s out p r e c i s e l y the change I have traced . We r e c a l l 
from the f i r s t Chapter t h a t the E n g l i s h m a t e r i a l i s t s , Locke 
and Hume, conceived experience, as does Feuerbach, as our 
sense-perception of the world. The o b j e c t s of experience 
were f o r them what Marx and Hegel ca31 'immediate' and what 
Marx c a l l s 'given from a l l e t e r n i t y ' . But f o r Marx i t makes 
no sense t o t a l k about objects or experience m t h i s way. 
Objects, he argues, are never'constantly self-same t h i n g s ' 
but always the products of the e x i s t i n g s t a t e of s o c i e t y and 
i n d u s t r y . So 'the c a n d l e - s t i c k here, the s n u f f box t h e r e ' , 
as Hegel puts i t , of the experience of the c l a s s i c a l epistem-
o l o g i s t s are h a r d l y p r t of a somehow p r i s t i n e sense-experience 
l\~i>. I b i d . 
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of the world. They are, as Marx would p o i n t out, only to 
be found m the more commercially advanced s o c i e t i e s . Thus 
even t h a t r e f l e c t i v e view of experience was only made possible 
by a reasonable l e v e l o f advancement m i n d u s t r y and comfort. 
I t makes sense f o r Marx to t a l k of the ob j e c t s of our exper-
ience m t h i s way because i t i s of course h i s view t h a t they 
immediately confront us as objects of our needs, and t h a t we 
are from the beginning p r a c t i c a l l y a c t i v e m r e l a t i o n t o them. 
Experience i s always a p r a c t i c a l experience. And since ob-
j e c t s are not given to as i n a manner compatible w i t h our 
needs we have always t o transform them i n t o our products 
through our labour. I t i s these of course t h a t the contem-
p l a t i v e view of experience i n t u i t s : the products of human 
44 
i n d u s t r y . Experience f o r Marx though begins p r i o r to t h a t . 
I t i s , as I have said, the experience of need whose s a t i s f a c -
t i o n , and what i s r e q u i r e d f o r i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n , depend on 
the l e v e l of advancement of s o c i e t y . Our experience i s t h e r e -
f o r e always a n a t u r a l , s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l experience. 
For as soon as we open our eyes to the world (both m the n a t u r a l 
and i n t e l l e c t u a l sense) we open our eyes to a n a t u r a l , l i m i t i n g , 
s o c i a l l y created and t h e r e f o r e h i s t o r i c a l l y l i m i t e d world. 
This i s what c o n s t i t u t e s experience f o r Marx. 
44. Marx i s making a s i m i l a r p o i n t when he says i n C a p i t a l t h a t 
' R e f l e c t i o n (Nachdenken) about the forms of human l i f e , also 
t h e r e f o r e i t s s c i e n t i f i c a n alysis,takes i n general an opposite 
path t o t h a t of the r e a l development. I t begins post festmus and 
t h e r e f o r e w i t h the f i n i s h e d r e s u l t s of the process of development 
The forms which stamp the product of labour as commodities and 
t h e r e f o r e are presupposed by commodity c i r c u l a t i o n already poss-
ess the f i x i t y of n a t u r a l forms of s o c i a l l i f e before men seel; t o 
give an account of themselves, not of the h i s t o r i c a l character of 
these forms, which already count as immutable f o r them, but of 
t h e i r content (G e h a l t ) . MEW, V o l , 25,pp. 89 - 90. 
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And, as I have suggested, he i s keenly aware of how t h i s 
view c o n t r a s t s w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l i s t s view of exp-
erience. And he misses no o p p r t u n i t y , t o d r i v e home h i s p o i n t . 
'So much i s t h i s a c t i v i t y , t h i s continuous sensuous work and 
c r e a t i o n , t h i s production the basis f o r the whole sensuous 
world as i t now e x i s t s t h a t even i f i t were only i n t e r r u p t e d 
f o r a year Feuerbach would not only f i n d a huge a l t e r a t i o n 
m the n a t u r a l world but also i n the whole human world and 
he would very soon miss h i s own means of apprehension (Ansch-
auungsverm8gen), indeed h i s own e x i s t e n c e ' . ^ I t makes l i t t l e 
sense f o r him t o take a ti m e l e s s , passive view of experience 
because what makes our a b i l i t y t o i n t u i t objects at a l l poss-
i b l e , i s i t s e l f dependent on the continuous labour and production 
of mankind. We can only i n t u i t because we are p r a c t i c a l l y 
a c t i v e m s u s t a i n i n g our l i f e . This t h e r e f o r e , Marx suggests, 
must be the way t o comprehend our experience, not az, our i n d i v -
i d u a l p r a c t i c a l l i f e but the 'sensuous world as fhe combined 
l i v i n g sensuous a c t i v i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t make i t u p ' . ^ 
45. Marx-Engels Werke 3, p. 44. 
46. I b i d . , p. 45. 
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IDEOLOGY AMD SOCIALIST REVOLUTION 
Id e o l o g i e s , then, are systems of mistaken ideas concer-
n i n g our a c t i v i t y . And Feuerbach's philosophy i s one such 
system o f ideas. Vie have seen t h a t Marx a t t r i b u t e s t h e i r 
development and hold to the d i v i s i o n of labour w i t h i n s o c i e t y . 
As a system of production t h a t has developed behind the backs 
of the producers and t h e r e f o r e c o n t r o l s the l i v e s of the 
producers instead of being c o n t r o l l e d by them, i t i n e v i t a b l y 
gives r i s e t o misconceptions m the minds of producers about 
the nature of t h e i r a c t i v i t y and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o one another. 
Ideas, Marx and Engels argue, have t h e i r o r i g i n in our exper-
ience. But t h i s , they argue, i s not an ab s t r a c t experience, 
the experience t h a t philosophers have invoked. I t i s our 
experience as consciously productive s o c i a l beings. We form 
our ideas t h e r e f o r e , they argue, m accordance w i t h the manner 
i n which we reproduce our l i v e s . A l l t h a t Marx's theory of 
ideology says, t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t where t h a t system of reprod 
u c t i o n i s confused or disorganised our conceptions w i l l be 
s i m i l a r l y confused or disorganised. 
We can now see how Marx's sometimes confusing ideas about 
class and ideology enter i n t o h i s account of experience and, 
m p a r t i c u l a r , h i s and Engels' strange sounding claim t h a t 
t h e i r ideas, indeed the whole of Marxian system, i s but the 
t h e o r e t i c a l expression of the r e a l l i f e p o s i t i o n of the 
working class. For i t i s Marx's c o n v i c t i o n t h a t man - and 
t h i s includes man qua philosopher or t h e o r i s t - as not a being 
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s q u a t t i n g outside s o c i e t y , we know not where. He i s the 
sum of h i s s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . I t f o l l o w s t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
there can be no ideas which have no r e a l basis m s o c i e t y . 
They must be the expression of some p r a c t i c a l m a t e r i a l claim 
or other. And where those ideas concern s o c i e t y as a whole 
they must be the expression of the p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of 
one or other group. E v i d e n t l y then Marx and Engels, i f 
they are not t o condemn themselves as a b s t r a c t t h i n k e r s , 
have t o include t h e i r ideas under t h i s head as w e l l . 
I h a r d l y need to say at t h i s p o i n t t h a t i t i s an axiom 
f o r Marx and Engels t h a t 'the h i s t o r y of a l l h i t h e r t o e x i s t i n g 
,47 
s o c i e t y i s the h i s t o r y of class s t r u g g l e s . So t h a t when 
they come t o t a l k of the s o c i a l groups whose i n t e r e s t s are 
r e f l e c t e d m systems of thought they do so m terms of class. 
The class r e l a t i o n s h i p i t s e l f , they argue, i s very c l e a r l y 
derived from the nature of the property r e l a t i o n s m any given 
epoch. We have masters and slaves, they claim, where the 
masters own both the means of production and the labourer; 
l o r d s and s e r f s where the l o r d s own both the means of produc-
t i o n and the s e r f ' s labour time; and c a p i t a l i s t s and wage-
workers where the c a p i t a l i s t class owns the means of production 
but buys the labour-power of the worker. I t i s s e l f - e v i d e n t 
from such an a n a l y s i s , they argue, t h a t the dominant class at 
any one time i s the dominant power m production. Now, as 
Marx and Engels f i r m l y b e l i e v e t h a t ideas have t h e i r o r i g i n 
47. Communist Manifesto, MEW, VoJ 4, p. 462. 
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i n such r e a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , i t i s p e r f e c t l y c l e a r to 
them t h a t m a t e r i a l dominance m any epoch must be r e f l e c t e d 
m i n t e l l e c t u a l dominance, hence, t h a t 'the ideas of the 
r u l i n g class are m each epoch the r u l i n g ideas'. This they 
argue must be so because 'the class which has the means of 
m a t e r i a l production at i t s d i s p osal w i t h t h a t disposes at the 
same time over the means of i n t e l l e c t u a l production. Thereby 
the ideas of those who do not have the means of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
production are on average subordinate t o i t ' . Furthermore, 
they say, 'those r u l i n g ideas are n o t h i n g more than the i d e a l 
expression of the r u l i n g m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s , the r u l i n g mater-
i a l r e l a t i o n s conceived as ideas; t h e r e f o r e j u s t the r e l a t i o n s 
which make one class i n t o the r u l i n g class are the ideas of 
48 
t h e i r dominance'. Contrary t o general o p i n i o n , then, Marx 
and Engels do not see the r u l i n g class m one epoch as conspir-
i n g t o delude e i t h e r themselves or t h e i r subordinate classes. 
I t i s simply, they argue, t h a t people t h i n k as they l i v e . 
And i f a person i s a member of a r u l i n g class he t h i n k s as 
one such memeber. So i t i s only n a t u r a l t h a t he should en-
courage the spread of the ideas of h i s class and attempt t o 
ensure t h a t they p r e v a i l m soc i e t y at l a r g e . For i t i s 
no more than a consequence of ins desire t o perpetuate h i s being. 
Marx and Engels f u r t h e r suggest t h a t w i t h the development of 
so c i e t y and the subsequent increase m the d i v i s i o n of labour 
48. MEW Z, p. 46. 
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the r u l i n g class may spawn a s p e c i a l class of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
producers t o carry out t h a t task f o r them. These people 
they do not h e s i t a t e t o c a l l i d e o l o g i s t s . And when Marx 
uses the term m i t s most p e r f o r a t i v e form he has i n mind 
those i n d i v i d u a l s who 'make i t the c h i e f branch of t h e i r 
l i v e l i h o o d the development of the i l l u s i o n s of t h i s class 
, 4q 
about i t s e l f . ^ 
I f t h i s i s so, there i s one f i n a l question t h a t Marx's 
theory of experience r a i s e s : Who then can p o s s i b l y not be 
an i d e o l o g i s t ? Or, what i s simply the same question m a 
sharper form, are not Marx and Engels, by t h e i r own admission, 
themselves i d e o l o g i s t s ? I t i s orthodox nowadays to t h i n k 
so. For, i t appear?, a system of ideas expressing the prac-
t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of the working-class can be nothing but t h a t . 
This, however, i s not an o p i n i o n t h a t Marx would share. The 
preoccupation w i t h t r u t h and o b j e c t i v i t y i s one t h a t i s sus-
t a i n e d r i g h t through h i s system. His theory of ideology i s 
not, t h e r e f o r e , one t h a t i s intended t o s u s t a i n ideology but 
t o b r i n g i t t o an end. What i s odd about t h i s however, i s 
h i s b e l i e f t h a t the manner m which t h i s i s t o b e achieved 
i s through the p r a c t i c a l , m a t e r i a l ambitions of the working-
class being f u l f i l l e d . Somehow Marx comes to the conclusion, 
then, t h a t t r u t h and o b j e c t i v i t y can coincide w i t h the aims 
of the working-class s o c i a l i s t movement. How does t h i s come 
about? We already know t h a t Marx's view of t r u t h or o b j e c t i v i t 
i s one t h a t i s p r a c t i c a l . T ruth, t h e r e f o r e , i s what coincides 
49. I b i d , 
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w i t h men's needs, What remains to be seen though i s how 
these needs are reduced t o the needs of the working-class. 
The reason i s t h a t the working-class i s , Marx argues, 
the only class t h a t i s m a p o s i t i o n , and ever has been m 
the p o s i t i o n , t o c o n t r o l man's productive r e l a t i o n s and the r e -
f o r e t o put an end the domination of the producers by the 
productive process i t s e l f . This w i l l at the same time 
b r i n g to an end i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g , he be l i e v e s , because 
those confused s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s which give r i s e t o i t w i l l 
have ceased t o e x i s t . This l a r g e claim again a r i s e s from 
Marx's c o n v i c t i o n t h a t what, at base, i s responsible f o r 
i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g i s the d i v i s i o n of labour and the class 
r e l a t i o n s t h a t have grown up alongside i t . I d e o l o g i c a l 
t h i n k i n g i s t h e r e f o r e m his mind inseparable from present 
c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , because the d i v i s i o n of labour comes i n t o 
i t s own w i t h commodity production , where production i s 
d e c i s i v e l y separated from consumption. That development heighten 
the c o n t r o l exercised by the productive process over the producer 
and e n t a i l s , Marx argues, t h a t the r e l a t i o n s of production 
s t i l l appear i n a n a t u r a l form t o the producers themselves. 
Under c a p i t a l i s t p r oduction, t h e r e f o r e , as under a l l other 
previous modes of production the r e l a t i o n s of production appear 
t o the producers not as ones they themselves create and perpet-
uate but ones t h a t have been created f o r them and t h a t perpet-
uate themselves. However Communism, which i s the mode of 
production t h a t most corresponds to the needs of the working-
c l a s s , ' d i f f e r s from a l l previous movements m t h a t i t r e v o l -
u t i o n i s e s the basis of a l l previous production and commercial 
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r e l a t i o n s and d e a l s w i t h a l l n a t u r a l l y developed premisses 
c o n s c i o u s l y as t h e c r e a t i o n s o f p r e v i o u s men, th u s s t r i p s 
o f f t h e i r n a t u r a l n e s s and s u b o r d i n a t e s i t t o t h e power o f 
u n i t e d i n d i v i d u a l s ' . By d e a l i n g w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g 
p r o d u c t i v e r e l a t i o n s c o n s c i o u s l y and a t the same t i m e e n d i n g 
c l a s s d i v i s i o n t h e Communist movement w i l l b r i n g t o an end 
i d e o l o g y . For, Marx c l a i m s m C a p i t a l , 'the s t r u c t u r e o f 
t h e s o c i a l l i f e process i . e . t h e m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n o n l y 
s t r i p s o f f i t s m i s t y v e i l when i t s tands as a p r o d u c t o f f r e e 
51 
s o c i a l i s e d men under t h e i r c o n s c i o u s planned c o n t r o l ' . 
Up u n t i l t h a t p o i n t , Marx su g g e s t s , t h e l i f e - p r o c e s s o f s o c i e t y 
w i l l appear m a d i s t o r t e d way t o t h e prod u c e r s themselves. 
They w i l l b o t h be, and be s u b j e c t t o , i d e o l o g i c a l t h i n k e r s . 
S o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n t h e r e f o r e p l a y s a r o l e t h a t p h i l o s -
ophy c o u l d n o t , t o Marx's s a t i s f a c t i o n , p l a y . I t can, m 
h i s view, prove t h e o b j e c t i v i t y of h i s view o f e x p e r i e n c e . 
I t can b o t h d i s p e l t h e 'clouds o f e r r o r ' from our t h i n k i n g 
and g i v e us one c o n c l u s i v e answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t r u t h . 
I t w i l l t h e r e f o r e be t h e end o f p h i l o s o p h y because i t f u l f i l s 
t h e end o f p h i l o s o p h y . 
50. I b i d . , p. 70. 
51. MEW, V o l 23, P- 9^ . 
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THE END OF PHILOSOPHY? 
I t i s g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n , as 
Marx envisaged i t , has n o t o c c u r r e d . I t seems t h e n , t h a t 
Marx's views on p h i l o s o p h y have n o t been f i n a l l y put t o t h e 
t e s t , and indeed t h a t Adorno ' s s u g g e s t i o n m N e g a t i v e D i a l -
e k t i k : 'Philosophy which a t one t i m e seemed o b s o l e t e , remains 
a l i v e because t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r i t s r e a l i s a t i o n was missed 
may be e n t i r e l y i n o r d e r . P h i l o s o p h y , i f we were t o f o l l o w 
Adorno's s u g g e s t i o n , has a c o n t i n u e d r e l e v a n c e because we have 
passed over t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e a l i s e Marx's aims. I t i s 
my view, however, t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e need t o adopt such an 
e x p e d i e n t t o sanction p r e s e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n , f o r 
at no t i m e do Marx's arguments t h r e a t e n p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f . 
What Marx's views t h r e a t e n i s n o t p h i l o s o p h y as such, b u t one 
p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f i t , namely, t h a t o f Hegel. 
T h i s we can see when we l o o k a t Marx's major o b j e c t i o n 
t o p h i l o s o p h y . As we have seen, h i s major o b j e c t i o n t o p h i l -
osophy i s t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t s a b s t r a c t t h i n k i n g . By t h i s Marx 
means t h i n k i n g which, l i k e t h a t found m the H e g e l i a n Phenomen-
o l o g y , ends up w i t h o u t an o b j e c t . I n o t h e r words, i t i s t o 
Hegel's p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a l i s m t h a t Marx o b j e c t s . The grounds 
f o r t h i s c o n f l i c t o f views come out i n an a n a l y s i s o f t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e n o t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e . E x p e r i e n c e Hegel d e s c r i b e s 
as t h a t process m which Mind ( o r S p i r i t ) f i r s t e x t e r n a l i s e s 
1. Adorno. N e g a t i v e D i a l e k t i k , Suhrkamp V e r l a g , F r a n k f u r t , 
1970, P. ±y~. 
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i t s e l f t o e s t a b l i s h t h e sensuous w o r l d b u t , s u b s e q u e n t l y , 
r e - e s t a b l i s h e s i t s e l f i n i t s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y by knowing 
the sensuous w o r l d as the o t h e r o f i t s e l f . So, m h i s 
view, e x p e r i e n c e i s t h i s process o f t h e e x t e r n a l i s a t i o n o r 
o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n o f Mind and t h e r e t r a c t i o n o f t h a t a l i e n a t i o n . 
I t i s t h i s n o t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h , i n Hegel's o p i n i o n , 
j u s t i f i e s t h e view t h a t Mind i s a b s o l u t e and t h e essence o f 
a l l f i n i t e t h i n g s . Marx, however, f i n d s l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r t h i s view o f e x p e r i e n c e . Indeed he argues, as we have 
seen, t h a t i t i s n o t a view t h a t stands up t o i n t e r n a l examin-
a t i o n . For a f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e n o t i o n o f o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n 
shows, Marx b e l i e v e s , t h a t our o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i s n o t something 
which we can r e t r a c t . We cannot, he argues, e x p e r i e n c e 
o b j e c t s w i t h o u t our becoming t h e i r o b j e c t , i n o t h e r words, 
w i t h o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t i n g m such a way t h a t i t does 
no t depend e n t i r e l y on our consciousness o f i t . But once 
we acknowledge t h i s we tnave t o propose a d i f f e r e n t view o f 
e x p e r i e n c e ; and i t i s , o f course, m p r o p o s i n g such a new 
view o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t Marx t h i n k s he i s s u p e r c e d i n g p h i l o s o p h y . 
I t i s t h i s t h a t e x p l a i n s t h e seemingly p a r a d o x i c a l t i t l e 
o f Marx's f i r s t m a jor p u b l i s h e d work: The P o v e r t y o f P h i l o s o p h y . 
For i t must be g r a n t e d t h a t on f i r s t s i g h t t h e book seems 
b a d l y e n t i t l e d . Because, on g l a n c i n g t h r o u g h i t , we d i s c o v e r 
no g e n e r a l d i s c o u r s e on t h e v a r i o u s branches o f p h i l o s o p h y , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , l o g i c , e t h i c s and e p i s t e m o l o g y - a l l o f w h i c h 
we might expect m a book supposedly about t h e ' p o v e r t y o f 
p h i l o s o p h y ' - but r a t h e r a c r i t i c a l account o f the work o f 
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a p o p u l a r French economist. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Marx i n t e n d s 
t h e work t o be a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o p h i l o s o p h y because m 
i t he a t t a c k s t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l method whic h he t a k e s Proudhon 
t o have d e r i v e d from Hegel. T h i s method o f Proudhon's, 
because I t i s Hegel's method, i s f o r Marx t h e method o f 
p h i l o s o p h y . So m c r i t i c i s i n g i t he b e l i e v e s h i m s e l f t o be 
c r i t i c i s i n g p h i l o s o p h y and, indeed, i n b r i n g i n g i t down 
b e l i e v e s h i m s e l f t o have b r o u g h t down p h i l o s o p h y . The 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l method, m Marx's view, reduces every o b j e c t 
t o t h e t h o u g h t o f i t , and, he says, 'are we t o be s u r p r i s e d 
t h a t i n the f i n a l a b s t r a c t i o n - f o r we are concerned w i t h 
a b s t r a c t i o n and n o t a n a l y s i s - each t h i n g p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as 
a l o g i c a l c a t e g o r y ? Are we t o be s u r p r i s e d that i f we l e t 
d r o p b i t by b i t a l l t h a t makes up t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f a 
house, d i s r e g a r d i n g f i r s t o f a l l t h e b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s o f 
w h i c h i t c o n s i s t s , t h e n t h e f o r m which marks i t out we f i n a l l y 
have o n l y a body m f r o n t o f us; and t h a t when we disregard 
t h e o u t l i n e s o f t h i s body we have f i n a l l y a space a l o n e ; and 
t h a t when we u l t i m a t e l y a b s t r a c t from t h e dimensions o f t h i s 
space t h a t m the end we have no more l e f t , o t h e r t h a n q u a n t i t y 
m i t s e l f , t h e l o g i c a l c a t e g o r y o f q u a n t i t y * ^ So 'by d i n t o f 
a b s t r a c t i o n ' we can w i t h t h e H e g e l i a n a b s o l u t e method t r a n s f o r m 
' e v e r y t h i n g j n t o a l o g i c a l c a t e g o r y ' . 
2. I t i s indeed t r u e t h a t t h e work t o w h i c h Marx addresses 
h i m s e l f m p a r t i c u l a r was c a l l e d t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f P o v e r t y 
and t h a t Marx has n o t missed t h e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a p l a y 
on words. 
3« Marx. Marx-Engels Werke 4, p. 127-
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There can be no doubt t h a t t h i s , f o r Marx, r e p r e s e n t s 
t h e ' p o v e r t y o f p h i l o s o p h y ' . H egel, he argues, t h i n k s 'he 
I s c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e w o r l d by means o f t h e movement o f t h o u g h t 
whereas', m f a c t , 'he i s o n l y r e c o n s t r u c t i n g s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
and c l a s s i f y i n g e c c o i d i n g t o t h e a b s o l u t e method t h e t h o u g h t s 
w h i c h are m t h e minds o f a l l ' . 2 * P h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g , 
t h e r e f o r e , has t h e b a s i c d e f e c t o f r e g a r d i n g t h o u g h t as t h e 
essence o f r e a l i t y . The p h i l o s o p h e r indeed comprehends t h e 
w o r l d m a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d manner t h a n t h e o r d i n a r y man 
b u t a t t h e same ti m e m i s t a k e n l y believes t h a t t h i s u n d e r s t a n d -
i n g exhausts e x p e r i e n c e . We are by now c l e a r t h a t t h i s view 
o f Marx i s one t h a t f i t s m w e l l w i t h Hegel's i d e a l i s m . I 
need h a r d l y p o i n t o u t , however, t h a t p h i l o s o p h y i s n o t t i e d 
t o any p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h y n o r indeed any p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e s i s . 
So p h i l o s o p h i c a l p u r s u i t s such as l o g i c and e t h i c s w i l l remain 
u n a f f e c t e d by any c r i t i c i s m t h a t Marx has t o o f f e r o f one 
p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h y . Marx, however, so wrapped up was he 
i n H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y , f a i l e d t o see t h i s . F o r him, t o 
r e j e c t H e g e l i a n i s m was t o r e j e c t p h i l o s o p h y . 
However we would be wrong t o condemn hirn f o r t h i s . As 
Hegel a p t l y p o i n t e d o u t , each person i s a c h i l d o f h i s t i m e . 
P h i l o s o p h y a t the t i m e Marx was r e a c h i n g h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l 
m a t u r i t y was dominated by H e g e l i a n i s m . We s h o u l d n o t be 
s u r p r i s e d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t Marx b e l i e v e d h i m s e l f t o have r e j e c t e d 
p h i l o s o p h y m r e j e c t i n g Hegel's account o f e x p e r i e n c e . We, 
however, w i t h the b e n e f i t o f h i n d s i g h t , can see t h a t he was 
n o t r e j e c t i n g p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f . As I have s a i d , he i s s i m p l y 
r e j e c t i n g one view o f p h i l o s o p h y . 
4. I b i d . p. 130. 
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Marx can, however, be c r i t i c i s e d on one s c o r e , namely, 
t h a t as a consequence o f h i s b e l i e f t h a t he was g o i n g beyond 
p h i l o s o p h y he l e f t untouched many o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t prob-
lems t h a t are r a i s e d by h i s view o f e x p e r i e n c e . I n o t h e r 
words because he t o o k t h e view t h a t p h i l o s o p h y d e a l s o n l y 
w i t h s c h o l a s t i c q u e s t i o n s , he n e g l e c t e d what we can now see 
t o be s e r i o u s p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems a t t e n d a n t on h i s v i e w s . 
He wishes, f o r i n s t a n c e , t o argue a p r a c t i c a l t h e o r y o f 
knowledge which c l e a r l y has p r o f o u n d i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e 
n o t i o n o f t r u t h . But q u e s t i o n s o f t r u t h a r e , o f course, 
i n h e r e n t l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l . Marx, however, has no d e s i r e t o 
f o l l o w o u t these i m p l i c a t i o n s because he sees h i m s e l f as 
s u p e r c e d i n g p h i l o s o p h y . Consequently he i g n o r e s what, 
t o us, are p r e s s i n g problems m h i s view o f e x p e r i e n c e . So 
Marx, f a r from b r i n g i n g an end t o p h i l o s o p h y , r a i s e s new and 
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